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I. Methodological Remarks & Clarifications
What is a right? As simple as it may seem at first glance, that is the underlying 
and overarching question of this thesis. Undoubtedly, we are all familiar from 
everyday life with the notion of rights. We suppose that we, as human beings, 
generally have rights, we use them as arguments in normative discourse, we 
claim them, we argue (sometimes fiercely) about who or what has or ought to 
have which rights. In short, the language of rights is “pervasive […] in politics, 
law and morality”1. Accordingly, knowing that there are rights as an essential 
part of our normative practice, at first glance, at least from the point of view of 
someone inexperienced in legal and moral philosophy, it should not be too hard 
to clarify what rights actually are then. Yet, it is this seemingly straightforward 
issue upon which philosophers and jurists have failed to reach even a basic 
agreement literally for ages. Why is that so? Taking a closer look, it is not just 
the nature of rights, but the nature of the initial question itself that appears prob-
lematic. Essentially, we must ask ourselves: does it suffice to confine oneself to 
the question ‘what is a right?’ in that form? Are we looking into the nature, the 
essence of rights then? How can we determine the nature of a normative term 
like ‘rights’ anyway? In short, is the epistemological interest specified enough 
by the initial question to possibly get a clear and meaningful result? Unsur-
prisingly, to ask this last question is to negate it. The reason for negating it lies 
not only in the vast amount of literature on the topic itself, sometimes seeming 
like an impenetrable and dense jungle to any new arrival, but also the fact that 
in this jungle all sorts of ideas on rights from all sorts of perspectives, scientif-
ic disciplines and cultural backgrounds have been lumped in with one another 
and grown together to make it appear to the interested reader as impermeable as 
well as opaque.2 Thus, starting any treatise on rights – arguably, with this topic 
even more so than in general – it seems absolutely vital to point out very clearly 
the exact epistemological interest, the aim and method of an endeavour like the 
one ventured here. To the sophisticated reader with a philosophical background, 
some of the following remarks might thereby seem self-evident and as such 
superfluous; yet, hopefully, it can and will be demonstrated that it is flaws and 
1 Tom Campbell, Rights: A Critical Introduction (London/New York: Routledge, 2006), 3.
2 Karl Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush (New York: Oceana Publications, 1930), 30: “Rights 
is a term that drips confusion”. Cf. Markus Stepanians, introduction to Individuelle Rechte 
(Paderborn: Mentis, 2007), vii.
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inaccuracies in the involvement with these fundamental questions that make 
quite a lot of current and traditional literature on rights defective. In this respect, 
to point out the importance of methodological clarity at the beginning of any 
treatise on rights seems more than just appropriate but actually a vital necessity.
To begin with, the ultimate aim of this thesis will be to formulate a sugges-
tion for a concept of rights which captures the essence of the term and, most 
importantly, can serve as a common basis for substantive normative debate and 
theory design due to being normatively neutral. We shall look into the mean-
ing of ‘normative neutrality’ presently. Beforehand, it is important to note that 
a central aim of this thesis is to thoroughly explore and describe the path which 
leads to the determination of such a concept. In other words, the goal is not only 
or primarily to produce an independent concept of rights, but also and espe-
cially, to clear the way a bit for future discussions about rights. Hence, this book 
is supposed to be just as much a work about rights as it is one about the theory 
of rights. Or, once more figuratively speaking: the main aim is to cut a small 
swathe through the jungle of rights theory and rights talk. By doing so, this book 
will at best not only shed a little light on a few of the darker spots in there, but 
also, by letting some fresh air into some of the denser parts of the forest, let out 
some heat from a few longstanding debates in the context of rights. Specifically, 
our interest will be on the debate about the proper concept of rights, focusing 
on the two major theory families: Interest (or Benefit) Theory and Choice (or 
Will) Theory.
One more remark before proceeding: The cutting of a swathe straight through 
a wide range of areas of moral and legal philosophy has the advantage of con-
necting knowledge that is too often left unconnected, thus enabling us to gain a 
better theoretical overview. Naturally, it is accompanied by great disadvantages 
as well, which can only be named and have to be accepted as such. Because 
the goal is theoretical clarification, synthesis, and exegesis, a number of highly 
problematic theoretical issues will have to be dealt with throughout this work, 
and a few self-developed ideas will have to be sketched, most of which cannot 
be explained to a full or (even vaguely) satisfying extent in a thesis like this. In 
most parts, highly controversial theoretical issues will be dealt with rather cur-
sorily or even only be touched on en passant. Naturally, this might give rise to 
accusations of superficiality, which are equally naturally hard to rebut. Thus, to 
a certain degree, I will have to rely on the indulgence of the reader, and espe-
cially of all those scholars whose works, though related to the overall topic of 
rights, I could not incorporate into this thesis.3 A famous quote ascribed to Ger-
3 In this respect, I share a general aim, if not necessarily the quality of his work, with the 
great legal theorist Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart, who in the preface to his seminal book ‘The 
Concept of Law’ noted that one of his goals was to “discourage the belief that a book on legal 
theory is primarily a book from which one learns what other books contain. So long as this 
belief is held by those who write, little progress will be made in the subject; and so long as it 
 1. Approaching Rights 3
trude Stein is: “I like a thing simple but it must be simple through complication. 
Everything must come into your scheme, otherwise you cannot achieve real 
simplicity”4. This somehow dialectical relation between simplicity and com-
plication appears inevitable for our purposes as well. And albeit the aim of this 
thesis is to simplify the idea of rights, a mere sense of reality forces us not even 
to try to explain every problem associated with rights. Even though I am fully 
aware that this might in parts result in a lack of comprehensiveness, we shall 
nevertheless try to lunge out as far as possible in terms of investigating theoreti-
cal problems/disputes linked with the notion of rights and consequently connect 
the dots. Such a kind of endeavour, despite its obvious weaknesses, is believed 
to be able to play a valuable part in this – as in any – debate in legal theory.
1. Approaching Rights
Thus, what exactly is our epistemological interest with regard to ‘rights’? And 
how can we distinguish it from other possible approaches? G. E. Moore put it in 
a nutshell when he wrote that generally “in Ethics, as in all other philosophical 
studies, the difficulties and disagreements […] are mainly due to a very simple 
cause: namely to the attempt to answer questions, without first discovering pre-
cisely what question it is which you desire to answer.”5 If as much is true, we 
should clarify at first what exactly the question is that we are trying to answer.
a) Conceptual versus Justificatory
Thus, let us dwell on the possible concrete aims of a theory concerning rights. In 
discussing rights, it is widely acknowledged – and often too uncritically adopt-
ed, for that matter – that one can and should distinguish between two kinds of 
approaches: an analytical, conceptual, or meta-ethical one in search for an an-
swer to the question ‘what are rights?’; and a justificatory, normative one aim-
ing at a satisfactory answer to the question ‘what rights should there be?’,6 i. e. 
how a normative system containing rights should be substantively shaped.
is held by those who read, the educational value of the subject must remain very small.” See 
H. L. A. Hart, preface to The Concept of Law, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012 
[1961]), vii.
4 As quoted by Robert Haas, afterword to What Are Masterpieces, by Gertrude Stein (New 
York/London: Pitman Publishing, 1970).
5 George E. Moore, preface to Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
repr. 1968 [1903]), vii.
6 See inter alia: William Edmundson, An Introduction to Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 119; Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, repr. 2002 [1975]), 10; Richard Brandt. “The Concept of a Moral Right and its 
Function,” The Journal of Philosophy 80 (January 1983): 29; George Rainbolt, The Concept 
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As indicated above, ours is supposed to be a conceptual inquiry7, i. e. in 
general we are looking for some kind of definition or explanation of the term 
‘right’. More precisely, we are planning to find and acquire an adequate under-
standing of the term ‘right’ – as in statements like ‘A has a right to do X’, ‘A 
has a right towards B that B not do Y’ or similar ones – which ought to make 
the term compatible with or viable for any conceivable and coherent substantive 
normative theory. The general goal of a conceptual inquiry thus understood is 
as basal as it is vital for any theoretical discourse. It is nothing but terminologi-
cal clarity, i. e. a clear and commonly agreeable understanding of a central term 
used in a certain field of interest. The idea is to find and define the term in ques-
tion in a way so that everyone participating in a substantial discourse can a prio-
ri agree on its basic meaning. Yet, is this the same kind of endeavour that other 
scholars undertook, who examined the concept, the meaning or the nature of the 
term ‘rights’? Quite clearly not, as there are various ways to approach ‘rights’ 
as a social phenomenon. To begin with, one could approach the term from an 
empirical, descriptive8 perspective, analysing only the actual usage of the term. 
Furthermore, one could be interested in the historical dimension, the tradition 
and genesis of the term, examining the origins of usage and the way the term 
developed over time. Finally, one could choose a more philosophical approach 
and try to acquire the best possible understanding of the term ‘rights’ in a given 
social context, i. e. a certain linguistic practice of a certain group of speakers, 
with the main goal of producing a consistent definition. Are the respective prod-
ucts of these approaches all different kinds of ‘concepts’? Accordingly, what 
exactly is meant by ‘conceptual’ and what is meant by ‘justificatory’? How-
ever clearly the distinction between conceptual and justificatory approaches is 
sometimes stated, it is at least as common in theoretical discourse to assume a 
blurring of lines between the above-mentioned two levels. For instance, both 
Choice Theory and Interest Theory are regularly believed to function on both 
levels alike.9 Thus, it appears advisable to examine the exact relation between 
of Rights (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), 14; Neil MacCormick, “Rights, Claims and Remedies,” 
Law and Philosophy 1 (August 1982): 356; Jules Coleman, Markets, Morals and Law (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1988): 33–34; Leif Wenar, “Rights,” in Stanford Encyclopae-
dia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Stanford University, 1997–), https://plato.stanford.
edu/archives/fall2015/entries/rights/. Critical: Andrew Halpin, Rights and Law (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 1997): 19–23.
7 The term ‘conceptual analysis’ is consciously avoided here, because our aim shall not be 
a mere analysis of the term ‘rights’, i. e. a decomposition of the factual usage of the term. This 
thought will be clarified presently. See also below sec. I, fn. 19.
8 Descriptive in the sense of ‘referring to facts’, not in the sense of ‘normatively neutral’, 
see presently sec. b), aa).
9 Edmundson, Rights, 119 ff. Cf. also Matthew Kramer, “Rights without Trimmings,” in 
A Debate over Rights, ed. Matthew Kramer, Nigel Simmonds, and Hillel Steiner (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1998), 91 (hereafter cited as RWT). Here Kramer claims that every concept of 
rights at least has some ‘thin evaluative stance’ to it.
 1. Approaching Rights 5
these two levels – the conceptual and the justificatory – and the two respective 
epistemological questions as a first step.
aa) Definitions: Some Introductory Remarks
Preliminarily, a few brief, and I suppose for philosophers of language unnerv-
ingly shallow remarks about definitions or specification of linguistic terms in 
general appear necessary. Some introductory thoughts, again based on classical 
remarks by G. E. Moore, shall lead the way. In his seminal work ‘Principia Ethi-
ca’ he described three different ways of defining a term:10 the arbitrary verbal 
definition, the verbal definition proper and a third one, which he gives no spe-
cific name. The arbitrary verbal definition is purely stipulative, not (necessarily) 
taking into account the actual usage of a term. An example is, ‘I define a table 
as a piece of furniture with a flat top and three legs’. Given the relativity of lan-
guage, such a definition is possible, of course, but in effect it is more or less 
senseless. It can be regarded as common sense that language is alive, that it is 
generally developable, and thus improvable, but also that it is a mere social fact. 
A definition which entirely loses its reference to the actual usage of the term that 
is being defined is bound to fail. On the other hand, the aim of a strict verbal 
definition proper is to describe only the actual usage of a term, like in the sen-
tence: “All English speaking persons understand a ‘table’ as being X.” A subset 
of this kind of definition is the dictionary definition; in our example the Ox-
ford Dictionary defines a table as “a piece of furniture with a flat top and one or 
more legs, providing a level surface for eating, writing, or working at”11. As we 
can already see in comparison to the arbitrary definition above, this kind of ap-
proach bears the advantage that it is properly linked with language as a factual 
phenomenon. For example, we all know tables with just one leg, which no one 
under normal circumstances would deny the quality of being a table. However, 
from mere experience we know that the common usage of a term can often be 
irregular, by times inconsistent.12 So, taken for granted that a general aim (if 
not the general aim) of philosophical enquiries is to reduce and at best eliminate 
inconsistencies in language usage, this kind of definition is not conclusively 
helpful either, as it only refers to facts irrespective of the correctness or cogen-
10 Moore, Principia Ethica, 8; William Ross, The Right and The Good (Oxford: Claren-
don, repr. 1973 [1930]), 1.
11 Oxford Dictionary, s. v. “table,” accessed December 28, 2016, http://en.oxforddictionar 
ies.com/definition/table.
12 It appears almost trivial to state that, even with a relatively clear example like this one, 
there will always be marginal cases. How high does an object have to be to still be qualified as 
a table? How large does the surface have to be? One does not unduly have to stress his or her 
imagination to come up with examples in which people could and would most probably dis-
agree about the table-quality of an object. However, these are problems of interpretation of a 
general definition, not so much of correctness of the definition as such.
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cy of a certain concept. In other words, if we simply analyse the factual usage 
of a term, we may work out certain common features, but we are unable to de-
termine whether the usage was or is sensible in the first place. Finally, Moore 
continues by explaining a third way of defining a term. With this one “we may 
mean that a certain object, which we all of us know, is composed in a certain 
manner: (…).”13 Thus, if we understand this statement correctly, an ideal defini-
tion of a term would be equivalent to a conclusive list of all elements (including 
their interdependent relations) of a certain object – their ‘defining’ features. Yet, 
this kind of precision can in practice hardly ever be expected. There will always 
be objects which could fall under a term but need not necessarily do so. There 
will always be marginal cases.14 Once more, not all elements of a definition are 
a matter of controversy. In our example, there are elements in the definition of 
a table which, I presume, are undisputed amongst all members of a linguistic 
community. Such ‘core features’ of a table could for instance be ‘an object with 
a flat top and at least one leg for people to stand or sit at’. So, it is presumed 
that, when various speakers discuss the features of a table, they might disagree 
on some features, e. g. the height or the number of legs, whilst they would most 
probably all agree on the features object, flat top, leg(s) and standing or sitting 
opportunity.15 Thus, it appears sensible to divide the definition process into two 
separate steps: First, one can work out factual minimum requirements which 
the investigated term has to meet, i. e. such conditions which every reasonable 
speaker of a certain language would still agree upon, leaving aside those con-
ditions that cause or could cause disagreement between different speakers with-
in the same community. If these minimal conditions are found, we have found 
what we shall henceforth call the scope16 of a term. As an intensional defini-
tion17 the scope is as such not viable for practical usage. For a start, it is merely 
13 Moore, Principia Ethica, 8.
14 Whether something falls under a definition is a matter of interpretation then, a nor-
mative task. See esp.: H. L. A. Hart, “Problems of the Philosophy of Law,” in Essays in ju-
risprudence and philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 89; John Finnis, 
Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980), 9 ff. Cf. also Timothy Endicott, 
“The Irony of Law,” Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 42 (2012), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2091043, 1–3.
15 As such it is not far from the dictionary definition, see above fn. 11. Even if they were 
equivalent in this case it would not ruin the more general point, though. In that case the diction-
ary definition would simply restate the core elements; that is, it would somewhat incidentally 
be just as wide as the scope of the term ‘table’.
16 What is called the scope of a term here should by no means be confused with the similar 
notion of a prototype, see e. g. Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence, “Concepts,” in Stanford 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Stanford University, 1997–), https://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/concepts/, sec. 2.2. A regular dinner table with four legs 
would for example most probably be called a prototype of a table (as everyone would agree on 
the table quality of the object), which does not imply that all tables need to have four legs. The 
minimal definition is wider. It includes all possible understandings of a term.
17 Cf. Anil Gupta, “Definitions,” in Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward 
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equivalent to the widest possible understanding in a given linguistic context, 
i. e. within a certain group of speakers. Methodologically, we use pure analysis 
in order to gain the scope. Hence, the scope does not have to rely on any value 
judgements. It is purely descriptive. As a second, consecutive step we are now 
able to gain a proper concept by evaluating the scope with respect to such qual-
ity features that might make it a good – that is, valuable and viable – concept. 
Thereby we might find additional definitional features for the term in question. 
Yet, importantly, a concept in this sense does not necessarily have to be narrow-
er than its scope with regard to cases of application. That is, the second evalu-
ative step should not be confused with a critical evaluation of those definitional 
features which are or could become a matter of controversy or with a decision 
in these controversies either way. To do as much would mean stipulation. Yet, 
a concept as presented here merely can be stipulative – it does not have to be. 
In other words, although a concept can be just as wide as the scope and consist 
of only its necessary core features, there need to be good reasons (or at least a 
good reason) for such a wide concept. Thus, the difference between scope and 
concept lies not in critical or marginal cases, which, as one may assume, could 
be excluded by the former and somewhat included by the other, but rather in the 
way each of the two is won. The scope is won by means of a pure, descriptive 
analysis of actual language use. It represents the smallest common denomina-
tor of various, possibly divergent ways in which a certain term is actually used. 
Whether this scope makes a good concept is an entirely different matter. In 
order for something to be a good concept there have to be reasons for why we 
should apply this concept and not some other one. In case of the scope applied 
as a concept, it has to be at the very least the pragmatic reason that speakers do 
not have to adjust their usage of the term (or at least reduce necessary adjust-
ments to a minimum).18 However, there might be different reasons why another, 
narrower concept could be preferable. What these reasons are in particular with 
respect to a concept of rights shall be investigated in much detail in sec. III, 2., 
e). For now, we shall just establish that the task of gaining a practically viable 
concept should be divided into two steps: a purely descriptive analysis with the 
result of gaining the scope of a term, and a subsequent (evaluative) decision 
for or against a concept, which can but does not have to be congruent with the 
scope depending on the significance of the reasons voting in favour of the re-
spective concept. The advantages of such a two-step conceptual inquiry19 as 
N. Zalta (Stanford University, 1997–), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/
definitions/.
18 With respect to quality features of a concept of rights this reason represents the feature 
‘practical adequacy’, cf. below sec. II, 2., e), cc), (1).
19 Cf. above fn. 7. The common term ‘conceptual analysis’ is purposefully not used, be-
cause what is proposed is just not a plain analysis, but a methodological approach which is in 
search of the best possible term to be used as a basis for further (substantive) inquiries. Only to 
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just described are supposedly evident: It combines positive aspects of both of 
the first two approaches concerning definitions described by Moore. It is evalu-
ative and thus (at least possibly) stipulative, i. e. it is aimed at a somewhat good 
or better language, and it is not just a delineative inventory. However, due to the 
prior descriptive, analytical step it is thus only to an extent where inconsisten-
cies and irregularities in language use are ruled out, and the concept still meets 
the fundamental understanding of a term in everyday usage, i. e. of all relevant 
speakers involved. Hence, the concept is regenerated with language as a factual 
phenomenon. Such a bipartite kind of conceptual inquiry takes into account not 
only the contingency of language, but also its actual existence as an undeniable 
social fact to cope with.
Importantly, the foregoing remarks do not imply that one should in any case 
proceed the way proposed here when examining a certain term. It is simply 
the way we shall proceed in this context. Undoubtedly, there are other possible 
theoretical designs, other kinds of analyses.20 Ours is the project of finding a 
concept which shall serve a specific purpose, namely to structure and linguis-
tically harmonise the debate about rights but without losing connection to lan-
guage as a factual phenomenon. As such it is presumably most closely linked 
to Haslanger’s notion of an ameliorative analysis, combining strictly analyti-
cal and evaluative elements.21 Thereby it is neither strictly descriptive, nor his-
torical, albeit it does not per se disregard historical aspects nor such aspects re-
garding the term’s factual usage.22 Also it should not be mistaken with the goal 
of the ‘philosophical’ approach sketched earlier, in search for a consistent usage 
of the term, for the best possible understanding in a given context. Such a ‘con-
cept’ would not have to rely on any kind of evaluative judgement, which rep-
resents a decisive difference in comparison to our approach. That is, if consis-
tency were the only criterion to mark the quality of a ‘concept’, we could reach 
our goal simply by means of (pure) analysis.23 Apart from these rather crude ex-
planations, the cogency of the idea of a combination of purely descriptive and 
evaluative elements in order to reach the goal proposed earlier will have to be 
axiomatically presupposed for the ensuing work. Unfortunately, a further devel-
opment of this matter is not possible in this context.
the degree of implying step (1.1) is this endeavour truly analytical. Beyond that it is evaluative 
and thereby possibly – even though not necessarily – stipulative.
20 See e. g. Sally Haslanger, “What Good Are Our Intuitions? Philosophical Analysis and 
Social Kinds,” The Aristotelian Society 80 (June 2006). http://www.mit.edu/~shaslang/papers/
HaslangerWGOI.pdf, 6 ff. Page reference refers to the online version.
21 Ibid, 7.
22 Cf. below sec. III, 2., e), cc).
23 We shall return to this thought much later, in sec. III, 2., e), dd), when actually making a 
decision between the merits of Choice Theory and Interest Theory.
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bb) The Scope of Rights
Let us transfer the foregoing ideas about the kind of ‘concept’ we are look-
ing for to our problematic initial question, ‘what is a right?’ To begin with, we 
ought to determine the scope of the term ‘rights’. In order to do so we need to 
ask ourselves: What out of all things could possibly be called a right? Like in 
the example above, we cannot rely on mere prototypes or typical examples.24 
A table with one leg can be a table just as well as one with six or eight legs. 
Accordingly, we have to examine all the relevant ways in which the term is 
used and consequently derive the core features by method of elimination. To 
start with, here are a series of statements containing the notion of ‘a right’, all 
of which I presume are most common and recognisable from everyday usage 
of the term.25
(I) I have a right to bodily integrity.
(II) My friend Q has a right not to be insulted by you.
(III) Babies have a right not to be abused or harmed in any way.
(IV) A has a right to claim the money out of a sales contract with B.
(V)  C has a right to attend demonstrations and express his opinion on 
the government.
As our aim is to find those features that every reasonable speaker26 would agree 
upon, we can now continue asking: Which possible features of rights can alrea-
dy, only from investigating these examples, be excluded from the scope? Given 
the statements above were all commonly accepted we can infer:
(1) Rights are not necessarily only active, i. e. regarding one’s own actions, 
see (IV) and (V), but possibly also passive, i. e. regarding the actions of others, 
see (II) and (III).
(2) The ability to have rights is not necessarily linked with the ability to 
make one’s own decisions, i. e. with moral or legal agency, see (III).
(3) Rights do not even necessarily have to be associated with a certain action, 
see (II) – (IV), but they can also be abstract, see (I).
What is then left to positively extrapolate from the five rights statements 
above are three core features, all of which I believe would be agreed upon by 
24 It is questionable whether there are any prototypes for ‘rights’ at all. Show people a reg-
ular dinner table and they will happily agree that they are standing in front of a table. Show 
them even the most basic statement containing information about a right or rights and they are 
probably going to argue about it.
25 Surely, it is possible that singular speakers could disagree at this point. It is impossible 
ever to exclude this possibility entirely. Our aim is therefore to name certain general and gen-
erally accepted cases of applications, which can be regarded as overall accepted and under-
standable.
26 Despite its obviously problematic implications, the idea of ‘reasonable’ speakers will 
have to be presupposed at this point in order to deduce the respective core features.
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both Interest and Choice theorists as well as proponents of any other theory 
concerning the nature of rights. Essentially, rights are normative, they are gen-
erally advantageous27, and they are appendant, i. e. they are bound to specific 
entities.28 In detail:
(1) Rights are an essentially normative phenomenon. This first point is sup-
posedly indisputable.29 The fact that rights are a (possibly integral) element of 
normativity30, which is to say that that their nature cannot ever be fully captured 
27 Arguably, one could also refer to this feature of rights as being ‘beneficial’. Yet, the no-
tion of ‘beneficence’ appears to be too strongly pre-shaped by substantive theories; especially, 
it evokes associations with consequentialist theories, not least with the substantive tradition of 
interest/benefit theories of rights, see therefore below sec. III, 2., e), bb). Due to our goal of 
producing a normatively neutral concept, such associations shall be avoided by using the sup-
posedly more neutral terms ‘advantage’, ‘advantageous’, ‘advantageousness’ henceforth. For 
a more detailed exposition of this point cf. below sec. III, fn. 183.
28 Undoubtedly, the choice of example-statements determines the result with regard to the 
features of the scope. Thus, the objection lies at hand that they were chosen just in order to 
produce this result. In other words, the (allegedly) purely descriptive nature of the scope might 
nevertheless have a covert, evaluative stance to it due to the conscious selection of only a few, 
certain examples and not all actual manifestations of a term. On the contrary, I assume that it is 
impossible to actually find example-statements that could foil the result found here. The three 
features are constant and could only be refuted by means of pure stipulation, i. e. by claiming 
“There is a non-personal right to peace”, “For A to have rights is detrimental for her” or even “I 
ride my right to work”. These propositions would surely not be generally agreed upon.
29 Cf. Brian Orend, Human Rights: Concept and Context (Ontario: Broadview Press, 
2002), 17–19.
30 The much debated notion of normativity arguably asks for some clarifications at this 
point: First, it is supposed there is a fundamental difference between the normative as referring 
to reasons (see therefore in more detail presently in sec. I, 1., b), aa)) and the descriptive as 
referring to fact. Implied is the common idea of a strict separation of ‘is’ and ‘ought’, at least 
to the extent that one cannot derive any normative conclusions merely from a set of facts. For 
the origin of considering the is-ought-relation as a problem, which is related to, but ought to 
be clearly distinguished from Moore’s commonly known (and terminologically misleading) 
notion of a “naturalistic fallacy” (Moore, Principia Ethica, 13), see David Hume, A Trea-
tise of Human Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, repr. 2009 [1738]), 302. Cf. also: 
Hans Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre, 2nd ed. (Reinheim: Scientia Aalen, 1960 
[1923]), 6–10; id, Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd rev. and extended ed. (Wien: Verlag Österreich, 2000 
[1960]), 196. Secondly, especially legal theory is often concerned with the notion of norma-
tivity, namely with what is often regarded as the ‘problem of normativity’ of the law in con-
trast to the normativity of morality. For introductions on this problem (with further references) 
see: Torben Spaak, “Kelsen and Hart on the Normativity of Law,” in Perspectives on Jurispru-
dence: Essays in Honour of Jes Bjarup, ed. Peter Wahlgren (Stockholm: Stockholm Institute 
for Scandinavian Law, 2005), esp. 398–401; id, “Legal Positivism, Law’s Normativity, and the 
Normative Force of Legal Justification,” Ratio Juris 16 (December 2003): 478–481; Andrei 
Marmor and Alexander Sarch, “The Nature of Law,” in Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 
ed. Edward N. Zalta (Stanford University, 1997–), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/
entries/lawphil-nature/, sec. 1.2. Even though hardly sufficient to match the level of sophis-
tication of the debate, a few arguments for why the normativity of law should not be regarded 
as a problem at all, i. e. why we should not deny the undoubtedly normative nature of legal 
rules (therewith denying structural differences between legal and moral rules), will be laid out 
below in sec. II, 5., d).
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only in an empirical, descriptive fashion, will be presupposed as common sense 
at this point.
(2) What does it mean ‘to be a normative concept’ though? It is not just ‘to 
be’ and be described as such, but rather it necessarily entails ‘to be or to exist for 
or against something/somebody’. It means having a normative significance31, 
positive or negative.32 ‘Right’, for that matter, in any way the term is used, bears 
a positive connotation, a certain advantageous normative thrust – a certain im-
pact existing or functioning in favour of a certain entity.33 In which way rights 
exactly exist or function, what their modus of existence is – e. g. mainly as pro-
tected choices or as protected interests – does not have to interest us right now. 
Already we can state, though: Rights, in any way the term is used, are some-
thing advantageous for the entity they belong to or are ascribed to.34
(3) And thus the third and last requirement has already been forestalled: 
Rights are essentially appendant to (or associated with) a specific entity. That is, 
a right must belong to or be conferred to somebody or something. There is an 
on-going and fierce argument in the relevant literature about the scope of suit-
able ‘right-holders’, i. e. regarding the question which entities qualify as capa-
ble of holding a right.35 It is not my intention to engage in this (however impor-
tant) dispute here. At this stage, it is sufficient to point out the fact that rights 
cannot be understood as entirely detached from the entity they are appendant to, 
i. e. the mere fact that there has to be a right-holder in the first place. In other 
words, if there is a right, there is always an entity (someone or possibly some-
thing) who has this right.
Now, even if we suppose the above made assumptions about the scope are 
correct, there is still (at least) one question jumping right at us: What is actually 
gained from such a way of proceeding? We seem to be in danger of ending up 
with a redundant, circular definition. Precisely, it appears as if all we did was 
31 A normative weight possibly, see below the discussion about the importance of princi-
ples in sec. II, 4.
32 Obviously, the term ‘positive’ is not to be understood in terms of legal positivism, pos-
itive rules or related notions – yet another reason why the term advantageous appears prefer-
able.
33 For the Interest (or Benefit) Theory of Rights, this seems self-evident, but even choice 
theorists would have to declare their agreement on rights being ‘advantageous’ in this most 
basic sense, as for them not just choices/decisions, but legally (or morally) protected decisions 
qualify as rights. Cf. below secs. III, 2., a) and c).
34 Carl Wellman, Real Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 7. Whether ad-
vantageous has to mean ‘invariably advantageous’ or merely “normally advantageous” (Kram-
er, RWT, 93) can be left undetermined at this point. It is a question worthy of consideration, 
though, which we will attend to later in sec. III, 1., b), aa).
35 Cf. only this respective miscellany: Carl Wellman (ed.), Rights and Duties, Vol. 3, Pos-
sible Bearers of Rights and Duties (London: Routledge, 2002). For a short outline of the dis-
cussion see Kenneth Campbell, “Legal Rights,” in Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed. 
Edward N. Zalta (Stanford University, 1997–), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/
entries/legal-rights/, sec. 3.
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point out what all existing theories have in common in order to then come up 
with the spectacular idea that they have something in common – as if we intend-
ed to define what a right was, only to then use this very definition as a standard 
to falsify other definitions. That would, however, only be objectionable if the 
aim was to conclusively define the term ‘right’ at this point. Once more, what 
we are in fact concerned with in this first step is not to produce a concept of 
rights in the sense of a conclusive bipartite, descriptive-evaluative definition 
or a viable concept in the sense of an evaluated scope (see above), but simply 
to determine the scope of the term. Accordingly, we cannot acquire a suitable 
answer to our initial question (1) ‘what is a right?’ because that would have to 
comprise consecutive answers to both of the following questions:
(1.1) Out of all things, which could we call a right?
(1.2) Out of these, which should we call a right?36
All we did so far was engage in (1.1). Only in combination – (1.1) and (1.2) – 
we can actually gain a viable concept. Still, both these (conceptual) questions 
can, of course, be distinguished from a third question, which is usually associ-
ated with the justificatory level of investigation:
(2) What rights exactly should there be?
Having identified these questions, we may now examine how different self-pro-
fessed conceptual approaches to rights (explicitly or implicitly) integrate these 
questions into their theoretical framework. In other words, we are now able to 
analyse exactly how the distinction between descriptive and normative jurispru-
dence as the most common methodological approaches in legal theory relates to 
the distinction between conceptual and justificatory accounts of rights as well 
as to the central epistemological questions just sketched.
36 The idea developed here, the methodological distinction between purely descriptive 
scope and in parts evaluative concept, is seemingly similar to the methodological approach 
developed by Jules Coleman and Jody Kraus in “Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights,” The 
Yale Law Journal 95 (June 1986): esp. 1341: “What is the correct analysis of rights? Theories 
of the correct analysis of rights typically […] conflate two distinct questions concerning the 
proper analysis of rights. A correct analysis of rights distinguishes between the logical form 
and the content of rights.” Their approach is at best superficially similar to ours, though. The 
ensuing idea of rights as ‘conceptual markers’ (ibid, 1342) does not clarify the boundary be-
tween pure analysis and evaluative conceptualisation, which our theory presumably is capa-
ble of. For critical reassessments of the article see Jeremy Waldron, “Criticizing the Econom-
ic Analysis of Law,” The Yale Law Journal 99 (April 1990); Charles Barzun, “Legal Rights 
and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis: A Case Study,” University of Virginia Public Law and 
Legal Theory Working Paper Series 43 (2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1959403, 8–28.
 1. Approaching Rights 13
b) Descriptive Jurisprudence versus Normative Jurisprudence
Evidently, the methodological questions discussed so far in the context of rights 
are very closely related to a more general and contentious theoretical dispute: 
the so-called methodology debate in jurisprudence37, also referred to as the 
‘Hart/Dworkin-debate’38. It is often described as a controversy between two 
academic factions: those promoting normative jurisprudence and (allegedly op-
posed to the former) those in favour of descriptive jurisprudence.39 Roughly, 
the two sides can be characterised as follows: Descriptive jurisprudence rests 
on a claim which Perry aptly describes as methodical legal positivism, namely 
“the view that legal theory can and should offer a normatively neutral descrip-
tion of […] law”.40 In other words, it is the view that a concept of law can be 
developed without recourse to substantive normative argument. This position 
was famously established, and has since been defended, by H. L. A. Hart and 
his followers.41 On the other hand, central to normative jurisprudence, as rep-
resented by Dworkin42, Perry43, Waldron44, and others, is the claim that law as 
an interpretive or argumentative practice can only be grasped with reference to 
and in connection to the fundamental values and therefore normative notions 
which lie at its very core. Accordingly, jurisprudence, when concerned with 
finding out about the nature of law, not merely about the law of a specific com-
munity, is held to be an essentially normative endeavour. Hence, at the core of 
the debate lies the question of whether an adequate understanding or a ‘concept’ 
of law (as such) can be found without reference to or inclusion of substantive 
normative considerations or moral judgements, but solely on the basis of so-
cial fact.45 Without actually entering into the debate and all its argumentative 
37 For an introductory article on this debate see only Julie Dickson, “Methodology in Juris-
prudence,” Legal Theory 10 (September 2004): 117–156.
38 Brian Leiter, “Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate: The Methodology Problem in Juris-
prudence,” American Journal of Jurisprudence 48 (2003). Leiter’s article provides a rather ac-
curate introduction to the debate. Cf. also Scott Shapiro, “The ‘Hart-Dworkin’ Debate: A Short 
Guide for the Perplexed,” University of Michigan Public Law Working Papers No. 77, http://
ssrn.com/abstract=968657.
39 For an instructive overview over both sides’ central arguments see Jules Coleman, The 
Practice of Principle (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 151 ff.
40 Stephen Perry, “Hart’s Methodological Positivism,” Legal Theory 4 (December 1998): 
427.
41 Most importantly in his seminal work: Hart, Concept of Law.
42 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1991 [1977]), esp. 
‘The Model of Rules I and II’ (hereafter cited as TRS). See also id, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1986).
43 Perry, “Methodological Positivism,” 427.
44 Cf. Jeremy Waldron, “Normative (or Ethical) Positivism,” in Hart’s Postscript, ed. Jules 
Coleman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
45 Precisely, Hart regards his theory as descriptive to the extent “that it is morally neutral 
and has no justificatory aims” (Hart, Concept of Law, 240). Cf. in this context: Perry, “Meth-
odological Positivism,” 428 ff.; Brian Leiter, “Legal Realism, Hard Positivism, and the Limits 
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depth, we may already assert that the terms ‘descriptive’ and ‘normative’ are es-
sentially ambiguous. ‘Descriptive’ in a strict sense can mean ‘with reference to 
facts alone, i. e. without reference to reasons’, whereas in a wider sense it could 
mean ‘without reference to substantive, moral considerations’. Accordingly, the 
notion of ‘normativity’ may in a wider sense refer to all kinds of reasons in con-
trast to facts, i. e. as the opposite to ‘descriptive’ s. str. On the other hand, it 
may in a stricter sense apply only to ‘moral or legal reasons’ as a special type 
of reasons, thus representing the opposite to ‘descriptive’ in a wider sense. Pre-
sumably, these thoughts are in need of further clarifications, i. e. before trying 
to make a stand in the methodology debate in subsection bb), we need to clari-
fy which meaning of ‘normative’ and ‘descriptive’ is referred to in this debate. 
Precisely, we need to clarify what exactly is meant by ‘normative neutrality’ or 
how a conceptual approach has to be designed in order to meet this criterion.
aa) Different Types of Reasons
Most generally, normativity represents the realm of evaluation and reasons – in 
contrast to the simple description of facts. Yet, as indicated, there are at least 
two possible understandings of both correlative terms: Normative reasons s. str. 
are those which tell people the (overall or relatively) right thing to do. These are 
moral reasons and supposedly also legal reasons.46 Apart from that, one could 
imagine a wider understanding of normativity, which comprises all kinds of 
reasons, and which would then also include aesthetic, prudential, instrumental 
reasons etc. By investigating ‘normative systems’, throughout this book we will 
restrict ourselves to normativity in the former, stricter sense, i. e. to legal and/
or moral systems. Yet, at this point it is important to note that generally there 
is a great variety of different types of reasons, because this insight helps us to 
clarify to which degree a conceptual approach like ours can indeed refer to rea-
sons without losing its ‘normative neutrality’ in the stricter sense. Precisely, a 
conceptual approach remains descriptive or normatively neutral as long as it re-
of Conceptual Analysis,” in Hart’s Postscript, ed. Jules Coleman (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 356–357; Tom Campbell, The Legal Theory of Ethical Positivism (Aldershot: 
Dartmouth Publishing, 1996), 69. Cf. also: Julie Dickson, Evaluation and Legal Theory (Port-
land, OR: Oxford Publishing, 2001); Andrei Marmor, “Legal Positivism: Still Descriptive and 
Morally Neutral,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 26 (2006). Marmor – in defence of Hart’s 
theory – ventures doubt about whether the actual problem, the nature of legal positivism, is 
accurately framed only by reference to the dichotomy between moral judgements and social 
facts. Marmor’s arguments in this respect are somewhat appealing. Unfortunately, a meaning-
ful examination – neither of the debate in general, nor of Marmor’s account in particular – can-
not be adequately conducted in this context.
46 Even though surely not unproblematic, the fact that ‘legal systems’ generally belong to 
the above-mentioned category of ‘normative systems’ will be also be axiomatically presup-
posed for now and will concern us once more in sec. II, 5., d), where we shall aim for (nothing 
more than) a heuristic attempt to define the relation or the difference between legal and other 
kinds of systems. Cf. above fn. 30.
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mains agnostic with regard to substantive legal or moral reasons. Therefore, we 
do not preclude the necessity to refer to other kinds of reasons at some point in 
order to develop a proper concept. More precisely, in order to define a concept 
of rights we need to make a judgement, namely by answering question (1.2): 
‘out of these, which should we call a right?’ And, obviously, we need recourse 
to reasons in order to do so. Yet, the reasons for making this decision do not 
(necessarily) imply any moral or legal judgements or predicaments as they are 
purely conceptual reasons, i. e. they represent quality features of a meta-theo-
retical or pre-substantive concept of rights.47 In other words, if ‘descriptive’ 
were to be understood as ‘lacking any practical normative implications’, the 
design of our conceptual approach would meet this criterion despite the fact 
that our concept is not entirely descriptive in the sense of ‘not implying any ref-
erence to reasons or judgements’, as descriptive could also be understood in a 
very strict sense.
bb) The Methodology-Debate: A Discussion at Cross-Purposes
Presumably, the parallels of our approach to the positions of Hart, Coleman 
et al. are obvious. In fact, we are engaged in an endeavour which can doubtlessly 
be counted amongst other works of ‘descriptive jurisprudence’. Nevertheless, 
it is noteworthy that this does not force us to reject normative jurisprudence 
as a methodological approach in its entirety. Simply, descriptive jurisprudents 
were and are following an entirely different enterprise than normative jurispru-
dents, which (famously) Hart himself pointed out in the postscript to his semi-
nal work ‘The Concept of Law’: “Legal theory conceived […] as both descrip-
tive and general is a radically different enterprise from Dworkin’s conception 
of legal theory […] as in part evaluative and justificatory […]”48. He continues: 
“It is not obvious why there should be or indeed could be any significant con-
flict between enterprises so different as my own and Dworkin’s […]”49. This 
insight is crucial. The appropriateness of any theoretical approach surely de-
pends on what one aims to discover or to prove with it. Descriptive jurispru-
dence is a more than legitimate enterprise due to its aim of examining an es-
sentially normative phenomenon – like rights or in Hart’s case the law – with 
the goal of producing a concept, which should sensibly pre-structure normative 
debate and theory without substantively predetermining it. Essentially, descrip-
tive jurisprudence is a project of meta-ethics. Normative jurisprudence, on the 
47 In short, these reasons are practical adequacy, normative neutrality, and meta-theoret-
ical accuracy. The particular significance of each conceptual reason will be laid out in detail 
in sec. III, 2., f), cc) below. Notably, the idea of ‘conceptual reasons’ in contrast to ‘normative 
reasons s. str.’ is at least similar to Brian Leiter’s distinction between ‘epistemic values’ and 
‘moral values’, see Leiter, “Hart/Dworkin Debate,” 34 ff.
48 Hart, Concept of Law, 240.
49 Ibid, 241.
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other hand, may produce very different results with regard to terms like ‘rights’ 
or ‘law’, but strictly speaking it does not employ a method contradictory or av-
erse to descriptive jurisprudence. At best it can make the claim that the method 
of descriptive jurisprudence is not incorrect, but rather insufficient to solve any 
practical legal problems. Yet, as much is evidently true and should also readily 
be conceded by any descriptive jurisprudent.50 Already by definition, one can-
not be able to offer solutions to practical normative problems by means of a de-
scriptive concept. In other words, the substantive normative notions necessary 
to describe rights as a practical phenomenon, i. e. to describe such rights that 
people actually have, cannot be included into Hart’s theory, at least not if it 
were to remain descriptive or normatively neutral.
Accordingly, the somewhat sound idea behind normative jurisprudence is 
that it is impossible to grasp the idea of normative notions like law or rights 
solely in an abstract way, i. e. to grasp the idea of law or rights ‘as such’ irre-
spective of an already specified or pre-existing legal system or a normative/ar-
gumentative practice that actually works with rights.51 In practice there simply 
does not (and never will) exist a thing like law ‘as such’. There are – and have 
been, and will be – different legal systems that actually exist and are being 
practiced. We can perceive and explain each of these specific legal systems in 
its own terms, and we can, of course, find out what they all necessarily have in 
common. Yet, even these common, necessary conditions could hardly be re-
garded as law ‘as such’. Rather the normative jurisprudents’ assumption ap-
pears correct that these necessary conditions need to be enlivened by substan-
tive normative argument.52 Only then we are actually able to determine the 
nature of ‘law’ or of ‘rights’ as phenomena of normative practice.53 And would 
it then not be better to engage in normative argument, in the interpretative prac-
tice, as which law presents itself, straight away? This last point appears to be 
of some importance in the debate. It is correct that rights are an instrument ap-
50 For instance, Perry is right when he supposes that by observing “that officials and per-
haps others accept the rule of recognition, meaning they regard it as obligation-imposing […]” 
what Hart actually does is “to describe the problem of normativity of law rather than to offer a 
solution” (Perry, “Methodological Positivism,” 466).
51 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 13–14, 37 ff., 45 ff., 91. I thereby presume that all thoughts 
which Dworkin developed specifically with respect to a concept of ‘law’ can be transferred to 
other essentially normative notions such as ‘rights’.
52 See e. g. Finnis, Natural Law, 3: “[…] a theorist cannot give a theoretical description 
and analysis of social facts [and therewith neither of the law as a social practice], unless he also 
participates in the work of evaluation, of understanding what is really good for human persons, 
and what is really required by practical reasonableness.”.
53 James Sherman, “Dialectical Deadlock and the Function of Legal Rights,” https://ssrn.
com/abstract=1976312, 58–59. Here Sherman claims that the ‘order of justification’ runs the 
other way around than is normally assumed. From defining a correct concept of rights we are 
not supposed to be able to draw substantive normative conclusions, but rather such a concept 
could only be deducible from a ‘superior’ normative theory.
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plied in normative practice, and that normative practice cannot be understood 
without reference to substantive normative considerations. However, this does 
not imply that we cannot determine a neutral terminology before engaging in 
the task of interpretation, namely with reference to (a) actual manifestations of 
the term and (b) necessary, meta-ethical structures. We would aim at a concept 
then, which tells us what rights are – that includes how we should understand 
the term – and expressly not which rights there are. Moreover, descriptive juris-
prudence rests on the claim that it is not only possible to produce such a con-
cept, but that, if it were possible, it is also ultimately desirable to do so as a pre-
liminary, theoretical step. In this sense, normative and descriptive jurisprudence 
are not mutually exclusive, which Hart, as mentioned earlier, correctly clarified. 
Rather, normative jurisprudence represents an interpretative enterprise which, 
as such, is sensible and even necessary, but which would do well to employ an 
impartial terminology to begin with. And producing such a terminology is, in 
turn, the very goal of descriptive jurisprudence.
Due to these rather loose interpretations, it may be doubted whether Hart and 
Dworkin would have fully agreed with this characterization of the relation be-
tween descriptive and normative jurisprudence. This is a matter which we can-
not decide in detail in this context. In any case, for our purposes it must suffice 
to pinpoint the methodology of our approach, which is for the most part analo-
gous to that of Hart’s descriptive endeavour concerning the concept of law. In 
short, the theoretical design can be summarised as such: Our approach is de-
scriptive in the sense of aiming at a normatively neutral concept of an essen-
tially normative term, namely rights. This happens however in full concession 
of the limited – or rather entirely non-existent – ability of such descriptive ap-
proaches to offer solutions for practical normative problems in law and morals 
alike. Thus, our aim is as simple as it might be sobering: A cogent descriptive 
theory regarding normative notions like rights can achieve nothing more – but 
also nothing less, for that matter – than setting the stage for substantive, justifi-
catory approaches. At best it will define the (deontological) limits of normative 
practice which any substantive, justificatory approach has to comply with. It 
will ask the correct questions that a substantive normative theory needs to an-
swer. It will build the basic terminological framework in which any coherent 
justificatory approach can and has to fit.
2. Overview of Content
For reasons of clarity and comprehensibility, the structure of the ensuing inves-
tigation shall be roughly delineated at this point. Mainly it will be oriented at 
the two consecutive questions (1.1) and (1.2). First, and for most of this book, 
we shall be concerned only with the scope of rights, i. e. with the purely de-
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scriptive question (1.1). The three features of the scope of rights are already fa-
miliar to us: Rights are normative, advantageous, and appendant. Yet, what we 
need to find out in order to formulate a concept of rights are the possible man-
ifestations of this scope, i. e. an answer to the question of which structural ele-
ments of our normative practice are or can be advantageous and appendant to 
a respective holder and under which conditions. In fact, in order to identify the 
scope, we need to engage in an investigation of the underlying, general, meta-
ethical structures of our social normative practice – a task almost too big even 
to try to engage in. In order to delimit this otherwise hopelessly wide endeavour 
at least to a reasonable degree, we shall (a) not examine the normative practice 
of a society as a whole but instead restrict our analysis (for the most part) to 
the internal logic of one normative system – a concept that will be introduced 
presently and thoroughly explained subsequently – and (b) other than that re-
strict ourselves to critical issues in moral and legal theory which are directly 
relevant for the theory of rights. The structure of our investigation will thereby 
defer to the central (and in each case eponymous) notions from Choice Theory 
and Interest Theory alike, i. e. the investigation in the first main part, sec. II, will 
pivot on the notions of decision54 and interest, or, more precisely, on legally 
protected decisions and interests. In the latter case that implies only such inter-
ests that serve as (intersubjective) reasons for other people’s duties. Hence, we 
will analyse the concept of actions, which we shall trace back to the notion of a 
practical decision, in sec. II, 2., and the mode in which such actions are evalu-
ated, which will lead us into the field of deontic logic in sec. II, 3. Subsequently, 
the notion of normative reasons, both practical and abstract, will be elucidated 
by reference to a line of theory know as Principle Theory in sec. II, 4. In other 
words, we will first deal with the meaning and (deontological) structure of ac-
tions and action evaluations and subsequently attend to the variety of reasons 
and their respective relevance for the theory of rights. All these (in parts rather 
abstract) theoretical deliberations will be framed by explanations regarding the 
concept of a ‘normative system’ in secs. II, 1. and 5. Thereby the notion of a 
‘normative system’ will simultaneously form the general theoretical frame for 
the investigation in this first main part of the book.
54 In terms of accuracy the term ‘decision’ appears preferable to ‘choice’, which is why 
throughout this work we shall refer to practical ‘decisions’ when one could colloquially also 
say that one chose to do something. The same goes for German language, as one could trans-
late both terms with ‘Entscheidung’. Yet, both languages allow for a more precise distinction. 
Whilst the term ‘choice’ in the sense of ‘choosing to do X’ insinuates a discretionary act that 
happens independent of necessary criteria for this choice (similar in German: ‘Wahl’), the term 
‘decision’ implies an act, which is based on reasons in favour of the option decided for and 
possibly against others. What is commonly referred to as ‘choice’ as in ‘Choice Theory’ ought 
to be understood in this latter, narrower sense and should therefore preferably be referred to 
as ‘decision’.
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Following these general theoretical wanderings, this almost violent tour 
through a variety of areas of moral and legal philosophy, we will finally at-
tend to the theory of rights as such in the second main part, sec. III. Thereby, in 
sec. III, 1., we will begin by working out relevant manifestations of the scope 
of rights in normative practice. In this part, the investigation will be strongly 
based on Wesley N. Hohfeld’s scheme of fundamental legal positions, though 
rather than simply adopting it, instead applying the insights won hitherto. In ef-
fect, analogously to Hohfeld’s scheme, we will identify four distinguishable po-
sitions as manifestations of the scope. In the ensuing sec. III, 2., we will then set 
our mind on programmatic question (1.2) in order to find out which of the four 
manifestations should be included in a cogent concept of rights. In other words, 
in a final step we will submit the traditional concepts of rights offered by Choice 
Theory and Interest Theory to a critical evaluation, concluding with a reasoned 
decision in favour of a modest version of Choice Theory.

II. The General Functionality of Normative Systems
As indicated earlier, even though this work regards itself as one dedicated to 
the aims and methods of descriptive jurisprudence, simultaneously one of its 
goals is to reveal the very narrow limits of what descriptive jurisprudence is 
able to accomplish, to show that we need to engage in normative reasoning 
and substantive debate in order to demonstrate how important to us normative 
terms really are. Surely, to try and explain the meaning and functionality of 
normative practice in contemporary human societies as a whole would be an 
endeavour too large in scale not only for this thesis, but certainly for any one 
book. Thus, we need to find a way to restrict our approach in terms of what it 
should be able to explain. In order to do so, a (supposedly original) concept 
shall be presented and outlined in this first main part, namely that of a norma-
tive system. The overall approach concerning rights developed here tries to re-
strict itself insofar as it shall be limited to an analysis of the functionality and 
inherent logic of a single such system, rights being assumed to be a proper-
ty explainable within the confines of one such system (at least for the most 
part1). This restriction shall serve as a kind of ‘valve for theoretical complexity’ 
and increase the explanatory adequacy of the overall approach. Introducing this 
concept, we are faced with two inevitable tasks: First, and naturally, we need to 
at least sketch the outlines of a definition for such systems. Secondly, we ought 
to be able to demonstrate that by restricting ourselves to the analysis of only 
one such system our approach is still explanatorily relevant. In other words, we 
ought to show that the concept of normative systems is a useful tool in order to 
map normativity or our normative practice. Not all of this can be achieved in 
one stroke, as we shall see presently.
1. Normative Systems I: The Concept of a Normative System
Let us start off with an attempt for a definition of a ‘normative system’ whose 
elements shall be explained bit by bit subsequently, mostly in this and the up-
1 For the necessary vertical extension of normative systems and the role powers and im-
munities play in this extension, i. e. in between different systems, see below sec. II, 5., b) and 
sec. III, 1., b), bb), (3), and (4).
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coming section II, 5.2 A normative system shall be understood as the consistent 
process in which a set of principles or values is applied to (factual or hypothet-
ical) actions in a way that allows applicants of the system to draw normative 
conclusions about these actions.3 Thereby each normative system possesses 
both an authority, issuing and addressing normative content, and a set of ad-
dressed agents.4 In this section we will only attend to the points ‘authority and 
addressees’ as well as to the consistency-criterion and close with a short note on 
the practical relevance of normative systems thus defined. Thereby the imple-
mentations in this section shall only serve as an extremely rough introduction. 
Consequently, the feature ‘process of application of principles’ will be elucidat-
ed by looking into the nature of reasons in sec. II, 4. Finally, in sec. II, 5., the 
problematic issues addressed in this and in the ensuing chapters will be supple-
mented and broadened. Surely, such a division of an explanation into various 
parts is far from ideal, yet it is owed to the complexity and interdependency of 
the various topics we are about to attend to in this first main part II. Thus, at this 
point I can only solicit the reader’s understanding to appreciate the findings in 
this section only in connection to those in the following ones.
a) Addresser and Addressees
Essentially, every normative system features both an addresser of normative de-
mands and respective addressees. More precisely, every normative system pos-
sesses both an authority and a set of addressed agents, typically a specific com-
munity. Importantly, ‘authority’ is used in a most wide fashion in this context.5 
2 As clarified before already, the normativity of such ‘normative systems’ is one in a strict-
er sense.
3 The idea of a ‘system’ is adduced in order to clarify the internal coherence/connection 
of its components, which finds its expression in the idea that the abstract reasons provided by 
the system, which may at times be adverse, are somewhat synchronised/harmonised due to 
the (definitional) necessity to produce unambiguous/homogenous results/judgements in nor-
mative practice. On the idea of internal coherence (German: “innerer Zusammenhang”) as a 
central trait of legal systems: Werner Krawietz, Recht als Regelsystem (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 
1984), 68–73, esp. 71. Cf. in contrast: Niklas Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt 
a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1995), 40–41. For a good overview over different possible understandings 
and usages of the term ‘system’ in the context of law and legal systems see: Claus-Wilhelm 
Canaris, Systemdenken und Systembegriff in der Jurisprudenz (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 
1983), 19–39.
4 This definition differs significantly from Raz’ approach to an idea of ‘normative sys-
tems’, see Raz, Practical Reason, 107 ff. Raz describes different types of normative systems, 
namely systems of interlocking norms, systems of joint validity, autonomous systems, and 
institutionalised systems. A thorough analysis of each of these concepts is impossible at this 
point, yet it is noteworthy that none of these ‘systems’ matches the (supposedly more general) 
concept of normative systems as introduced here. Especially, the notion of a strict inner con-
sistency is implied in neither of Raz’ systems.
5 For instance, it is considerably wider than Raz’ most influential concept of authority (see 
esp. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), 23–105), which refers 
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Not only does it not necessarily have to be one person/one agent that exerts au-
thority, but it can be a group of persons or even the community as a whole, as is 
the case in democratic societies. Moreover, the ‘authority’ of a system does not 
even have to be personal at all, as is the case with divine rules or intrinsic goods, 
which provide reasons for actions. Hence, the notion of authority is understood 
in a sense that every consistent set of rules, i. e. every normative system, needs 
to be retraceable to some higher-order will or some higher-order good or goods, 
which we shall refer to as the authority of the system.6 This shall only provide a 
rough idea of the notion of authority. We will return to and deepen this thought, 
especially the relation of normative content and higher-order authority, in 
sec. II, 5.
Corresponding to an authority addressing normative content, every norma-
tive system possesses a set of addressed agents. Normally, in intersubjective 
normative systems these addressees form the normative community. It is these 
intersubjective systems, e. g. certain areas of the law or the moral code of a 
community, which we will be focussing on. However, it is noteworthy that not 
every normative system needs to have more than one addressee. It is perfectly 
possible for a normative system to have an authority addressing rules at only 
one agent. Thereby the distinctive feature dividing intersubjective and intrasub-
jective normative systems is that of the personal identity of authority and ad-
dressee, i. e. we are faced with an intrasubjective system only in the case when a 
person directs normative content to oneself in the form of ‘self-addressed com-
mands’.7
to political authority in the sense of state authority. Only one crucial difference is that Raz 
thus regards authority as something that can or needs to be exercised (ibid, 23). By contrast, 
authority in this context is meant only in a most technical sense as any kind of higher-order 
justification for any kind of normative content. Presumably, for any normative content such a 
justification needs to be provided – be it through an authoritative decision, i. e. an act of (po-
litical) competence, by means of an intrinsic/persistent reason, or by means of a combination 
of both. See esp. below sec. II, 5.
6 Thus, also in accordance with the remarks in the foregoing footnote, we can distinguish 
between personal and substantial authority. Notably, the authority of a system neither has to be 
purely personal nor does it have to refer exclusively to persistent goods or normative content. It 
can, and often will be, a mix of both. In fact, we are very much used to this kind of construction 
from legal practice. Here we find a fundamental conflict between the will of a democratically 
elected sovereign and the rule of law, i. e. the rule of a set of inaccessible, persistent goods. 
Hence, we find the authority being in part personal and in part substantial, i. e. it is generally 
exercised by some agent, which is bound, though, to some fixed normative boundaries. Cf. also 
sec. II, fn. 235. Accordingly, the notion of ‘authority’ needs to be carefully distinguished from 
that of ‘competence’. The latter can only be held and exercised by agents/persons. See there-
fore esp. secs. II, 3., c) and II, 5., b) below.
7 Cf. Gerald Cohen, “Reason, Humanity, and the Moral Law,” in The sources of norma-
tivity, ed. Christine Korsgaard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 176; Michael 
Bratman, “Castaneda’s Theory of Thought and Action,” in Faces of Intention (Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge 1999), 227. Cf. also Anthony Kenny, Will, Freedom, and Power 
(New York: Barnes & Noble, 1975), 32–33; id, Action, emotion, and Will, 2nd ed. (London: 
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b) Consistency
The central distinctive feature of normative systems is their inner consistency 
(or homogeneity8), which means that within one specific normative system, an 
applicant, by definition, cannot come to distinct evaluation results or judge-
ments regarding the same action.9 Precisely, in practice within one system every 
specific action can always only be either obligatory, forbidden, or permissible.10 
Thereby not excluded are conflicts between different abstract norms or differ-
ent principles within one system. Such conflicts are rather constitutive for nor-
mative systems, as we will see below in sec. II, 4. The consistency-claim made 
here merely implies that a conflict between prescriptions as specified norma-
tive demands referring to specific actions is per definitionem impossible with-
in one system. As this consistency criterion is a definitional feature of any one 
system, a case in which ones detects conflicting judgements regarding the same 
action X, which regularly happens in normative practice, of course, could only 
Routledge, 2003 [1963]), 167; Richard Hare, “Wanting: Some Pitfalls,” in Practical Infer-
ences, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 44–58. We will meet the notion of 
‘self-addressed commands’ at various stages of this investigation. In short, the idea is that the 
internal aspect of performing an action ought to be described as the application of commands/
of authority by the capable agent to oneself. This notion, which might appear a bit strange 
intuitively, relies on an understanding of the person/the agent as a discursive process – that 
is, as constituted by a reflexive, inner dialogue. In other words, the ability to enter into a re-
lation with one’s self (and thus the ability to command this self to behave in a certain way) is 
thereby regarded as a central – if not the central – trait of human beings or of capable agents 
more generally. Cf. Michael Quante, Person (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2007), 24 ff., 153. 
This central idea about personhood can be traced not least to Kant, his conception of self-con-
sciousness (cf. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allen 
W. Wood (London: MacMillan, 1990 [1781]), 157–158, 334) and his notion of ‘duties to one-
self’, which becomes understandable with reference to a dividedness of the person as a whole 
in homo noumenon and homo phaenomenon (Immanuel Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals,” 
in Practical Philosophy, ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999 
[1797]), 395). Presumably, one does not have to accept all of the (by times problematic) tenets 
of Kantian philosophy in order to accept the notion of ‘self-addressed commands’, but it surely 
offers a strong basis for this idea. Besides, not only amongst philosophers in a stricter sense the 
link between freedom and ‘self-commanding’ was acknowledged. Thus, it was Johann Wolf-
gang Goethe who wrote: “Wer sich nicht selbst befiehlt, / Bleibt immer Knecht.” (in English: 
“One who does not command himself will stay servant forever.”), see J. W. Goethe, Poetische 
Werke Vol. 2, Berliner Ausgabe, Vol. 1–16, ed. Siegfried Seidel, Berlin, 1960 ff., http://www.
zeno.org/nid/20004846281, 368. Even though all these thoughts are certainly worthy of a more 
elaborate discussion, as much will have to happen in a different context. For our purposes we 
simply have to presuppose axiomatically the notion of a person as the maintaining of a con-
scious relationship with oneself.
8 In fact, there are different ways to perceive this notion of ‘consistency’ within a norma-
tive system, i. e. different forms of consistency. These shall be discussed in detail at a later 
stage, precisely in sec. II, 5., b), cc).
9 Cf. Ota Weinberger, “Die Pluralität der Normensysteme,” Archiv für Rechts- und Sozial-
philosophie//Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy 57 (1971): 401.
10 See below sec. II, 3.
 1. Normative Systems I: The Concept of a Normative System 25
mean two things: Either we are dealing with conclusive judgements referring 
to a specific action or merely with prima facie judgements, with conflicting 
general norms or principles. The latter possibility, conflicts of general norms, 
is implied in the consistency-claim made above as this claim only refers to spe-
cific actions and corresponding specific judgements. And in the former case, if 
there were indeed conflicting conclusive judgements, we are not dealing with 
one system, but with a multiplicity of (competing) systems. To clarify the ter-
minology used in this context once more: The notion of a ‘conclusive judge-
ment’ is understood as the ultimate result of a balancing process, not as the 
process itself. A ‘conclusive judgement’ is equivalent with a specific ‘prescrip-
tion’ regarding the action in question. Such prescriptions contrast with general 
‘norms’. Thus, the problem of a ‘conflict of prescriptions’ is not the same as a 
‘conflict of norms’ within one system, but the former can by definition only be 
presented as a conflict between different systems. From these two kinds of nor-
mative conflicts – intra-systemic conflict of norms/principles and inter-systemic 
conflict of prescriptions – we need to distinguish carefully the notion of a true 
dilemma, which may also occur within one system. Yet, in deviation from most 
common interpretations, it is not to be understood as a conflict of obligations, 
but rather as a practical decision situation, in which none of the available op-
tions of conduct is legitimate, i. e. allowed to be performed. We shall incremen-
tally attend to each of these possible normative ‘conflicts’ in much detail in the 
following sections.11 For now, a central, heuristic insight from this preliminary 
categorisation is that in social normative practice, as we know it, there is not 
one overarching or comprehensive normative system, but rather our practice is 
essentially built and to be understood as a plurality of normative systems.12 The 
fact that this fundamental multiplicity of normative systems is also a theoretical 
necessity has to be axiomatically presupposed for now. We shall return to this 
problem in sections II, 4., and II, 5., as an adequate understanding of this prob-
lem asks for a proper understanding of the logic of actions and practical reasons, 
which will be provided in the subsequent sections.
11 For a detailed explanation of the functionality and significance of intra-systemic con-
flicts between norms and/or principles see sec. II, 4. For a better understanding of inter-sys-
temic conflicts cf. the remarks on the multiplicity of normative systems in sec. II, 5. The no-
tion of a dilemma as a possible inconsistency within a normative system is a viable challenge 
to our theory, which we shall deal with in detail in sec. II, 3., b). In short, the occurrence of 
genuine dilemmas is possible within a (consistent) normative system, yet only as provisional 
conclusions, which ultimately need to be resolved by the respective authority by means of an 
additional judgement.
12 Cf. Weinberger, Pluralität der Normensysteme, 399.
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aa) Specificity of Actions
Duly note that our consistency-claim is a rather modest one due to being linked 
to the inner logic of only one normative system. Thus, correctly understood it 
has no substantive normative implications at all. In other words, it should not 
be mistaken for the admittedly strong substantive claim that normative practice 
in itself ought to be consistent. Consistency as described here simply states the 
idea that we need to be able to reach unambiguous judgements regarding spe-
cific actions within a specific normative context. As much is simply a practical 
necessity, of which the consistency-claim is an equally necessary consequence. 
We shall sketch this central thought now and return to it in detail in sec. II, 5., 
b), cc).
As indicated earlier, the consistency claim is closely linked to the notion of 
a specific or specified action, which (exclusively) can be the object of a con-
clusive judgement or of a prescription. What exactly is meant by that? Without 
having to rely on a specific concept of actions yet, this notion can already be de-
termined insofar as it is regarded as a practical necessity to take into account all 
relevant circumstances with regard to an action in order to come to a conclusive 
judgement. In other words, the accuracy of an action evaluation depends on the 
amount of relevant circumstances considered in evaluating it. In order to clarify 
these thoughts, consider the following example: A takes out his dream woman 
W to his cabin by the lake in order to have a romantic night there (including 
consented sex, if it were solely for A to decide). Just as W has explicitly given 
A the appropriate consent and things seem to turn out just as planned for A, he 
hears C crying out for help, who is just about to drown in the lake. A, being an 
excellent swimmer, could easily save C, however A is afraid that W might take 
back her consent if he would leave now. Suppose further that A is not only a 
decent lover, an excellent swimmer, but also a master at defusing bombs and at 
the very same time, whilst A and W are in the cabin and C is drowning in the 
lake, there is a huge bomb about to explode in the nearby town T, and A is the 
only one able to defuse it. However, he would not be able to both save C and 
defuse the bomb. Suppose further that all these are facts which A is aware of. 
What ought A do? In order to give an answer to this question, we have quite a 
few different sets of facts and circumstances to evaluate. First of all, with W’s 
consent, A certainly has a permission to have sex with her – a permission at least 
in relation to W herself. Nevertheless, we would assume that he also has an obli-
gation to save C’s life and, moreover, that this obligation somehow ‘outweighs’ 
his former permission. Yet, from an even wider angle the same would presum-
ably happen to this obligation in relation to the ‘conflicting’ obligation to defuse 
the bomb and save not one, but thousands of lives in T. The question we need 
to be concerned with in this context is: Are we dealing with different normative 
systems (due to the at least prima facie conflicting judgements) or simply seg-
 1. Normative Systems I: The Concept of a Normative System 27
ments of one and the same system? I assume the latter is the case and I shall try 
to show why that is so: Both action evaluations ‘A is permitted to have sex with 
W’ and ‘A is obliged to save C from drowning (instead of having sex with W)’ 
leave out essential features of the situation that is to be evaluated, in both cases 
the circumstances of the bomb scenario in T, A’s ability to help and his knowl-
edge of these facts. Supposing that we are dealing with a system that weighs 
saving others’ lives higher than individual pleasure, and in which the saving of 
a thousand lives is regarded as preferable to the saving of one, in our example 
the resulting, unambiguous judgement will have to be that defusing the bomb is 
obligatory for A, implying that all other actions are forbidden. The point is that 
in order to properly assess an action within a normative system, one needs to 
consider as much information as possible regarding the accompanying circum-
stances of the action in question. Moreover, I claim that this is a universal, how-
ever non-normative, claim within any normative system, as only by assessing 
an action properly, and that is comprehensively, we know exactly what the ob-
ject of our evaluation is in the first place. Only by presupposing the aim to eval-
uate one comprehensive set of facts we can prevent different competing action 
evaluations for the same situation (as in our example) and thus conflicting nor-
mative judgements within one system. Naturally, we could still formulate less 
wide action descriptions, only that this would be a straight way into confusion 
about actual, concrete normative demands (as we also saw in our example). 
Therefore, in order to determine the concrete normative demand derived from 
one set of principles or rules, we need first to consider the maximum of pos-
sibly relevant circumstances in a given situation. Once more, this claim is uni-
versal for all normative judgements within any normative system. Despite what 
some may assume now, this does not make me a moral particularist13, because 
there is a decisive constraint with regard to this claim, though one which does 
not affect its universality. Namely, it is not implied that all these circumstances 
considered also need to count as normatively relevant. The question regarding 
normative relevance is subsequent to the practical necessity of considering the 
maximum of possibly relevant circumstances. And it is answers to this question 
about relevance that actually define what a normative system is, what it consists 
of and what results it produces.
bb) Normative Relevance of Circumstances
Arguably, this qualification is in need of some further clarification. Let us there-
fore return to our example with the cabin at the lake. If I am correct with the 
universality claim above, then we are dealing with one normative system in the 
13 Jonathan Dancy, “Moral Particularism,” in Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed. 
Edward N. Zalta (Stanford University, 1997–), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/
entries/moral-particularism/. Cf. also id, Ethics without Principles (Oxford: Clarendon, 2004).
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example and different action evaluations, most of which are simply not accu-
rate enough. This assumption presupposes an important point though, namely 
that all circumstances described in the example are regarded as normatively rel-
evant within the system in question. Imagine, for instance, that A is an egois-
tic hedonist that principally does not care about other people but only about his 
own pleasures. In that case, following this moral code A would be permitted (if 
not even obliged) to have sex with W, and this so even if he would know and 
consider all the other circumstances mentioned in the example. Thus, we are of 
course dealing with a normative system here which is distinct from the one we 
described earlier in the cabin-example. In A’s egoistic system the set of norma-
tively relevant circumstances is considerably narrower. And exactly this is the 
crucial point: In order to identify a normative system, we need to determine two 
things, namely its set of values or what it counts as normatively relevant, and 
the fact that these values are applied in a consistent fashion, i. e. that for every 
specific action it produces only one prescription/concrete normative demand. 
This is the reason then why we should never a priori be restrictive with the cir-
cumstances considered. Otherwise we run the danger of not including all nor-
matively relevant reasons in our judgement and thus possibly ending up with a 
false normative conclusion on the basis of a given set of values. One might ob-
ject that the evaluations made on the basis of a restricted set of circumstances 
are not strictly speaking ‘false’, but merely represent some kind of prima-facie 
evaluations. Such a view would disregard the original purpose of prescriptions 
and normative systems in general, though, which is to guide agents in making 
concrete judgements in specific situations, to give them conclusive reasons for 
how to act in specific contexts. In what way is a prima-facie permission to sleep 
with W or a prima-facie obligation to save C useful for A in this situation in 
which he has to decide what to do? I tend to think it is useful in no way at all. 
This surely raises another possible objection: Is not the construction of different 
‘normative systems’ only another way of framing this problem by calling A’s 
permission to sleep with W no longer a prima-facie permission but a permis-
sion within another (in this case hedonistic) normative system? Even though not 
implausible, such an objection would miss the decisive point of my argument. 
I am not claiming that we cannot subdivide the decision-making process that is 
arriving at a normative verdict, with the language of ‘prima-facie obligations’ 
and the like being one way of doing so and the talk of ‘reasons’ that need to be 
balanced another. My point is simply that in order to make the most of this de-
cision-making process, in order for it to produce the most accurate and clear 
results, it needs to rely on a most accurate consideration of possibly relevant 
circumstances. Only then does a normative demand make proper sense in con-
nection with the normative context to which it refers, be it a much reduced nor-
mative system as in our hedonism example or a more comprehensive one as in 
the original example.
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To avoid misunderstandings, let me reframe the problem once more: First of 
all, it is important to note that the demonstrated consecutive two-step-process 
(first trying to consider all circumstances, then filtering out those that are nor-
matively relevant) is a necessity for theoretical accuracy. As such, it does not 
imply that in practical normative reasoning we actually always do proceed in 
that way nor that any of us ought to proceed in that way under all circumstances. 
On the contrary, our limitations with regard to time and information often re-
quire us in real life to perceive circumstances through a normative filter, i. e. to 
already perceive only certain circumstances as relevant due to normatively pre-
shaped mental images. My claim is not that one should always make an attempt 
to widen these pre-shaped images in order to come to ever more differentiated 
and better judgements. Although this seems not an entirely unreasonable claim 
(at least to a certain degree), it goes well beyond what I am trying to argue. To 
what extent it is actually good to make an effort to constantly widen one’s nor-
mative worldview and when it might not be is not our concern because it is an 
issue which needs to be resolved by a substantive normative theory.14 Accord-
ingly, pointing out the necessity to consider as many circumstances as possible 
for making a proper judgement is not making a normative claim, but rather aim-
ing for theoretical clarity. The fact that there is, within our (modest) theoretical 
framework, a possibility for normative systems to constantly expand their view 
on the world and consequently expand their normative checking routine is, as 
such a possibility, readily accepted. From a meta-ethical point of view this does 
not pose a problem because this possibility is not entailed by the demand that 
such an expansion has to or ought to happen. The central non-normative claim 
merely is that we are in need of clear and unambiguous judgements, no matter 
the normative basis for these judgements, and thus that the idea of prima-facie 
normative demands will often be misleading. After all, being normatively neu-
tral, this should be an entirely acceptable claim: We need precise normative 
judgements, i. e. we need to avoid the situation where a delimited canon of 
values generates incompatible prescriptions. This idea is already grounded in 
the very purpose of normative science as ‘applied science’. To practice law in 
particular, but also ethics, is or at least should not be mainly about elaborating 
ever more sophisticated accounts of the abstract wonders of values, principles 
or rules. It is about deciding cases, judging specific actions. The necessity to at 
least find unambiguous judgements is inherent to any normative practice then. 
In a nutshell: The claim that one ought to consider as many practical circum-
stances as possible already contains a decisive practical limitation: what exactly 
is regarded as still possible or advisable and what is not has to be determined by 
a substantive normative theory.
14 As is the related conflict between equity and legal certainty or between consequentialist 
and deontological reasoning; see therefore below sec. II, 4., c), dd).
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cc) Persistence of Normative Judgements
There are certain temporal problems with regard to the persistence of practical 
judgements within one system over time, which shall not be left unmentioned 
in this context. However, it is assumed that our meta-ethical consistency claim 
generally remains untouched by these problems, as they also need to be re-
solved by a substantive normative theory. In detail: There are mainly two prob-
lems regarding the temporal extension of normative systems. One is the prob-
lem of a change in norms after an action has been performed and the ensuing 
retrospective judgements.15 The second is the problem of future changes in ju-
dicature, i. e. the introduction of a differing judgement about the same kind of 
action without a relevant difference in circumstances.16 Presumably, by claim-
ing that every normative system needs to provide an ambiguous evaluation re-
garding a specific action it is not claimed that within this system the judgement 
cannot change over time, even without a relevant change in the circumstances. 
Hence, it is not implied that retroactive punishment, for example, is per se im-
possible. However, in order to allow for it to happen one would have to rely on 
a proper, substantive theory of the evolution of normative systems, which can-
not be provided here. This limitation of our theoretical approach is independent 
of the definitional claim that a normative system is best understood as a process 
rather than as a somewhat static set of rules or possibly a set of rules and prin-
ciples. Rules (and principles, for that matter) realise their inherent purpose by 
being applied to actions, and in order for rules to exist and to be applied we need 
abstract reasons.17 This constant interplay between the concrete level of actions 
and rule-application and the abstract level of reasons as a necessary feature of 
normative systems is what makes such systems more suitably defined as proc-
esses rather than aggregates of norms at a certain point in time. In fact, it seems 
advisable to distinguish between two different concepts of ‘process’ then: One 
refers to the idea of specification of normative content through application and 
is as such a definitional trait of normative systems as introduced earlier. The 
other one refers to the temporal dimension of normative systems, i. e. changes 
15 Perhaps most strikingly in the case of retroactive punishment. To get an impression of 
the two main opposing standpoints in this debate – still vivid till this day – see only: Gustav 
Radbruch, “Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht,” Süddeutsche Juristen-Zeitung 
1 (1946): 105–108; H. L. A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,” in Es-
says in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 72–78. Cf. 
also Hart, Concept of Law, 211–212.
16 Regarding the theoretical problem of to what extent legitimate expectations regarding 
the law are (or rather ought to be) protected for the future, that is to say the problematic im-
plications of the doctrine of judicial precedent, i. e. the binding effect of (high-court) judge-
ments, cf. only Michael Gerhardt, “The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking 
and Theory,” College of William & Mary Law School Faculty Publications Paper 980 (1991), 
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/980.
17 For an elaborate explanation of this point in considerable detail see below sec. II, 4., b).
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of content over time, and is as such excluded from our investigation. Precisely, 
it is assumed that the timeliness of normative systems in terms of norm ap-
plication is independent of the question of to what extent time itself can affect 
changes in a system’s content. In order to answer these questions, in order to 
properly explain the idea of law as a process in the latter sense, we are in need 
of a substantive theory that offers an account of the functions of concrete nor-
mative judgements in time – a theory that can surely not be provided here.18
c) Theoretical Relevance of the Concept
A specific problem about our definition of normative systems might be its pos-
sible width, or rather the danger that it might be too narrow to actually be of rel-
evance in order to explain complex normative nexuses, because when strictly 
applied also a sole and simple norm would fall under the definition. However, 
this problem appears more fearsome than it actually is, as it is also entirely pos-
sible to subsume much more complex systems under the definition, e. g. the 
catalogue of fundamental rights in the German constitution. In fact, any (how-
ever large) set of principles issued by a specific authority and addressed to a 
set of agents can be a normative system as long as it delivers consistent results, 
i. e. as long as it ultimately matches every specific action with an equally spe-
cific normative demand. Therefore, not all principles that are part of the system 
need to play a relevant role in every judgement made on the basis of the sys-
tem, which makes it possible for more complex systems to adequately capture 
a great amount of actions. Hence, even though the conclusions we are about to 
draw about the structure of normative systems will not be about ‘the law’ in its 
entirety,19 they are far from being trivial. They do have explanatory relevance at 
least with regard to large parts of what we know as law, e. g. constitutional law 
or the law of fundamental rights.20
2. Freedom of Decision and Actions
As we can see from the standard examples concerning rights in sec. I, 1., a), bb), 
the notion of rights seems to be one which is for the most part closely linked 
with that of actions – either one’s own actions as in ‘A has a right to do X’ or 
18 Especially, such a theory would have to include a proper assessment of the conflicting 
functions of orientation, i. e. for agents to ex ante know how to direct their future behaviour, 
and an indicatory/establishing function, i. e. reacting to changes in social values by setting a 
new standard for conduct.
19 See below sec. II, 5., esp. b) and d).
20 Moreover, the fact that even a single norm falls under the definition serves as a good 
indicator for the vast extension of normative systems in normative practice, see below sec. II, 
5., b).
32 II. The General Functionality of Normative Systems
someone else’s as in ‘A has a right that B not do X’. Hence, we need to suppose 
that in order to gain an appropriate understanding of the notion of a right, one 
ought to be clear about the concept of actions to begin with. This is what we 
shall attend to in the following section.
a) Necessary Presupposition: Undetermined Decisions
Before we start examining the concept of actions as such, we ought to clari-
fy one notion that is often regarded as a precondition for our very ability to be 
moral agents: free will. In this respect, our hypothesis shall be: Some idea of 
an agent’s ability to make undetermined (or at least not entirely determined21) 
decisions, i. e. an agent’s ability to decide for themselves between different op-
tions with regard to their behaviour, is a necessary precondition for any concept 
of normativity.
Before clarifying the plausibility of this assertion, at first it seems vital to dis-
tinguish two different ways in which the notion of decisions could generally be 
understood. First, we could understand it in an internal way, thus being limited 
to the area of the mind. In that sense one could e. g. decide to do more sports in 
the future, yet doing so could be and remain a purely ‘mental act’. Generally, 
one can simply regard something as valuable in his or her mind and we could 
regard that act as his or her ‘decision’. On the other hand, there is the notion of 
a decision applied, an effective or practical decision as one might call it, which 
leads to perceivable events in a social, intersubjective environment. In this sec-
tion on the meaning of actions we shall restrict ourselves to this second under-
standing of decisions. It is in these effective decisions that the mind actually 
meets the world, that the deontic meets the ontic. Hence, a general distinction 
is proposed between an intrapersonal level of normativity, which is concerned 
with mental activity like thoughts, wishes, fantasies, deliberations, plans, etc. – 
plainly speaking: with all that happens ‘only’ in our heads – and an interper-
sonal one, which is concerned with analysing actions and normative systems.22 
21 Notably, the notion ‘undetermined’ should not be understood in a particularly strong 
sense. Even if we correctly understand (legal) autonomy as a ‘threshold concept’ (in German: 
“Schwellenkonzept”, see: Thomas Gutmann, Freiwilligkeit als Rechtsbegriff (München: Beck, 
2001), 6–12, esp. 9–10), i. e. as something which an entity either possesses or lacks in a binary 
fashion, beyond this threshold – i. e. amongst such beings generally regarded as autonomous – 
a decision can surely be more or less influenced by external, heteronomous factors (ibid, 7). In 
other words, the idea of ‘undetermined decisions’ as introduced here and as used subsequently 
does not (have to) rely on a strong concept of metaphysical freedom in the sense that these de-
cisions must be entirely free of external influences, but it simply presupposes the general ca-
pacity to form an independent decision between different options of conduct in light of more or 
less strong heteronomous influence on one’s decision-making ability. The crucial idea is that of 
a resulting, realised option of conduct being retraceable to a decision which is at least not fully 
explainable in terms of external causes.
22 Again, the resemblance to a traditional Kantian distinction is unmistakeable, i. e. Kant’s 
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Admittedly, by making this assumption I will have to rely on the reader’s pre-
theoretic intuitions to a certain degree.23 And surely, the proposed distinction 
is not at all unproblematic. For example, can there not be interpersonal rules 
sometimes which forbid intrapersonal acts? Suppose the moral code of a com-
munity does not allow persons to fantasise about killing other people, maybe 
not enforcing the prohibition with drastic legal sanctions but at least with some 
kind of (moral) reproach, because such fantasising is thought to be bad for the 
development of one’s own character or personality. Suppose further that A viv-
idly imagines killing B and later on talks about these fantasies. Consequently, 
A would have to be reproached for his fantasies. Thus, can there be interperson-
al rules whose purpose is the evaluation of mental processes? One might think 
that the reproach is only possible because A confesses his phantasies and thus 
puts them into an intersubjective sphere. An adequate response to this objection 
could be the following: Clearly the reproach does not depend on the mere tell-
ing of having had such fantasies, but on allowing oneself to have had them in 
the first place. Yet, only by reporting about the mental activity did it become 
perceivable in an intersubjective context in the first place. In this way A’s fan-
tasy also became an intersubjectively perceivable event, an event which we be-
lieve can have causal effects like spoiling one’s character. Not until we regard 
it as such can a link be established from the event to a somewhat blameworthy 
decision and, consequently, can moral responsibility be ascribed. Thus, the ex-
ample does not disprove our conception of events as occurrences perceivable 
in a social context, distinguishable from mere mental activity, but rather helps 
to reinforce it.24
Let us return to our initial assertion that the individual ability to make un-
determined decisions is a necessary, internal precondition of our normative 
practice. To begin with, the idea of practical decisions as the link between mind 
and world is loosely based on a Kantian understanding of agent causation, di-
viding causality in general into natural causality (i. e. the laws of physics) on 
the one hand and a ‘causality by freedom’ on the other, which means that agents 
acting on behalf of their own decisions create their own causes that cannot be 
distinction between ‘morality’ and ‘legality’ (Kant, Metaphysics, 375, 383). Kant held that 
the law, in contrast to morals, “has to do, first, only with the external and indeed practical re-
lation of one person to another, insofar as their actions, as deeds, can have (direct or indirect) 
influence on each other” (ibid, 387). Without committing myself (or indeed having to commit 
myself) to the Kantian distinction between law and morals in detail, I do believe this general 
separation between an intrapersonal and an interpersonal level of normativity to be a rather 
useful axiom in order to roughly map out a way through normativity in total.
23 Cf. Kent Bach, “Actions are not Events,” Mind 89 (January 1980): 115.
24 The possibility that this proposed demarcation between interpersonally perceivable 
events and mere intrapersonal mental activity might not be entirely congruent with the one 
between morality and legality in a Kantian sense (see above sec. II, fn. 22) poses a problem, 
which unfortunately cannot be solved here but could give rise to further investigations.
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explained as the effect of any prior cause.25 I am thereby not necessarily sup-
porting all Kantian claims about the nature of causality and/or perception.26 The 
only point is that within a normative system, if we aim at ascribing responsibil-
ity for actions in the first place, we cannot avoid adopting such a differentiated 
account of causality, just as we cannot avoid adopting some account of freedom 
of will, yet only to the extent that we presuppose both accounts as an internal 
element of our normative practice. Thus, the initial assertion might seem like 
an enormously strong claim only at first glance as no claim about an actual ex-
istence of any kind of free will is entailed by it. Essentially, what we are dealing 
with in this respect is the long-standing debate regarding the possible compati-
bility of the notions of free will on the one hand and the idea of a causal deter-
minism on the other.27 A development and defence of a reasonably elaborate 
position in this extensive academic debate between compatibilists and incom-
patibilists is plainly impossible in this context. Thus, a position in this dispute 
will only be taken insofar as we shall make the following, supposedly rather 
modest, axiomatic assumption: Even if there were no actual free will, we would 
still have to presuppose it in social life within the internal logic of our normative 
practice in order to ascribe responsibility.28 In other words, we need a notion 
of free decisions in order to make sense of normative practice in the first place, 
25 Following Kant, a human agent, being part of the physical world, is submitted to the 
(causal) rules of this world. Yet, by also being an intelligible being it can start new causal 
chains due to his or her own willing. In this way the two forms of causality are compatible. To 
be precise and avoid misunderstandings it would probably be better not to speak of “two forms 
of causality” in this context in the first place. Also for Kant there is only one set of causal state-
ments that describe the relation between a cause and an effect, which is natural causality. ‘Cau-
sality by freedom’ does not imply another kind of causal relation, but rather only adds the idea 
of independent causes to the general concept, see Kant, Pure Reason, 465: “[…] causality [of 
our will] […], independently of those natural causes, and even contrary to their force and in-
fluence, can produce something that is determined in the time-order in accordance with empir-
ical laws, and which can therefore begin a series of events entirely of itself”. See also ibid, 634. 
Cf. Eric Watkins, “Kant,” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, ed. Timothy O’Connor 
and Constantine Sandis (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 526.
26 For a rough outline of such a Kantian account of causality see Bertram Kienzle, “Klassi-
sche Kausalität mit und ohne Konstanz,” in Auf Freigang, ed. Sibille Mischer, Michael Quante, 
and Christian Suhm (Münster: Lit, 2003), 93 ff.
27 For a traditional incompatibilist view see e. g. George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning 
the Principles of Human Knowledge, ed. Jonathan Dancy (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1998 [1710]). For a classical compatibilist account cf. esp. Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard 
Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, repr. 2006 [1651]). For a good overview over 
the more recent development of the debate see Neil Levy and Michael McKenna, “Recent 
Work on Moral Responsibility,” Philosophy Compass 4 (2009).
28 For a more sophisticated development of this general idea see Michael Quante, “Philos-
ophische Freiheiten. Eine systematische Landkarte zur Einleitung,” in Auf Freigang, ed. Sibil-
le Mischer, Michael Quante, and Christian Suhm (Münster: Lit, 2003), 14 ff.; id, Einführung 
in die Allgemeine Ethik, 4th ed. (Darmstadt: Wiss. Buchgesellschaft, 2011), 165 ff., esp. 175. 
Here Quante aptly describes freedom as an ‘internal momentum’ of our ethical practice of as-
cribing responsibility.
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i. e. the practice of prescribing rules and ascribing responsibility for not com-
plying with them. Only radically deterministic incompatibilist approaches are 
thus excluded from the scope of this thesis. A detailed explanation of why this 
is believed to be an acceptable (and supposedly largely agreeable) consequence 
is arguably beyond the scope of this thesis.
b) The Concept of Actions
What exactly is an action then? We will begin scrutinising this question by 
sketching the rudiments of Donald Davidson’s standard account in this respect. 
Surely, a comprehensive analysis of this standard conception, let alone of the 
theory of actions in total, cannot be provided here. However, a few weakness-
es of the standard account shall be pointed out, namely those which are rel-
evant for our purposes. In this process, the outlines of a concept of actions will 
emerge, which shall serve as a basis for the further investigation of rights.
aa) The Standard Conception
Arguably the most common and widely accepted approach to an action def-
inition is the one offered by Donald Davidson, who designed and defended a 
causal theory of action, i. e. a theory which claims that an “agent performs an 
action only if an appropriate internal state of the agent causes a particular result 
in a certain way”29. In fact, even though his works have been subject to a wide 
debate and have prompted quite a lot of disagreement – often enough with good 
reasons as we will see – Davidson’s main theses about the nature of actions re-
main so widely accepted in contemporary literature on actions that they are 
worth being treated as a basis for the ensuing investigation. A convincing theory 
of actions will have to engage with Davidson’s fundamental theses, which shall 
be summarised as follows30:
(I) Actions are events. Taken into account the distinction between world and 
mind made before, Davidson draws a rather natural conclusion, which is still 
drawn by most authors concerned with action theory nowadays, namely that ac-
tions essentially are events. More precisely, an action is supposed to be a certain 
kind of event – one which is in some way caused or can be explained in terms 
of a preceding mental activity by the agent performing the event. That is: If A’s 
29 Wayne Davis, “The Causal Theory of Action,” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Ac-
tion, ed. Timothy O’Connor and Constantine Sandis (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010). Davis 
offers a brief introduction to causal theories of action in general. Cf. also Donald Davidson, 
“Actions, Reasons, and Causes,” The Journal of Philosophy 60 (November 1963).
30 The three main theses are inspired by the outline of Davidson’s account in: Ralf Stoeck-
er, introduction to Handlungen und Handlungsgründe, ed. Ralf Stoecker (Paderborn: Mentis, 
2002), ix–xii. Cf. also id, “Davidson,” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, ed. Timo-
thy O’Connor and Constantine Sandis (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 603.
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arm rises, the event – that is, what everybody can witness – is ‘A’s arm rising’. 
If, however, the overt arm movement is caused by some mental episode of A’s, 
we say ‘A raised his arm’ as a specific way of describing the event ‘arm rising’ 
and thus qualifying it as an action.31
(II) Actions are explicable by a pair of attitudes of the agent, his or her pri-
mary reason. The mental side of acting, which Davidson is referring to here, 
has been given a lot of different names. Whilst he wants the cause for a physical 
event classified as an action to be understood as the pair of desire and appropri-
ate belief of the acting agent,32 others have preferred notions like intention33, 
willing34, or volition35. And even though very different in detail, they all have 
in common that they describe a somehow irreducible mental element of what 
constitutes an ‘action’, or more precisely a behaviour that is at least thought to 
be under some kind of control by the agent performing it.
(III) The relation between primary reason (II) and the event under (I) is that 
of cause and effect. According to this orthodox position there are two events in-
volved in explaining actions: a mental one (II), and the actual physical event 
(I), the ‘action’ s. str. The relation between these two represents a third element 
of the action definition in need of explanation. The orthodox position holds that 
there is a causal relation between (II) and (I).
bb) The Causal Structure of Action Explanations
Consequently, we shall examine possible defects of these conceptions, espe-
cially regarding the proposed underlying causal structure, which is adopted by 
most contemporary conceptions of actions. Precisely, we shall demonstrate that 
the model ‘event – causal relation – event’ is not appropriate and that the logic 
of actions requires a more complex model of causality, one that accounts for the 
notion of independent first causes36 in the form of undetermined or not entirely 
determined practical decisions, which mainly function as the leverage point for 
the ascription of responsibility for performing an action.37 In detail:
31 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, repr. 1995 
[1953]), § 621, 161.
32 Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes,” 686.
33 This term has been fundamentally shaped by Gertrude Anscombe, mostly in: id, Inten-
tion (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979 [1957]). Cf. Michael Bratman, Intention, Plans and Practical 
Reason, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987). In contrast to Davidson’s account 
Bratman held someone’s ‘intention’ to be an irreducible mental element, not to be divisible into 
desire and belief. Cf. also id, Faces of Intention, 244–245.
34 Herbert Grice, “Intention and Uncertainty,” in Proceedings of the British Academy 
Vol. 57 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971).
35 Carl Ginet, On Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 30–39.
36 Cf. above sec. II, fn. 25.
37 This problem is relevant in the context of rights as a conception of actions being both 
a decision in favour of an option X and against an option Y, which is implied by the proposed 
causal structure of actions, is vital for the ensuing critical re-analysis of the deontic operators, 
 2. Freedom of Decision and Actions 37
To begin with, let us consider the different existing positions regarding the 
causal structure of actions in order to adequately distance ourselves from them. 
Therefore, let us once more suppose that actions have something to do with (a) 
a physical event and (b) some kind of mental episode. Roughly four different 
positions can be distinguished then:38 (1) The term ‘action’ describes an event 
and only this single event as a basic action.39 The corresponding mental activity 
is the cause but is not to be confused with the actual action-event, which may 
have further imputable effects. In accordance with this, we may distinguish dif-
ferent descriptions of the same basic action. Roughly, this is the orthodox posi-
tion held by Davidson and his followers. (2) Others claim that the term action 
essentially refers only to the mental act involved, which is in the relevant lit-
erature often referred to as the act of ‘trying’.40 This classification is supposed 
to give a clearer account of the specific intentional nature of actions. The under-
lying reasoning is all but implausible: In the standard example the event of arm 
rising stays the same, whether it happens intentionally or not. The difference 
lies in the causal ‘bringing about’ of the event, i. e. the ‘trying’ by the agent. So, 
if the mental act of trying is what defines an action, we might just as well have 
found our essential defining feature. (3) Notwithstanding the soundness of this 
argument, others raised the equally sound objection that the mere ‘trying’ with-
out any accompanying event cannot reasonably be called an action, certainly 
because it would deviate too much from our ordinary understanding and usage 
of the term ‘action’. For example, a person with a numb arm might mentally try 
to raise it without any perceivable outward effect. Did he nevertheless perform 
an action? This appears at least doubtful, which is why quite a few scholars 
have argued that the term action is best described by combining all elements of 
the causal process. Hence, an action is supposed to be best described as a com-
whose results in turn will enhance our understanding of the theoretical structures underlying 
not only the Hohfeldian scheme of legal entitlements, but also and especially the dispute be-
tween Interest and Choice Theory.
38 Cf. Christoph Lumer, “Handlung/Handlungstheorie,” in Enzyklopädie Philosophie, ed. 
Hans Jörg Sandkühler (Hamburg: Meiner, 1999), 540.
39 Donald Davidson, “Agency,” in Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1980), 59; the assumption that actions are events is wide-spread. Hornsby, on the other hand, 
has contended that actions could be better understood as ‘activity’, as something that an agent 
is engaged in, that he or she is doing rather than simply an event happening. This account is 
not entirely convincing, either, as even attempts to do something, i. e. engaging in doing some-
thing but not being able to finish it, can be described as events, namely the events of starting to 
do something, thereby aiming at a certain goal. See Jennifer Hornsby, “Basic Activity,” Aris-
totelian Society Supplementary 87 (June 2013): 7.
40 Jennifer Hornsby, “Trying to Act,” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, ed. 
Timothy O’Connor and Constantine Sandis (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010). Cf. id, Actions 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980). Cf. also Ginet, On Action, 15–20, even though 
Ginet puts an emphasis on the notion of a ‘volition’ as the defining feature of an action, see 
above sec. II, fn. 35.
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bination of both the act of trying plus the ensuing physical event.41 (4) Finally, 
there are those who claim an action is best described as neither the event nor 
the mental activity but rather as the specific causal relation between these two 
elements.42 With this position it is argued that an action is neither an event it-
self nor a mental act causing the event – it is more precisely said to be the very 
causing of the event. Thus, the action is identified with the intentional bring-
ing about of the event.43 It seems evident that this position faces possibly even 
greater doubts with regard to compatibility with everyday usage and common 
understanding of the term ‘action’ than position (2) before.
Without wanting to dwell on the respective strengths and weaknesses of each 
position, for our purposes it is most noteworthy that all of them have one thing 
in common: Their conceptions are based on the same structural phenomena 
with regard to actions and causation. In all four there is some mental event or 
mental act involved, e. g. an intention or volition to do something, which causes 






Figure 1: Causality Model I.
Thus, in a way they fail to converge on a single definition for ‘action’ because 
they have a single practical phenomenon to define but are bound to a causal 
theorem which consists of three different elements – two events and their re-
lation.44 Whilst all four positions at least agree on this basic structure, a con-
ception of agent causation45, as it is proposed here, differs not only in terms of 
which elements are to be included into the definition but also in terms of the un-
derlying causal structure. Presumably, we experience problems in defining what 
an action is just because we are concerned with a phenomenon located at the 
41 See only Brian O’Shaughnessy, “Trying (as the Mental ‘Pineal Gland’),” The Journal of 
Philosophy 70 (June 1973): 383–386.
42 Georg von Wright, Norm and Action – A logical enquiry (London: Routledge, 1963), 
35 ff. Cf. also Fred Dretske, Explaining Behaviour (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 17. 
Dretske also focuses on the causal relation between some internal occurrence and external be-
haviour. He does not, however, describe it as a punctual moment in time, but as a “process – 
C’s causing M – that begins with C and ends with M”. Thus, Dretske’s view must probably also 
be located somewhere in between (3) and (4) of the suggested categories.
43 Von Wright, Norm and Action, 35 ff. Cf. also Maria Alvarez and John Hyman, “Agents 
and Their Actions,” Philosophy 73 (1998): 219–221.
44 O’Shaugnessy, “Trying,” 375.
45 For a rough outline of such a theory of agent causation see Randolph Clarke, “Toward a 
Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free Will,” Noûs 27 (June 1993): 191–203. See also below 
sec. II, fn. 48.
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very crossroads of mind and world. Thus, roughly speaking, it could be argued 
that it is neither to be found only on one or the other side, see position (1) and 
(2), nor on both together, see position (3), but rather that it is the crossroads, the 
very link between mind and world. Von Wright once described this idea quite fit-
tingly (in spite of arguing against it almost in the same breath) as a momentary 
“click in the brain” – the moment in which a state of mind turns into an outward 
behaviour.46 Yet, arguably, this ‘relation’ between the two levels, the linking 
notion between the mental and the physical aspect of acting, between the mind 
and the world, is not some in-between between cause and effect, but it is best 
described as a cause by itself, an undetermined first cause.47 O’Connor gets to 
the heart of this idea of first causes, when he writes: “I am the source of my own 
activity, not merely in a relative sense as the most proximate and salient locus 
of an unbroken chain of causal transactions leading up to this event, but funda-








Figure 2: Causality Model II – Agent Causation.
The defect of the standard conception is thus that it relies on a one-track con-
ception of causality, that is, the notion that every event can be explained caus-
ally, i. e. every event is both cause for some effect and effect of some preceding 
cause. If we as a moral or legal community want to hold people responsible for 
their actions this model is insufficient, though. If actions were causally explica-
ble the notion of individual responsibility could not be simultaneously held up. 
Therefore, a practical decision needs to be understood as unique in its causal 
46 Georg von Wright, “Explanation and Understanding of Action,” Revue Internationale 
de Philosophie 35 (1981): 138–139.
47 Hence, Bach’s account (4) is indeed able to explain the importance of decisions for de-
scribing certain events and only these events as actions. Unfortunately, he does not identify the 
action with the underlying practical decision as an event birthed into the world by an agent’s 
discretion, but instead he regards the mere relation between two separate events as an action 
and thus identifies it with virtually no relevant entity at all. As such it cannot reasonably be re-
garded as a suitable definition. Precisely, when Bach states “Actions […], not being events, are 
neither causes nor effects” (Bach, Events, 120) he goes one step too far. Correctly understood, 
an action is a cause, yet simply not any cause but a first, undetermined one.
48 Timothy O’Connor, “Agent Causation,” in Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on 
Indeterminism and Free Will, ed. Timothy O’Connor (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1995), 173. For an excellent overview of agent causal theories from Reid to Chisholm see: 
Timothy O’Connor, Persons and Causes (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 43–66.
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structure by being an independent first cause, i. e. only a cause. It should alrea-
dy be clear from the context that the notion of a practical decision describes the 
result of a (supposed) mental process, i. e. in favour of X and against alternative 
options, and not the process itself. These decisions then cannot be explained in 
terms of their own causes, but only in terms of reasons for making them, which 
in a way opens up the ontic world of cause and effect to the deontic world of 
possibilities and options. Importantly, a more general idea of causation is there-
by not given up, i. e. the relation of cause and effect is not principally question-
ed. We rather need to enrich our understanding of causality by adding the ele-
ment of practical decisions as first causes for ensuing effects in order to make 
sense of our normative practice.49
Arguably, the relation between the concepts of ‘actions’ and ‘practical deci-
sions’ is in need of some further clarifications. Precisely, we may ask ourselves: 
Is a practical decision itself already an action? If so, are both concepts equiv-
alent and therefore interchangeable? To begin with, the terms are by no means 
equivalent, though they are very closely connected. Looking to figure 2 above, 
we shall understand an action as (intersubjectively perceivable and thus evalu-
able50) practical effects or occurrences which we ascribe to an agent as his or 
her doing. We are only able to ascribe them, though, by supposing some kind 
of control of the agent over the respective events – precisely, by supposing that 
the agent decided to let them happen, despite the fact the she could have decid-
ed not to do so. Quite simply, this very connection between causal world and 
conscious agent, the possibility to impute practical effects to an agent, is rep-
resented by the notion of a practical decision. Importantly, ‘decision’ is not to 
be understood in the sense of a necessarily conscious act, but rather only in the 
sense of an agent’s acute ability to decide differently with regard to the imput-
ed effects, i. e. the idea that A performed an action X because she somehow 
could have decided to perform Y instead.51 Accordingly, a practical decision is 
not just some mental act that could or could not have consequences in the real 
world; rather, the very notion necessarily implies such effects as it represents 
the (otherwise missing) link between mind and world. Put bluntly, it merely 
49 Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1976), 69–
72. Cf. also O’Connor, Persons and Causes, 68–74.
50 Once more, the notion of ‘internal actions’ is already conceptually excluded due to the 
exclusive focus on intersubjectively perceivable events. As much is thought to be a plausible 
and useful limitation of the concept of actions as an essential feature of actions is the fact that 
they are evaluable. As we saw earlier, such evaluations occur in intersubjective contexts, see 
above example in sec. II, 2., a). Consequently, the idea of an only internal action must be a con-
tradictio in adjecto.
51 In this respect our account crucially differs from Harry Frankfurt’s account of actions, 
which is essentially flawed. Decisive for the determination of an action is the possible other-
ness of the underlying decision, not of the externally perceivable events. See therefore below 
sec. II, 2., c).
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represents the fact that you let your mental activity have practical effects on the 
world.52 Hence, a practical decision cannot itself be an action. Actions comprise 
both practical effects and an imputation context. Thus, for reasons of theoretical 
clarity it seems appropriate to distinguish sharply between actions as the objects 
of evaluation in normative practice, and practical decisions as the reference 
point for such evaluations. Precisely, in normative practice we assess and ev-
aluate actions, i. e. practical occurrences imputed to an agent as her doing, and 
not practical decisions, already because the latter cannot even be named due to 
their sole function as imputation connections. Yet, as we shall see in much de-
tail in sec. II, 3., the structure of action evaluations corresponds to the structure 
of practical decisions because it is these decisions which function as leverage 
points for ascribing responsibility in the first place. Thus, a practical decision 
could be described as the origin of an action, but it certainly is not an action it-
self, which ultimately debilitates possible objections regarding an otherwise im-
plausible ‘regress of actions’, which would occur if we were to equate actions 
and (practical) decisions. Only in that case the decision to do something would 
require another decision/action to decide accordingly and so forth.53
Once more in other words: The notion of a practical decision both represents 
a necessary condition for actions, yet by definition it cannot occur on its own. 
Being a first cause its very existence already implies some practical effects 
and thus the existence of some (yet unspecified) action. These thoughts can 
be neatly illustrated by employing the image of a source in relation to its river: 
Clearly, the source is not (equivalent to) the river. Still, without source there 
can be no river. And the existence of a source necessarily implies the existence 
of a river, though which may vary greatly in length and width. To conclude: 
Practical decisions are best understood as the leverage points for the ascription 
52 Thereby it is irrelevant whether the effects come from active or passive behaviour. If we 
generally presuppose a decision-making-ability, then one cannot avoid making practical deci-
sions/performing actions – even if you decide not to act, then the action ‘standing still’ has an 
effect on the world as you could have done something different, see below sec. I, 3., b), aa), (1) 
on the nature and meaning of omissions.
53 Christian Budnik, “Überlegen und Entscheiden,” in Handbuch Handlungstheorie, ed. 
Michael Kühler and Markus Rüther (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2016), 172. As indicated there, quite a 
few theorists will probably object to the notion of undetermined decisions as these decisions’ 
provenance allegedly remains somewhat mystical. Yet, that would be a justified objection only 
if we already supposed that everything had to be explainable in terms of cause and effect, i. e. 
that everything has to have a provenance in the form of a cause. In fact, why should it not be 
plausible to assume the idea of a consciousness (possibly as the result of a very long evolution-
ary development) that initiates its own causal chains, especially by virtue of this being some-
thing that we all experience? To be clear, I am still not claiming that there actually is freedom 
of this sort, but I am simply concerned with the question: What do we have to suppose in order 
to make sense of our normative practice? What are its foundations? In this respect, I seriously 
wonder why it should be more mysterious to presuppose something which we are all familiar 
with from our own subjective experience, namely our ability to make decisions, than presup-
posing a lack of that very thing. In fact, the latter appears more of a mystery to me.
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of responsibility or blame for actions, i. e. by means of practical decisions we 
establish a connection between the agent and practical occurrences, whereas 
actions are a means to (linguistically) frame the overall context, the leverage 
point plus imputable effects. Moreover, in the internal logic and practice of a 
normative system, i. e. for our purposes, it is sufficient to work with actions and 
suppose the notion of a practical decision only as a means to impute practical 
effects to an agent. Once more figuratively speaking, we know everything that 
defines a river if we learn about its course from its mouth back to its source 
without necessarily having to know where exactly the water comes from. Thus, 
more intricate matters regarding the nature of decisions in a more general sense 
as (purely) mental episodes, e. g. the relation of deliberations and decisions54, 
can be left undetermined due to our focus on intersubjective normative prac-
tice. Importantly, the effects of practical decisions can – again in analogy to the 
river-image – be both temporally distant and/or imputed in a general fashion 
to a series of individual practical decisions, which shall be demonstrated in the 
following section.
cc) Breadth and Generality of Action Descriptions
In addition to the implied mono-causal structure of cause and effect, Davidson’s 
idea of a concept of actions being limited to ‘basic actions’ deserves rejection 
as well. In normative practice we ought to opt for a much broader understand-
ing of the term – a task which is most relevant for our enterprise, as it would 
add yet another ‘valve’ of theoretical complexity. In short, in normative theory 
in general and in the theory of rights in particular we are concerned with action 
evaluations. Presumably, the result of an action evaluation essentially depends 
on the breadth and generality of the respective action. If this action can be ev-
erything from the most concrete to the most general, the task of preliminarily 
clarifying the exact action examined clearly is one of major importance for the 
resulting judgement.55
54 Budnik, “Überlegen und Entscheiden,” 172–176, with further references.
55 Instantly problematic appears the relation between (1) this rather wide concept of ac-
tions and (2) the above mentioned theoretical necessity to take into account all relevant cir-
cumstances for an action evaluation. Presumably, we need to distinguish two different problem 
areas here: With (1) we are concerned with the generality of action descriptions, e. g. the action 
‘building a house’ as the summary of various single steps and single actions, whereas with (2) 
we claimed that in order to evaluate each action we need to consider all relevant circumstances 
for this action. An example: A builds a house on his land. For quite a few parts of it she hires 
illicit workers. Clearly, the latter action is forbidden. That does not make the former, more gen-
eral action forbidden, though. Rather we can say “A was permitted to build her house”, despite 
the fact that not every single step was legitimate. Importantly, the result of an action evaluation 
is essentially dependent on the width/generality of the action description in question. Only for 
this description can we actually determine all situationally relevant circumstances. In case of 
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(1) Breadth
The standard account claims that only the basic event, i. e. roughly the first 
identifiable event in a however long causal chain, is a proper ‘action’ and that 
the ascription of further causal effects merely represents different possible de-
scriptions of the same basic action. Hence, with the width of actions we mean 
the possibility to describe a series of effects in temporal order as an action itself, 
depending only on the possibility to impute these events to the exercised will of 
an agent (or possibly a group of agents56).
In order to elucidate the underlying problem let us have a look at a rather spe-
cific problem from the field of action theory, namely that of action individua-
tion.57 The problem basically deals with the temporal integration of actions, i. e. 
with the question: When does an action take place? Bach illustrates the prob-
lem appealingly with an example, which shall be adopted for our purposes:58 
Camper A fires his rifle at an attacking coyote. The coyote, badly wounded, flees 
and dies 24 hours later from the fatal wound. What exactly did A do? Which 
action or actions did he perform? There are various ways of describing what 
happened. At least the three most distinct shall be listed here: (a) A pulled the 
trigger. (b) A shot at the coyote. (c) A killed the coyote. Davidson and other pro-
ponents of the standard account claim that only one action happened, the basic 
action (a). All other statements are supposed to be nothing but different de-
scriptions of the somehow primitive action ‘pulling the trigger’.59 This position 
can also be referred to as a reductionist account.60 Yet, following the standard 
account we are faced with the problem that A apparently killed the animal 24 
hours before it actually died, which seems plain wrong.61 In contrast, the stand-
ard account argues that if we qualify (c) as an independent action, then A seem-
ingly engaged in killing the coyote for a whole 24 hours, even though he might 
the action ‘building a house’, that means all circumstances concerning the question of whether 
it was allowed to build a house on this piece of land, in general and with whatever means.
56 The intricate problem of group action cannot be dealt with further here. At any rate, the 
possibility of group actions is not excluded by the thoughts and remarks provided. Cf. also 
below sec. III, 1., a), bb), (1) for an explanation of how Wesley N. Hohfeld’s scheme of entitle-
ments is able to account for such ‘group actions’.
57 Sometimes also referred to as the ‘time-of-a-killing-problem’, see Judith J. Thomson, 
“The Time of a Killing,” The Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): 115. Cf. also Donald Davidson, 
“The Individuation of Events,” in Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980).
58 Bach, Events, 117.
59 Davidson, “Ageny,” 59. Cf. Anscombe, Intention, 45–46.
60 Irving Thalberg, Perception, Emotion, and Action (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1977), 85.
61 The same happens if we apply the definition from position (2) above, probably even 
more so in this case: A would have killed the coyote by just trying to shoot at it. Bach in a way 
eludes the problems associated with individuation in his account (4), but at the (much too) 
high cost that his ‘actions’ are no longer relevant entities at all (see above sec. II, fn. 47). Cf. 
Stoecker, introduction, xxi.
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have been on the way home or doing something entirely different already at 
the actual time of death. This is only a pseudo-problem, though. Whether a set 
of facts, an event or a series of events can be ascribed to an agent as his or her 
action is not a question of consciousness about the events or effects at the time 
of their occurrence. It is a (normative) matter of imputation of the effects to a 
practical decision, which in turn will depend on the (subjective or intersubjec-
tive) foreseeability of certain consequences. If A foresaw and could foresee that 
his rifle shot would (or at least could) eventually kill the coyote, why should 
we not qualify (c) as an independent action? Our example – like all standard 
examples for the problem of action individuation (e. g. poisoning the well, flip-
ping a light switch, etc.) – have in common that there is only one practical de-
cision but several effects associated, which are temporally detached. That is, (a) 
can be assigned to a specific point of time t1. At exactly t1 A pulled the trigger 
then, whereas (b) happens at a point of time t2 and the coyote dies at a point of 
time t3. In my view, each of the events at t1 till t3 can without inconsistencies be 
called actions of A, because as much is not a matter of when something happens 
that could be directly influenced by A but rather it is a normative matter of im-
putation, of ascribing an event (or a series of events) to a decision. Imputation 
of certain effects is necessary in order to ascribe responsibility for an action, in 
fact in order to qualify something as an action in the first place. If that is so then 
in terms of terminology it is an unreasonable claim that we should only think 
of the practical decision, the basic action, as a proper action. In fact, an action 
fits practical needs much better if it is understood as at least one first cause plus 
further imputable effects. In other words, the content of (a) simply is the mini-
mum content that one can expect from an action. Other causally related effects, 
as long as they are regarded as imputable, can form actions just as well. Thus, 
there is no reason not to think of three distinct actions in the above mentioned 
example.62
(2) Generality
The aforementioned imputable effects need not only be temporally rather dis-
tant. Moreover, we need not always retrace every action to a single practical de-
cision; we can just as well refer to a series of decisions. Without a doubt, much 
of what we usually refer to as ‘actions’ cannot be linked to just one practical 
decision. For example, ‘to build a house’ surely describes a single action, and 
just as surely one would have to make quite a number of practical decisions in 
the course of doing so. This does not pose an insuperable conceptual concern as 
62 In this respect O’Shaughnessy’s account (3) is entirely agreeable and almost identical 
to ours. It would have been desirable, though, for him to have rejected the idea that there were 
two causally related events involved in an action – a notion he explicitly defends, though. See 
O’Shaughnessy, “Trying,” 375.
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it is only a matter of abstraction, of consolidating different action descriptions. 
Hence, ‘to build a house’ is a more general compound of various simpler actions 
dominated by a superordinate goal. In the image of a river from before, we may 
think of such an action as a river with various influent streams. Another exam-
ple: If A in our coyote case not only shot the animal but also afterwards walked 
up to it and stabbed it, she still would have killed the coyote only once. Or imag-
ine a passionate football player, who plays a match with her team. It is natural to 
refer to the activity as ‘she played football’ instead of referring to every single 
decision made in the course of the match. Most often there is simply no need 
for such detail in intersubjective discourse. The overall effect that she was run-
ning around kicking a leather ball every once in a while for roughly 90 minutes 
can be grasped more easily by referring to the general action ‘playing football’ 
without risking theoretical inconsistency. Concluding this section, we can thus 
hold that any action comprises at least one practical decision as a first cause and 
at least one imputable effect, possibly a wide range of such effects.
c) Frankfurt’s Critique of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities
Even though we cannot discuss all problematic aspects of the aforementioned 
action definition, despite the fact that there are surely quite a few worthy of dis-
cussion, we shall at least opt for one of the most relevant criticisms of a con-
ception of actions like ours based on undetermined decisions or the individual 
ability to freely decide between alternative options – namely Harry Frankfurt’s 
influential work on this topic.63
Therefore, we need to return to our basic presupposition: causality by free 
will and undetermined decisions as an internal momentum of our normative 
practice. Implied in this presupposition is what Frankfurt called the Principle 
of Alternate Possibilities (PAP).64 By defining actions as behaviour that is to 
some extent controlled or governed by the entity performing it, which would 
e. g. also include purposeful behaviour by animals, Frankfurt tried to make a 
point against the aforementioned principle. His basic argument is the following: 
A person can be responsible for her actions, even though she could not have 
done otherwise. There are possible circumstances in which an agent A could 
not decide to do Y instead of X, e. g. because of some apparatus attached to A’s 
brain that would force him to do X anyway. What if, however, A would want 
63 An overview over Frankfurt’s account as well as the arguments offered by both its sup-
porters and opponents can be found in Levy and McKenna, “Moral Responsibility,” 98–102. 
Another challenge that would surely be worth discussing, but cannot be considered in detail 
is the one offered in: Fred Dretske, “Machines, Plants and Animals: The Origins of Agency,” 
Erkenntnis 51 (1999). Dretske essentially questions whether there is a clear line to be drawn 
at all between those capable and those not capable of performing actions/making decisions.
64 Harry Frankfurt, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” The Journal of Phi-
losophy 66 (December 1969): 829.
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to do X and actually does X independent of the apparatus and for her own rea-
sons? Would she then not be responsible for doing X, even though she practi-
cally could not have done otherwise?65 Frankfurt is relying on the readers’ in-
tuitions here. His example completely misses the point, though. The principle 
of alternate possibilities is not falsifiable in this fashion.66 In fact, an agent can 
only be responsible for her actions if and only if she could have done otherwise.
In detail: Suppose our action definition, comprising both first cause and im-
putable effect(s), was correct. Then an agent would be responsible for an event 
in case she decided to (causally) bring about this event and could have decided 
differently. This differing decision could have two effects though: (1) bring-
ing about another, different event or (2) bringing about the same event only 
in this case not causally due to the agent’s own will, but due to some irresist-
ible external force. Thus, strictly speaking, in the second case it would be no 
‘bringing about’ of the event in the first place. So, what Frankfurt actually de-
scribes in his example are two different sets of facts.67 In both cases A is able 
to decide to do Y but would eventually end up behaving in a way that would 
seem as if she performed X. The difference between the two scenarios is that 
if she decided to do X, she could indeed be held responsible for doing so be-
cause she at least could have decided to do Y, even though that would have led 
her to doing X anyway.68 However, in case she decided to do Y and ended up 
doing X because of some irresistible form of coercion applied to her she could 
not be held responsible for doing X. That is so, because in the second case she 
did not bring about her body performing X, but the behaviour was caused by 
some external force. Thus, consequently and strictly speaking the event in the 
second case cannot even be called an action, because it lacks an actual practical 
decision made by A herself and therewith the possibility for ascribing responsi-
bility, whereas the ascription of responsibility in the first case derives from the 
very fact that A actually brought about her own behaviour with the possibility 
of deciding to do Y instead – with the consequent effect of not being respon-
sible for X – which she simply did not do. In other words, in the first case A is 
responsible for her action because she could at least have decided not to be re-
65 Ibid, 835–836.
66 For a few notable examples of a correspondingly critical assessment of Frankfurt’s chal-
lenge to PAP (out of the vast amount literature on Frankfurt in general) see only: Robert Kane, 
The Significance of Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 40–58; Carl Ginet, 
“In Defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: Why I Don’t Find Frankfurt’s Argu-
ment Convincing,” Philosophical Perspectives 10 (1996); Michael McKenna, “Alternative 
Possibilities and the Failure of the Counterexample Strategy,” Journal of Social Philosophy 28 
(1997); Michael Otsuka, “Incompatibilism and the Avoidability of Blame,” Ethics 108 (July 
1998).
67 Cf. McKenna, “Alternative Possibilities,” 77.
68 This kind of objection is also referred to as the ‘flicker strategy’, cf. John M. Fischer, 
The Metaphysics of Free Will (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 134–140.
 2. Freedom of Decision and Actions 47
sponsible.69 This might sound strange at first, which is possibly due to a rather 
strangely constructed example. As a normative conclusion it is entirely sound. 
In fact, Frankfurt’s machine either (a) controls the consciousness of the agent 
in the sense of eliminating options from the start or (b) by changing the agent’s 
mind if she decided something wrong, i. e. in the example to do Y. If (b) were 
the case then the machine would only get active if A decided to do Y. If she de-
cided to do X her decision would be the only relevant incentive for the perform-
ance of X. If she decided to do Y, the machine would automatically change her 
mind making her prefer and perform X instead. Still, after the machine’s inter-
ference it would also be her decision, namely deciding in favour of Y, which in 
this case is the indirect cause for her according behaviour, namely the occur-
rence of X.70 Hence, what Frankfurt misinterprets is the connection between 
causality of decisions and responsibility. Whilst he appears to treat both ideas 
analogously, they clearly are not. In both cases A’s decisions are (however di-
rectly or indirectly) causal for X. In the first scenario A’s decision is actually 
free. Thus it can serve as an undetermined first cause. The idea of responsibility 
is inseparably linked to this notion of a first cause. In the second case A’s de-
cision to do Y may have eventually led to her doing X, but this decision would 
have been determined by the interference of the machine. This interference does 
not destroy the causal chain, but it does exclude the possibility of ascribing re-
sponsibility. Ironically, Frankfurt thus in a way emphasises with his example 
what he intended to refute in the first place: the necessary connection between 
responsibility and the indeterminateness71 of practical decisions.72
d) Conclusion
In this section we found that the most fundamental and unanalysable feature of 
an action is a practical decision, which itself represents an undetermined or not 
entirely determined first cause. In a nutshell, the notion of a practical decision 
thereby represents the idea that, in intersubjective social practice, responsibility 
69 Cf. Otsuka, “Avoidability of Blame,” 688.
70 It is this resemblance, I think, which led Frankfurt to the conclusion that “the behav-
iour of the unknowing addict is plainly as intentional when he is caused to take the drug by the 
compulsive force of his addiction, as it is when he takes it as a matter of free choice.” (Harry 
Frankfurt, “The Problem of Action,” American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (April 1978): 161).
71 Regarding the necessary degree of this indeterminateness see already above sec. II, 
fn. 21.
72 As already mentioned, another example which Frankfurt offered as a challenge for PAP 
is this: Drug addict A is said to take heroin, because she “enjoys its effects and considers them 
to be beneficial”, see Frankfurt, “Problem of Action,” 160. In fact, she would take heroin any-
way, because she unknowingly became addicted to the drug. So, basically the machine from 
the first example is replaced by some internal but nevertheless irresistible force. To Frankfurt it 
seems clear that the addict (i) took the drug freely and (ii) could not have done otherwise (ibid). 
In my view, as much is simply a contradictio in adjecto.
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for intersubjectively perceivable occurrences is ascribed to an agent, which is 
only possible by supposing the agent’s ability to decide between different op-
tions. Put differently, a practical decision is what we cannot avoid presuppos-
ing in order to understand ‘A’s arm rising’ as ‘A raises his arm’73, i. e. to under-
stand something that happens as something that someone does. Consequently, 
we defined an action as one or the concatenation of a number of such practi-
cal decisions plus imputable, intersubjectively perceivable effects. This defini-
tion is considerably broader than that of Davidson’s standard account and con-
sequently much more flexible. As indicated earlier, actions are the universal 
currency of normative systems. The evaluation of every action is entirely de-
pendent, though, on the breadth of the respective proposition of the specific ac-
tion description in each and every case.
3. Deontic Logic
As mentioned earlier, for the most part the notion of rights, or of having a right, 
is in one way or another linked with actions, either as in ‘A has a right to do X’ 
or as in ‘A has a right that B does (not do) X’. So far we only got to know the 
concept of actions as such. Yet, the ‘rights’ in the just mentioned examples are 
evidently not only referring to actions, but rather to the respective action ev-
aluations, i. e. to the way in which the action X is normatively assessed in the 
normative system in question. Such evaluations, i. e. the normative demand as-
sociated with the action in question, are expressed with the aid of the deontic 
modalities. Essentially, actions are said to be either permissible (P), obligatory 
(O) or forbidden (F).74 In short, for the question of whether a right of someone 
exists it appears to be of central importance whether a certain reference action 
is either the object of a duty, i. e. of a positive obligation (O) or a negative pro-
hibition (F), or of a permission (P). It is especially this modality ‘permission’ 
and its debatable deontological structure which is the main reason why we need 
to engage in a thorough analysis of the fundamental categories of deontic logics 
73 Cf. above sec. II, fn. 31.
74 The abbreviations are borrowed from Georg von Wright, “On the Logic of Norms and 
Actions,” In New Studies in Deontic Logic, ed. Risto Hilpinen (Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing, 
1981), 22. Besides, we shall leave the question unconsidered whether the notions of obligation, 
prohibition and permission refer only to actions or also to states of affairs, i. e. in this context 
we shall analyse the meaning of ‘ought’ only in the sense of an ‘ought-to-do’ and disregard 
the possibility of an ‘ought-to-be’. As much appears to be a reasonable theoretical concession, 
as surely no one would object to the claim that (O), (F) and (P) at least also refer to actions. 
Regarding the distinction between ‘ought-to-do’ and ‘ought-to-be’ see von Wright, “Logic of 
Norms and Actions,” 9. See originally Charles Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory (London: 
Kegan Paul, 1930), 141–142. Cf. also John Horty, Agency and Deontic Logic (New York: Ox-
ford Universtiy Press, 2001), 34 ff., 59 ff. For a rough introduction to Broad’s central theses see 
Quante, Einführung Ethik, 31.
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at this point. A precise understanding of the nature and importance of permis-
sions will prove to be vital for a correct appreciation of the merits of the Choice 
or Will Theory of rights in the second main part of this book. In this respect my 
main theses to be outlined and defended in this section are the following: Per-
missions – as opposed to obligations and prohibitions – ought to be understood 
as ‘normative exemptions’ (in German: Freistellungen), i. e. to have a permis-
sion to do X implies being allowed to choose between either doing X or per-
forming some alternative option Y, both of which being legitimate options.75 If 
this were true, it would have great effect on the theory of rights, as Hart’s well-
known distinction between ‘unilateral’ and ‘bilateral’ liberties would prove to 
be at best dispensable, if not even plain false.76 Additionally, the most important 
implication of this first thesis is that any lack of a duty (positive or negative) 
with regard to a certain action would automatically result in such a ‘normative 
exemption’ for the addressed agent, i. e. in terms of logical relations there is an 
exclusive disjunction between (O), (F) and (P) within every normative system. 
As much will prove to function as a central argument in favour of Choice Theo-
ry later on, which is why we need to take a close look at the logical structure of 
permissions at this point. In the course of doing so, an original model of the re-
lations between the fundamental deontic operators shall be sketched.77
75 This alternative option Y should not be misinterpreted as ‘the omission of X’, at least 
not in the sense of non-X, i. e. all alternative options to X. On this delicate relation between 
action-option X and its omission see presently sec. II, 3., b), aa), (1). On the idea of ‘legitima-
cy’ as a marker for the normative status of options of conduct see also presently sec. II, 3., b), 
aa), (2).
76 H. L. A. Hart, “Bentham on Legal Rights,” in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Second 
Series), ed. Alfred Simpson (Oxford: Clarendon, 1973), 175–176 (hereafter cited as LR). In 
short, the idea is that a unilateral liberty exists in case one is (only) permitted to perform an 
action X, whilst in order to possess a bilateral liberty one needs to be permitted both to per-
form X and to abstain from doing so. Accordingly, A would, for instance, have a unilateral 
liberty to pay her debt to B on time (she is allowed to do so, yet not allowed to abstain from 
doing so), whereas she would have a bilateral liberty to donate money for charity, for example. 
Other ways to frame this idea include distinguishing between ‘weak and strong permissions’ 
(see therefore: von Wright, Norm and Action, 85–87, esp. 86: “An act will be said to be per-
mitted in the weak sense if it is not forbidden; and it will be said to be permitted in the strong 
sense if it is not forbidden but subject to norm. Acts which are strongly permitted are thus also 
weakly permitted, but not necessarily vice versa. […] an act is permitted in the strong sense 
if the authority has considered its normative status and decided to permit it. […]”; id, “Logic 
of Norms and Actions,” 25; cf. also Raz, Practical Reason, 85 ff.), or between ‘half-liberties’ 
and ‘full liberties’ (Joel Feinberg, “Postscript to ‘The Nature and Value of Rights’,” in Rights, 
Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 157). 
All these distinctions are equally problematic because they treat both respective notions as 
one building upon the other – that is, bilateral liberty/strong permission/full liberty as a gain 
in freedom compared with unilateral liberty/weak permission/half-liberty – thereby conflating 
two distinct theoretical perspectives. See below sec. II, 3., b), aa) and esp. secs. III, 1., a), cc), 
(2) and III, 1., b), bb), (2), (c).
77 Admittedly, this is a rather delicate balancing act. I dare to advance in a field of study 
which is indeed far too broad than to be pressed into one small chapter. On the other hand – 
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In order to incrementally explain and defend the two working theses from 
above, we shall proceed as follows: In section a) we shall delineate the most 
important and predominant assumptions from common deontic logics regarding 
the fundamental deontic modalities mentioned above. Our object of study will 
therefore be Standard Deontic Logic (SDL) accompanied by a possible-worlds 
semantics, which presumably is the prevalent system of deontic logic today.78 
In section b) this system shall be critically reviewed and in parts revised. Con-
sequently, in section c) we will point out the most important implications for 
normative practice and substantive normative theory design of the newly devel-
oped system of deontic modalities.
a) Fundamentals of Standard Deontic Logic
There are various theories concerning the fundamental modalities in deontic 
logic. For the sake of simplicity we will only discuss the presumably most com-
mon system, originally developed by G. H. von Wright, namely what is nowa-
days referred to as ‘standard deontic logic’ or simply SDL.79 A thorough anal-
ysis of SDL, let alone a formally correct logical analysis, cannot be provided 
here.80 Instead, as a basis for the ensuing discussion we shall formulate three 
fundamental assumptions expressly or implicitly provided by SDL, all of which 
I also believe to be at least predominant, if not pervasive, in deontic logics as a 
field of study more generally. The first one appears to be trivial at first glance 
in my defence for doing so nonetheless – I can hold that it has to be done and to be written in 
order to support a central point elsewhere. Presumably, this exactly is both chance and curse 
of trying to make a theoretical cross-section as proposed earlier. Besides, with regard to the 
quality of the analysis I need to concede that despite my fiercely criticising traditional deon-
tic logics in this section, I am not so bold as to try to develop a singular, conclusive system of 
deontic logic in the sense of a system of formal logic. The following remarks, thoughts and 
observations should rather be seen as a critical challenge to common arguments and structures 
from the point of view of a jurist as a ‘normative practitioner’. Ideally, they will prove helpful 
in principally rethinking and rewriting the logic of norms and prescriptions as a future task for 
those more skilled in the language of formal logics.
78 For a brief, but well-written introduction to the history of deontic logic see Simo Knuut-
tila, “The Emergence of Deontic Logic in the Fourteenth Century,” in New Studies in Deontic 
Logic, ed. Risto Hilpinen (Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing, 1981).
79 SDL as a system of logic goes back to a series of publications by Georg Henrik von 
Wright, the most important of which is his paper ‘Deontic Logic’ (Georg von Wright. “Deon-
tic Logic,” Mind 60 (January 1951): 1–15) which not only established a new school in deontic 
logic, but the very term ‘deontic logic’ in the English language – a terminological reference to 
Ernst Mally’s publications on the subject in German language in the 1920s, cf. Ernst Mally, Lo-
gische Schriften (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1971). Cf. also von Wright, Norm and Action; id, “Logic 
of Norms and Actions”.
80 For something of the sort, an analysis of problems entailed by SDL for practical nor-
mative reasoning, see Jörg Hansen, Gabriella Pigozzi and Leenert van der Torre, “Ten Phil-
osophical Problems in Deontic Logic,” in Normative Multi-agent Systems, Dagstuhl Seminar 
Proceedings 07122. http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/941.
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as it simply seems to state the fact that the notions of ‘obligation’, ‘prohibition’ 
and ‘permission’ all apply to actions:
SDL1: (O), (F) and (P) are all concerned with the same reference object, 
namely an action. 
With this apparently weak thesis quite a few critical points remain untouched. 
For now, it can remain unconsidered whether (O), (F) and (P) are conclusive 
with regard to their reference object or whether there might be other parallel op-
erators. Moreover, it is left undetermined whether (O), (F) and (P) only apply to 
actions or also to states of affairs, the latter of which will not be our concern in 
this context.81 Finally, and as we shall see presently, it is also left undetermined 
by SDL1 whether one or two of these three might be more fundamental than the 
others or how they might be interchangeably definable. At this point our second 
main thesis comes in.
SDL2: (O) implies (P).
It is usually presumed that an obligatory act must also be permissible or that 
obligation implies permission. Furthermore, SDL1 and SDL2 are believed to be 
consistent due to the following (implied) reasoning: Both (O) and (P) refer to a 
certain action X. Yet, (O) contains more information than (P) or refers to more 
than only action X, but (O) is said to imply that not only the action X is permis-
sible, but also that the omission of X is not permissible/forbidden. In this sense 
(P) is regarded as a ‘unilateral liberty’ or a ‘weak permission’.82 The reference 
object of both (P) and (O) is supposed to be an action X, for example the action 
X ‘A jumps into the pool’. In case X is (O), e. g. if A jumps into the pool in order 
to save B from drowning, it is supposed to be also permissible (P). In case X is 
(P), it could be either obligatory or optional (OP)83 in the sense of a ‘bilateral 
liberty’ or a ‘strong permission’, yet the latter only if the omission of X were 
also permissible (P).
In order to elucidate this common understanding of the relation between (O) 
and (P), let us consider another related thesis: Implied by SDL1 and SDL2 is the 
idea that the three deontic modalities (O), (F) and (P) are mutually definable, all 
three by each one of the other two simply by adding the sentential connective of 
negation represented as ‘~’.84 Generally, in ethics and in deontic logic the three 
81 See above fn. 74.
82 See above fn. 76.
83 Paul McNamara, “Deontic Logic,” in Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed. Ed-
ward N. Zalta (Stanford University, 1997–), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/
entries/logic-deontic/.
84 Ottfried Höffe, Lexikon der Ethik, 7th rev. ed. (München: C. H. Beck, 2008), 48–49; 
McNamara, “Deontic Logic”; Annemarie Pieper, Einführung in die Ethik (Tübingen: Francke, 
2000), 18; Quante, Einführung Ethik, 28; Klaus Adomeit and Susanne Hähnchen, Rechtstheo-
rie für Studenten, 6th ed. (Hamburg: C. F.Müller, 2012), 30–32.
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operators (O), (F) and (P) are regarded as somehow basal categories in order 
to determine the normative demand regarding an action or a type of action,85 
even though sometimes, with regard to their mutual definability or explicability, 
one or two are regarded as more fundamental than the others.86 Belzer writes in 
this respect: “It is common in deontic logic to take one of the three concepts – 
‘obligatory’, ‘forbidden’, ‘permissible’ – as primitive and to define the others 
in terms of the chosen one, the most popular approach defining the permissible 
and forbidden in terms of the obligatory.”87 As much is what von Wright did by 
placing the modal operator (O) for ‘obligatory’ in the centre of SDL. Hence, 
adding the proposition p to this operator (O) “the standard definitions of ‘per-
missible’ and ‘forbidden’ are Pp = ~O~p and Fp = O~p, respectively”88. Ac-
cordingly, translating these findings into the language of actions, an action X 
is supposed to be permissible if the omission of X is not obligatory, and it is 
supposed to be forbidden if its omission is obligatory. Similarly, this reasoning 
85 See already Gottfried Leibniz, Frühe Schriften zum Naturrecht (Hamburg: Felix Meiner 
Verlag, 2003 [1669–1671]), 46–52, esp. 47. Leibniz mainly focussed on the notions of permis-
sion (lat.: Jus) and obligation (lat.: Obligatio) as seeming analogues to the alethic notions of 
possibility and necessity, at various points he refers to forbidden actions as well as the negation 
of one’s right (ibid, 48–49). See also Reinold Schmücker, “Grundkategorien moralischer Be-
wertung,” in Handbuch Angewandte Ethik, ed. Ralf Stoecker et al. (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2011), 
13–14; Edgar Morscher, Normenlogik: Grundlagen – Systeme – Anwendungen (Paderborn: 
Mentis, 2012), 9; Risto Hilpinen and Paul McNamara, “Deontic Logic: A Historical Survey 
and Introduction,” in Handbook of Deontic Logic and Normative Systems Vol. 1, ed. Dov Gab-
bay et al. (London: College Publications, 2013), 5 ff.; Höffe, Lexikon der Ethik, 48–49; Pieper, 
Einführung Ethik, 18; Franz von Kutschera, Grundlagen der Ethik, 2nd ed. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 
1999), 1; Quante, Einführung Ethik, 28; Hubert Fackeldey, Handlungsnormen (Bern: Peter 
Lang, 2005), 21; Winfried Löffler, Einführung in die Logik (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2008), 
237 ff., esp. 237.
86 For a dissenting approach, see for instance von Kutschera, Grundlagen, 1. Here the no-
tion of obligation is regarded as more fundamental than the other two, because those are sup-
posed to be explainable in terms of (O) and not vice versa. Cf. also Herbert Keuth, “Deontische 
Logik und Logik der Normen,” in Normenlogik, ed. Hans Lenk (Pullach: UTB Verlag Doku-
mentation, 1974), 65. Tomberlin on the other hand describes deontic logic as simply “the logic 
of obligation and permission” (James Tomberlin, “Deontic Logic,” in Cambridge Dictionary 
of Philosophy, 3rd ed., ed. Robert Audi (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 255). 
The same is held, for instance, in: Ota Weinberger, Normentheorie als Grundlage der Jurispru-
denz und Ethik (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1981), 56; Stephen Kuhn, “Deontic Logic,” in 
The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 2nd ed., ed. Ted Honderich (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 199. Cf. also Peter Prechtl, “Deontische Logik,” in Metzler Lexikon Philosophie, 
3rd ed., ed. Peter Prechtl and Franz-Peter Burkard (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2008), 343. Prechtl dis-
tinguishes the three (supposedly fundamental) deontic operators ‘permissible’, ‘forbidden’ and 
‘indifferent’. The juxtaposition of permissibility on the one hand and ‘indifference’ as (suppos-
edly) a position of ‘normative exemption’ is at least surprising. It is a mistake not uncommon, 
which, as we will find shortly, is grounded in a confusion between two distinct levels and there-
with two distinct sets of deontic modal operators, see below sec. 3., b), aa) and cc).
87 Marvin Belzer, “Deontic Logic,” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philsophy, Vol. 2, ed. 
Edward Craig (New York: Routledge, 1998), 887.
88 Ibid.
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works also for (P) or (F) as the respective primitive operator. For instance, if 
we regarded (P) as primitive we could define ‘obligatory’ as Op = ~P~p and 
‘forbidden’ as Fp = ~Pp.89 Much the same would apply for (F) in relation to 
(O) and (P). To conclude: Even though (O), (F) and (P) are believed to vary in 
terms of specificity, the presupposition of a trivalent system of basic deontic 
modalities in order to normatively assess actions can be regarded as predomi-
nant amongst those concerned with deontic logics in general and with SDL in 
particular.90 Also we can conclude that in order to define the modalities mutu-
ally it appears crucial to assess not only X as the action we are interested in but 
also the omission of X. We shall return to the notion of omission presently. Be-
fore we do so, let us consider our third and final thesis regarding SDL, which is 
very much connected to the foregoing presumptions:
SDL3: At least to some extent there is an analogy between alethic modal 
logics and deontic modal logics, i. e. the basic logical relations between 
the alethic modalities necessary, impossible and possible are mostly anal-
ogous to the relations between the deontic modalities obligatory, forbid-
den and permissible.91
Sumner, for instance, claims as a basis for his ensuing analysis of rights that 
“[…] deontic categories (required/forbidden) are counterparts, or perhaps spe-
cial cases, of alethic modal categories (necessary/impossible)”92. To clarify this 
common reasoning, let me quickly offer a most rough introduction into alethic 
89 Von Wright, “Logic of Norms and Actions,” 5. See also: Robert Alexy, Theorie der 
Grundrechte, 3rd ed. (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1996 [1985]), 183–184 (hereafter cited as 
TG); Edgar Morscher, “Deontische Logik,” in Handbuch Ethik, ed. Marcus Düwell, Christoph 
Hübenthal, and Micha Werner (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2011), 327.
90 For a notable, if not very recent, counter-example see Alexius Meinong, “Psycholo-
gisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werth-Theorie,” in Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 3: Abhandlungen 
zur Werttheorie (Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1968), 88–93. Here Meinong 
invented a scheme with four basic modalities, which ultimately leads to even more puzzles 
than with the three modalities of the standard model. For a short introduction to and critique of 
Meinong’s central theses see Hilpinen and McNamara, Historical Survey, 9–15.
91 See, inter alia: Leibniz, Frühe Schriften zum Naturrecht, 46–52; Alois Höfler, “Abhän-
gigkeitsbeziehungen zwischen Abhängigkeitsbeziehungen,” Sitzungsberichte der kaiserlichen 
Akademie der Wissenschaften Wien (Philosophisch-historische Klasse) 181 (1917); Alan An-
derson, “A Reduction of Deontic Logic to Alethic Modal Logic,” Mind 67 (1958): 100–103; 
Arthur Prior, “Deontic Logic,” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Vol. 4), ed. Paul Edwards 
(London/New York: Collier-MacMillan, 1972), 509–510; von Wright, “Logic of Norms and 
Actions,” 4. In the same essay von Wright also expressed a few doubts regarding the extent of 
the analogy and remarks: “[…] the analogy between the two logics is not as perfect as many 
people have thought” (id, “Logic of Norms and Actions,” 6–7). Nevertheless, he concludes the 
article with a generally affirmative remark regarding the idea of an analogy. Thus, it appears 
that von Wright would affirm the rather weak thesis SDL3 despite the ‘imperfection’ of the 
analogy.
92 Leonard Sumner, The Moral Foundations of Rights (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987), 22, 23 
(hereafter cited as MF).
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modal logic and the prevalent possible-worlds semantics.93 Alethic modalities 
are concerned with the truth value of certain propositions. Fundamentally, ale-
thic modal logic is a bivalent logic with the basic operators true (T) and false 
(F). By expanding the truth value of a proposition from one world, the actual 
world w, in which p can only either be true or false, to possible other worlds 
w’, we can expand the alethic operators (T) and (F) likewise to ‘necessity’ (N), 
‘impossibility’ (I) and ‘contingency’ (C)94. A proposition p is necessary in case 
it is true in all possible worlds. It is impossible in case it is false in all possible 
worlds. It is contingent if it is true in some possible world or worlds, and false 
in some possible world or worlds. Traditionally, the logical relations between 








Figure 3: Square of Oppositions with Alethic Modalities.95
Let us quickly clarify the different relations named in the illustration: Two prop-
ositions are contrary if they cannot both be true. They are contradictory if they 
have opposing truth-values – that is, if the truth of one implies the falsity of the 
other and vice versa. They are subcontrary if they can both be true, but cannot 
both be false. And finally, they stand in a relation of implication if the truth of 
the first implies the truth of the second, but not conversely.96 Importantly, if we 
93 The idea of explaining notions such as ‘necessity’ and ‘impossibility’ with reference to 
other possible worlds originates once again from Leibniz. For an introduction to Leibniz’ ac-
count of possible worlds, see Nicolas Rescher, “Leibniz and Possible Worlds,” Studia Leib-
nitiana 28 (1996). This idea has been incrementally developed and refined most prominently 
in: Rudolf Carnap, Meaning and Necessity, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1970 
[1947]); Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980); id, “Semantic con-
siderations on modal logic,” Acta Philosophica Fennica 16 (1963). Notably, Kripke was the 
first to introduce a proper semantics of possible worlds for alethic modal logic. Cf. also Mor-
scher, Normenlogik, 107.
94 Normally this third operator is referred to as ‘possible’. Shortly we shall look into the 
reasons for why it seems preferable to avoid the ambiguous term ‘possibility’ in this context.
95 The design of figs. 3 and 4 is adopted from McNamara, “Deontic Logic”. Cf. in this re-
spect also Adomeit and Hähnchen, Rechtstheorie, 28, 30; Klaus Röhl, “Praktische Rechtsthe-
orie: Die deontischen Modalitäten,” Juristische Arbeitsblätter 31 (1999): 602.
96 McNamara, “Deontic Logic”.
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combine the subcontrary operators ‘possible’ and ‘non-necessary’ we are able to 
deduce the notion of ‘contingency’ from the scheme, i. e. if a proposition is both 
possible and non-necessary, its truth value is contingent. The consistency of the 
interdependent logical relations in the former scheme will not be contested here, 
but will be presupposed for the further investigation.
Of increased interest to us is the presumption that the deontic operators are 
supposed to be applicable analogously, i. e. that they are supposed to possess 








Figure 4: Square of Oppositions with Deontic Modalities.97
As one already finds from the illustration, the relations between the alethic mo-
dalities necessary, impossible, and possible are supposedly analogous to the 
(presumably fundamental) deontic modalities obligatory, forbidden, and per-
missible. Additionally, we find the operator ‘non-obligatory’ in the illustration, 
which needs to be read as ‘is allowed to be omitted’ and is sometimes referred 
to as “omissible”98. A few important insights implied in this ‘Deontic Square 
(DS)’99 are: If an action X is obligatory, it is also permissible. In other words, 
DS implies the truth of SDL2. Furthermore, if an action X is forbidden, it can 
neither be obligatory nor be permissible. And finally, analogous to the results 
in the alethic modal square there is a fifth modality which is deducible: If an 
action X is both permissible and omissible, it is supposed to be ‘optional’ (OP). 
This latter point is of crucial importance to us. Not the feature ‘permissibility’ 
or ‘permission’ as such is supposed to grant a ‘normative exemption’ as de-
scribed earlier, but only the combination of ‘permissibility’ and ‘non-obliga-
tion’, i. e. the case in which one is both allowed to do and to omit an action X, 
is said to substantiate the normative position of being free to choose whether to 
perform X.
97 Ibid; Adomeit and Hähnchen, Rechtstheorie, 28, 30; Röhl, Praktische Rechtstheorie, 
602.
98 McNamara, “Deontic Logic”.
99 Ibid.
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One aspect about SDL is still unclear so far: If alethic and deontic modal 
logic are structurally analogous, how are the deontic modalities spelled out in 
a possible-worlds semantics? Presumably, if it simply were true in all possible 
worlds that A performs action X at a certain point in time, it would make A’s 
doing X necessary, but not obligatory. Hence, for the deontic modalities, in 
contrast and in addition to the logical structure of the alethic modalities, one 
has to refer not simply to all possible alternative worlds, but to relatively ideal 
worlds.100 Precisely, one needs to take into account possible worlds ideal in re-
lation to the primarily examined, actual world w, i. e. only such worlds in which 
the truth value of A doing X is uniform to the evaluation of X in w.101 Accord-
ingly, an action is obligatory if A’s doing X were true in all worlds w’ relatively 
ideal to actual world w. In turn, it is supposed to be forbidden if it were false in 
all worlds w’ relatively ideal to w. Finally, it is supposed to be permissible if it 
were true in some of these worlds and false in some of them. We shall find that 
this wide-spread understanding of ‘permission’ or ‘permissibility’ in relation to 
the concepts of ‘obligation’ and ‘prohibition’ and in analogy to the alethic no-
tions of ‘necessity’, ‘impossibility’ and ‘contingency’ is flawed, which is mainly 
due to a lack of a proper assessment and understanding of the concept of actions 
in the first place.
b) Revision of SDL
Let us now critically examine the three foregoing theses associated with SDL. 
Therefore, in section aa), we will begin by accumulating a few general thoughts 
and observations regarding the deontic modalities by once more giving careful 
attention to our concept of actions. First, we shall point out two different un-
derstandings of the term action and the theoretical consequences of this distinc-
tion. Consequently, we shall critically examine the nature of omissions, which, 
as we clarified earlier, play a central role in determining the normative demand 
associated with an action. Thereafter, in sections bb) and cc), we will review 
and (where necessary) revise our three central theses in the light of the former 
findings. Thereby we will find that neither SDL1 nor SDL2 are strictly speaking 
false but that both together are irreconcilable. SDL3 on the other hand will be 
shown to be plain wrong.
100 Also referred to as worlds “deontically accessible” from world w, cf. Kuhn, “Deontic 
Logic,” 199–200. The difference is one only in terminology, not in meaning.
101 Hence, ‘ideal’ in this context is far from meaning anything as ‘paradisiac’, but it 
simply describes a state of harmony between different worlds with regard to the deontic results 
produced in these worlds.
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aa) Two Perspectives on Actions – Two Levels of Deontic Logic
Earlier we identified the central feature of any action X as a practical decision 
in favour of a certain option X and thereby against other possible options Y, 
Y’, etc. Hence, it is important to note that the action X strictly speaking is not 
equivalent with the sole option X as a mere factual occurrence (as a single event 
or a series of events). The notion of an ‘action X’ rather implies both the exist-
ence of an actual option X, i. e. an option realised or at least hypothetically to 
be realised, and at least one alternative option Y.102 In other words, the evalu-
ation of an action X implies the evaluation not simply of X as a solitary option 
of conduct, factually or hypothetically realised, but additionally the evaluation 
of alternatives, of at least one alternative option Y. Consequently, we can de-
duce a crucial insight for our analysis: In normative contexts the term ‘action’ 
is used ambiguously. Precisely, we are able to distinguish two meanings of this 
term: One that refers to the ‘action as such’, i. e. especially to the underlying 
(actual or hypothetical) practical decision – in favour of option X and against 
option Y – and one that refers to the solitary option of conduct X, factually or 
hypothetically realised. Moreover, in accordance with that we are able to and 
hence should distinguish two (different, however related) theoretical perspec-
tives on actions and on action evaluations and consequently two perspectives 
on the modalities in deontic logic: one that is concerned with the normative de-
mand associated with ‘actions as such’ and one that is concerned with the nor-
mative status of actions in the latter sense.103
Inspired by H. L. A. Hart’s (at least) analogous distinction between internal 
and external point of view,104 we shall refer to these two theoretical perspectives 
as the internal perspective (for actions as such) and the external perspective (for 
plain options of conduct). This theoretical link might come as a surprise at this 
point. My point is the following: With both theoretical perspectives, we nec-
essarily presuppose an effective intersubjective normative practice with some 
authority issuing rules and addressing these rules to certain agents. Also with 
102 Cf. above fn. 75.
103 Thereby the term ‘normative status’ significantly differs from von Wrights ‘deontic 
status’ (von Wright, “Logic of Norms and Actions,” 23), which in our context would describe 
the normative demand associated with an action.
104 Hart, Concept of Law, 55–61. Unfortunately, Hart did not apply his theoretical ap-
proach, the distinction between internal and external aspects regarding rules, to the basic cat-
egories in deontic logic. I assume if he would have done so he would have found that tradi-
tional deontic logic fails because it cannot make sense of the transition between these two 
perspectives. It is noteworthy that a reasonably sophisticated treatise of Hart’s (for the most 
part ingenious) work cannot be offered in this context. That is, the question of to what extent 
our idea of internal and external perspective is analogous to that of Hart is left to be determined 
by possible future investigations. For a well-written introduction on the topic of Hart’s inter-
nal and external perspective in general cf. Scott Shapiro, “What is the Internal Point of View?” 
Fordham Law Review 75 (2006), http://ssrn.com/abstract=937337.
58 II. The General Functionality of Normative Systems
both perspectives we suppose someone examining normatively guided conduct 
with a specific interest, which we shall simply refer to as the examiner. Now, 
importantly, neither is the internal point of view restricted to applicants of the 
respective rules, e. g. the ex ante directly addressed agent or the ex post address-
ed judge, nor is the external viewpoint restricted to an external observer in the 
sense of someone not affiliated with the respective moral community. Hence, 
the internal/external distinction does not refer to an affiliation of the examiner 
to the community in any way but rather to the distinct epistemological interests 
any examiner can obtain with regard to a certain action. With the internal per-
spective, we attend to an ‘action as such’ and therewith essentially to a practical 
decision (X→Y). Yet, at least theoretically, one can take another perspective by 
asking not ‘what ought to be done?’ but rather in a more limited fashion, from 
a supposedly external perspective, ‘is the realised conduct conformable to the 
rules of the system?’ This latter question regarding conformity or non-conform-
ity does not necessitate the same amount of information with regard to X as the 
former one asking for the normative demand. Here a plain statement about the 
normative status of X as a single option of conduct would suffice, whereas from 
the internal perspective we need information about both the normative status 
of X and the status of at least one option Y105. Hence, with the internal per-
spective we examine the actual demand addressed to an agent capable of com-
plying with it, capable of making practical decisions. Surely, however, also an 
external observer of a normative practice can be interested in whether a certain 
conduct is, for example, obligatory and not just conformable. Likewise, it is un-
doubtable that an applicant can by times be interested only in the conformity or 
non-conformity of his or her actions. Importantly, the external perspective does 
not happen to be a sociological106 or empirical perspective, but it is rather a 
normative point of view on normatively guided conduct, from which we do not 
merely examine the action in accordance with the structure of a practical deci-
sion, but from which we understand ‘actions’ as solitary, factually or hypotheti-
cally realised options of conduct – knowing, however, that it is still normatively 
guided conduct which is examined. As a consequence, the external perspective 
necessarily presupposes an internal practice of capable agents making practical 
decisions. In short, internal and external perspective are literally only perspec-
tives on the same phenomenon, namely an intersubjective normative practice. 
One perspective takes into account only the unidimensional option of conduct, 
whilst the other frames the entire practice by holding a multidimensional view-
point at an action as essentially a practical decision in favour of X and against 
some alternative option Y.
105 In some cases of all possible options Y, as we shall also see presently.
106 Cf. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 13.
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What exactly is this Y as the ‘alternative to X’ or the ‘omission of X’, though, 
and how do we correctly evaluate or assess it? At a closer look, we find that the 
nature and normative function of Y as supposedly ‘the omission of X’ is as im-
portant for a correct understanding of deontic modalities as it is unclear. Can 
‘the omission of X’ actually be obligatory just like X itself? Can we infer in-
sights about the normative demand associated with ‘the omission of X’ simply 
by knowing the demand associated with X? Hence, before we can confer the 
insights won so far to the fundamental categories of deontic logic – with the re-
sult that in accordance with the distinct theoretical perspectives on actions and 
action evaluations we are in need of distinguishing two sets of deontic modali-
ties – we need to clarify the nature and function of Y in determining the norma-
tive demand associated with an action X.
(1) Actions and Omissions
The notion of ‘omission’ is essentially ambiguous. In fact, it possesses at least 
three possible meanings: (1) First it can simply and intuitively refer to the en-
tirety of alternative options to X, i. e. non-X. (2) Yet, in those cases in which we 
formulate a moral or legal reproach for someone omitting an action, we do not 
refer to an entirety of alternative options but to a specific, hypothetical action 
which had been obligatory but has not been performed.107 (3) Finally, the third 
possible understanding describes the notion of ‘omission’ in a way in which it 
serves a purely theoretical purpose. In this sense ‘the omission of X’ gains im-
portance in order to determine the normative demand for a certain action X. The 
crucial difference between (1) and (3) is that in order to determine the norma-
tive demand for X we do not in every case have to refer to the omission of X in 
the sense of (1), i. e. as the entirety of all alternative options, but in some cases 
it suffices to determine the normative status of at least one alternative option 
Y. Precisely, in order to determine the normative demand for any action X we 
invariably need to determine the normative status of the option X and whether 
there is at least one legitimate option Y to fall back on for the addressee of the 
rule. In doing so we shall use ‘legitimacy’ and ‘illegitimacy’ as the possible la-
bels for the normative status of any single option of conduct. Only if we answer 
the question regarding at least one legitimate alternative option negatively, do 
we indeed refer to the omissions of X in the sense of (1), because in this case we 
107 Once we raise an accusation towards A regarding an omission we are not simply saying 
what she did not do, but implied is a statement about what A specifically ought to have done 
in a certain situation instead of doing what she did. We no longer evaluate her factual behav-
iour, the actually given set of facts, but rather an action/a set of facts that never happened, that 
is purely hypothetical; yet in terms of normative reasoning, it is just as specific as her actual 
behaviour. Hence, the reproach with omissions in this sense lies in not performing a specific 
action which would have been obligatory. Or in other words, the leverage point for the accusa-
tion is not non-X, but a specific hypothetical action X which has unduly not been performed.
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need to determine that there are strictly no alternative options to fall back on. 
If we answer the question positively, though, it suffices to determine (at least) 
one option Y which is allowed, that is to say, legitimate. Hence, ‘omission’ in 
the sense of (3) describes a theoretical auxiliary tool, which sometimes means 
all alternative options equivalent to (1) and sometimes only at least one alter-
native option Y.
Thus, it appears the notion of ‘~X’ in the mutual definitions of the three mo-
dalities should be handled with more care than it is usually done.108 Put simply, 
by equating ‘~X’ with (1) one misses out on the fact that the different normative 
demands do not necessarily imply statements about the normative status of all 
alternative options to X. Importantly, due to the fact that we ask for the norma-
tive status of at least one alternative option Y, we do not and cannot determine 
the normative demand for Y by determining that of X. In detail: The normative 
status of Y (or of all Y’) solely has an auxiliary function in order to determine 
the normative demand for action option X. In order to determine the normative 
demand for one specific alternative option Y, which we could of course do, we 
would have to think of Y as the central action option, i. e. we would have to 
make this specific Y the new X and compare it to its own alternatives instead. 
Accordingly, the relation of X to Y is essentially distinct from that of Y to X, 
which makes it impossible to draw conclusions from the normative demand for 
X to that for Y. If we examine the action X, we evaluate a specific option X in 
comparison to other legitimate alternative options to fall back on. In order to 
determine an answer to that question we construct Y as one out of innumerable 
alternative options to X. Only if we think of Y as a specific option, though, one 
given a normative status, can we label it legitimate or illegitimate. If we an-
swer the question negatively we infer there is no legitimate alternative course 
of action at all. If we answer it positively we infer that there is at least one le-
gitimate and realisable alternative option to X, which is sufficient information 
to determine the normative demand for X. In short, X is a concrete option; the 
‘omission of X’ in the sense of (3) on the other hand is more of an open ques-
tion. Hence, if we were to turn X and Y around, i. e. if we were to examine Y as 
an action option, then for Y (as the next action option X) the former X would 
be just one alternative option.109 An example: Suppose it is forbidden for A to 
108 Cf. von Wright, “Logic of Norms and Actions,” 7, 24. Von Wright correctly asserts 
“that individuals [i. e. actions/options of conduct] cannot be ‘negated’. ‘[F] ~ x’ and ‘[O] ~ x’ 
are meaningless signs” (ibid, 24).
109 Dissenting in this respect: Carl Bottek, Unterlassungen und ihre Folgen (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2014), esp. 338. Presumably, despite being spirited and well-argued, Bottek’s 
claim that omissions essentially are actions is not entirely accurate. He is right to the extent 
that a reproach for omissions is grounded in the idea that an obligatory action was not taken 
(see above). However, this would not be a proper explanation for the idea that an ‘omission’ 
is the deontological counterpart to an action (of non-X in relation to X). It would instead only 
shift the perspective toward the analysis of another action X. We are always investigating and 
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assault B. Traditional deontic logic infers that the omission of this action X 
is obligatory for A. This inference, which appears intuitively sound, bears ev-
idence of a serious theoretical defect, though. For an action X to be forbidden, 
there has to be at least one option Y as a legitimate alternative to fall back on. 
For instance, instead of assaulting B, A could take a walk. However, A’s talking 
a walk is far from being ‘obligatory’ for A. Suppose that A is also allowed to 
drink a coffee instead of assaulting B, then A’s taking a walk would be optional 
(OP) for A. Yet, there is no way to infer from some action X being forbidden 
that the omission of X is optional, which is simply due to the fact that we do not 
have to refer to all possible alternatives to X in order to determine a prohibition 
of X.110 The point is: We cannot determine the normative demand for an omis-
sion as an entirety of options, because normative demands can only be assigned 
to actions. Hence, we cannot in all cases determine the normative demand for 
a specific alternative option Y by knowing the normative demand for X and 
hence the normative status of Y, because we do not have sufficient information 
to do so, as for instance in the case of X being prohibited. Once more from a 
different angle: The statement ‘A has a duty to omit X or a duty not to do X’ is 
in fact paraphrasing the prohibition for A to do X. That is, the duty in the sense 
of a prohibition in this case is certainly not identical with a positive obligation 
as we came to know it. With an obligation a concrete conduct is prescribed. It is 
a somewhat ‘aimed ought’, whereas it is exactly this which is not the case for a 
‘duty to omit X’. It merely tells A not to do X – i. e. it is tantamount to a prohi-
bition of X – not what A actually ought to do.
There are quite a few who claim the difference between action and omis-
sion is only formal and not semantic. For instance, Kelsen asserts that action 
and omission are two categories that are interchangeable and could better be 
reduced to the simpler category ‘conduct’.111 All things considered so far, this 
does not seem to hold true. Kelsen assumes that (a) ‘you ought to tell the truth’ 
is equivalent to (b) ‘you must not tell lies’. If I tell a lie and this is regarded as 
my action X, then the omission of X in the first sense of non-X is not to tell a 
lie. It could, however, as we have seen, be all kinds of actions. It does not nec-
essarily have to be that I tell the truth instead. That means (b) might be implied 
by (a), but this implication does not go both ways. For instance, (b) does imply 
the alternative option simply to stay silent.
To summarise: Intuitively, we assume that a person A can simply decide not 
to perform a certain action X, i. e. to omit X, without committing oneself to a 
evaluating certain actions X. If we want to describe what it is that is non-X, i. e. the structural 
counterpart of X, then it would be futile to state that the omission of X is just another X. Due 
to the innumerability of alternative options to any specific X, one is bound to understand the 
nature of non-X as a necessarily indeterminate question for at least one legitimate alternative 
to a primarily examined option X.
110 Cf. von Wright, “Logic of Norms and Actions,” 24.
111 Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Theorie der Normen (Wien: Manz, 1979), 76–77.
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specific other course of action. For instance, the content of the statement ‘G 
chose not to kill P’ seems explanatorily sufficient. This way of thinking shall be 
fundamentally challenged. In effect, to behave is always to perform some ac-
tion. Precisely, if we presuppose the general ability to make practical decisions, 
one cannot avoid making these and thus performing actions. If you decide not to 
go to work today but instead to stay in bed, you do not only ‘not go to work’ but 
you also and inevitably perform the action ‘staying in bed’ despite the fact that 
it might feel like not taking action or doing nothing at all. Whatever decision an 
agent takes with regard to his or her conduct, the result will be a specific action 
that is actually happening, even if that means that an agent just consciously sits 
or stands around, only seemingly doing nothing at all.112
The central assumption that an agent, if generally capable of making deci-
sions, cannot avoid performing actions – put bluntly, that one cannot not act – 
will surely be objected to. Critics will thereby probably, and at first glance not 
unjustly, refer to the subjective experience of behaving as well as basic neuro-
logical insights with regard to action and motivation. Both tell us that we are 
not actually always positively motivated to act nor positively decided in favour 
of some course of action, but rather very often the mental act behind not doing 
something is an inhibition – in other words, a directed volition not to do some-
thing, to restrict oneself or one’s natural impulses. Neuro-scientific research 
suggests that these two mental processes – positive motivation to actively per-
form a certain action and the negative motivation to inhibit oneself – can be 
clearly distinguished, not only with regard to the subjective experience of the 
agent, but also with regard to different brain activity in each case.113 An exam-
ple: A is heavily provoked by B in such a way that A is virtually driven to attack 
B violently. Suppose A musters all power of will she can not to do it, not to give 
112 A short side note: The explanation so far does not even to some extent explain why 
some omissions are associated with a legal charge whilst others are not. For example, when A, 
who is a lifeguard, just stands at the riverbank and watches B, who is unable to swim, drown, 
in most legal systems A would be charged for murder or homicide – in legal terminology not 
because she (actively) killed B but because she omitted saving him. However, when you go 
out on a Friday night, (probably) no one would legally or morally accuse you of murder, be-
cause you did not spend the time or money to prevent children in some other part of the world 
from starving to death. The difference between these two cases lies in the accountability of the 
outcome or, in other words, the actual possibility of having exercised the action demanded. 
Whether someone is obliged to take a certain action is a normative question. The hypothetical 
action of rescuing B in the first example must have been both understandable and realisable for 
A in this situation, whereas responsibility on a scale as broad as depicted by example two can-
not sensibly be claimed by any normative system (at least not from any single individual). To 
draw a line where responsibility for actions not taken starts and where it ends is a normative 
problem which cannot be further dwelled upon here.
113 See, for instance, Benjamin Libet, Mind Time – The Temporal Factor in Consciousness 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 137–151. Very roughly, Libet’s point is 
this: Based on empirical research he regards the main function of our (experienced) conscious 
will as a ‘conscious veto’ against actions otherwise already initiated on a neurological level.
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in to her impulses, and just keeps standing still where she is. Our account of ac-
tions and omissions insinuates that A’s actual action was ‘standing still’, which 
was not obligatory, but rather permitted. Accordingly, one may assume that our 
account is inadequate due to its divergence from the subjective experience of 
A as the acting agent in this situation. Intuitively it seems A would not claim 
that she positively decided to stand still, but at best that she decided not to let 
her temper get the better of her. In effect, such an objection is hardly convinc-
ing. Our account is perfectly able to properly describe the respective actions 
performed in the example. First, the mental act or self-addressed command ‘to 
restrict oneself’ can without further ado be regarded as a positive action itself, 
a practical decision to positively stop one’s own natural impulses. The inter-
nal, mental act reaches an intersubjective sphere through communicating it or 
simply through the experience of other agents or empirical knowledge. Thus it 
becomes perceivable for others and henceforth evaluable. Effortlessly we can 
then determine the ‘obligatory-ness’ of the action ‘inhibiting oneself’. In this 
sense we could say ‘A is obliged to stop herself’ instead of ‘A is under a duty not 
to do X’, which I presume is not only in accordance with A’s subjective expe-
rience, but rather describes it more precisely. Besides, there are other possible, 
externally perceivable actions that are separable from the former action and 
hence ought to be evaluated separately. At least these are (1) the possible attack 
on B which is forbidden and (2) the mere standing still. The latter is caused by 
a successful self-restraint or self-commitment and is as such not obligatory but 
permitted. For instance, in the same situation another person P who possesses 
an increased impulse control could possibly also decide not only to stand still 
(trembling with rage), but even to turn around and walk away – another possible 
and legitimate action which would thus also be permitted. Hence, it is decisive 
for the cogency of our account of actions and omissions to clearly identify the 
action examined. Decisive in this respect is what we actually do or want to un-
derstand as actions in a social context, as intersubjectively perceivable and ev-
aluable. In any case, however, only such specific actions are possible objects of 
the fundamental evaluation patterns. An entirety of alternative options to a spe-
cific option X is certainly not.
(2) Two Kinds of Deontological Statements
Thus, we are now able to sketch the respective information content of the var-
ious deontic operators in accordance with the two perspectives on actions as 
well as with the theoretical role of omissions. Let us begin with level one, an 
action assessed from an external perspective. When we ask for the normative 
status of a singular option of conduct we can initially distinguish two different 
possible answers: It can be positively relevant, i. e. compliant with a normative 
system, or negatively relevant, i. e. non-compliant. Instead of compliant and 
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non-compliant (and for lack of better expressions) we shall, as indicated earlier, 
henceforth use the terms legitimate (L) and illegitimate (IL).
(L)X  = option X is legitimate = X(+)114
(IL)X  = option X is illegitimate = X(–)
On second level we examine the normative demands that a system address-
es – that is, the practical normative content that is directed at the applicants of 
the system. From this internal perspective we extend our view to possible al-
ternatives to X and thus to practical decision situations. To be clear: The point 
of reference, of evaluation is still a specific option of conduct X – only now 
in relation to possible alternatives. Thus, the second-level statement/normative 
demand regarding X contains two pieces of information: the normative status 
of X plus the normative status of either at least one option Y (insofar as Y is 
a legitimate option) or all alternative options Y, Y′, etc. (insofar as all of them 
are illegitimate). If one combines the two possible normative statuses of X and 
the two possible outcomes with respect to the omission of X in the sense of (3) 
accordingly, namely that either all Ys are (IL) or that at least one Y is (L), we 
receive four possible combinations:
(1) X(+) / all-Y(–)
(2) X(+) / one-Y(+)
(3) X(–) / one-Y(+)
(4) X(–) / all-Y(–)
Positions (1) and (3) are an exact representation of our (seemingly) well-known 
deontic modalities obligatory (O) and forbidden (F). Position (2) represents a 
permission (P) in the sense of a ‘strong permission’ or in the form of an optional 
action (OP), i. e. a permitted decision. In short, one is obliged to do X, if he or 
she is not allowed to do anything else under the given circumstances. A permis-
sion exists, if one can actually decide to perform X or refrain from doing so by 
doing Y. And finally, a prohibition can only be sensibly formulated if there is 
at least one legitimate alternative option to the illegitimate option X, even, as 
we saw earlier, if it was only the alternative option ‘standing still’ and thus re-
fraining from doing X. Position (4) on the other hand is a special case, which 
one would probably not expect in this context given the fact that we are used to 
thinking of (O), (F) and (P) as somewhat basal.115 It will thus require our spe-
cial attention. What (4) describes is the normative situation of a true dilemma – 
therefore marked (D) in the following – which some will find surprising, if not 
114 The operator (L) neither implies an ‘ought’ (as in an obligation) nor a ‘permission’. 
Precisely, it could be both. It simply represents a kind of positive marker, a plain (+) in the 
basic binary code of normative systems regarding singular options of conduct.
115 Schmücker, “Grundkategorien,” 13.
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bewildering, to be mentioned in the same breath with the other three.116 The 
reasons for why this is on the one hand a logical consequence of our thinking 
thus far, yet why (D) nonetheless does not possess the same practical relevance 
as the other three, will be laid out presently. Before we do so and in order to 
clarify the abbreviations used henceforth, once more an overview of all a priori 
distinguishable deontic modalities on second level:
(O)X  = action X is obligatory  = X(+) / all-Y(–)
(F)X  = action X is forbidden  = X(–) / one-Y(+)
(P)X  = action X is permissible = X(+) / one-Y(+)
(D)X  = action X is dilemmatic  = X(–) / all-Y(–)
Once more, the rather unexpected operator (D) describes the decision situation 
of a true dilemma. Interestingly, the deontological structure of such dilemmas, 
which scholars have quarrelled over literally for ages, fits neatly into the over-
all scheme presented here. A standard example for a dilemma is the so-called 
‘Trolley-Problem’117 – roughly, a case in which human life must be weighed 
against other human life by some individual agent A. Precisely, if A did X she 
might save Q’s life but thereby kill P, whereas if she did Y it would only be the 
other way around. Accordingly, a true dilemma is defined here as a situation in 
which none of the available options of conduct considered by themselves are 
allowed, that is, legitimate. Notably, this understanding of true dilemmas differs 
decisively from the standard conception for genuine dilemmas provided by Sin-
nott-Armstrong, who defines it as a situation in which (1) an agent A ought to 
do X, (2) A ought to do Y, (3) A cannot do both X and Y together, but each sep-
arately and (4) neither obligation overrides the other.118 The (possible) occur-
116 Arguably, the most influential work on the topic of moral dilemmas in recent years was: 
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Dilemmas (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988). A good over-
view of the various (futile) attempts to explain the role of dilemmas in deontic logic is provided 
in: Lou Goble, “A Logic for Deontic Dilemmas,” Journal of Applied Logic 3 (2005): 461–483. 
For a recent and elaborate approach on the topic of ‘moral dilemmas’ in German cf. also Helen 
Bohse-Nehrig, Moralische Dilemmata als wahre Widersprüche (Münster: Mentis, 2013).
117 Originally developed in: Philippa Foot, “The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of 
the Double Effect,” Oxford Review, No.5 (1967), http://www.pitt.edu/~mthompso/readings/
foot.pdf. Cf. also the extensive discussion of the problem by Judith J. Thomson in: id, “Kill-
ing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem,” The Monist 59 (1976): 204–217; id, “The Trolley 
Problem,” Yale Law Journal 94 (1985), 1395–1415.
118 Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Dilemmas, 29. The elements of the definition are analo-
gously adopted. Originally, it says: “A moral dilemma is any situation where at the same time: 
(1) there is a moral requirement for an agent to adopt each of two alternatives, (2) neither 
moral requirement is overridden in any morally relevant way, (3) the agent cannot adopt both 
alternatives together, and (4) the agent can adopt each alternative separately” (ibid). The no-
tion ‘moral requirement’ thereby roughly corresponds with that of an obligation in our termi-
nology (ibid, 12–15), whereas Sinnott-Armstrong fails to distinguish clearly enough between 
concrete obligations in the form of prescriptions and general obligations in the form of norms, 
see below sec. II, 4., b).
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rence of such dilemmas has traditionally been regarded as an inconsistency in 
one’s moral theory.119 Importantly, most normative conflicts thus labelled as 
‘dilemmas’ do not fall under the definition provided here which is due to our 
theoretical framework of multiple normative systems. Additionally, neither true 
dilemmas as introduced here nor the two other kinds of conflicts – intra-system-
ic conflicts of general norms/principles and inter-systemic conflicts of concrete 
prescriptions – pose an insuperable concern for substantive normative theories.
In detail: Within our theoretical framework the standard cases according to 
Sinnott-Armstrong’s definition do not pose any difficulty at all – at least insofar 
as they indeed refer to two conflicting concrete obligations – because then they 
would actually refer to conflicts between different systems. Moreover, such con-
flicts are rather a vital part of the overall conception. Undoubtedly, it must be 
impossible for two conflicting obligations to exist within one system, yet this 
possibility is already conceptually excluded (see above), i. e. any set of rules/
principles which were to produce two conflicting concrete obligations could 
not be regarded as a ‘system’ in the first place. One may object that there is no 
meaningful difference between claiming there are two conflicting obligations 
or claiming there are no legitimate options of conduct. That is, in the example 
one might say that the claims ‘A has an obligation to save P as well as an obli-
gation to save Q’ and ‘A is prohibited to kill P and to kill Q’ are two sides of the 
same coin, one positive and one negative way of expressing the same norma-
tive requirement. There is a decisive difference, though: An obligation demands 
something – a specific conduct to be realised positively, i. e. even in the case of 
a dilemma as understood traditionally one could comply with some, even though 
not all, normative requirements. However, in my view the idea of someone being 
able to comply at least with one positive obligation is better framed as different 
reference systems addressing competing demands at the agent, whereas we can 
clearly distinguish the idea of a situation in which there are precisely no positive 
options at all within one system, but every possible conduct would ultimately 
lead to illegitimate results. Precisely, the conception of a dilemma as a conflict 
of obligations does not sufficiently take into account the possibility of multiple 
normative systems and thereby ultimately misses out on the possibility of an in-
dependent deontic modality (D) apart from obligations and prohibitions within 
one system. Let us apply these thoughts to the aforementioned ‘Trolley-Prob-
lem’. First, we could frame the case as a conflict of general, prima facie norms 
or principles. As indicated earlier, we shall attend to the nature of such conflicts 
in detail in the following section II, 4. Already we may state that in case such a 
prima facie conflict occurs, in practice it needs to be resolved by means of a prac-
119 See only Terrance McConnell, “Moral Dilemmas,” in Stanford Encyclopaedia of Phi-
losophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Stanford University, 1997–), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
fall2014/entries/moral-dilemmas/, sec. 3, with further references to the respective accounts of 
Kant, Mill, Ross et al.
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tical judgement. That is, in practice a decision has to be made, both by the acting 
agent ex ante and the judge concerned with the matter ex post. Hence, the idea of 
two conflicting concrete obligations would imply that not one verdict would be 
spoken, but rather two or more, which would in turn mean we are dealing with 
more than one normative system. The impossibility to behave legitimately is thus 
better illustrated as an entire absence of positive/legitimate options.
Surely a few questions regarding dilemmas remain: How can such genuine/
true dilemmas occur in normative practice? And does the possibility of their 
occurrence render a substantive normative theory inconsistent? To begin with, 
they can occur only if no criteria can be found (or indeed possible criteria are 
excluded a priori) which could mark one of the possible options preferable in 
relation to the others.120 In (moral or legal) practice such cases especially occur 
when a normative system contains absolute, i. e. non-quantifiable values/prin-
ciples. Such would, for instance, be the case if the ‘Trolley-Problem’ would be 
judged under German law, where neither qualitative (concerning the value, the 
importance of the individual existence) nor quantitative criteria (concerning the 
number of lives possibly saved and/or the amount of approximate life-time left) 
with regard to human life ought to be applicable in order to produce a prefer-
ence or to come to a verdict.121 The extent to which it is sensible to presume 
absolute values in general shall not be our concern here. Exactly how to solve 
the problem of true dilemmas, how one should dissolve this situation if it comes 
to it, is a substantive moral question far too complex to be dealt with here in ad-
equate depth. Fortunately, the substantive question is not what interests us any-
way. We rather want to know whether (D) is a viable deontic modality or not. 
Even though the structure of (D) is mirror-imaged to that of (P), the answer is 
theoretically yes, in practice ultimately no – at least not in the same way as the 
other three are. In contrast to (P), (D) does not contain any viable information 
for the applicant of a normative system, except for the mere fact that a true di-
lemma occurred. Whilst (P) signalises to the addressee that she may decide 
what to do herself, i. e. offering a multitude of possible roads to take, (D) leaves 
no options to choose between at all. Given the fact that one simply cannot avoid 
120 In this respect it shows a structural similarity with (P) as introduced before, namely 
with regard to the lack of a clear, predefined normative demand to which an agent can adjust 
his or her conduct. The difference is that in the case of a permission the decision regarding 
which option is more preferable lies by definition solely with the acting agent herself.
121 In fact, the implied reasoning can be regarded as a rather vital part of the common un-
derstanding of law in Germany, see especially the famous judgement from 2012 by the German 
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) about the constitutionality of the so-called 
‘Luftsicherheitsgesetz’, BVerfGE (Amtliche Entscheidungssammlung des Bundesverfassungs-
gerichts // German Supreme Court Reports) 115, 118. In this ruling the highest German court 
declared a law as unconstitutional that would allow the downing of an airplane hijacked by ter-
rorists. The judges based their decision on a fundamental ‘imponderability’ of human life and 
thereby committed themselves to a strictly anti-consequentialist position.
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behaving oneself in some way, this entails that (D) has to be resolved in an ad-
ditional, second step for one of the other three modalities to actually make any 
conduct legitimate and thus possible to perform. To avoid misunderstandings, it 
shall be emphasised that this does not imply that within a normative system de-
cision situations of the like of (D) cannot or indeed should not occur; that is, that 
they indeed pose an insuperable concern for normative theories. Only (D) itself 
cannot sensibly be adduced in order to formulate a practical normative demand. 
Eventually one would have to revert to one of the other three modalities. In 
other words, a sensible, viable prohibition can only be formulated if there is at 
least one option to fall back on for the agent in question.122 True dilemmas are 
nevertheless theoretically possible within a normative system. At first glance, 
this assumption (the possibility of dilemmas) appears to be in conflict with the 
conceptual necessity for a normative system to produce unambiguous judge-
ments.123 Yet, as indicated earlier, these judgements only need to be ultimately 
unambiguous, which effectively resolves the (seeming) conflict as the idea that 
(D) can serve as a provisional result in the process of drawing a normative con-
clusion/making a normative judgement is itself consistent with the consistency-
claim regarding normative systems.124
Even if not outright inconsistent, can the fact that a normative theory allows 
for dilemmas to arise within its framework be invoked as a strong argument 
against the theory’s overall plausibility/cogency? I do not dare to form a final 
judgement on this question here. It might seem – especially from the point of 
view of a consequentialist – as though it were at least more truthful to renounce 
the possibility of such situations a priori, if they would have to be resolved for 
one of the other categories anyway. It is hard to deny some plausibility to such 
an argument. On the other hand, a normative theory that would not allow for 
any dilemmas to occur, i. e. a radically consequentialist account, would have to 
provide the applicant in any such situation a priori with a definite normative 
demand, (O) or (F), and would thus in a way leave no room for individual re-
sponsibility. In other words, why should it not be possible to acknowledge the 
existence of a dilemma as a first step in order to consequently solve it by means 
of an additional judgement? An advantage of such a (deontological) reasoning 
might be that it better lives up to the imminent tragedy of certain real-life cases 
by prima facie denying the possibility of only one plainly right solution of the 
case, a right decision for the agent – whilst simultaneously acknowledging the 
necessity that some decision has to be made. To conclude: True dilemmas and 
therewith the operator (D) are at least possible within a normative system.125 If 
122 Just as well a sensible obligation necessarily implies that in a certain context there is 
no alternative option to fall back on.
123 See above sec. II, 1., b).
124 Ibid.
125 Cf. Matthew Chrisman, “Deontic Modals,” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
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they do occur, it is the task of the norm issuer to make an additional judgement 
about how to resolve (D), i. e. to make the action X in question either permis-
sible, obligatory or forbidden. Hence, (D) itself, in contrast to (O), (F) and also 
(P), is not immediately relevant to the applicant of a system in terms of being a 
realisable normative demand for the addressee of the system’s rules.
As indicated, given the fact that the normative requirement is supposed to be 
unambiguous, the modality (P) is not unproblematic, either, insofar as it does 
not strictly speaking contain any normative demand, at least not in the sense of 
a predefined normative content directed at an agent that could simply be fol-
lowed. In fact, as much is the very nature of permissions, namely that the ad-
dressee has to decide for herself what to do. The permission is not itself norma-
tive content defined by the system but rather the content in question is left open 
to the agent’s own normative definatory power.126 Thus (P), in sharp contrast 
to (O) and (F), does not offer an unambiguous precept in the sense of a (more 
or less) clear, directed requirement. The normative demand conveyed by it is 
nevertheless unambiguous: Quite simply, the agent addressed by it may/ought/
has to decide for him- or herself. By making the step from the first to the second 
level one implicitly embraces this possibility, namely that the normative defi-
natory power regarding certain actions is delegated to the individual addressee 
of the system, that the individual agent is endowed with this ‘power’ herself. 
In short, a permission (P) does not prescribe normative content, as is the case 
with (O) and (F), but it represents a (delegated or original) individual normative 
competence.127 Thus, competence and permission (P) go hand in hand. Nota-
bly, the term ‘competence’ as such is thereby understood very generally as any 
normative definatory power of an entity regarding a certain normative matter, 
i. e. irrespective of whether one wants to refer to authoritative competences in 
a stricter, traditional sense, e. g. the power of the lawgiver or the judiciary, or 
the competence of an individual agent in an intersubjective system, e. g. the cit-
izen’s right to enter into contracts. For better discriminability we shall hence-
forth always refer to the latter as ‘individual competences’.
bb) Two Meanings of Permission
The findings so far enable us to infer that and why SDL1 and SDL2 are incom-
patible. As a reminder: We designated SDL1 as the claim that (O), (F), and (P) 
(Online Version 2015), https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/deontic-modals/v-1/: 
“Perhaps a full theory of morality will explain that genuinely moral dilemmas are impossible, 
but this is a substantive claim about morality rather than a trivial claim about semantics”.
126 Importantly, between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ on first level does not stand ‘optional’ – 
in the sense of a possibility to choose – as is too often wrongly assumed. See below shortly, 
sec. b), dd).
127 We shall return to this central thought of a juxtaposition of authoritatively imposed 
content and individual competence in sec. c) below.
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all refer to the same reference object and SDL2 as the claim that (O) implies 
(P). Hence, SDL1 is true only if we understand (P) as a normative exemption 
as sometimes represented by (OP). Only then (O), (F) and (P) truly refer to the 
same object, namely an action as such, and therewith ultimately to a practical 
decision. However, if this were the case then SDL2 would necessarily be false, 
because (O) would not imply (P), but they would rather exclude each other. If, 
the other way around, we would understand (P) as (L), then SDL2 would be 
correct, but SDL1 would be false, because (O) and (F) refer to actions as such 
whilst (L) refers to a solitary option of conduct.128 The above shows only that 
SDL is somehow flawed and that we could understand the notion of ‘permis-
sion’ either way. In order to prove that a permission should be understood in the 
sense of a ‘normative exemption’ and that these ‘strong permissions’ stand in 
an exclusive disjunctive relation to (O) and (F) we need to take one step further 
and question the analogy-thesis SDL3.
cc) Analogy between Alethic and Deontic Modal Logic?
Essentially, the possible-worlds semantics which functions neatly for alethic 
modal logic is not transferable to the deontic modalities due to very different 
underlying epistemological interests in each field of modal logic. Precisely, due 
to the specific task of judging and guiding conduct the deontic modalities de-
mand a distinct logical structure that gives credit to the ability of agents to make 
practical decisions.
(1) Constructing an Analogy: Two Levels of Statements
To begin with, we shall try to work out commonalities in logical structure be-
tween deontic and alethic modalities. First of all, both sets of modalities have 
at least similar reference objects. Both refer to certain propositions. Alethic mo-
dals describe the truth-value of propositions p in general. Deontic modals refer 
to certain kinds of propositions, namely to descriptions of actions.129 As we 
learned earlier, due to the possible-worlds semantics alethic modal logic pre-
supposes two different levels of statements with regard to a certain proposition 
p. In the actual world alone a proposition can be labelled either true (T) or false 
(F). Taking into account other possible worlds the truth value is specified to 
either necessary (N), impossible (I) or contingent (C).130 The relation of these 
128 For an example of the rather common confusion of (P) and (L) see only Löffler, Ein-
führung Logik, 237. The idea of distinguishing two senses of ‘action’ and accordingly two 
senses of ‘permission’ at least shines through in: Johan Van Benthem, Davide Grossi, and Fen-
rong Liu, “Priority Structures in Deontic Logic,” Theoria 80 (2014): 139–140. However, the 
authors remain far too vague and brief in this respect.
129 At least also; see once more above fn. 74.
130 Additionally, in the case of epistemic uncertainty about the first-level truth-value of p, 
one might say that p is possibly true (t) or possibly false (f). In contrast to the first- and sec-
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alethic modalities is illustrated in the following table, arranged according to the 
respective strength of the truth value statement:
First Level
Unidimensional statements regarding  
the truth of propositions p in actual  
world w
Epistemic interest:





Multidimensional statements regarding 
proposition p in all possible worlds
Epistemic interest:
The absolute strength  





Figure 5: Two Levels of Alethic Modal Logic.
If we compare these findings to the two levels of deontic operators, at first 
glance there do appear to be a few analogies. On the basic first level we find 
a bivalent logic in both cases with the operators (T) and (F) as well as (L) and 
(IL). Also in both cases these basic operators are further specified on a second 
level by putting the first-level statements in relation to respective alternatives. 
Surprisingly, however, we find that we end up with three operators on level 
two in alethic logic – (N), (I) and (C) – whilst we were able to distinguish four 
ond-level operator these imply only indirect truth value statements regarding p – that is, state-
ments of uncertainty with regard to the actual unidimensional truth value statements (T) and 
(F). Accordingly, it would surely also be possible to make such statements in deontic logic re-
garding the possibility/probability that either (L) or (IL) occurs in a normative system. Hence, 
with regard to an option X we could state that it is ‘possibly legitimate’, ‘possibly illegitimate’ 
or simply ‘normatively contingent’ representing ‘either (L) or (IL)’. We could note these oper-
ators like this: (l)X = Xp(+); (il)X = Xp(–); (nc)X = X[(+) or (–)]. Importantly, the information 
content accompanied by the operator (nc) should be carefully distinguished from the notion 
of a ‘normative exemption’. (nc) certainly does not imply that X is permitted due to neither 
being positively demanded (obligatory) nor negatively prohibited (forbidden), but it does state 
an epistemic uncertainty about an evaluation regarding X that can be determined. Hence, not 
(nc) but rather (P) is able to account for ‘normatively indifferent’ actions or ‘morally neutral’ 
behaviour, cf. below sec. c), (1).
Generally, we need to raise a practical question in this respect, namely which deontic oper-
ators are actually of any use to us, as we are concerned with norms and their application. From 
the point of view of a normative scientist, rules or norms are either supposed to ex ante guide 
the behaviour of agents addressed by the content of the norm or to allow an ex post judgement 
about an action in the light of the normative content of the norm. By defining the normative 
status of an option of conduct X or the normative demand for an action X, we determine certain 
normative requirements. Thus, because of the inherently practical aspect of norms, we need to 
be able to acquire an unambiguous result with regard to the normative requirement. In other 
words, for the normative sciences only such categories can be relevant in the first place which 
express toward the user a clear normative requirement with regard to an option of conduct or a 
choice situation. That implies that such statements about X that do not at all make it clear how 
an agent is or was supposed to behave in a specific situation can be disregarded as irrelevant 
for our purposes, which goes for (nc) as well as for (l) and (il).
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theoretically relevant operators on the same level in deontic logic. The reason 
for this divergence is simple: In deontic logic we examine one specific propo-
sition in relation to possible alternatives, whilst in alethic logic on level two we 
usually examine a whole set of possible propositions as such with regard to the 
question of whether all of them are either true or false. Hence, we can receive 
only three possible results: all true (= necessary), all false (= impossible), some/
some (= contingent). We could, however, easily expand the alethic scheme to a 
tetravalent logic like the deontic logic on level two by adapting the respective 
question and focussing on a specific proposition p in actual world w in relation 
to p in other possible worlds w’. In that case we would end up with following 
alethic operators on level two:
Second Level
Multidimensional statements 
regarding proposition p in 
 actual world w in relation to 
p in other possible worlds w’
Epistemic interest:
The relative strength 
of the unidimen-




(PC) = positively contingent
(NC) = negatively contingent
Figure 6: Second Level of Alethic Modal Logic – Alternative.
Proposition p is necessary if it is true in w and in all other w’. It is impossible if 
it is false in w and in all other w’. As much is evident. Furthermore, we might 
refer to p as positively contingent if it were true in w but false in at least one 
world w’. In turn, it would be negatively contingent if it were false in w but true 
in at least one world w’. Hence, (PC) and (NC) are nothing but specific manifes-
tations of the generic operator (C) – simply with a relative focus on one of the 
examined possible worlds. Duly note that I am not claiming we should extend 
alethic modal logic to the above mentioned tetravalent scheme. On the contrary, 
the extension proposed here is not fit for the primary epistemological interest in 
alethic logic, which questions the absolute strength of a truth value statement. 
The extension to a tetravalent system is solely provided for theoretical purposes 
in order to precisely carve out the differences between the two kinds of modal 
logics in the following, because only this way are we able to construct two basic 
modalities on the first level and four basic modalities on the second level both 
in alethic and deontic modal logic.131
131 Another short side note: In alethic modal logic there have been a number of quarrels 
over the nature of ‘possibility’. Presumably, quite a few of those quarrels derive from in-
discriminate usage of the term. In fact, there are in total five different ways to depict the col-
loquial notion of ‘possibility’ in terms of alethic modals. First, something can be possible in 
the sense of (t) or (f). Second, if p is (T) it is at least possible in the sense of being (PC) or (N). 
Third, if p is referred to as positively contingent or negatively contingent, it is possible in a 
very narrow sense. Fourth, these two combined, i. e. if p is (C) = (PC) v (NC), means possibil-
ity in the strict sense. And finally, it also seems reasonable to regard proposition p as possible 
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(2) Deconstructing the Analogy: Understanding and Assessment  
of ‘Alternatives’
Despite a few superficial similarities, there are major differences in the struc-
ture of alethic and deontic modalities.132 In this section we shall focus on two of 
these, both of which are related to the notion of possible alternatives to the cen-
tral proposition p or action-option X respectively. In short, alethic and deontic 
logic vary not only in the understanding but – somehow consequently – also in 
the assessment of alternatives.
(a) Alternatives I: Understanding
Both in alethic and in deontic logic we examine alternatives to a specific prop-
osition p in an actual world w. However, the two kinds of modal logic do not 
seem to take into account the same kinds of alternatives. In alethic logic we ex-
amine the same proposition p in alternative worlds w’, whereas in deontic logic 
we examine alternative propositions p’ or alternative options Y in the actual 
world w. At first glance, this differentiation appears questionable. Precisely, it 
might seem as if the alleged difference were based on a merely axiomatic pre-
supposition of an action concept which is based on the principle of alternate 
possibilities within the actual world w (see above). Accordingly, what else is 
‘A doing Y’ other than another possible world in which A does not do X, but 
does Y instead? This is the decisive point, though. In deontic logic we are not 
asking for an alternative assessment of the same proposition, but we are consid-
ering alternative propositions in the first place. Consider the following exam-
ple: Suppose there is an option of conduct X ‘drinking coffee’ and an option Y 
‘drinking tea’. Respectively, there are the propositions (I) ‘A drinks coffee’ and 
(II) ‘A drinks tea’. Suppose (I) and (II) are contradictory, i. e. if (I) is true in the 
actual world w (II) is false and vice versa. Now, in order to demonstrate that (I) 
is necessarily true (however absurd the claim might actually be) we would have 
to show that (I) is true in every possible world, i. e. that A also drinks coffee in 
every possible world w’ at the same point in time. Hence, to determine the sec-
ond-level alethic modality the proposition (I) remains unchanged. We analyse 
the truth value of (I) in w and the truth value of (I) in all w’. What would happen 
if we did the same thing in deontic logic with regard to the action X? First, we 
may determine that X is legitimate in w. Yet, if we learned that X was legiti-
in case it is not impossible, i. e. the negation of impossibility ~(I). Despite linguistic intuition 
there is a subtle difference between (C) as possibility s. str. and ~(I). The negation of impos-
sibility comprises not only alternatively (PC) and (NC), but also (N) as a third contravalent 
modal. Hence, ~(I) describes possibility in a wide sense, meaning that p is true at least in one 
possible world. It is in this sense, namely as ~(I), that ‘possibility’ is used in the square of op-
positions above.
132 Thereby we will restrict ourselves to mere observations. The reasons for why this is 
and even has to be the case will be provided in the following subsection (3).
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mate in all other possible worlds w’, we would still not know why it should be 
obligatory. This is the reason why some scholars try to bridge this theoretical 
gap with reference to relatively ideal possible worlds (see above). This theoret-
ical hat trick only raises problems, though, instead of solving any. Precisely, we 
might raise a justified objection as to what exactly qualifies worlds as ideal; that 
is, who chooses which world is relatively ideal and which is not? Especially, 
why resort to the strange construction of relatively ideal worlds in order to ex-
plain the notion of obligation, when it can be explained so much more easily? 
In effect, an action is obligatory if one has to perform it, which entails the idea 
that other possible actions should not be performed. In the example, ‘drinking 
coffee’ is obligatory for A if and only if ‘drinking tea’ as well as any other ac-
tion is illegitimate under the given circumstances. To know about the legitimacy 
of ‘drinking coffee’ in other possible realities or under other possible circum-
stances is simply not of interest to anyone concerned with the application of 
rules or norms in this context.
(b) Alternatives II: Assessment
Furthermore, not only do alethic and deontic modal logic rely on different un-
derstandings of the notion of alternatives to the examined proposition p, but 
importantly they also vary in how they assess these already distinct alterna-
tives. Precisely, the question asked with regard to possible alternatives essen-
tially differs. Let us therefore have a closer look at the structure of the two sets 
of modals, beginning with the alethic modalities. In order to elucidate the actual 
differences between alethic and deontic modalities, we should at first agree on 
a common notation. As the bivalence of level one will remain unchallenged, in-
stead of (T) and (F) or (L) and (IL) we shall simply note (+) and (–) for a pos-
itive or a negative assessment, irrespective of whether that applies to the truth 
of the proposition or to the legitimacy of the option of conduct. The primarily 
examined proposition p will be separated from the alternatives by a ‘/’. We will 
note ‘alt’ for alternatives and additionally ‘all’ if all alternatives are supposed to 
have a certain status and ‘one’ if at least one alternative is supposed to have this 
status. Finally, for reasons of simplicity we will adopt the language of ‘p’ and 
‘alt’ instead of ‘X’ and ‘Y’ for the deontic modalities. Accordingly, we can note 
the four distinguishable alethic modalities on level two like this:
(N)p  = (+)p / (+)alt all
(I)p  = (–)p / (–)alt all
(PC)p  = (+)p / (–)alt one
(NC)p  = (–)p / (+)alt one
Let us now contrast these modalities with the logical structure of the deontic 
ones. As laid out earlier, here we distinguish obligatory (O), dilemmatic (D), 
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permissible (P) and forbidden (F). In the language described earlier, they would 
read like this:
(N)p  = (+)p / (+)alt all
(I)p  = (–)p / (–)alt all
(PC)p  = (+)p / (–)alt one
(NC)p  = (–)p / (+)alt one
(O)p  = (+)p / (–)alt all
(D)p  = (–)p / (–)alt all
(P)p  = (+)p / (+)alt one
(F)p  = (–)p / (+)alt one
Figure 7: Comparison – Alethic and Deontic Modalities.
Interestingly, we now find that only modalities (I) and (D) as well as (NC) and 
(F) are indeed structurally analogous. Especially in the – often allegedly anal-
ogous – pair (N) and (O) we find a striking structural difference, though. The 
same goes for the relation between (PC) and (P). How can we explain these 
differences? If we look closely at the assessment of p and the respective as-
sessments of possible alternatives, we find that the underlying epistemological 
question is a different one in deontic modal logic from that in alethic modal 
logic. Whilst in the latter we ask the question ‘does at least one alternative have 
a unidimensional status different from that of p?’, in the former we generally 
ask ‘does at least one alternative have a positive status (independent of the stat-
us of p)?’
(3) Distinct Epistemological Interests
So much for mere observations. Evidently, we ought to find a reasonable ex-
planation for these differences. Essentially, the structural differences between 
alethic and deontic modalities are based on fundamentally different (primary) 
epistemological interests. In case we, as speakers of a language, use alethic 
modalities we are either interested in the mere truth value of a proposition p 
on level one or in the (relative) strength of such a unidimensional truth-value 
statement. Hence, the epistemic interest is always connected and related to the 
first-level truth value of p. In deontic logic, however, we are interested in the 
normative assessment of actions. As we saw earlier, actions as such can only 
be understood as being performed by agents capable of making practical de-
cisions. Hence, the very idea of deontic logic and of ‘obligation’ presupposes 
a normative practice which is fully explainable only from an internal perspec-
tive, that is, on level two. Hence, technically speaking, in deontic logic we are 
not primarily interested in unidimensional first-level statements regarding le-
gitimacy, but mostly in second-level statements, i. e. the primary epistemolog-
ical interest regarding the normative demands on a capable agent with respect 
to an action X. Without a doubt the first-level statements do have relevant in-
formation content, too. Precisely, we can draw certain normative conclusions 
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from the mere fact of whether an action is in accordance with the rules of a nor-
mative system.133 However, this information is in a way only a function of the 
complete second-level statement. And here lies the decisive difference between 
alethic and deontic modal logic: In the former the existence of a second level is 
not necessarily implied by a first-level statement, whilst in the latter this is the 
case. In other words, we may draw practical conclusions from an action’s being 
legitimate or illegitimate, but these first-level assessments of actions already 
presuppose a normative practice on the second level where an action is always 
either obligatory, forbidden, permissible, or dilemmatic. This is why earlier we 
only distinguished between different perspectives (internal and external) on the 
same phenomenon, an intersubjective normative practice. Put simply, we can-
not make sense of the deontic modalities without presupposing agents capable 
of making decisions.
Once more in other words: How exactly can we explain the differences in 
understanding and assessment of ‘alternatives’? As laid out before, on the sec-
ond level in alethic modal logic we want to learn about the (relative) strength of 
truth statements. Therefore, it is only consequent to analyse the truth value of p 
in every possible world. In deontic logic, however, we are evidently not inter-
ested in the (relative) strength of a legitimacy statement.134 Indeed we do spec-
ify the first-level legitimacy statement with the second-level statement; howev-
er, not with regard to the strength of the first-level statement but instead with 
regard to alternative ways to behave, to act. Given this (primary) epistemologi-
cal interest, it is then only consequent to ask for at least one positive/legitimate 
alternative and not for at least one differently assessed alternative, because the 
applicant of a normative system is interested in whether a legitimate option X 
has to be performed (= obligation) or one is free to perform it (= permission). If 
one adopted the logical structure of (N) and (PC) for (O) and (P) we would ob-
tain a set of information that is in theory conceivable, but inviable for normative 
practice. For instance, if all alternatives to a legitimate option X were also legit-
imate, the action would still only be permissible. Similarly, if we knew that one 
alternative option Y to a legitimate option X were illegitimate, we would still 
not be able to determine the normative demand for X as it could yet be either 
obligatory or permissible. Accordingly, the leading question in alethic modal 
logic is also only consequent. Here we do not base our analysis on a decision, 
that is, alternative options of conduct to fall back on, as a theoretical starting 
point, but we are interested in the uniformity of a specific assessment of p in all 
possible worlds. To conclude: The differences in logical structure of the oper-
133 The range of possible conclusions from an external perspective is strictly limited to 
this single thing: determination of conformity or non-conformity with the content of a norma-
tive system.
134 As indicated before, even if an action were legitimate in all possible worlds it would 
not make this action obligatory.
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ators in alethic and deontic logic are retraceable to the fundamentally different 
epistemological interests in making use of the respective modalities and there-
fore in deontic logic to the necessary presupposition of an agent’s capability to 
make practical decisions. According to the respective epistemological interest 
on multidimensional level two we find that ultimately alethic modal logic is a 
trivalent logic, i. e. there are three conceivable results135, whilst deontic logic is 
tetravalent with four conceivable results regarding the normative assessment of 
a practical choice situation.
(4) Excursus: Dilemmas as the Missing Theoretical Piece in SDL
This result differs most evidently from traditional deontic logic in the classifi-
cation of the dilemma, which is usually not regarded as a proper deontic oper-
ator or as a decision situation structurally analogous to, for example, that of an 
obligation. However, even though it is not as relevant in normative practice as 
the other three (see above), for a correct and complete understanding of deon-
tic logic it is an absolutely indispensable part. In this respect, the disregard for 
the deontological role of dilemmas in normative theory is admittedly some-
what surprising. For an attempt of an explanation for this disregard, let us have 
another quick look at the square of oppositions introduced earlier. There we find 
that we can indeed make sense of the logical relations predefined in the square 







Figure 8: DS with Revised Deontic Operators.
The above represents the classical understanding of a scheme containing all rel-
evant deontic operators, because in addition to the four positions depicted in the 
square, we can also directly deduce (P) or (OP) from the scheme by combining 
(L) and ~(O): An action that is legitimate and not obligatory necessarily offers 
a normative exemption.136 Hence, it might appear as if the operators which are 
135 Necessary (p true in all worlds), impossible (p false in all worlds) and contingent (p 
true in some worlds and false in some worlds).
136 Klaus Röhl and Christian Röhl, Allgemeine Rechtslehre, 3th ed. (Köln: Heymann, 
2008), 191 ff.
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either named in this scheme or which are deducible from it are somewhat con-
clusive in order to explain normative practice, because apart from (P) we find 
the obligation (O), the ‘weak’ or ‘unilateral’ permission (L), and seemingly also 
the negative notion of ‘prohibition’ with (IL). Yet, we know now that (IL) is not 
equivalent with (F). Hence, what we can strictly speaking neither detect in nor 
deduce from the scheme are both (F) and (D). Once more: A prohibition can 
only sensibly be formulated if the agent in question is or was allowed to act 
in an alternative way. As for the role of (D), we learned earlier that dilemmas 
are not as relevant in normative practice as the other three due to the practical 
necessity to convert them into another deontic operator in order to formulate a 
sensible normative demand. Thus, the assumption lies at hand that it is the com-
prehensible practical negligibility of (D) that led to its otherwise fatal theoret-
ical neglect.
dd) Imperative Logic as an Objection?
Let us consider one possible objection a bit more thoroughly, which presumably 
some will raise against the idea of a multidimensional deontic logic as sketched 
so far. One may object that it might very well be possible to spell out the three 
deontic modalities (O), (F) and (P) in a strictly unidimensional system and thus 
also according to an action concept that defies the presumption of individual 
freedom, if one understands (O) and (F) as simple imperatives directed by the 
respective authority at an agent.137 In terms of deontic structure, the three mo-
dalities would then have to be spelled out like this:
(+)  = Do X!  = obligatory (O)’
(–)  = Don’t do X! = forbidden (F)’
(+) or (–)  = Do X! or Don’t do X! = permissible (P)’
The idea is fairly simple: Allegedly, with (O)’ and (F)’ clear imperatives/com-
mands are provided by a normative system whilst with (P)’ such an imperative 
is not raised, which in turn is supposed to lead to some kind of normative vac-
uum with regard to action X, a state of affairs where it simply does not matter 
to the respective authority whether X is performed or not – in other words, a 
state of authoritative indifference. At what point exactly does this model fail? In 
a nutshell, the three alternative modalities implicitly presuppose an action con-
cept that relies on the notion of practical decisions. As we clarified earlier obli-
gations and prohibitions only make sense if there are other possibilities which 
are left to fall back on (or not). Admittedly, at first glance this might seem like 
a circular argument – certainly to those who think that optionality and freedom 
137 Cf. Adomeit and Hähnchen, Rechtstheorie, 30. There they seem to presuppose such a 
unidimensional understanding in their account of obligation.
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are not necessary preconditions for actions.138 In addition to the criticism lev-
elled at these positions before, my claim here is not simply that my deontologi-
cal model is correct just because it comprises the idea of optionality or because 
it explains it better, but rather that the multidimensional model is necessarily 
correct, because the unidimensional model on the one hand cannot forgo the 
supposition of freedom, whilst at the same time it is unable to incorporate it. 
Hence the action concept defended here and the very notion of obligation sup-
port each other mutually.
In detail: Allegedly the only possibility to make sense of a unidimension-
al deontic logic would be to deny the idea of optionality and commit oneself 
to a logic of imperatives as described above. Such a system needs to negate 
individual freedom, i. e. the individual ability to decide between different op-
tions from the start. It could only distinguish between rule-governed and spon-
taneous factual behaviour. Otherwise one would automatically end up with a 
multidimensional model proposed earlier, in which (O), (F) and (P) are norma-
tive way-markers for the generally capable agent. In the unidimensional model 
the modalities would have to be understood as mere triggers for behaviour, as 
immediate impulses (obligations) or negative barriers (prohibitions). Thus, the 
agent would have no proper control over his or her behaviour, but the norm 
would unilaterally dictate it, positively or negatively. Yet, such an understand-
ing prompts serious theoretical problems: First of all, how can we explain re-
sponsibility for actions, that is, the ascription of responsibility? As indicated 
earlier, without reference to at least the possibility of free decisions within nor-
mative practice, there is simply no way to do so.139 Secondly, how can we ex-
plain the fact that an agent performs or refrains from performing an action X 
despite this action being neither obligatory nor prohibited, but simply left un-
evaluated by the authority? In fact, permissions as structural features can, even 
in the form described above, only be properly explained with recourse to the in-
dividual ability to choose between different options. The decisive point thus is: 
If we understand the deontic modalities as unidimensional commands, initially 
there is no room for a third modality next to positive and negative commands – 
at least not without a noticeable but ultimately inexplicable shift in the mode of 
addressing the agent in question. Whilst (O)’ and (F)’ are clearly directed com-
mands or imperatives, (P)’ would surprisingly be read and understood as some 
kind of offer towards the agent to pick either of the former two imperatives for 
herself as he or she pleases. However, if we took the unidimensional nature of 
the imperative logic seriously there could surely be no possibility to choose 
here, but (P)’ as the non-existence of (O)’ and (F)’ would simply imply that re-
garding an action X alternatively one of the two imperatives (O)’ or (F)’ exists 
138 See above sec. II, 2.
139 Ibid.
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or at least has to exist. Accordingly, (P)’ cannot and should not be understood 
as a normative exemption in the sense ‘either you do X or you do X – you are 
allowed to do both’, but in terms of deontic logic (P)’ would be equivalent to 
the statement ‘either X is obligatory or X is prohibited’. Consequently, the prop-
osition ‘Do X! or Don’t to X!’ is by no means equivalent to ‘You may do X.’. 
Thus, in a logical system that is unidimensional and works with only two oper-
ators, (+) and (–), any conceivable action would eventually have to be identified 
as either of the two. A lack of such a label for an action would consequently not 
lead to a normative exemption but merely describes a state of epistemic uncer-
tainty. This, however, is an understanding already entirely opposed to our fun-
damental perception of permissions in everyday normative practice. Their very 
purpose seems to be that no predefined reason is unilaterally dictated but that 
the agent in question is free to do as she pleases, to find reasons and decide be-
tween different options by herself. This notion of optionality is simply not educ-
ible within a unidimensional deontic logic based on imperatives.
c) Implications of the New Scheme
Apart from the idea that the notions of obligation, prohibition and permission 
cannot be explained without recourse to the obliged person’s ability to make 
practical decisions, what are (other) important implications of this newly devel-
oped scheme, especially with regard to an accurate theory design in legal and 
moral theory and thus for the theory of rights? Primarily, we gain an insight 
from the new scheme about normative systems which is central enough to the 
theory of rights to give this book its very name: the strictly exclusionary rela-
tion of duties and (strong) permissions in normative practice within one nor-
mative system140 – the strictly exclusionary relation of predefined normative 
content in the form of authoritatively predefined practical reasons and of in-
dividual competence in the form of permissions. Precisely, within a normative 
system any action will always either be the object of a duty – positive or neg-
ative – or of a normative exemption, granting the agent in question the ‘free-
dom’ to individually form a decision between different options. Let us dwell on 
this central thought for a moment longer: To begin with, there is a general and 
necessary juxtaposition of the three deontic operators (O), (F) and (P) in nor-
mative practice. As much is not a theoretical, but certainly a practical necessity 
within any conceivable normative system in a world of human beings.141 This 
140 We forgo (D) in this respect already due to the fact that in practice it has to be ‘resolved’ 
into one of the other three possibilities. Thus, in practice there is an exclusionary, contra-valent 
relation only among (O), (F) and (P).
141 Obviously, the idea of a system in which every action is (O) or in which every action 
is (F) would be inconsistent. The same goes for a system in which every action is (P) which 
is quite fittingly described in the Hobbesian natural state, in which everybody has a “Right to 
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insight is crucial because it implies that any viable, i. e. practically possible, 
normative system and therewith any normative theory needs to strike a balance 
between predefined intersubjective value judgements or predetermined norma-
tive content, i. e. normative content directed at agents in the form of duties, 
i. e. (positive) obligations and (negative) prohibitions,142 and normative areas 
of individual discretion, of personal autonomy or of individual competence, in 
which A is held to decide for herself which action to perform and for what rea-
sons. These areas of personal discretion then come in the deontological form of 
permissions. Thus, in a way permissions reduce the requirements of what nor-
mative systems and their respective authorities need to prescribe, whilst simul-
taneously increasing the demands on agents to the extent that they are free to but 
also forced to find their own reasons.
These assertions ought not to be mistaken for the admittedly too far-reach-
ing claim that any practicable normative system would have to cherish individ-
ual autonomy or personal freedom as something intrinsically good or desirable. 
As much is expressly not a necessary truth about every conceivable normative 
system. Take, for example, traditional religious ethics which are entirely duty-
based.143 In these normative systems a certain number of specific obligations 
and respective prohibitions were prescribed to the agents addressed. Apart from 
these duties, though, people were free to behave as they pleased. For instance, 
if middle-age farmer F followed all the duties set out by his king and his relig-
ion he would still do no wrong by freely choosing between eating potatoes or 
cabbage for lunch. Even in these systems, as in any conceivable system, per-
missions (P) as structural elements can be found.144 The fact that personal au-
any thing” (Hobbes, Leviathan, 99), i. e. in which there are no negative normative boundaries 
with regard to certain actions. Such a state would not describe, as Hobbes himself intended it to 
do, a normative system of some kind but rather a state of anomy, i. e. the entire absence of any 
rules, because no obligations or prohibitions would be predefined whatsoever. A system with 
only (P) and (O) is impossible, because (O) already presupposes that some possible actions 
are (F). A combination of only (P) and (F) might seem plausible at first glance – as in the idea 
of a system’s being strongly based on individual liberty with only some explicit prohibitions. 
A system entirely without obligations is not really imaginable, though. Not only would any 
kind of contractual obligation be impossible, but also no one could ever be blamed for failing 
to help others, as this reproach is bound to an obligatory action that has not been performed 
(see above). So finally, what about a system that contains only obligations (O) and prohibitions 
(F)? We find that such a system is at least theoretically possible. However, as indicated earlier, 
it is at this point that we reach the limit of what can sensibly still be demanded of human beings 
by normativity. Such a system would have to predefine the plain right thing to do in any given 
situation. As pointed out earlier, such a system would be far too demanding in every respect. 
Thus, the presumption of three deontic modalities on level two is a theoretical necessity just 
like the existence of first-level modalities (L) and (IL) – only this time not an a priori deonto-
logical one, but a practical one.
142 Which thus are also predefined and viable reasons for actions for the agents in question.
143 Edmundson, Rights, 7.
144 In this respect, it is noteworthy that, mentally, we ought to separate the notion of per-
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tonomy as the freedom to decide certain things for oneself is not necessarily 
always regarded as an (intrinsically) good thing is another, a substantive nor-
mative matter. This question regarding a possible (intrinsic) value of personal 
autonomy is independent of the fact that there will always be a juxtaposition 
of predefined, intersubjective content and individual, subjective competence. 
Hence, a necessary truth about normative systems is the following: Regarding 
a specific action a system either needs to provide a definite judgement that can 
be directly facilitated in order to guide one’s behaviour, i. e. a judgement in the 
form of (O) or (F), or it has to delegate this evaluation to the agent herself, i. e. 
give her permission to do as she pleases, to form her own judgement. Thus, the 
newly developed scheme should prove helpful in aiming at a more conscious 
theory building in ethics and law, which includes a better awareness of the fact 
that the existence of a duty implies an authoritative decision against someone’s 
individual freedom145 and vice versa, that any authoritative decision against 
regulation, against defining clear normative boundaries is in effect a delegation 
of normative competence to the individual.146
Finally, another important implication for the theory of rights, which shall 
at least be insinuated at this point, is the following: Hitherto, one might have 
argued that if we knew an action was neither obligatory nor forbidden, the ac-
tion would not necessarily have to be optional (OP), because it could simply be 
the object of a ‘weak permission’ or ‘unilateral liberty’.147 Hart, for instance, 
defined a unilateral liberty as “the absence of either an obligation not to do 
something or an obligation to do it”148. We know now that such a reasoning is 
flawed and also why this is the case, namely due to disregard for the different 
mission as the deontic operator (P) from our positive linguistic intuitions regarding terms like 
‘permission’, ‘liberty’, ‘freedom’, etc.
145 Thereby we only refer to the individual freedom of the agent specifically addressed 
by a duty. Thus, these remarks do not touch upon, let alone preclude, the possibility of under-
standing a certain set of duties in the classical Kantian sense not as strictly speaking freedom-
restricting but rather as enabling the exercise of (other people’s) freedom in an intersubjective 
context and hence facilitating a maximum of freedom in total.
146 Does this mean that any authoritative decision against defining duties is necessarily 
also a decision in favour of individual liberty or an (indirect) appreciation of individual liberty 
as a good worthy of protection? As much is not the case. The appreciation of individual liber-
ty as an intersubjective value is not a deontological necessity, but rather a (ground-breaking) 
evolutionary step in substantive normative reasoning, which goes hand in hand with the emer-
gence of ‘rights’. Individual liberty as a value represents an institutionalised counterweight to 
authoritatively imposed duties. Once autonomy is accepted as an intersubjective value, to have 
liberties is then no longer only a necessary side effect of the unwillingness to impose duties by 
the relevant authority but means that the value of individual freedom is now more important 
in the sense of outweighing possible authoritative considerations in this case. Essentially, what 
we are dealing with here are the differences between pure duty ethics and such ethics princi-
pally working with rights – a topic we shall return to in much detail in sec. III, 2., e), cc) below 
when discussing the ‘evolution of rights and rights talk’.
147 See above fn. 76.
148 Hart, LR, 175–176. Cf. also Nigel Simmonds, “Rights at the Cutting Edge,” in A De-
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levels of deontic modal logic. If we cannot determine either a positive obliga-
tion or a negative prohibition with regard to an action X, in practice we need 
to assert a permission (P) and therewith a normative definatory power held by 
the respective individual. A proper understanding of permissions is vital for an 
appropriate understanding of the Choice Theory of rights. However, we will 
have to postpone an adequate and more detailed assessment of the questions of 
whether a permission as such can be regarded as a normative advantage for the 
addressed agent149 and whether permissions are equivalent to authoritative de-
cisions in favour of individual freedom150 to later stages of the inquiry.
d) Conclusion
Let us summarise our main insights from this section on deontic logic and to 
what extent they matter to us in finding an appropriate concept of rights. First, 
there is no sensible way to frame the notions of obligation, prohibition, and per-
mission without presupposing freedom of decision. As much is only indirectly 
relevant for the theory of rights. Very much relevant, however, is the second 
main insight, namely that there is an exclusivity and a necessary juxtaposition 
of duties and permissions in any conceivable normative system – a fact that will 
indirectly serve as a strong argument in favour of Choice Theory in the second 
main part of this book.151 Thus, in a way we concentrated mainly on this line 
of theory so far. More precisely, due to our strong focus on the nature of per-
missions and their role in normative reasoning in the foregoing section c), we 
hitherto mainly clarified the function of a structural element that is strongly em-
phasised with regard to rights by Choice Theory. Before we are truly able to 
enter the debate about rights, we need to ensure a proper understanding also of 
the structural complement to decisions, which in turn is emphasised by the ri-
valling Interest or Benefit Theory: reasons. A practical reason, as in ‘a reason to 
do something’, is the structural element of normativity that any plausible ver-
sion of Interest Theory somehow incorporates.152 Often enough, as in the case 
bate over Rights, ed. Matthew Kramer, Nigel Simmonds, and Hillel Steiner (Oxford: Claren-
don, 1998), 155.
149 See therefore below sec. III, 1. under a), cc) (2), as well as b), aa) and bb), (2).
150 See therefore below sec. III, 2., e), cc).
151 The obvious assumption is that Choice Theory equates rights with permissions. Unfor-
tunately, it is not quite as easy as that, as we shall see in the abovementioned second main part.
152 For terminological clarification it appears noteworthy that the term ‘practical reason’ 
will throughout be used in this sense, as a reason that becomes practical, a reason for an agent 
to perform a certain action, not, as it is usually understood, in the sense of a ‘general human 
capacity’. Cf. Jay Wallace, “Practical Reason,” in Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed. 
Edward N. Zalta (Stanford University, 1997–), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/
entries/practical-reason/. For a critical assessment of the diverse usage of the term ‘reason for 
actions’ cf. Ralph Wedgewood, “Intrinsic Values and Reasons for Action,” Philosophical Is-
sues 19 (2009).
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of Joseph Raz’s influential formulation of an Interest Theory, which represents 
one of the most convincing accounts of the theory family up to date, the term 
‘reason’ is even placed in the very heart of the respective rights’ definition. Raz 
roughly defines a right as “an aspect of X’s well-being (his interest) [which] is 
a sufficient reason for holding some other person to be under a duty”153. Thus, 
in order to acquire an adequate understanding of the undoubtedly central term 
‘reason’ we need to leave the field of actions and prescriptions now and enter 
more abstract fields of normativity, namely those dealing with norms, rules, 
principles, values, and similar phenomena.
4. Principles, Norms and Values
So far we have discovered that to act essentially is to make a practical decision 
for a certain reason. What is this reason, though? A certain (prevailing or out-
weighing) value? A norm? Or maybe – often characterised as something in be-
tween the former two – a principle? And, most importantly, to what extent are 
these issues relevant for us in this context, i. e. in trying to find an adequate 
concept of ‘rights’? Generally, we already clarified that the notion of rights is 
closely linked to that of reasons. If rights really were reasons, which we will 
presuppose at this point, there seems to be a meaningful difference, though, be-
tween rights in the sense of ‘A has a right to do X’ or ‘A has a right that B not do 
Y’ and more abstract rights such as ‘A has a right to bodily integrity’. On the one 
hand there appear to be rights that are strictly linked to actions (specific ones or 
types of actions), on the other hand there are rights which do not show this con-
nection. In any case, from common parlance we are very much used to both the 
former (see above sec. I, 1., a), bb), examples II or III) as well as the latter (ibid, 
example I). The difference between the two can be described as the one between 
practical reasons and abstract reasons. They shall henceforth be referred to as 
thus. One of my aims in this section is to show that abstract reasons are an im-
portant part of normative reasoning; that is, they play a meaningful role in the 
functionality of normative systems. In other words, normative systems are not 
simply the entirety of a certain number of norms but rather should be regarded 
as a process, one in which both abstract values and concrete prescriptions play 
a meaningful role as well. For the enterprise of finding out about the nature of 
rights, these insights are crucial insofar as any account of rights that would be 
limited to practical rights such as ‘A has a right to do X’ or ‘A has a right that B 
not do Y’ would a priori be overly restrictive. So far we have indeed restricted 
our analysis to the logic of actions or certain action types. Thus, we need to en-
gage in an analysis of the nature of practical and abstract reasons as the content 
153 Raz, Morality of Freedom, 166.
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of a normative system in order to truly and fully understand the nature of rights 
in turn. As indicated before, we shall thereby start from the premise that there 
actually are these two kinds of reasons: practical and abstract ones, the former 
being reasons for actions (concrete actions of more general action types) and 
the latter being plain reasons in the sense of general intersubjective goods or 
objectives. Hence, our preliminary assumption is that practical reasons can be 
described in the form of the deontological modalities (O), (F) and (P) whilst this 
is just not possible for mere abstract reasons. In contrast, these abstract reasons 
or values need to be regarded as somewhat ideal objectives.
More specifically, let us formulate two hypotheses regarding the nature of 
abstract reasons, which shall pre-structure the ensuing analysis:
T1: In contrast to norms as practical reasons, abstract reasons are not di-
rectly applicable in the sense of implying the possibility to serve as a rea-
son for an action or a concrete judgement.
T2: Still, abstract reasons have a normative significance to the extent that 
they serve as quantities in the balancing process necessary for the solution 
of so-called ‘hard cases’.
Whilst T1 points out the difference between abstract and practical reasons, T2 
points out the meaningful role of abstract reasons for normative reasoning in 
general. For the purpose of elucidating these theses our main object of study 
will be the idea of principles as proposed by (what is normally referred to as 
instances of a) ‘Principle Theory’, the most prominent versions developed and 
defended by Ronald Dworkin, Roberty Alexy and their followers.154 The main 
reason for choosing principles as the central object of study is their alleged 
existence in the ‘border area’ between norms and abstract values.155 That is, 
on the one hand principles are supposed to be different from ordinary rules in 
being more general properties. Yet, despite their generality they are supposed 
to have a practical relevance, i. e. by principle theorists they are believed to be 
applicable in order to solve practical legal or moral problems. Hence, Principle 
Theory directly reacts to both of our central theses formulated above: It explic-
154 See esp. Alexy, TG, 70 ff., and already Robert Alexy, “Zum Begriff des Rechtsprin-
zips,” in Argumentation und Hermeneutik in der Jurisprudenz, ed. Werner Krawietz et al. 
(Berlin: Duncker Humblot, 1979), 59–87. See also: Dworkin, TRS, 22 ff. In his seminal work 
from 1985, Alexy borrowed a few ideas regarding the notion of principles from the prior works 
of Dworkin, with an emphasis on the norm-theoretical aspect of principles, though. Even be-
fore Dworkin, the general idea of principles as a specific kind of norms had been elaborately 
developed in Josef Esser, Grundsatz und Norm in der richterlichen Rechtsfortbildung des Pri-
vatrechts (Tübingen: Mohr, 1990 [1956]), 39 ff. For further references regarding the emer-
gence of Principle Theory see: Robert Alexy, “Zur Struktur der Rechtsprinzipien,” in Regeln, 
Prinzipien und Elemente im System des Rechts, ed. Bernd Schilcher, Peter Koller, and Bernd-
Christian Funk (Wien: Verlag Österreich, 2000), 31.
155 See only Alexy, TG, 133 ff., with further references.
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itly negates T1, whilst it explicitly affirms T2. In other words, Principle Theory 
affirms both critical and controversial features of principles: their alleged role 
in balancing processes as well as their applicability.156 My aim is to show that 
one can only have one or the other and that principles are best understood as 
being of normative significance only as abstract quantities in balancing process-
es. Thus, the ensuing investigation is roughly structured as follows: In section a) 
the outlines and common theses of Principle Theory as a line of theory shall be 
sketched. Subsequently I will roughly expound my main points of criticism of 
Principle Theory. Accordingly, in sections b) and c) we will then successively 
and in detail analyse T1 and T2, each in relation to the arguments which Princi-
ple Theory offers in each respect.157
a) Introduction: Principle Theory
Let us first try to get a clear picture of the central tenets of Principle Theory. 
Beforehand, it is noteworthy that there is a great variety of theories, which are 
regarded or regard themselves as ‘principle theories’ and that these function on 
a number of different levels. Accordingly, the (quite prevalent) critique can be 
and is usually divided into corresponding categories.158 There are even quite a 
few scholars who generally reject Principle Theory.159 In this respect it shall be 
156 With respect to the former point our approach indeed largely overlaps especially with 
Alexy’s work, which will make it possible for us to simply rely on certain positions developed 
in his principle theory, especially with regard to certain deontological features of principles. 
This goes especially for the role principles play in balancing processes, in particular their role 
in practical legal or moral argumentation. In this respect, a central claim of principle theory, 
namely that not all cases can be solved simply by the application of rules, is strongly sup-
ported. On the other hand, our approach differs from ordinary principle theories in general 
and Alexy’s approach in particular with regard to the practical applicability of principles (see 
above).
157 In terms of theoretical frugality, it is at least not an unjust question, why we do not 
simply rely on the tenets of Principle Theory with respect to T2, which are principally shared/
adopted here. In my view, a few explanatory words might be helpful, as this feature of prin-
ciples is particularly often and rigorously criticised. Despite the fact that I will not be able to 
offer a conclusive defence of Principle Theory in this respect, it seems all but unjustifiable to 
support this central claim regarding principles with a few of my own thoughts on the matter.
158 For the different kinds of possible attacks on Principle Theory and respective counter-
arguments see inter alia Alexy, “Struktur der Rechtsprinzipien,” 36 ff.; Robert Alexy, “Die 
Konstruktion der Grundrechte,” in Grundrechte, Prinzipien und Argumentation, ed. Laura 
Clérico and Jan Sieckmann (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009), 12–13; Jan Sieckmann, “Probleme 
der Prinzipientheorie der Grundrechte,” in Grundrechte, Prinzipien und Argumentation, ed. 
Laura Clérico and Jan Sieckmann (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009).
159 See inter alia Ralf Poscher, Grundrechte als Abwehrrechte (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
2003); id, “Einsichten, Irrtümer und Selbstmissverständnisse der Prinzipientheorie,” in Die 
Prinzipientheorie der Grundrechte, ed. Jan Sieckmann (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007); id, 
“Theorie eines Phantoms – Die erfolglose Suche der Prinzipientheorie nach ihrem Gegen-
stand,” Rechtswissenschaft 4 (2010); Jospeh Raz, “Legal Principles and the Limits of Law,” 
The Yale Law Journal 81 (April 1972); Jan Henrik Klement, “Vom Nutzen einer Theorie, die 
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noted that we will only be concerned with the ‘norm-theoretical’ aspects and 
level of principle theory, concerned with the logical and interdependent struc-
tures of norms, principles and similar elements, and only insofar as it is vital for 
our purposes. Accordingly, we will not be able to adequately discuss the cogen-
cy e. g. of Principle Theory’s normative or argumentation-theoretical dimension 
in this context.160
aa) Principle Theory: Central Theses
Central to Alexy’s theory is his semantic concept of norms, which distinguish-
es between norm and norm statement, a norm being the analysable content of 
a norm statement. Norm statements however can take different forms.161 The 
distinction is analogous to one common in the philosophy of language, namely 
between the form and the proposition of a statement.162 This semantic concept 
presupposed, Alexy goes on defining two different subcategories of norms: rules 
and principles. Rules are supposed to be “definite reasons”163, principles on the 
other hand he refers to as “prima-facie reasons”164. For him the main difference 
between rules and principles lies in the way these norms (can and do) conflict.165 
Much the same goes for Dworkin’s account of principles.166 Both assume that a 
conflict between different rules could only be solved either by invalidating one 
alles erklärt,” Juristenzeitung 15 (2008). Rejecting an idea of specifically ‘legal’ principles 
as opposed to moral principles: Larry Alexander and Ken Kress, “Against Legal Principles,” 
Iowa Law Review 82 (1996–1997); id, “Replies to Our Critics.” Iowa Law Review 82 (1996–
1997). For an apt critique of Dworkin’s model of principles see Neil MacCormick, Legal Rea-
soning and Legal Theory (Oxford: Clarendon, 1978), 152 ff., 229 ff.
160 Jan Sieckmann, Recht als normatives System (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009), 44 ff.
161 Alexy, TG, 40 ff., esp. 42–43, with reference to the similar terminology of Weinberger 
and Ross, who differentiated between ‘directives’ and the ‘the linguistic form which expresses a 
directive’, cf. only Alf Ross, Directives and Norms (New York: Humanities Press, 1967), 34 ff. 
Notably, though, Ross’ understanding of the term ‘norm’ differs significantly from Alexy’s. For 
a well-written description of the central tenets of the semantic concept of norms see esp. Jan 
Sieckmann, “Semantischer Normbegriff und Normbegründung,” Archiv für Rechts- und Sozi-
alphilosophie//Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy 80 (1994).
162 Alexy, TG, 46.
163 Ibid, 88, 90. That idea bears some resemblance to Raz’s account of norms, who gen-
erally regards mandatory norms as ‘exclusionary reasons’, i. e. reasons for actions. Cf. Raz, 
Practical Reason, 73 ff.
164 Alexy, TG, 88, 90. The concept of prima-facie duties and -rights was first developed 
in: William Ross, The Right and the Good, see esp. 19–21. Cf. also id, “Prima Facie Duties,” 
in Moral Dilemmas, ed. Christopher Gowans (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 
1987).
165 Alexy, TG, 77–79. Cf. Ulfrid Neumann, “Die Geltung von Regeln, Prinzipien und Ele-
menten,” in Regeln, Prinzipien und Elemente im System des Rechts, ed. Bernd Schilcher, Peter 
Koller, and Bernd-Christian Funk (Wien: Verlag Österreich, 2000), 119–121; Carla Huerta, 
“Normkonflikte im Lichte der Prinzipientheorie,” in Grundrechte, Prinzipien und Argumenta-
tion, ed. Laura Clérico and Jan Sieckmann (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009), 186–190.
166 Dworkin, TRS, 26–27.
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of the rules or by installing some rule of precedence between the two, where-
as principles are by their very nature bound to conflict with each other. These 
conflicts of principles are then resolved by means of balancing.167 Principles 
are said to command that something ought to be realised to as high a degree as 
possible relative to the legal and factual possibilities. They were thus primarily 
referred to by Alexy as ‘commands of optimisation’.168 This characterisation 
or choice of words had been subject to much criticism.169 Responding to this 
criticism he later preferred to describe principles as an ‘ideal ought’,170 leaving 
untouched the general idea that they have both an ideal and a practical nature.
Furthermore, there is wide agreement amongst proponents of a principle 
theory that rules, in contrast to principles, can only either be followed or not be 
followed. Dworkin states in this respect that rules were only ‘applicable in an 
all-or-nothing fashion’171. The difference between his account and Alexy’s lies 
in the details concerning this point. The latter explicitly disagrees with Dwor-
kin’s assertion that all instances of a norm, i. e. all cases where it either applies 
or an exception has to be installed, could at least theoretically be numbered.172 
For Alexy norms by their very nature have to remain vague to a certain degree, 
certainly in their respective periphery.173 On the other hand, on various occa-
167 Ibid, 26; Alexy, TG, 77. On the nature of these balancing processes see also: Nils 
Jansen, “Die normativen Grundlagen rationalen Abwägens im Recht,” in Die Prinzipientheo-
rie der Grundrechte, ed. Jan Sieckmann (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007), esp. 45–57.
168 Alexy, TG, 75.
169 Jan Sieckmann, Regelmodelle und Prinzipienmodelle des Rechtssystems (Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 1990), 65; Poscher, 2010, 350–351; Klaus Günther, Der Sinn für Angemessen-
heit (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1988), 268 ff.
170 Robert Alexy, “Ideales Sollen,” in Grundrechte, Prinzipien und Argumentation, ed. 
Laura Clérico, Jan Sieckmann (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009), 21.
171 Dworkin, TRS, 24.
172 Dworkin claims that at least theoretically all cases of application of a norm could be 
listed, whereas Alexy apparently assumes that norms necessarily remain vague to a certain de-
gree, maintaining fuzzy or “furry edges” (the latter term being borrowed directly from Dwor-
kin, TRS, 6). Properly understood, there is no inconsistency here at all. Dworkin is not strictly 
wrong with his claim. It could in pure theory be possible to list all cases of application of a 
norm. Already the idea is just not very useful, though, because if anyone could list all cases of 
application of any norm, there would no longer be the need to have norms in the first place. It 
is as if you were saying “it is theoretically possible for a human to know everything, provid-
ed he or she has enough brain capacity”, which might be true in theory, except such a being 
would hardly be referred to as a human any longer. Norms exist in order to reduce complexity; 
they are a practical necessity. They are an intermediate product lying between ideas and their 
practical application. Furthermore, they are the content of linguistic statements. As such they 
are necessarily general and vague; Alexy is right on this point. On the other hand, to be general 
means to only generally apply to certain cases, i. e. not necessarily apply and that means there 
can possibly always be circumstances in which a norm – despite being a norm – does not apply 
due to circumstances which are not foreseen in the norm itself. It is at least always possible that 
CP is more extensive than CN.
173 Cf. also Hart, Concept of Law, 122, where Hart refers to this phenomenon as the ‘open 
texture’ of rules.
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sions he refers to them as being ‘definite’174, which does seem a bit surprising 
already at first glance. We will return to this point later on. Without planning 
to dwell further on the apparent differences between Dworkin’s and Alexy’s ac-
count, we can at least concede some kind of common denominator for Principle 
Theory as a line of thought with regard to its underlying account of rules: Both 
theorists see rules as containing normative fixtures within what is legally and 
factually possible, notwithstanding the fact that they have to be applied in an 
individual case by means of subsumption.175 In any case, there is unanimous 
agreement amongst principle theorists that rules can either practically be fol-
lowed or not be followed, whereas principles need to be applied by means of 
balancing them with other principles.176
As a standard example for an actual constitutional right whose nature as 
either a principle or a rule would be disagreed upon by proponents and oppo-
nents of a principle theory, we shall consider the freedom of expression/free-
dom of speech, which will remain our standard example throughout the whole 
chapter.177 Simplified, the dispute between the two theoretical factions can be 
summarised as follows: When A insults B in terms of the law, A’s freedom of 
expression conflicts with B’s personality rights. Proponents of a principle ac-
count claim that in such a case two principles conflict and that this conflict 
needs to be resolved by means of balancing the two in order to come to a judge-
ment. Depending on the gravity of the insult and other practical circumstances, 
sometimes the former, sometimes the latter principle would prevail. Their op-
ponents – in accordance with Alexy’s terminology we shall refer to them as pro-
ponents of a ‘rule account’178 – would claim that finding a verdict in this case 
is not a matter of balancing two (possibly even non-legal179) quantities, but 
174 See inter alia Alexy, TG, 92.
175 Cf. Thomas Schmidt, “Vom Allgemeinen zum Einzelfall,” Zeitschrift für philosophi-
sche Forschung 66 (2012).
176 A short side note: The general idea of balancing as a means to overcome conflicts of 
principles is adopted here from Principle Theory. However, it is explicitly not argued that bal-
ancing is an entirely rational process that can be executed precisely by means of (quasi-) math-
ematical formulae. For rather unfortunate attempts to do so cf. only: Carlos Pulido, “The Ra-
tionality of Balancing,” Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie//Archives for Philosophy of 
Law and Social Philosophy 92 (April 2006); Lars Lindahl, “On Robert Alexy’s Weight Formu-
la for Weighing and Balancing,” in Rights: Concepts and Contexts, ed. Brian Bix and Horacia 
Spector (Farnharn/Burlington: Ashgate, 2012), 559. Essentially, balancing means creating a 
relation of precedence between two conflicting goods/principles with respect to the (relevant) 
facts of a case, i. e. balancing means making a decision, which requires reason and normative 
argument, cf. below sec. 4., b, bb) and 4., c) cc). Correctly understood it is thus somewhat ad-
verse to the idea of a rationalisation and formalisation of decision-making processes by means 
of transferring them to a formalised, mathematical language.
177 Cf. inter alia Jan Sieckmann, Recht als normatives System, 24 ff.; Nils Jansen, Die 
Struktur der Gerechtigkeit (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998), 92 ff.
178 Alexy, TG, 106 ff.
179 Roughly, Dworkin understands principles as an impact of morals on law. In light of 
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simply finding the right legal rule to govern the case or to apply to the case, e. g. 
by adding an exception to one of the existing, yet conflicting rules. If there is no 
valid rule to be found whatsoever, the decision in this case shall be left to the 
discretion of the judge.180 In conclusion we can state that even though Dwor-
kin’s and Alexy’s positions might differ in detail in quite a few (not unimpor-
tant) aspects,181 their fundamental norm-theoretical claims are almost identical. 
Both assume the existence of abstract principles as a subcategory of norms in a 
legal system. In contrast to rules these principles are characterised by having a 
prima-facie normative weight, which is supposed to make them suitable for bal-
ancing processes in so-called ‘hard cases’, in which a solution cannot be found 
by merely applying a legal rule.
bb) Central Points of Criticism
Consequently, what will our critique of Principle Theory concentrate on? 
Mainly these are two points, which will be sketched now and then spelled out 
more clearly subsequently: First of all, by distinguishing only rules and princi-
ples Dworkin, Alexy, and their followers show surprising disregard for a rather 
central element of normativity, which we already elaborated and which can and 
should be distinguished from general norms, namely concrete prescriptions. So, 
in the following sections we shall take a closer look at the interdependent re-
lation of abstract principles and concrete prescriptions, paying special attention 
to the role norms or rules play in the overall process. Secondly, even though the 
general existence of phenomena with the basic logical features of principles as 
Dworkin and Alexy describe them will not be contested, the categorisation of 
principles as a subcategory of norms182 is all but convincing. By giving care-
ful attention to both terms and their respective features, I aim to show that their 
‘principles’ are actually another element of a normative system entirely differ-
ent from norms, namely what we earlier referred to as abstract reasons or which 
could also be referred to as values. Thus, we will need to have a closer look at 
the dividing line between principles (or values183) as allegedly axiological or 
the yet-to-be-defended thesis that law itself consists of proper normative systems (see below 
sec. II, 5), d)), Weinberger’s assertion that such principles which are relevant for legal deci-
sions are not external, but imminent (“system-relative”) legal quantities appears preferable, see 
Ota Weinberger, “Revision des traditionellen Rechtssatzkonzepts,” in Regeln, Prinzipien und 
Elemente im System des Rechts, ed. Bernd Schilcher, Peter Koller, and Bernd-Christian Funk 
(Wien: Verlag Österreich, 2000), 60.
180 Dworkin, TRS, 17, 31 ff.
181 For a critical analysis of the differences between these two theories see Robery Alexy, 
“On the Concept and the Nature of Law,” Ratio Juris 21 (September 2008).
182 Alexy, TG, 72.
183 Or possibly ‘interests’ (see above). In claiming that Alexy’s principles are actually valu-
es and not norms, our critique is at least similar to the teleology-objection to Principle Theory, 
most famously advanced in: Jürgen Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhr-
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evaluative quantities in contrast to norms as allegedly deontic quantities and 
also at possible criteria for making this distinction.184 As both mentioned points 
of criticism intertwine in various ways, I will not stick too strictly to the order 
provided here but there will be a few unavoidable overlaps.
cc) Terminological Issues
As indicated, abstract reasons could be and are usually referred to as ‘values’. 
In other contexts, the respective, pre-normative, abstract quantities to be con-
sidered in normative reasoning are described as someone’s (critical or well-un-
derstood) ‘interests’. Yet already terminologically it appears preferable to re-
treat from these labels to a more neutral term such as ‘principles’. This is so due 
to a blurring of the lines between meta-ethics and substantive normative ethics 
at this point: With regard to value judgements, at some point every normative 
theory has to explain the relation between the evaluating subject and the ob-
ject worthy of being defended. The moral intuitionist has to concede that even 
if there were objective, a priori values in existence they would still have to be 
perceived and regarded as such.185 For the moral relativist on the other hand all 
values are relative, i. e. they depend only on the perception and judgement of 
the subject.186 Still, it is always a certain object and its features that the subject 
has to refer to. Thus, without wanting to imply that ‘value’ is a strictly intui-
tionalist term or ‘interest’ necessarily relativist, there appears to be a danger in 
generally using one of these terms for the structural phenomenon of an abstract 
intersubjective good as they at least seem to point in a certain direction defin-
ing the relation between subject and object, which should entirely be the task 
of a substantive normative theory. Whilst the term ‘interest’ seems to be more 
kamp, 1992), 310–311. Habermas’ account significantly differs from ours, though, especially 
with regard to the central claim of a “binary […] encoding” of all norms (ibid, 311). See also 
Jürgen Habermas, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1996), 367 ff.
184 For a brief but well-written introduction to the debate about the relation of axiology 
and normativity or of “the evaluative and the deontic” see: Michael Zimmerman, “Value and 
Normativity,” in Oxford Handbook of Value Theory, ed. Iwao Hirose and Jonas Olson (Oxford/
New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).
185 Generally, Moral or Ethical Intuitionism rests on the claim that “basic moral proposi-
tions are self-evident – that is, evident in and of themselves – and so can be known without the 
need of any argument” (Philip Stratton-Lake, “Intuitionism in Ethics,” in Stanford Encyclo-
paedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Stanford University, 1997-), https://plato.stanford.
edu/archives/win2016/entries/intuitionism-ethics/). For prominent contemporary intuitionist 
accounts cf. inter alia the works of Robert Audi, Jonathan Dancy, or Russ Shafer-Landau.
186 Moral Relativism as a meta-ethical approach essentially holds “that the truth or jus-
tification of moral judgments is not absolute, but relative to the moral standard of some person 
or group of persons” (Chris Gowans, “Moral Relativism,” in Stanford Encyclopaedia of Phi-
losophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Stanford University, 1997–), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
win2016/entries/moral-relativism/). Notable recent accounts in meta-ethical moral relativism 
include the works of J. David Velleman and Gilbert Harman.
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subject-oriented, the term ‘value’ has a rather object-oriented connotation. For 
our purposes it therefore appears preferable to use the term ‘principle’ as a kind 
of conceptual superordinate as it is more neutral in terms of compatibility with 
possible substantive theories of value or interest.
b) Principles, Norms and Prescriptions
As indicated earlier, in this section introductory thesis T1 shall be analysed, 
which concerns how Principle Theory errs by claiming that principles are di-
rectly applicable as reasons for concrete actions or judgements. After a few gen-
eral preliminary theoretical remarks in aa) and bb), we will therefore critically 
review Alexy’s theory with regard to thesis T1 in subsection cc).
aa) Prescriptions as Distinct from Norms and Principles
To begin with we need to ask ourselves: why is the analysis of our normative 
practice so often confined to only norms or rules? If one looks into the relevant 
literature, it would appear almost trivial to state that by analysing a norm system 
or a normative system we are looking into the logic and/or nature of norms. But 
does that really suffice? In fact, at a closer look it seems rather surprising that 
the law of a community as an example for a special kind of normative system187 
is constantly referred to only as a “set of […] rules”188 or (speaking for prin-
ciple theorists) possibly a set of rules and principles. The central point in this 
respect is that norms, a normative system, and normativity in general can only 
be adequately grasped and explained by and through its application, through 
agents actually complying or not complying with rules and/or principles by per-
forming concrete actions.
(1) Normativity as a Process
In short, a normative system is not an aggregate of norms or norm statements, 
not simply a set of rules, but it is best understood as a constant inductive-deduc-
tive process pivoting around the evaluation of concrete cases/actions. On the 
level of application or of concrete actions we can find concrete prescriptions at 
work – a phenomenon to be discriminated carefully from rules in terms of their 
generality, as we will find presently. Additionally, with regard to discrimina-
bility the same goes for principles as abstract ideas of the good in relation to 
norms. Hence, it does not suffice to merely distinguish ‘norms’ and ‘norm state-
ments’. Indeed, we should be concerned with drawing a clear line between the 
form and the normative content of statements. Thus, I suppose Alexy’s intention 
187 Disregarding for a moment that the law of a community in total can probably not be 
characterised as merely one normative system, see above II, 1.
188 Dworkin, TRS, 17.
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to distinguish more clearly between norm and norm statement is praiseworthy. 
There are various ways to formulate different normative demands. Discussing 
the nature of norms, we should analyse the content of such sentences, not de-
bate over matters of form. Yet, how are we to identify the substantive content 
of a norm statement? As a simple reformulation of a statement appears all but 
helpful, we should generally avoid using linguistic criteria – such as ‘sentences 
containing a notion of ought’ or similar phrases – but rather analyse the varying 
normative content of different normative phenomena and their formal, deonto-
logical structure. Hence, it is not enough to restrict ourselves to the analysis of 
only ‘norms’ on the substantive level, but we should be worried about working 
out structurally different kinds of normative content behind different forms of 
statements. Consequently, in contrast to a semantic concept of norms which re-
stricts itself to the content of a norm as containing one of the deontic modalities 
(F), (O) or (P) as Alexy’s account apparently does,189 I argue that it is preferable 
to describe the normative content of a statement as anything directly or indi-
rectly aimed at guiding or judging conduct. These different kinds of normative 
content then comprise everything from most abstract ideas, goods or principles 
to most concrete prescriptions.
Once more in other words: Law is often – most often only implicitly – char-
acterised as the mere sum of normative elements like rules (and possibly prin-
ciples), which are then used or applied in order to determine “which behaviour 
will be punished or coerced (…)”190. Alexy, for instance, names “two dimen-
sions” of norms, namely rules and principles, which he also sees as the consti-
tuting features of a normative system.191 In a nutshell, the assumption that the 
nature of law can be grasped by dealing with it as a set of general rules alone is 
as common as it is ultimately malicious for legal theory. By describing a nor-
mative system as a set of abstract rules or norms, we unnecessarily restrict our-
selves to investigating only a snapshot in time. If we want to gain an adequate 
understanding of law we need to think of a normative system as something less 
static, we need to add a temporal dimension to our understanding of it. In order 
to correctly grasp law and normativity in general we need to capture it as a con-
stant and dynamic inductive-deductive process, a reciprocal going back and 
forth between abstract ideas and their practical application. A normative system 
does not simply consist of rules, nor even of rules and principles. Such a sys-
tem becomes comprehensible only as a constant development, a process recip-
rocating between the most concrete, i. e. concrete judgements regarding specific 
actions, and the most abstract, i. e. abstract ideas of the good. With regard to 
structural elements within this process we should then distinguish not two, but 
189 Alexy, TG, 72 (in German): “[Normen] lassen sich mit Hilfe der deontischen Grund-
ausdrücke des Gebots, der Erlaubnis und des Verbots formulieren.”
190 Dworkin, TRS, 17.
191 Alexy, “Ideales Sollen,” 33.
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(at least) three different phenomena: first, prescriptions as governing specific 
actions. Second, abstract ideas of the good, that is to say, principles. And finally, 
everything that exists in between, what is usually made out as the essential and 
sole constituent parts of a ‘norm system’: norms or rules.192 A norm thereby re-
lates to both other elements, as it can be described both as a generalised pre-
scription as well as a principle put into relation with other (possible) principles 




Figure 9: Functionality of a Normative System as an Inductive-deductive Process.
(2) Structural Features of Principles, Norms and Prescriptions
All three elements of normative systems have in common that they direct some 
kind of normative content towards the addressed agent in question, which varies 
in specificity and, accordingly, in applicability. However, their structure is at 
least comparable: They all make a normative statement or demand under the 
condition that a certain set of circumstances applies. The level of specificity 
in the circumstances that needs to apply may thereby vary (considerably). Yet, 
the two-fold structure of conditional circumstances and respective normative 
content is pervasive. As a basis for further investigation I will thus start off by 
sketching what I believe to be the different structures of principles, norms and 
prescriptions.193 This shall serve as a short introduction only. An incremental 
explanation of the nature of the three elements will ensue. Principles, to begin 
with, appear to bear the following formal structure:
[Principle Q] = under CQ [Q]
‘C’ stands for the entirety of relevant circumstances to consider.194 Principles 
demand their general consideration in case an action affects the principle in 
192 The terms ‘norm’ and ‘rule’ are used in an interchangeable fashion. Focussing on the 
basic, structural features of normative phenomena, they appear to be equivalent. The exact 
reasons for this terminological choice will be laid out presently in secs. II, 4), b), bb) and cc).
193 Duly note that the different structures are not presented in the strict language of formal 
logics, but rather ought merely to serve as illustrations.
194 Concerning the relevance and irrelevance of circumstances cf. once more sec. II, 1., 
b), bb).
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question, that is, if the relevant circumstances are present – for example, in 
the case of the freedom of expression, whenever someone expresses his or her 
opinion on something. Supposing these relevant circumstances exist, principles 
demand that the applicant of the system ought to consider Q as being of gen-
eral normative importance. Essentially, this is what Alexy means by referring 
to principles as ‘commands of optimisation’195. However, at most they imply 
a command or an obligation to behave in a certain way by finding a verdict or 
choosing a right course of action. Certainly, with respect to the actual normative 
matter in question, e. g. whether to verbalise the insult thought of, the principle 
itself cannot be ‘translated’ into a normative demand in the sense of (O), (F) or 
(P). Hence, the normative demand of principles is not immediate in the sense 
that one could align one’s conduct to it. They are not directly applicable in the 
sense of being practical reasons for actions, just because their normative content 
Q lacks the necessary relational form of practical reasons. This thought will be 
explained in more detail presently. For the moment we shall continue by con-
trasting the formal structure of principles with that of prescriptions:
[Prescription P]-duty = under CP [Q>/<XY]
The normative content of prescriptions is a concrete relation of precedence be-
tween different possible objectives or different principles. Thus the implied 
concrete normative demand is immediately directed at the applicant in this case. 
The subscripted ‘P’ thereby stands for ‘practical’, because with a prescription 
one takes into account a conclusive set of practical information, of practical 
circumstances, i. e. ‘CP’ implies that ‘all things considered’, in a real-life sce-
nario, one ought to perform the prescribed (obligatory) action. Importantly, that 
implies the entirety of possibly relevant circumstances, but goes one step fur-
ther. CP refers to those circumstances which are deemed normatively relevant 
within the respective system by the respective authority.196 Consequently, under 
‘CP’ one definitely ought to behave according to the normative content pre-
scribed. Thus, prescriptions with a structure as described above can only be 
concrete obligations (O) or prohibitions (F). The formal structure of the deontic 
modality (P) would have to be noted differently, e. g. like this:
[Prescription P]-permission = under CP [Q = XY].
195 Cf. also Alexy’s modification in this respect by drawing a questionable distinction be-
tween ‘commands of optimisation’ (German “Optimierungsgebote”) and ‘commands to be 
optimised’ (German: “Gebote zu optimieren”): Robert Alexy, “On the Structure of Legal Prin-
ciples,” Ratio Juris 13 (September 2000): 304; id, “Struktur der Rechtsprinzipien,” 38–39. 
Cf. also Sieckmann, Recht als normatives System, 22–23; id, “Grundrechte als Prinzipien,” in 
Die Prinzipientheorie der Grundrechte, ed. Jan Sieckmann (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007), 19.
196 See above, sec. II, 1), b), bb): only the normatively relevant circumstances matter in 
order to formulate a prescription. The preliminary step to take into account as many circum-
stances as possible (see above) is thereby necessarily implied.
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Finally, the structure of norms unsurprisingly lies somewhere in between the 
former two:
[Norm N]-duty = under CN n[Q >/< XY] or under CN n[Q = XY].
As with prescriptions, the normative content is that of a relation of prece-
dence,197 only this time not a concrete but a general one. The superscripted ‘n’ 
is thereby supposed to imply that the relation of precedence offered by the norm 
is only valid normally or usually, that is, under regular conditions. Whereas all 
norms are general in this respect, the level of generality of norms can of course 
greatly vary. Especially, the principles relevant for a certain decision need not 
even all be specified. It suffices to put one relevant principle into relation with 
other possible considerations in general. A very abstract norm could for exam-
ple demand that ‘normally under circumstances CQ principle Q should prevail 
over other possible considerations’: [Norm N1] = under CQ n[Q>XY]. A norm 
becomes ever more specific the more reasons/principles and the more other 
relevant circumstances it takes into account. A more specific norm could then 
demand that ‘normally, given the circumstances CAB and the additional cir-
cumstance X, principle A should prevail over principle B’: [Norm N2] = under 
CABX 
n[A>B]. An example: If CA stands for ‘whenever someone expresses their 
opinion’ and CB likewise for ‘whenever someone’s personality rights are affect-
ed’ a possible norm could read: ‘In case someone insults someone else the free-
dom of expression should prevail over the other’s personality rights, provid-
ed that the expression is taken as an act of political discourse or satire, and not 
merely with the intention to degrade the other.’ This latter specification regard-
ing additional accompanying circumstances would then be CX. What all norms 
have in common, no matter how specific they are, and which thus marks their 
most important feature in contrast to principles and prescriptions, is that they 
all contain an element of uncertainty with regard to the outcome of a certain 
case. Norms retain a certain prima-facie expectation with regard to conduct. 
They are not definite; they only apply usually or normally. In other words, their 
central distinctive feature is the lack of specificity of the implied normative de-
mand. Importantly, due to the relational form of their implied normative content 
norms are nevertheless directly applicable, i. e. viable as practical reasons. With 
regard to the normative content they contain the same formal structure as pre-
scriptions. If the circumstances in the checking routine of the norm match the 
circumstances in a practical case, norms are simply applied. In other words, in 
regular/ordinary cases they are easily convertible into prescriptions. Moreover, 
197 All that said before regarding the difference between permissions and duties applies 
analogously to rules/norms as well as prescriptions. Strictly speaking, permissions do not 
imply a relation of precedence, but one of coequality. Therefore they are a normative exemp-
tion for the addressed agent. Importantly, they do imply a relation, which clearly separates 
them from principles as abstract quantities. See also below sec. II, fn. 198.
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one could say they are simply utilised as prescriptions. What happens, how-
ever, when we find circumstances in practical cases that are not implied in the 
checking routine of the norm, but which we think we should consider in finding 
a judgement? What happens in these so-called ‘hard cases’? We shall consider 
this decisive problem shortly. For now, let us continue focussing on the abstract 
distinction between rules and principles a bit longer and analyse more carefully 
the conceptual dividing lines between principles, norms and prescriptions.
bb) From Principle to Prescription
How exactly does one come from principles to prescriptions and the other way 
around? What are the necessary mental steps to take? As an entry point for the 
ensuing discussion and in accordance with the foregoing remarks, I presume 
that in order to come from a set of principles to a certain prescription there are 
two distinguishable mental steps to take which also mark the aforementioned 
conceptual dividing lines between principles and norms on the one hand and 
between norms and prescriptions on the other. These are: relationing and con-
cretisation. Whilst the former stands for the transition from abstract to practical 
reasons, the latter does so for the transition from general normative demands/
requirements to prescriptions or concrete normative demands.
In detail: For a start, ‘concretisation’ marks the threshold between principles/
norms and prescriptions. How can that be so in light of the fact that norms (as 
has also been stated earlier) can already greatly vary in terms of concreteness? 
In short, a prescription is concrete because its element CP, in contrast to CN or 
CQ, describes a set of circumstances that is inevitably bound to a specific prac-
tical decision in one particular case. Thereby all relevant circumstances are nec-
essarily included, notwithstanding the fact that the definition of these circum-
stances, of what actually qualifies as relevant and considerable, is a relative 
one – relative to the values protected by the system in question, that is, to the 
will of the authority in question (see above). In other words, both principles and 
norms only become concrete by being applied. Yet, through application they 
become a formally different element altogether, namely a prescription. Thus ul-
timately, we may understand concretisation as application.
Apart from that, norms and prescriptions differ from principles in containing 
a relation of precedence as their normative content. Hence, in contrast to prin-
ciples as abstract reasons they are applicable because and insofar as their con-
tent thus mirrors the structure of actions as practical relations of precedence. 
This thought is crucial and needs to be clarified: Discussing actions earlier, we 
found that performing an action means deciding between different options of 
conduct, even if they are not fully specified by the agent. Thus, by performing 
an action we inevitably judge certain possible options over others, thus also 
certain objectives over others. In other words, we inevitably, even though often 
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unknowingly, put different (possible) objectives into a relation of precedence. 
Consequently, a reason to act in a certain way can never simply be an abstract 
reason as an abstract quantity, but must imply a practical priority of certain rea-
sons over other (at least possible) considerations. In other words, a reason to 
act, a practical reason must represent a relation of precedence in order to suit 
the logic of actions. Accordingly, a single idea/abstract principle can by itself 
not possibly be motivating for an action. It cannot function as a reason for a 
practical decision. Only when considered in relation to other specific or merely 
possible objectives, i. e. when put into relation, it can become such a practical 
reason.198 In sharp contrast to principles, norms and prescriptions are capable 
of providing reasons for practical decisions just because, already by their very 
nature, they contain a relational normative content.
 principles  = under CQ [Q] abstract
general <      ——————————————————
 norms/rules = under CN 
n[Q > XY]
—————————————  > relational
concrete prescriptions = under CP [Q > XY]
Figure 10: Structural Features of Normative Elements.
cc) The Impracticability of Principles
So far we only considered very generally why and to what extent principles and 
rules/norms differ. Now it is time to return to our object of study and transfer 
these thoughts to Alexy’s account of principles. Where exactly does his theoreti-
cal model fail? Essentially, Alexy makes two assumptions that are ultimately in-
consistent: On the one hand he explains the nature of norms and the connection 
between norms and ‘ought’199 with reference to the three deontic modalities.200 
Thus, norms in the Alexyan sense imply a generalised statement about the nor-
mative demand ascribed to an action or to a general type of action. Detached, 
this assumption is for the most part in accordance with our account so far. On 
the other hand, Alexy claims that principles are not merely reasons for rules, 
198 Remembering the normative structure of permissions (P) above, we now find that any 
norm (P) can never be itself motivating for an action precisely because it lacks the necessary 
relation of precedence in its normative code, which only obligations and prohibitions contain. 
Accordingly, the normative meaning of permissions was not unjustly compared to a state of 
normative indifference earlier. In a negative sense, much the same applies to the deontic mo-
dality (D), sorted out earlier. Another point that hopefully becomes clearer now is the nature of 
so-called ‘self-addressed commands’ (see above): Intrasubjectively a direct motivation to act 
can only be offered by an obligation due to the positive relation of precedence offered by it.
199 Not in the sense of an obligation, but in a very general, nominalised sense (German: 
“Sollen”) referring to normative precepts in general.
200 Alexy, TG, 43–44, 72.
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but can be reasons for concrete normative judgements as well.201 This claim is 
consistent with his claim that principles are a subcategory of norms. And this 
is precisely where Alexy’s version of a principle theory fails: Either he is right 
with the claim about the applicability of principles, their ability to serve as rea-
sons for actions and concrete judgements. Yet, in this case there would be no 
real need to distinguish between principles and rules in the first place, at least 
not on a norm-theoretical level with regard to distinct structural features. They 
would differ only in their degree of generality.202 A principle would then be 
nothing but a very general type of norm, whilst in fact we pointed out the vari-
ation in generality as one of the very characteristic features of norms in general 
(see above). Alternatively, Alexy could uphold the claim that only conflicts of 
principles, due to their ideal and abstract nature, can be resolved by means of 
balancing. Yet, in that case principles as exactly these abstract ideas cannot at 
the same time be reasons for concrete normative judgements, because, in con-
trast to rules, they would not bear the necessary relational form (see above). If 
the latter was true for principles, which I think we should assume, then certainly 
the ‘ideal ought’ of principles is wider than the ‘ought’ of norms.203 In other 
words, when Alexy counts principles as a subcategory of norms, he errs because 
the ‘ought’ in his ‘ideal ought’ cannot possibly be the same thing as the ‘ought’ 
in norms or prescriptions, because it describes a reason that is non-relational.
Additionally, given the role that prescriptions play in normative reasoning 
alongside norms, when Alexy refers to rules as ‘definite’ he seems plainly mis-
taken. Even a relatively specific rule like ‘Do not cross the red lights’ is far 
from being definite. It has to be applied and subsumed in any particular case. In 
other words, it has to be concretised to become definite. And once it has been, it 
has already become something different altogether, namely a prescription. The 
lights-rule for example would normally be understood as ‘Do not cross the red 
light, except in case of acute emergency and only if possible without endan-
gering other people’. Yet, even when specified like this, one would still have to 
define what kinds of emergencies qualify as valid emergencies. Would you be 
allowed to cross the light if you brought a woman in labour to a hospital? How 
about if you carried someone with a stroke or a seizure? How about a broken 
finger? The possibilities are endless, and we find that the norm is far from being 
definite and that this is so due to its very nature as being a norm. We can decide 
whether a rule is applicable only in connection to the facts of a specific case. 
Only then does a norm actually become ‘definite’. Only then does it become a 
prescription. Alexy fails to point out the difference between rules and concrete 
201 Ibid, 72.
202 Ibid, 73. For similar criticism see Raz, “Legal Principles,” 838, and (already) Esser, 
Grundsatz und Norm, 51.
203 Cf. Weinberger, “Revision Rechtssatzkonzept,” 63–64.
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prescriptions; sometimes he even seems to confound the ideas entirely.204 Neg-
ligence of the level of application presumably then led him to a somewhat de-
fective understanding of the other elements, norms and principles.
For illustration let us apply the foregoing theoretical considerations to an ex-
ample from legal practice, a standard example for principles by principle theo-
rists: constitutional rights. Are such rights best perceived as rules or as princi-
ples? In this respect we need to be aware that we are not looking for criteria to 
specify and categorise different positive laws into either rules or principles.205 
The task of legal theory is finding the different structural elements that play a 
role in the process of law and legal decision-making. So, from their outer ap-
pearance almost all laws could be characterised as containing rules. This goes 
for fundamental rights as well. Of major importance in this respect is yet again 
the fact that the level of specificity in putting a principle in relation does not 
have to be very high to transform it into a rule. Let us once more use our stand-
ard example, ‘freedom of expression’: We can perceive this ‘right’ as an abstract 
good such as ‘The idea that people are allowed to speak their mind is generally 
a good thing’. This implies that free speech is a good thing independent of other 
possible considerations. However, without adding any other specific quantities 
to the normative equation we can just as well formulate this right as a (very gen-
eral) norm simply by saying: ‘As a rule, that is, normally, one should be allowed 
to speak his or her mind’. That way we already establish a normative relation, 
namely by implying that the idea of free speech will normally outweigh other 
conflicting considerations. Thus, it already becomes applicable. The difference 
between norms and principles is subtle then, but in terms of structure quite clear 
nonetheless. Norms are either generalised prescriptions and/or principles put 
into a general relation of precedence. Once more in other words: If you con-
sider Article 5 of the German Grundgesetz, which states “Everyone has the right 
to express and spread his or her opinion”206, it is all but wrong to interpret this 
statement in the following way: Under regular circumstances, or, in general, one 
should be allowed to express and spread his or her opinion. From what we said 
so far, that would make the statement a norm. Does this finding conflict with our 
initial assumption that certain rights are best understood as principles? It could 
only do so if principles were in effect useless for practical normative reasoning. 
However, in the ensuing section c) we will find that it is fairly often principles 
which actually are at work behind constitutional rights in reaching a decision/a 
practical judgement – thus at least in ‘hard cases’.
204 Alexy, TG, 88; id, “Ideales Sollen,” 33.
205 Raz, “Legal Principles,” 825.
206 In German: “Jeder hat das Recht, seine Meinung […] zu äußern und zu verbreiten […]”.
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dd) Conclusion
‘To do X’ implicitly means for the acting agent to judge option X as preferable 
in relation to other option. A practical reason, i. e. a reason for someone to act in 
a certain way, therefore needs to be a reason that offers a relation of precedence 
between different (possible) abstract reasons. Principles as such abstract rea-
sons can therefore never be directly motivating for actions. They are not directly 
applicable to any practical judgements. Hence, Principle Theory’s rejection of 
T1, i. e. the thesis that principles as abstract reasons are not directly applicable 
in the sense of implying the possibility to serve as a reason for an action or a 
concrete judgement, needs to be regarded as misguided.
c) The Problem of ‘Hard Cases’
If it were really as easy as we have seen to convert a principle into a norm, 
namely by merely asserting that a certain principle would usually outweigh 
other non-specified considerations, then the pressing question is, of course: 
what do we need principles for anyway? Let me reframe the problem investigat-
ed in this section: Above, in introductory thesis T2, a general normative signif-
icance of abstract reasons has been alleged. Why and to what extent should we 
assume such a significance of principles in addition to that of norms? This ques-
tion is decided over the matter of so-called ‘hard cases’, i. e. such cases in which 
we cannot reach a unanimous conclusion solely by applying an existing norm, 
either because the case is not regulated at all or because there are conflicting 
rules that, if applied, would come to contrary results.
aa) Principles as Normative Properties?  
The Relation of Axiology and Normativity
Beforehand, supposing a general normative significance of principles as ab-
stract ideas of the good, we ought to give some attention to the general theoret-
ical distinction between axiology and normativity and the alleged permeability 
between these two levels. So far principles were on the one hand said to be axi-
ological quantities, but at the same time said to have a ‘normative significance’ 
with respect to the evaluation of actions. So, even if I were able to convincingly 
expound the distinct norm-theoretical structure of principles in comparison to 
norms and their role in the solution of hard cases in the following sections, there 
is another, admittedly rather bold claim implied in T2, namely that anything 
deemed ‘good’ is in some way (however indirectly) aimed at guiding or judging 
conduct207 – a claim that shall be upheld, yet qualified. The predominant view 
is that not everything deemed good has in some way to be acted towards. An ex-
207 At least in the sense of a “pro-tanto ought”, cf. Jansen, Struktur der Gerechtigkeit, 62.
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ample to support this claim could be that of a meteor rushing towards the earth, 
threatening to kill all life on the planet.208 In this respect it is asserted that even 
though one might think of that as a generally bad thing, it has no implications 
on what anyone actually ought to do in this situation, given that no one could 
in fact change the outcome of the situation.209 Thus, one objection against in-
cluding axiological quantities into a normative system could be that normativity 
would get too demanding that way. However, the fact that one might in effect 
not be able to take any action against a certain outcome does not have to affect 
the normative requirements of the situation. If human life in general is seen as a 
good thing, then presumably it follows that one generally ought to behave in a 
favourable way towards it.210 Thus, in our example, if one did have the chance 
to actually stop the meteor he or she certainly ought to do so. Such a view is 
not only in conflict with a common understanding of axiology as not (directly) 
related to conduct, but at the same time with the equally common claim ‘ought 
implies can’.211 A strong and intuitively plausible argument for this position is 
that it would be simply absurd to demand something from an agent which she 
(or anyone for that matter) simply cannot do. This argument entails, though, 
that we cannot or should not distinguish between the prescription of a concrete 
normative demand in a certain situation and the possibility to ascribe blame or 
accusation, i. e. the question of whether under the given circumstances a mis-
conduct can sensibly be reproached. Examples for cases in which we are used 
to sparing reproach or accusation are the incapacity to make decisions, e. g. due 
to a psychotic episode, the inability to attain the end in question (e. g. saving the 
world in our meteor-example), and possibly also the case of true dilemmas in 
which there is simply no other valid option left (see above). Ultimately, a dis-
tinction between normative demand and reproach is not necessary, but certainly 
possible.212 Obviously the normative demand would then imply a much weaker 
208 Cf. Quante, Einführung Ethik, 30–32, esp. 31.
209 Ibid, 31.
210 See above fn. 207.
211 Immanuel Kant, “Critique of Practical Reason,” in Practical Philosophy, ed. Mary 
J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999 [1788]), 163–164: “He judges […] 
that he can do something because he is aware that he ought to do it and cognizes freedom with-
in him, which, without the moral law, would have remained unknown to him”. For a more 
recent approach to this fundamental principle see Peter Vranas, “I Ought, Therefore I Can,” 
Philosophical Studies 136 (2007): 167–216. Notably, Vranas regards the implication as a con-
ceptual necessity.
212 For a much more sophisticated account arguing for a similar severing of the conceptual 
ties between ‘ought’ and ‘can’ see: Michael Kühler, “Demanding the Impossible,” in The Lim-
its of Moral Obligation, ed. Marcel van Ackeren and Michael Kühler (New York: Routledge, 
2016). Kühler claims that due to their specific “direction of fit”, statements about obligation 
are independent of statements about the ability to fulfil these obligations. Hence, if one ought 
to do X, yet for some reason cannot do X, “this only entails that the corresponding ‘ought’ 
will, maybe necessarily, remain unfulfilled” (ibid, 123). Instead, Kühler interprets the prin-
ciple ‘ought implies can’ as a “complex moral principle based on considerations of fairness” 
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sense of ‘ought’, but it counts in favour of it that a lot of our thinking in practical 
normative contexts seems to follow these two consecutive steps. For example, 
when A kills B but was in a state of incapacity at the time due to an acute psy-
chosis, we tend to make a (legal/moral) judgement like ‘Naturally, A ought not 
to have killed B, but we cannot blame him for it.’ The point is: It is not per se 
inconsistent to say ‘you ought to stop the meteor’, even though you practically 
will not have any chance of stopping it. It might not be sensible to do so, which 
is why we spare you the reproach despite your non-compliance with the a prio-
ri demand.213 Thus, regardless of whether you want to rely on a stronger or a 
weaker sense of ‘ought’, the inclusion of axiological quantities into the realm of 
normativity does not raise the demandingness of the latter. Only because some-
thing is ‘good’ it does not mean that we put blame upon us in case we do not 
attain it as an end.
Another objection to the inclusion of axiological quantities in the realm of 
normativity lies at hand: It is widely held that there is a ‘variety of goodness’.214 
Even if ‘moral goodness’ were to have influence on our actions, there are other 
types which are not supposed to have such influence, for example ‘instrumen-
tal goodness’ like when someone says ‘this is a good bike’ or ‘this is a good 
screwdriver’.215 I suppose, things are or we make them good, because and only 
because they should in some way affect our views and opinions and thus ulti-
mately our actions towards them. That is, if it is true, which I believe it is but 
I am afraid I will not be able to conclusively explain here, that ‘to be human 
means having to act’216, what are views and opinions on anything good for if 
(ibid, 127). For a more elaborate version of this position cf. also Michael Kühler, Sollen ohne 
Können? (Münster: Mentis, 2013).
213 Leaving aside the fact that probably there would be no more ‘we’ left once the mete-
or landed. Besides, a similar argument, namely that an obligation becomes meaningless with-
out corresponding actual ability to fulfil it, is provided in: Richard Hare, Freedom and Reason 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1963), 51–66. Based on Strawson’s account of semantic presupposition 
(Peter Strawson, “On Referring,” Mind 59 (July 1950): 320–344), Hare claims that ‘ought’ 
only semantically presupposes ‘can’ and thereby offers a considerably more modest account of 
a conceptual tie between the two notions than Vranas does (see above fn. 211).
214 Cf. Georg von Wright, The Varieties of Goodness (London: Routledge, repr. 1972 
[1963]).
215 A short side note: The ‘variety of goodness’ described here is analogous to the variety 
of reasons described earlier, including normative reasons s. str., but also prudential, aesthet-
ic, conceptual reasons, etc. All of these reasons can be practical reasons for action, i. e. also 
conceptual reasons. For instance, the statement “Mr Weissinger advocates a choice theory of 
rights” clearly describes an action of mine. The reasons for this action might indeed be man-
ifold, yet I daresay that they were mainly conceptual reasons. That is, the reasons for endorsing 
a certain concept are such reasons that provide for the quality of this concept or of concepts in 
general. They are not normative in a stricter sense, nor of any other kind.
216 Cf. Ralf Ludwig, Kant für Anfänger (München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1999), 
9 (in German): “Mensch sein heißt handeln müssen.” This quote is regularly associated with 
Kant directly. Notably, it is not an actual quote of Kant’s, but merely a didactic statement that 
has been used often enough in the context of Kantian texts to get ascribed to Kant himself 
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not to have some kind of an effect on our practical decisions towards them? This 
goes for all ‘varieties of goodness’, even for instances of ‘good’ that are usually 
not associated with normative requirements s. str. If one claims ‘this is a good 
screwdriver’ it is implied that the object in question has features which make it 
suitable to handle screws. Obviously, there is no direct normative implication 
in this statement, certainly not in the form of a command or any other immedi-
ate normative requirement. However, the normative content of the statement is 
merely hidden, which is to say it depends on the circumstances, because it is im-
plied that in case you were in need of using a screwdriver, you ought to use this 
one as it fulfils the respective technical requirements (provided of course there 
are no better screwdrivers at hand either).217
To conclude: Discussing normative systems and normative demands, we 
need to be clear about the general functionality of a normative system, i. e. espe-
cially we need to know all discriminable structural elements of it and how they 
interact. In this respect we can and should distinguish axiological quantities (= 
values/principles) and deontological quantities s. str. (= norms and prescrip-
tions). As basic elements of normativity in general, both norms and principles 
are ultimately concerned with the evaluation of conduct, only on different levels 
of abstraction. In this respect it is unclear why theorists usually feel the neces-
sity to establish or explain some kind of logical priority between deontological 
and axiological categories,218 when one could just as well see them as related 
concepts mutually dependent on each other in the overall inductive-deductive 
process of normativity.
bb) Rule Account vs. Principle Account
What happens when a decision has to be made in an unclear legal or moral 
matter? What happens when norms or principles collide? How do we solve 
‘hard cases’? As indicated before, according to Alexy’s analysis of the problem 
we can a priori distinguish two opposing accounts here: the rule account (RA) 
by times. In a way, this quote encapsulates a thought developed earlier, namely that one can-
not not perform actions, see above sec. II, 3., b), aa), (1). Cf. also Joseph Singer, “The Legal 
Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld,” Wisconsin Law Review 
82 (1982): 1059: “[…] making choices is what human beings do”.
217 Naturally, a normative system of law or morals will not provide you with an answer to 
the question of which screwdriver you should best use. There will be a rather specific norma-
tive system though that is concerned only with this question and which is (or at least can be) 
consistent with superordinate systems like law/morals etc. Cf. above the general remarks on 
plurality of normative systems in sec. II, 1.
218 See only Zimmerman, “Value and Normativity,” 15–25, with further references. Cf. 
also: Detlef Horster, Ethik (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2012), 107–110; Mark Schroeder, “Value Theo-
ry,” in Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Stanford University, 
1997–), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/value-theory/, sec. 3, with further 
references.
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and the principle account (PA).219 Proponents of RA claim there are generally 
only rules that can be applied or that collide in hard cases, the latter with the ef-
fect that either one rule needs to be invalidated or that an exception is added to 
one of the rules. Proponents of PA, in contrast, believe to be able to prove both 
the existence of and the necessity for principles as an independent normative 
phenomenon by showing that rules do not possess the capacity to collide with 
each other. Thus, PA implies a juxtaposition of norms and principles in norma-
tive reasoning,220 whilst RA entirely denies the existence of principles as mean-
ingful properties in drawing normative conclusions. On the basis of our insights 
about normative systems so far, we shall find that the general assumptions of 
proponents of RA regarding the application of norms are all but wrong. RA’s ex-
planation of the functionality of such a system is at best fragmentary. Hence, we 
will reach the conclusion that the idea of such a system is better grasped by in-
cluding the idea of principles. Let us have another look at our standard example 
to clarify the opposing claims: O verbalises a statement, which P finds insulting. 
Here O’s right to express his opinion as one principle (P1) collides with P’s per-
sonality right as another (P2). The applicant of a normative system – whether 
a judge ex post or O himself ex ante, i. e. before performing the action – has to 
come to a conclusion about what is or was the overall right thing to do in this 
situation. We learned earlier that the form of this final decision can be described 
as e. g. ‘under CP [P1 > P2]’. RA and PA differ in describing how one reaches 
this result. RA claims there are only two norms effective in this case, one that 
claims ‘One should normally be allowed to express their opinion freely.’ or 
‘under CP1 n[P1 > XY]’ and another that claims ‘Normally one should not per-
form actions that affect the personal feelings or the honour of another person.’ 
or ‘under CP2 n[P2 > XY]’. In order to decide which option of conduct is pref-
erable, the applicant needs to choose which one of these two rules should be ap-
plied under the given circumstances. Following from that choice we could then 
add an exception to the neglected rule and thus have another, more specific rule 
to use in future cases. On the other hand, PA claims that something entirely dif-
ferent happens in hard cases: According to PA the applicant of the system does 
not choose between different norms, one of which she simply applies, but in 
cases in which not one norm applies, we take into account all relevant abstract 
reasons, balance them with respect to the actual facts of the case and thus form 
a decision. The result is a practical prescription then, from which we gain a new, 
more specific norm by means of generalisation.
219 Alexy, TG, 104 ff.
220 Hence, this categorisation and the terminology used here differs significantly from 
Alexy in this respect: PA is not to be understood in the sense of a strict principle model, which 
pertains to be able to eschew rules entirely, but rather as what Alexy called a combined “rule/
principle-model” (Alexy, TG, 117).
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Before we dwell on the advantages and disadvantages of RA and PA, let us 
elucidate where exactly they differ by drawing on another, similar, dichotomic 
pair of theses, which is entirely made up at this point solely for argumentation 
purposes, i. e. in order to eventually show where RA fails. The two theses to be 
introduced regard the permeability between axiology and normativity or the 
manner in which practical normative conclusions are found. First, one could 
purport a ‘division-thesis’ or a ‘two-step-thesis’ such as the following: Princi-
ples/values play a role for normative processes only on a superordinate level. 
Principles are put into relation in order to ascertain norms. Norms are then ap-
plied to practical cases. Yet, next to norms principles have no proper role to play 
in normative reasoning s. str. Contrary to that, one might purport another thesis, 
a ‘unity-thesis’ or ‘action-centred-thesis’ such as this: Principles need to be put 
into relation to serve as practical reasons, yet this happens not on an abstract 
theoretical level but in light of and with respect to the facts of a concrete case. 
In this sense, principles are directly relevant to drawing normative conclusions.
cc) Fallacies of the Rule Account
Where exactly does RA fail? An apparent inconsistency in RA is the idea of 
an ‘adding of an exception’ to one of the conflicting rules in hard cases. A new 
norm, which implements an exception to one of the rules that had existed so far 
or which invalidates one of the conflicting rules, does not simply appear out of 
thin air. As indicated earlier, prior to the norm comes the decision in the practi-
cal case. The rule account tries to avoid this detour over the level of application 
when in fact it cannot. The new norm is won from an inductive conclusion from 
the concrete evaluative judgement in the single hard case. Yet, how is this con-
crete judgement won? When two norms collide it is certainly not the case that 
one of them is simply applied arbitrarily. A proponent of RA needs to draw on 
the idea that the judge uses his or her discretion to choose one of the conflict-
ing rules in question to be the one to govern the case. But what are criteria for 
this, the judge’s decision? Surely they are not the ones provided by the system 
in question. Nor is the decision ‘criteria-free’, an act of arbitrary discretion. In 
effect, in the example case the judge necessarily either prioritises P1 over P2 or 
P2 over P1. This act of prioritising based on the facts of the individual case is 
not performed by applying or not applying norms, but essentially this is the bal-
ancing process that proponents of PA claim happens in hard cases.
Put differently and in more detail: Is the judge’s verdict in hard cases a crite-
ria-free, gratuitous decision between two norms or a reasoned decision for one 
principle and against another? Presumably, the latter description makes more 
sense given our perception of actions and judgements as we cannot understand 
the discretion, which a judge is supposed to have in hard cases according to RA, 
without the notion of prioritising. In other words, if the judge chooses norm 1 
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over norm 2 he sets a relation of precedence between these two norms under the 
practical circumstances of the given case. Both norms are as such applicable to 
practical cases, so a decision between the application of either norm 1 or norm 
2 should not be a theoretical problem. In fact, though, one does not choose be-
tween two choices – one makes a decision. And a decision itself is the setting 
of a relation of precedence. Put simply, deciding is defining a relation of prec-
edence. A glimpse at the formal structures of norms and principles emphasises 
this idea: When judge J is caught in a conflict between following either N1 = 
‘under CP1 n[P1 > XY]’ or N2 = ‘under CP2 n[P2 > XY]’ and eventually chooses 
to follow N1, according to RA he would have to set the following new relation 
of precedence:
‘under CP [(P1 > XY) > (P2 < XY)]’
It is at best superfluous, though, if not logically questionable, to describe this 
newly won relation of precedence as a relation between different relations. The 
formal statement above can effortlessly be reduced to the following form famil-
iar to us:
‘under CP [P1 > P2]’
This form makes more sense, because here not different relations, but different 
quantities, different values or objectives are being related. And it is these ref-
erence objects of norms and prescriptions which are principles. In other words, 
we make better sense of practical judgements in hard cases by not merely de-
scribing them as criteria-free, arbitrary choices between different norms as dif-
ferent predefined reasons, but instead as a concrete act of relating different ab-
stract reasons and thereby the definition of a concrete relation of precedence. 
The idea of discretion as some kind of decision without being backed by rea-
sons is at best misleading. If we choose between two possible reasons, naturally 
we do not need another additional reason for choosing one side, but the reason 
we side with simply is the reason we need. However, by doing so we rate this 
chosen reason in some way better than the neglected one. We relate them and 
this practical relating essentially is deciding. Hence, the boundary between dis-
cretion as a gratuitous choice and a decision actually in favour of something 
and against something else dissolves. We cannot decide without reasons (either 
reasons regarding what to choose or reasons from which to choose), and there-
fore we cannot decide without defining a relation of precedence. And when we 
relate reasons, it is merely a simplification to identify not norms as the relatable 
quantities (which are themselves generalised relations) but rather the objectives 
that actually are related within these norms, namely principles.
A seeming weakness and implausibility of PA is that it might appear to by-
pass the level of norms entirely, whereas the general importance of norms, 
which is that they reduce complexity and thus make a state of affairs intelligible 
108 II. The General Functionality of Normative Systems
for us, is rather undoubtable.221 If PA were understood in this strict, exclusive 
sense, namely that we only needed principles in order to draw normative con-
clusions, as a theory it would indeed be implausible. In fact, PA has a decisive 
advantage over RA in this respect due to its being inclusive. It affirms and rein-
forces the existence of principles but does not generally regard norms as less 
important than principles. It regards principles as relevant in hard cases and 
norms in regular ones. Thus, it rather is RA which seems implausible by a priori 
and entirely excluding principles from normative theory. In order to clarify this 
point, let us reconsider our dichotomy between ‘division-thesis’ and ‘unity-the-
sis’: The central weakness of both notional accounts lies in their implied claim 
for exclusivity. Once again, the practical importance or necessity of general 
rules for our social coexistence shall not be called into question. However, the 
undeniable importance of rules for normative practice is not subverted by ad-
mitting that there are certain cases which cannot be solved simply by applying 
rules. Normative practice happens to be a fruitful juxtaposition of both kinds of 
normative reasoning purported in the ‘division-thesis’ and the ‘unity-thesis’ – a 
juxtaposition of the mere application of norms (mere concretisation) in regular 
cases and a specific balancing process of conflicting principles in hard cases 
(relationing and concretisation).222 Hence, the inclusivity of PA is its decisive 
advantage in comparison to an overly exclusive RA.
dd) Conclusion
To conclude: The meta-ethical claim argued for is that any normative system 
necessarily contains both norms and principles, i. e. there is a natural juxtapo-
sition of two different kinds of normative conclusions. Sometimes we simply 
apply norms, sometimes we go the hard way and weigh conflicting principles 
according to the special circumstances of a single case.223 Which way to go, 
what best to do in each case, furthermore what exactly qualifies a case to be a 
‘hard case’ – all this is not a matter of discretion, though. It is no longer a meta-
ethical problem at all but it is a key issue for any normative theory to provide 
for. This question is reflected in the stress ratio between equity and legal certain-
ty/predictability which legal systems in practice exist in. It is in this stress ratio 
that different substantial ethical theories lay different foci. Whereas deontologi-
cal theories tend to emphasise the importance of predictability and thus the per-
sistence of rules, the opposite usually goes for consequentialist theories which 
tend to aim at a maximum of equity.224 For consequentialism the identification 
221 Cf. Alexy, TG, 104 ff.
222 Hence, there is a dichotomy between ‘division-model’ and ‘unity-model’ of normative 
reasoning only if each one would imply a claim for exclusive validity.
223 Alexy, TG, 117 ff.
224 For an instructive article (in German) with regard to the differences between both tradi-
tional lines of theory (with a focus on the assessment of action consequences) cf. Jörg Schroth, 
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of ‘hard cases’ is then mainly a matter of effort, of endeavour. The purpose of 
judging actions justly, and that is equitably, were inherent to any normative 
system and would remain as a necessary task. Although truly just judgements 
would remain an unreachable ideal for us, one which could only ever be approx-
imated, it is one which we can and should at least approximate. For deontologi-
cal ethics the question of whether we are dealing with a hard case is no question 
at all. Generally, one ought to follow the existing rules. However, deontology 
also somehow has to deal with the fact that normative systems develop and 
change over time, that they evolve in the light of new, unforeseen cases. To ex-
plain the emergence of new and more specific rules for the future, deontological 
theories also need the idea of unprecedented decisions in hard cases and thus 
of principles, even though they could of course reduce them to a minimum – to 
unknown cases, for example.
d) Conclusion
To sum up: When Alexy speaks of principles he mostly refers to and has in mind 
constitutional rights, which themselves are mostly formulated as norms. Struc-
turally, in legal reasoning these parts of the constitution often function like prin-
ciples as explained here, as abstract arguments and quantities in a balancing 
process with the aim of reaching a practical decision in so-called hard cases. It 
is the great achievement of principle theories in general and Alexy in particu-
lar to point out this specific norm-theoretical feature of principles. His distinc-
tion between principles and rules is defective, though. Basically, he claims that 
principles are norms due to the fact that they most often come in the form of 
‘rules’, like basic constitutional rights, whereas the semantics of norms signifi-
cantly differs from that of principles. Correctly understood principles are not a 
somewhat ‘aimed’ or directed ‘ought’, but, just like Alexy points out himself, an 
‘ideal’ one. Hence, in contrast to what Alexy explicitly claims they are not (di-
rectly) applicable in the sense of serving as a practical reason. Furthermore, the 
deficiency of Alexy’s account is owed to his separation of normative elements 
into only two different kinds, rules and principles, whilst we are in fact in need 
of distinguishing at least three basic elements with principles, norms and con-
crete prescriptions. Supposedly, disregard for this latter category is primarily 
responsible for many of the misunderstandings within normative theory.
Accordingly, with regard to rights as our overarching object of study we may 
now accept the following: If we for now suppose that rights actually are rea-
sons, there is no reason a priori not to think they could be both practical reasons 
(norms or prescriptions) and abstract reasons (principles), in each case append-
“Deontologie und die moralische Relevanz der Handlungskonsequenzen,” Zeitschrift für phi-
losophische Forschung 63 (2009).
110 II. The General Functionality of Normative Systems
ant to a certain entity.225 The foregoing remarks on how we draw normative 
conclusions should thereby help us distinguish a bit more clearly between rights 
in the former and rights in the latter sense.226
5. Normative Systems II: The Multiplicity of Normative Systems
We are now almost ready to engage in the actual, theoretical debate about rights. 
One more thing beforehand, though: At this point the foregoing explanations re-
garding the notion of ‘normative systems’ need to be supplemented and refined, 
based on the insights won thus far about their inner functionality. In doing so 
we will not solely attend to the notion of a normative system as such, but mainly 
to the phenomenon of a (factual or even necessary) multiplicity of normative 
systems in normative practice. Despite the fact that our analysis of rights is for 
the most part limited to the inner functionality of one specific system, there are 
two reasons why it seems nevertheless appropriate to proceed in this way. First 
of all, the premise to restrict the analysis to one system would undoubtedly be 
strengthened if we were able to demonstrate that normative systems in general 
are an adequate means to map normative practice as a whole. This point goes 
especially for the two excursuses under c) and d), which bear no direct rel-
evance for the topic of rights, but whose purpose is to advocate for the cogency 
of the general theoretical frame. The second reason is that an understanding of 
the vertical extension of normative systems in terms of justification, which we 
shall attend to presently, is absolutely vital for an adequate understanding of 
Hohfeld’s scheme of fundamental legal positions later on, precisely with regard 
to its two levels referring to a relation of super- and subordination of normative 
systems.227 In order to avoid misunderstandings we will have to distinguish this 
225 To what extent exactly this insight applies to Interest and Choice Theory of rights, i. e. 
whether their respective rights definitions comprise both kinds of rights, practical and abstract, 
is a matter to which we will give careful attention in sec. III, 2., c) and d).
226 In this context we are able to adequately classify Shafer-Landau’s specificationist ac-
count of rights, see Russ Shafer-Landau, “Specifying Absolute Rights,” Arizona Law Review 
37 (1995). What he describes as ‘absolute rights’ are in fact principles cut to length according 
to practical manifestations of a principle, according to practical decisions in which the prin-
ciple in question prevails. Hence, his idea of rights that are absolute in their respective area 
of application but in constant need of being further specified is mirrored by our concept of a 
yet-to-be-specified norm (in sharp contrast to an abstract principle). Thomson on the other 
hand appears to understand rights as general arguments, as principles that can be infringed 
upon, rather than as a principle whose boundaries are already practically confined, see Judith 
J. Thomson, “Self-Defense and Rights,” in Rights, Restitution, and Risk – Essays in Moral 
Theory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986): 37 ff. Cf. also William Parent and 
William Prior, “Thomson on the Moral Specification of Rights,” Philosophy and Phenomeno-
logical Research 56 (December 1996): 837–845.
227 It is exactly to this degree that rights cannot be understood as strictly limited to the 
logic of one system alone.
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idea of a vertical extension in terms of justification linked with the Hohfeldian 
scheme from a vertical extension in terms of validity, i. e. the idea of creating an 
order amongst a plurality of divergent normative systems by imposing super-
ordinate, i. e. primarily valid, systems.
a) Introduction: Multiple Normative Systems in Practice
In order to get a rough idea at first of what is meant with the notion of ‘multi-
plicity’ of normative systems in general, consider the following example, which 
also demonstrates that the law should not be understood as a single system: 
Playboy P cheats on his girlfriend G. First of all, criminal law does not for-
bid such an action, at least no criminal law in any reasonably liberal society. 
However, if P and G were engaged to be married at the time the action could, 
depending on the respective legal rules, lead to civil remedies.228 Furthermore 
I presume most people would find P’s action to be morally wrong. Thus, mor-
als understood in this very wide sense of a general social opinion only for the 
moment, P’s action was forbidden in this overall social context. However, with-
in another, qualified social context, amongst Q’s drinking buddies for instance, 
the idea of cheating on one’s girlfriend under certain circumstances could be 
generally approved of, let alone be obligatory depending on the appeal of the 
affair. Amongst P’s family members, though, P’s behaviour might once more be 
strictly disagreed upon. Finally, P himself, being a hedonistic character, might 
have come to the conclusion that cheating in this case was (at least) permissible 
within the confines of his personal value system. Unsurprisingly, what we are 
discovering here are not inconsistencies or different value judgements within 
one normative system, but rather very different normative systems altogether. 
We can identify different areas of the law, different moral codes, different rules 
within different social groups, but also differing individual beliefs and values. 
All these represent different normative systems. The fact that they produce dif-
ferent prescriptions concerning the same action leaves the inner consistency of 
each system untouched. Instead, one might say the evaluation of an action is 
context-dependent.229
228 As would be the case in German family law, where both parties could reclaim engage-
ment presents and expenses made in expectation of a marriage in such a case.
229 Neil MacCormick, “Wrongs and Duties,” in Rights and Reason, ed. Marilyn Fried-
man et al. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000), 141. Cf. also Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Ox-
ford: Clarendon, 1979), 153–157, where Raz refers to different “points of view” regarding the 
judging of an action.
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b) Vertical Extension of Normative Systems: Justification and Plurality
Apart from being a factual phenomenon in social practice, the multiplicity of 
normative systems can also be explained in theory. The normative practice of 
any reasonably developed community necessarily has a multitude of different 
layers, multiple levels in vertical as well as horizontal order, all of which rep-
resent normative systems. Precisely, as indicated earlier, one can distinguish 
two ways different normative systems can relate to each other in terms of super- 
and subordination: One refers to the justification of normative content, to the 
idea of authority as sketched earlier. In this respect a superordinate system is 
not concerned with the same actions as a subordinate one but rather with actions 
creating or altering the content of the respective subordinate system. The other 
refers to a primacy in validity of a superordinate to a subordinate system with 
regard to an evaluation of the very same action. As much shall be demonstrated 
in detail in two separate steps: First, under aa), we shall attend to the problem 
of justification of normative judgements or normative content and therewith the 
aspect of a vertical order of normative systems in the former sense. In this con-
text we will find that there is an infinite regress of justification regarding nor-
mative judgements in theory, which in practice needs to be limited or ‘capped’. 
As mentioned before, a correct understanding of this multi-level structure will 
prove to be absolutely crucial for a proper assessment of the Hohfeldian scheme 
and its different levels in the second main part of this book. Subsequently, under 
bb), we will find why and to what extent there is also a necessary extension of 
normative systems in the opposite direction, i. e. a somewhat practical necessity 
to presuppose a plurality of divergent subordinate systems.
Like the claim for comprehensiveness in consideration of circumstances, 
the claim for a necessary multiplicity of normative systems is also supposedly 
meta-ethical and therefore normatively neutral, which shall be demonstrated 
under cc), where we shall simultaneously sharpen our understanding of ‘nor-
mative consistency’. Especially, we will find that the multiplicity-claim does 
not – as some may now assume – favour positions of moral pluralism; that is, 
it is not equivalent to a rejection of a monistic unity-thesis of morality, i. e. the 
claim that morality or normativity ought to be understood as a whole due to one 
highest, guiding principle.230 This would not be the counter-claim to my thesis 
as I am not at all claiming that there are different ways to normatively assess the 
world and we have no way of saying which one is better than the other. The ac-
tual counter-claim to mine would be that there was in effect only one normative 
system. Such a contention, however, would necessarily be false. First of all, if 
230 For an excellent overview of the pluralism-monism-debate in value theory see Chris 
Heathwood, “Monism and Pluralism about Value,” in Oxford Handbook of Value Theory, ed. 
Iwao Hirose and Jonas Olson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). For a brief, but 
well-written introduction to the debate see Schroeder, “Value Theory,” sec. 2.2.
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we suppose one system, we therewith suppose this system’s authority, which is 
(at least typically) exercised within the confines of another, superordinate sys-
tem. This problem could be avoided with reference not to a person, an agent ex-
erting authority, but with reference to a divine/natural/intrinsic and therefore an 
a priori persistent reason. However, a subordinate extension, our second point, 
is practically inevitable, i. e. even if there were no superordinate systems, there 
certainly are subordinate systems to any one intersubjective system. These sub-
ordinate systems need to fill the normative gap that arises due to the delegation 
of normative competence to the individual, which, as we saw earlier, cannot be 
avoided by any practical normative system. This point shall be explicated in de-
tail in the following section.
aa) Justification: The Infinite Regress of Justification
Earlier, in sec. II, 3., the necessary juxtaposition of authoritatively imposed con-
tent and individual competence within a singular normative system was point-
ed out. From this intra-systemic relation of permitted individual decisions and 
prescribed practical reasons we can and should distinguish another fundamental 
dialectical relation between decisions and reasons regarding evaluative judge-
ments in general. Precisely, one cannot pre-theoretically determine which one 
has priority between the two, that is to say, determine which one was first, as 
both are mutually dependent on each other. Loosely based on Hegelian ideas 
of dialectics, neither decisions nor reasons can be prior to the other in terms of 
meta-theoretical priority, but rather ‘one is the truth of the other’231 as each pre-
supposes the existence of the other on the next higher level of justification. In 
detail: Whether a certain normative matter or normative problem is solved by 
the provision of some reason (content) or by someone’s solitary decision (com-
petence) – presumably, in both cases it is impossible to determine which was 
first in terms of an ultimate justification. That is, every normative content could 
in theory be retraced to some act of competence, an authoritative decision for 
or against it. In turn, every such act relies on the fact that determining the nor-
mative content was permitted, that is, not forbidden, in the first place, i. e. that 
the definatory power was ascribed by not making any specific demands in the 
form of obligations or prohibitions from an even higher, superordinate system. 
In other words, the superordinate authoritative act232 of ascribing duties or per-
missions demands another normative content-basis, i. e. a (protected) permis-
sion to do so, which in turn asks for another superordinate authoritative act of 
231 Georg F. W. Hegel, The Science of Logic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010 [1812]), 503 ff., 652.
232 Insofar as authority is exercised through actions, and not already by means of an a 
priori persistent reason, see above sec. II, fn. 6, as well as below the respective remarks on 
‘sole immunities’.
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definition, and so forth. Hence, we find ourselves in an infinite regress of jus-
tifying normative judgements.233 Roughly speaking, for every duty we may 
question the respective authority (‘who says so?’), whilst for every act of per-
sonal authority or competence we may question the reasons for providing this 
competence (‘what is the substantial basis?’). Hence, there is a natural, vertical 
extension of normative systems in terms of justification. Thereby the (person-
al) authority regarding a subordinate system is nothing but a position of com-
petence in a respective superordinate system. An example from legal practice: 
A has a duty to pay taxes for owning a car. Supposedly, it has been decided by 
the respective democratic legislature in A’s community that car owners should 
pay taxes. Thus, the parliament itself as the relevant authority for tax law had a 
permission, a competence to enact this kind of rule. This competence, though, 
had to be granted to parliament by a higher authority to start with, namely by 
the people as the actual sovereign. That is, through the act of electing the legis-
lature it was given the respective permissions to issue tax laws. Electing has to 
be permitted as well, though. Yet, there is no higher, personal authority to grant 
a people the competence to elect its own leaders, thus we need to assume this 
fact as a somewhat intrinsic, persistent value, which should not be further ques-
tioned. We could alter the example to the extent that not an elected parliament, 
but a monarch reigns as an absolute sovereign. Historically, the absolute author-
ity of such monarchs was justified by the will of god as a higher being, rather 
than the will of the people. Thus, in such a case the ultimate justification some-
233 Hans Kelsen also recognised such a regress of justification with regard to legal norms, 
see: Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, ed. Matthias Jestaedt (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008 
[1934]), 74–76; id, Reine Rechtslehre [1960], 196–227. Famously, he tried to resolve it by 
reference to a hypothetical “Grundnorm” (Reine Rechtslehre [1934], 77; Reine Rechtslehre 
[1960], esp. 204–209). Roughly, the idea is problematic in my view because it introduces a 
‘hypothetical basis’ for some not-further-disputable norm/principle, whereas such a (however 
skilful) stunt does not appear to be necessary at all. In contrast, as we shall see presently, the 
problem of a regress of justification is, or rather eventually has to be, resolved simply by deter-
mining a highest, non-disputable norm/principle. Such could, for instance, be the democratic 
principle that every valid legal norm must be ultimately retraceable to a democratic decision of 
the people as the sovereign. Now, one could refer to this necessity – either the principle itself 
or the act of determining it – as the ‘Grundnorm’, and it is an open question, which cannot be 
followed here, whether Kelsen could (in some parts) be interpreted that way. However, it is 
sufficient to describe the necessity to terminate the regress as a practical necessity, which for-
goes any (further) hypothetical assumptions. Unfortunately, apart from these few and crude re-
marks, it is impossible to discuss Kelsen’s most influential and still controversially discussed 
theory in an adequate fashion in this context. Addendum: To those unfamiliar with Kelsen’s 
work it will appear strange that both the first and second edition of his ‘Rechtslehre’ are cited 
in this context. Notably, as Jestaedt correctly points out, Kelsen revised and extended his 1934-
work to a degree, where it is fair to say that first and second edition are no longer the same 
book, see Matthias Jestaedt, introduction to Reine Rechtslehre, by Hans Kelsen, ed. Matthias 
Jestaedt (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 2008 [1934]), li.
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how can be regarded as an act, even though an act by an ideal being, rather than 
as an intrinsic good.234
What we learn from these examples is that the regress of justification is only 
infinite in theory. In normative practice the pre-theoretical, dialectical relation 
between decisions and reasons describes a stress ratio that has to be resolved by 
any substantive theory one way or the other. Precisely, the infinite regress can 
only be – and indeed has to be – limited or ‘capped’ by ultimately either assert-
ing/implementing an inaccessible, persistent reason or an ultimate decision/in-
dividual judgement. Thereby the structural problem of the infinite regress is not 
strictly speaking solved, but in a way only ‘chopped’ due to practical needs. At 
some point in justifying our moral claims we simply need to commit ourselves 
to some ultimate decision (dictum, decree, etc.) or to some ultimate, indisputa-
ble (possibly ‘natural’) reason. In (German) legal practice we are familiar with 
both phenomena. We leave most areas of law to the discretion of the democratic 
sovereign and in certain matters we regard the ultimate judgement of a highest 
(often constitutional) court as ultimately binding, whereas we are also used to 
thinking of certain legal standards, e. g. the right to vote, the freedom of expres-
sion, or the prohibition of death penalties, as generally inaccessible to human 
discretion.235
Hence, we conclude: Normative systems are essentially defined over their 
content, the values they protect, the reasons and thus the duties they provide. 
They provide us – at least to some degree – with answers to the questions ‘what 
is valuable, i. e. worthy of protection or worth to be promoted/enabled?’ and 
consequently ‘what are we/am I to do?’ Yet, it is a more than just question to 
raise what role we as capable agents play in bringing these reasons up in the 
first place, as reasons do not seem to simply float around in the air around us. 
In this respect, we already became familiar with two positions earlier, present-
ed in their extreme forms here. In a nutshell, relativists claim that all values, all 
reasons are relative and depend entirely on our judgements, whilst intuitionists 
purport a priority of reasons, which we only encounter by means of moral intui-
tion. The central point in this respect is that these conventional meta-theoretical 
models actually cross the line to substantive normative reasoning by asserting 
some kind of priority of decisions over values or vice versa. If they were to re-
main strictly meta-ethical theories none of them could ever deliver a convincing 
solution to the problem of justification, because structurally there is simply no 
priority to unravel without crossing the border to normative reasoning, without 
us actually committing to one side and thereby ‘cutting off’ the infinite regress 
234 Thus, one may also find that asking questions regarding ultimate justification even-
tually leads into questions of metaphysics, of transcendental philosophy.
235 Essentially, as much describes the fundamental conflict between the ideas of democra-
cy as the rule of the majority (or its elected leaders) on the one hand and a ‘rule of law’ on the 
other. See also above sec. II, fn. 6.
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as described above. Ultimately, this is far from surprising as normative reason-
ing is about making judgements, starting with fundamental ones like this. Now, 
certainly not implied by these remarks is the claim that it is generally super-
fluous to argue about matters of ultimate decisions or ultimate reasons due to 
the impossibility to determine a meta-theoretical priority. On the contrary, these 
substantive arguments are something we simply cannot even avoid engaging in. 
They are decisive matters for any community to attend to: Which values do we 
regard as inaccessible? Which are open to our (better) judgement? Only there 
is no use in arguing over this issue on a purely descriptive, meta-ethical level.
bb) Plurality I: The Fact of Competing Judgements in Subordinate Systems
In normative practice the relation between different normative systems is not 
simply one of justification in vertical order. Rather we often find conflicts of 
different systems regarding the same action. Importantly, the possibility of such 
conflicts is already implied in the issuance of permissions. In detail: We re-
member that every normative system needs to strike a balance between prede-
fined content and areas of individual competence (see above). A normative sys-
tem in practice which does not include permissions as a systemic element236 is 
simply not imaginable (see above). However, already due to acknowledging that 
certain normative matters are left to individual judgements one also needs to ac-
knowledge a factual multiplicity of normative systems, because with regard to 
these normative matters left undetermined, different, incompatible judgements 
can and will be made in respective subordinate systems. An example: In liberal 
societies there is a legal permission for everyone to practice any religion, i. e. 
for everyone to live one’s life in accordance with that religion whose rules one 
sees fit. That is, in effect wide areas of permitted behaviour are provided by the 
law, in which everyone can submit to whatever ‘subordinate’ rules/normative 
systems provided by specific religious or other social groups they agree with. 
How is this order of super- and subordination determined, though? Surely, in an 
already existing hierarchical structure it is simply determined by the next high-
est authority and ultimately by the highest (accepted) authority, i. e. in the afore-
mentioned example the electing people as the democratic sovereign. However, 
it is noteworthy that this predetermination only functions theory-immanently, 
i. e. naturally the question regarding the legitimacy of the (highest) authority, 
that is, questions regarding the relation or the order of super- and subordination 
between various possible (highest) authorities are substantive ones, which can-
not be answered by a meta-theory. An example: Suppose A is faced with a re-
ligious obligation regarding action X, whereas the law forbids this very action. 
With good reasons we generally regard the law as the superordinate system and 
236 Not as valued permissions in the form of liberties, see therefore below secs. III, 1., a), 
cc), (2) and III, 2., b), bb), (2).
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A’s religious obligation as subordinate (and therefore as void).237 Yet, we can 
only do so based on a substantive theory that deploys such an order of the law 
over particular religious rules, which is not necessary but for which we need the 
aforementioned good reasons.
The notion of possibly differing, subordinate judgements shall be illustrated 
once more with the aid of the following example: Suppose M’s partner N is fa-
tally ill and M could save N’s life by donating a vital organ, i. e. M could save 
his partner’s life by sacrificing his own. Suppose further that the law permits 
him to do so. What would be the right thing to do? In order to decide in favour 
of one option as opposed to the other, M needs to have reasons. In this case 
there will probably not be established social practices, like the rules of a certain 
social group, which provide rules regarding what to do; the decision will ulti-
mately be a personal one. Different persons will come to different judgements 
according to their individual priorities. The point is: If they do, we can say that 
these decisions are born from different subordinate normative systems – in that 
case from different intrasubjective normative systems – one of which implies 
a practical precedence of one’s own life over one’s partner’s life and the other 
system vice versa.238
cc) Plurality II: The Possibility of Joint Validity or Four Kinds  
of Normative ‘Consistency’
Proceeding from the notion of competing or conflicting prescriptions from dif-
ferent subordinate normative systems, by analysing our normative practice one 
quickly finds that different judgements regarding the same action are not nec-
essarily always in horizontal order, but rather they can accrue from systems 
standing in a relation of super- and subordination – this time not in terms of 
justification, though, but in terms of validity. Importantly, through this primacy 
different prescriptions do not necessarily exclude each other, but under certain 
conditions they can be jointly valid. Demonstrating why and how this is the case 
is the same as refining the notion of normative ‘consistency’, which we shall 
thus attend to in this section. Earlier we identified ‘consistency’ as a central trait 
of any one normative systems. At that point, in sec. II, 1., we were only con-
cerned with the inner structure of one such system. We clarified the notion of 
‘specificity’ of actions and a normative system’s central trait as its labelling each 
of these specific actions with only one equally specific normative demand: (O), 
237 For a detailed analysis of these kinds of conflicts see presently sec. cc).
238 A short side note: Surely not every permission within a normative system, e. g. any 
legal permission, is itself normatively relevant in the sense that one has to have other norma-
tive reasons s. str. to perform the permitted action. However, if we regard it as an action in the 
first place we may nonetheless require of the agent to produce reasons more generally for per-
forming it, which can of course be aesthetic, instrumental, etc., and as such normative reasons 
only in the widest sense of the term, see above sec. I, 1., b), aa).
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(F) or (P). For better discriminability (and as indicated earlier) we shall refer to 
this requirement regarding the inner constitution of a single system as its ho-
mogeneity henceforth. Yet, homogeneity does not appear to be the only thing 
people refer to concerning normative consistency, especially not if we were to 
endorse the theoretical framework of a multiplicity of such systems. Hence, we 
may ask ourselves: What do we (and what can we) mean by talking of ‘consis-
tency’ in normative contexts apart from and in addition to ‘homogeneity’? My 
assumption is that we should carefully distinguish (at least) three additional 
kinds, which shall for better discriminability be named satisfiability, compati-
bility, and coherence. In detail: Generally, as indicated in the foregoing section, 
the notion of ‘homogeneity’ must be distinguished sharply from any state of af-
fairs in which an agent is faced with different competing prescriptions, imposed 
by different normative systems, with regard to the same action. How do these 
different demands relate to each other? Apparently, in case an agent is faced 
with both an obligation (O) and a prohibition (F) to perform an action X, she is 
faced with somewhat ‘inconsistent’ demands. One is per se not able to comply 
with both an obligation and a prohibition with regard to the same action. Sim-
ilarly, also (O) and (P) as well as (F) and (P) do seem to be mutually exclusive 
to some degree. An action cannot be forbidden and permissible at the same 
time, at least not if both prescriptions are linked with equal claims for consid-
eration or validity. However, at a closer look there does seem to be a crucial dif-
ference between the relation (O)–(F) on the one hand and (O)–(P) or (F)–(P) on 
the other. Whilst (O) and (F) exclude each other necessarily – compliance with 
one automatically leads to violation of the other – this does not go for the other 
two. One is indeed able to comply with both an obligation or prohibition and 
a permission, if only one complies with the former.239 In other words, in sharp 
contrast to an obligation combined with a prohibition, a duty and a permission 
are jointly satisfiable. Precisely, two or more distinct prescriptions, imposed by 
distinct normative systems, are satisfiable if it is possible for them to be jointly 
complied with by the same agent irrespective of a possible primacy in validity.
Admittedly, without reference to a possible super- and subordination, satis-
fiability by itself appears to be a rather useless theoretical tool. Hence, in order 
to make sense of it, we need to apply it to the notion of a super- and subordina-
tion of normative systems in terms of validity. Roughly, questions and claims 
for validity equate to the questions of whether a system ought to be (primarily) 
applied and by whom. To begin with, it is worth acknowledging that differ-
ent prescriptions can relate to each other both in horizontal and vertical order, 
whereby the superordinate system is entailed by a claim of primary validity 
239 In doing so, we assume that the legitimate alternative to the forbidden/illegitimate op-
tion of conduct matches with the legitimate alternatives implied in the respective permission, 
which does not necessarily have to be the case in different systems. We shall presuppose this 
fact at this point for the sake of simplicity.
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within a certain community. Let us imagine such a community, e. g. the popula-
tion of a country. Normative systems applied amongst this community are each 
accompanied by a certain claim for validity, which can be either universal, i. e. 
it is supposed to apply to every member of the community, or particular, i. e. it 
is supposed to apply to a specific group of people within the greater community. 
By virtue of these thoughts we are now equipped to introduce our third man-
ifestation of normative consistency: compatibility. Distinct concrete normative 
demands, imposed by distinct normative systems, are compatible if it is pos-
sible for them to be jointly valid within the same normative community. At first 
glance, compatibility appears to have two manifestations then: (a) Conflicting 
prescriptions in horizontal order are compatible if the respective validity claims 
are not universal but particular, and if they address separate groups within the 
greater community. (b) Additionally, due to their general satisfiability, permis-
sions and duties are compatible in case there is a superordinate permission and 
respective subordinate duties. If the superordinate system issues an obligation 
or a prohibition, then (O)–(P) and (F)–(P) are still satisfiable, yet incompatible 
because in both cases, by exercising the permission, one would violate the re-
spective obligation or prohibition, which one has to obey primarily.240 If, for 
example, the law of a modern, pluralistic society imposes some prohibition, 
subordinate moral permissions and obligations are certainly incompatible and 
thus void, because due to their subordinate status they have to defer to the pro-
hibition. Notably, (a) and (b) are not independent, but they are rather two sides 
of the same coin. A normative system that regards its validity claim as partic-
ular implicitly acknowledges a superordinate permission to judge and to act 
otherwise. Equally, the fact that a permission is superordinate implies that all 
subordinate normative demands can at best be linked with a particular validity 
claim.
Let us illustrate these thoughts by employing the following example: Sup-
posedly, there are all kinds of established moral convictions regarding the issue 
of full-face veiling of women in public. Whilst a considerable part of mainly 
Muslim women (and men for that matter) regard it as obligatory (at least for 
themselves, possibly also for women in general), quite a few opponents, con-
cerned mainly with the issue of gender equality, advocate a legal prohibition 
instead. Additionally, a traditional liberalist would probably have to regard the 
matter as decision that should be made by every woman herself, thus urging the 
action to be legally permitted. Clearly, the substantive issue cannot and shall not 
be discussed here. The point is simply a technical one: If a community does ban 
a conduct like veiling by means of a legal and thus superordinate prohibition, it 
240 In the case of a superordinate prohibition if one decides to perform the legitimate op-
tion X, and in the case of a superordinate obligation only if one decides to perform a legitimate 
alternative option.
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makes distinct demands incompatible and thus ultimately invalid. By contrast, 
if we suppose a permission (P) as the primary, superordinate rule then each in-
dividual agent can comply with the permission and the duty simultaneously, 
i. e. follow the respective obligation or prohibition – insofar as they accept the 
particularity of their conviction in the entire legal community. In other words, 
superordinate permissions are compatible with subordinate obligations/prohi-
bitions because agents are now able to comply with both the superordinate per-
missions and their particular normative convictions. Finally, whilst the notion 
of compatibility merely describes a relation between multiple, distinct prescrip-
tions, the state of an entirety of normative systems in vertical and horizontal 
order, in which no incompatibilities occur, shall be described as coherent. Thus, 
a multitude of normative systems can be coherent insofar as the imposition of 
a superordinate permission reconciles the competing particular normative posi-
tions on a lower level and to the extent that each of these positions discards any 
claim for universality, which in practice appears to be one of the biggest prob-
lems in pluralistic societies.241
The relation between coherence, compatibility, satisfiability and homogenei-
ty is undoubtedly a delicate one. The four manifestations of normative consis-
tency are structural presuppositions and theoretical tools that can be integrated 
and executed by every substantive normative theory in different ways. Hence, 
we ought to distinguish carefully: For a multitude of systems to be compatible 
or coherent, the systems involved must obviously be homogenous. Thus, intra-
systemic homogeneity is a precondition for the other three.242 Moreover, as a 
condition for unambiguous normative judgements within one normative system 
it is nothing but a practical necessity in any normative context, to be provided 
by any substantive moral theory. We can surely disagree about the evaluation 
of a certain conduct within a moral community. Yet, to deny the necessity of 
homogeneity would mean to accept it as reasonable for a judge to speak two 
different verdicts in one case, one allowing and one condemning the action in 
question. As much would clearly be senseless. The point here is that in order 
to disagree about normative judgements we first need to make definite judge-
ments. As much (and nothing else) is implied in the notion of homogeneity. 
Hence, a lack of it would in effect make normative reasoning itself pointless and 
void. In other words, the notion of homogeneity amounts to nothing more than 
a practicability of normative judgements, i. e. an exclusivity of the fundamental 
deontic modalities (O), (F), and (P) in a specific context.243 On the other hand, 
241 Especially when it comes to religious rules, which unfortunately a lot of people tend to 
perceive as universal and not as particular.
242 In this respect it appears important to note once more that any one system as such could 
never be coherent, because the concept of coherence as presented here already presupposes a 
multitude of normative systems.
243 That is, with respect to judging a certain action on the basis of any given set of values. 
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satisfiability is solely a technical term, which simply describes the relation be-
tween conflicting prescriptions; thus it is nothing that a substantive theory could 
possibly achieve or aim at. By contrast, compatibility as well as coherence de-
scribe states of affairs that could, but do not necessarily have to be provided or 
aimed at by a substantive theory. In other words, a substantive theory can surely 
allow for different concrete normative demands or different judgements to be 
and to remain incompatible. If coherence is thus not achieved by a superordi-
nate permission, the result would simply be a set of incompatible normative de-
mands. Accordingly, compatibility and coherence are normatively pre-shaped 
concepts, because to some degree they draw on the undoubtedly substantive 
idea of tolerance, which is implied in the notion of different, yet jointly valid 
normative demands in horizontal order.
To conclude: Based on the foregoing remarks we can establish an important 
point regarding the nature of our theoretical framework and the dispute between 
pluralists and monists mentioned earlier.244 Namely, the theoretical presupposi-
tion of a multiplicity of normative systems does not imply whether it is a good 
thing that different value judgements with regard to the same normative matter 
exist. In other words, the theoretical framework offered here is strictly nor-
matively neutral. Hence, both radical pluralists as well as strict monists could 
make use of the model of multiple normative systems. The monist would have 
to claim that (1) not every normative system actually in existence is a good or 
appropriate normative system and that (2) overall coherence could at least be 
established between all appropriate normative systems due to a uniting highest 
system or a highest principle. Pluralists, on the other hand, have no problem 
availing themselves of this model, whatsoever. They would simply claim that 
for certain (or most, or all) normative matters there is no consolidating princi-
ple, there simply is disagreement or incompatibility. Thus, what the pluralist has 
to reject is the idea of (overall) coherence. This poses no problem for our theory, 
as the multiplicity claim regarding normative systems does not, as we have just 
seen, demand coherence, but simply describes a state in which it could be pos-
sible for coherence to occur. Once more, either theory certainly cannot reject the 
idea of homogeneity within one system. Apart from that, we find that our multi-
plicity claim does not tend to any side; it is strictly neutral in the debate between 
moral pluralists and monists.
Given a necessary multiplicity of systems surely this can be regarded as a rather weak claim 
and, supposedly, there is nothing to reply in my defence to that.
244 See above fn. 230.
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c) Excursus I: Supererogatory Actions
With recourse to the multiplicity-thesis we are now able to make sense of a cat-
egory for evaluating actions, which we bypassed earlier in order to be explained 
more adequately now: supererogatory conduct. In the relevant literature regular 
attempts can be witnessed to try to explain the phenomenon of supererogato-
ry behaviour, i. e. actions that exceed normative expectations, that are literally 
‘above what is asked for’ in connection to (as one amongst equals with) the 
standard operators of deontic logic.245 We will see that none of them are con-
vincing, and the reason for their failure lies before us now. In contrast to our fun-
damental second-level deontic modalities (O), (F), (P) and (D), the notion of su-
pererogatory behaviour cannot be explained within the logic of only one system, 
but rather all the more fittingly with reference to a multiplicity of systems and to 
our standard modalities.246 Plainly, a supererogatory action is one that an agent 
has a permission (P) to perform in a reference system, whilst the same action is 
regarded (by the agent herself or otherwise intersubjectively) as the performance 
of some form of ‘higher’ or rather somehow more important obligation (O). Put 
differently, agent A acts in a supererogatory way if she exceeds the obligations 
strictly demanded of her by a reference system by following a self-imposed obli-
gation. In the reference system the action cannot be subject to a prohibition, but 
for the exceeding action to still be regarded as legitimate/positive it must be sub-
ject to a permission (P). Additionally, the exceeding action needs to be regard-
ed as favouring a specific reason, which, due to the lack of predefined reasons 
with a permission, is neither imposed by the reference system nor excluded by 
it either. Consequently, the notion of supererogation cannot be understood if not 
with reference to another normative system which prescribes the action in ques-
tion to A by means of an obligation – this can be another intersubjective norma-
tive system or (at least) an intrasubjective moral code, i. e. the personal moral 
convictions of A that ‘force’ her to perform the action in question. In short, su-
pererogation describes the relation between two normative judgements from two 
245 A few notable examples for treatises regarding the notion of supererogation: James 
Urmson, “Saints and Heroes,” in Essays in Moral Philosophy, ed. Abraham Melden (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1958); Joel Feinberg, “Supererogation and Rules,” Ethics 
71 (July 1961); Roderick Chisholm. “Supererogation and Offence: A Conceptual Scheme for 
Ethics,” Ratio 5 (1963); Paul McNamara, “Supererogation, Inside and Out: Toward an Ad-
equate Scheme for Common-Sense Morality,” in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Vol. 1, ed. 
Mark Timmons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
246 Similarly, the problem regarding the possibility of ‘rights to do wrong’ (averse to the 
idea: John Mackie, “Can there be a right-based moral theory?” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 
3 (1978): 351; supportive: Jeremy Waldron, “A Right to Do Wrong,” Ethics 92 (October 1981): 
esp. 31–37) can be met by reference to the multiplicity of normative systems. Hence, within 
one system it is clearly impossible to obtain or exercise a right and commit a wrong. Yet, it is 
perfectly possible to exercise a right provided by one system, the same act being judged as a 
wrong within another system.
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normative systems presupposing that (a) the judgement based on the reference 
system is a permission, (b) this judgement is the primarily binding one, yet that 
(c) the judgement based on the other system, i. e. the obligation in question, is 
the somewhat better one. Evidently, the notion of supererogatory behaviour is 
quite a problematic concept then, because it raises just concerns as to why the 
judgement in (c), being regarded as the overall better one, should not be more 
binding, i. e. superordinate in terms of validity, than the one in (a). It presupposes 
a meaningful difference between what is ultimately one’s obligation to do and 
what would be best to do. Arguably, this is a possible substantive claim but far 
from being a necessary theoretical one. Thus, supererogation is an essentially 
substantive phenomenon generally explicable with reference to the instruments 
available to us. Yet, it does not seem to be a necessary, let alone a particularly 
useful tool for all conceivable substantive normative theories.
d) Excursus II: The Relation of Law and Morals
Finally, by availing ourselves of the idea of a multiplicity of normative systems 
I believe we are even able to shed some light on one of the most central and 
traditionally most heated debates in legal philosophy: the concept of law and 
therewith the relation of law and morals.247 My aim is thereby surely not to 
offer a conclusive account of the nature of law, but rather I would like to dem-
onstrate possible ways in which the ideas of an infinite regress of justification 
and of a plurality of normative systems could be made fruitful in the future in 
order to gain an adequate understanding of law as a much more complex phe-
nomenon.
Presumably, the idea of law is very closely linked with the idea of a primacy 
in the validity of certain normative systems over others in normative practice. 
In a nutshell: The law of a certain community is believed to be the sum of nor-
mative systems that provide binding rules for the members of this communi-
ty, whereas binding means something like ‘not further disputable/challengea-
ble’.248 That does not mean that all legal rules need to apply to all members of 
247 If it actually could, it would surely be a great argument in favour of the idea of mul-
tiple normative systems as the theoretical model. Therefore, I will allow myself to propose 
some ideas about this issue at this point, despite the rather obvious fact that the following im-
plementations are not (closely) linked to our topic of rights any longer. Thus, if you are inter-
ested only in rights, feel free to skip this section. If you are interested in law and morals on a 
broader scope, please read on. For an instructive piece of work on the relation of law and mor-
als see, for instance, Heinrich Geddert, Recht und Moral (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1984). 
For a shorter introduction see Hans Jörg Sandkühler, “Moral und Recht? Recht oder Moral?” 
in Recht und Moral, ed. Hans Jörg Sandkühler (Hamburg: Meiner, 2010).
248 This notion of ‘bindingness’ entails a whole set of serious problems. For instance, does 
it necessarily imply the possibility of enforcing a legal obligation or prohibition by means of 
coercion? Or does it suffice to characterise legal ‘bindingness’ as the lack of possibilities to 
further question or discuss certain judgements? If so, how can we reasonably distinguish law 
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the community. On the contrary, we would probably all regard the obligations 
arisen out of a binding contract as legal obligations. These are by their very na-
ture relative to the parties involved. Thus, a community’s law is a law not due 
to the fact that it actually applies to everyone irrespective of the circumstances, 
but rather because it is binding to whomever it does apply to by virtue of being 
a law and because it is one element in a sum of legal systems, each of which are 
binding for their addressees and which in their entirety are aimed at being co-
herent. Thereby the latter feature of coherence is seen only as a necessary, not a 
sufficient one for the law of a community.249
Certainly, there are more than a few points to discuss about this most rough 
definition. Only to begin with, why is the law (at least as we know it) best un-
derstood not as only one normative system, but rather as the sum of various 
systems of a specific type, namely legal ones? As much shall be elucidated by 
the following example, which also serves as another more specific example for 
the extension of normative systems in terms of validity: A enters into a contract 
with B to sell him an (non-fungible) item Q for 80 €. Shortly after that, B enters 
into a contract with C to resell Q for 100 €. Before A is able give Q to B (or di-
rectly to C), D approaches A with an enormous offer. He offers to buy Q from 
A for 150 €. A agrees to D’s offer, i. e. she also enters into a contract with D to 
sell Q to him (instead of B). Provided all persons involved are fully capable and 
the law in question values autonomy and the general possibility to form legally 
binding contracts, the legal situation seems to be the following: A has form-
ed contracts with both B and D. Also B has formed a contract with C, though 
which is not of our concern right now. We can infer that A should have an obli-
gation both towards B and towards D to hand over Q. Obviously, A cannot fulfil 
both obligations, though. The normative demands are not satisfiable. By def-
inition the respective contracts A–B and A–D are different normative systems. 
Moreover, as implied earlier, I believe they are best understood as independent 
legal normative systems. This may seem surprising at first, but in fact it is what 
autonomy (in terms of private law) is essentially all about, namely the freedom 
to shape one’s life at one’s own convenience by entering into contracts and 
thus giving oneself one’s own ‘laws’. Essentially, this is what Hart meant by 
famously calling the autonomous agent a “small-scale sovereign”250, i. e. being 
the actual norm issuer on a certain, however small scale. By creating binding 
from other moral codes like the rules of a religious community, which surely also regard their 
rules as ‘binding’? I am afraid these central and important questions about the role of coercion 
and state power for any concept of law will have to be left unanswered here, as they would 
demand an intensity and depth of investigation which I simply cannot provide in this context.
249 As much should already be clear from the examples in sec. bb) above. By contrast, the 
very notion of a coherent entirety of normative systems in a pluralistic society would require 
legal as well as moral systems. Hence, we need to find different criteria to separate these two, 
which we shall attend to presently.
250 Hart, LR, 192.
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rules in an intersubjective context one creates one’s own ‘laws’. Back in our 
example the conflict can only be resolved through some kind of superordinate 
normative system. Here different ways of resolution are imaginable: First, we 
could think of a substantive criterion to resolve the conflict. For instance, we 
could set a temporal criterion (1.1): In this case only the earlier formed contract 
would be valid. Evidently, the argument here would be the protection of legiti-
mate expectations on the side of B. One could imagine other substantive crite-
ria, for instance economic ones (1.2): We could let only that contract be valid 
which produces the best economic result (for seller A or the overall economy), 
which would in our case clearly be the latter contract between A and D. The ar-
gument here would make a point for an ideal allocation of resources in an econ-
omy, which would be produced if D paid the highest price. Apart from these and 
other possible substantive criteria there is an entirely different way to resolve 
the problem, which is the way the German legislature – and most legal systems 
I am aware of – did solve it: (2) not by means of a substantial predefinition, but 
by means of a superordinate permission. That is, objectively we recognise both 
contracts as valid, i. e. as legally binding. Both provide the parties with rules 
and obligations, which cannot be outweighed by one another. Meanwhile the 
conflict between the incompatible normative demands is resolved not by some 
predefined rule but by A’s deciding for herself which obligation she wishes to 
fulfil.251 If she is led by an economic reasoning she will certainly choose to 
fulfil her contract with D, because then she would (probably) have to disburse 
B with the 20 € of lost profit, but would nevertheless make an overall profit of 
50 €. She could, however, just as well decide to honour her prior agreement with 
B and give the item to him instead.252 We see that with solution (2) a decision 
with regard to the evaluative conflict between ‘protection of legitimate inter-
251 Not uncommonly the term ‘conflict’ is quite frequently used in this context. Howev-
er, one should be very careful not to confound obviously distinct normative phenomena, all 
of which are frequently labelled as ‘normative conflicts’. Roughly we can divide the notion of 
normative conflicts into two main categories, the latter of which can be specified more clearly. 
To begin with, we can distinguish intra-systemic and inter-systemic conflicts. The standard 
intra-systemic conflict is the one between different competing principles. As we learned the 
occurrence of such conflicts is a vital part of the functionality of any such a system. Our second 
main category comprises such conflicts that arise between distinct intersubjective systems – 
that is, between different, incompatible normative demands. Thus a special kind of inter-sys-
temic conflict is one between an intrasubjective normative system and an intersubjective one, 
i. e. between the individual’s self-addressed command to perform a certain action and the rules 
of a community. This conflict means nothing but the breach of a norm by an individual agent. 
In a way, this is the most fundamental type of normative conflict. This is also the one con-
clusion that can, without further ado, be drawn from the normative status of an action X, (L) 
or (IL). Namely, such a conflict describes the fact that the performance of a certain action con-
flicts with the normative content of the system in question. On the nature and different possible 
forms of ‘normative conflicts’ cf. also David Martinez Zorilla, “The Structure of Conflicts of 
Fundamental Legal Rights,” Law and Philosophy 30 (2011): 733 ff.
252 Provided she had a change in mind in the meantime, because otherwise such a motiva-
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ests’ on the one hand and ‘maximum profit’ on the other is delegated to the in-
dividual agent. The point is, however, that this last solution, favouring individ-
ual autonomy or individual responsibility, is all but necessary. It is the lawgiver 
of a community that has to decide a priori whether to predefine a certain content 
for such situations, as in cases (1.1) and (1.2), or to delegate the decision as in 
case (2). In any case, this – the lawgiver’s – decision requires reasons. These 
could be the arguments we noted earlier – (1.1) protection of legitimate inter-
ests, (1.2) maximum profit or (2) individual autonomy.
Let us now assume the lawgiver in question decides, as the German legis-
lature did, to route for solution (2) and strengthen autonomy. What is it that 
makes this rule law and not one that is in favour of (1.1) or (1.2)? Naturally, 
the lawgiver’s judgement could be criticised on the basis of a dissenting judge-
ment, i. e. on the basis of other normative systems in favour of solution (1.1) 
or (1.2). Provided we have the aim to find the right way to solve the problem, 
there is certainly no way to avoid dissenting opinions on the matter. The point 
is, however: The possibility of reasoned dissenting opinions/judgements does 
not actually pose a theoretical problem for a concept of law or for the lawgiver, 
because this is precisely where the true purpose of the law of a community lies: 
In contrast to all other possible normative systems, it is the law’s very purpose 
to put an end to the potential infinity of normative conflicts through the infinite 
possibilities to challenge normative judgements. The law of a community con-
cludes these discussions about conflicting normative judgements by imposing 
ultimately valid systems, by making definite judgements with regard to certain 
matters, which then are binding for all respective addressees. Admittedly, this 
comprehension of law might appear more original than it actually is. In fact, it 
is heavily influenced and (for the most part) perfectly consistent with Hart’s 
ideas about the nature of law. Surely, on my account only such systems can be 
legal ones – can be law – which are recognised and accepted as such. To that 
extent law can indeed only be described with reference to social facts, as Hart 
famously claimed. This recognition and acceptance is the task for the relevant 
authority in question. Thus, in order to actually determine what the law of a 
community is we need more than a (purely) descriptive account of law. Above 
all, we need a substantive political theory concerning reasons for exerting au-
thority and a set of standards, defined by this authority, for which rules or which 
normative systems count as legal ones and which do not. In this respect, our ac-
count adopts Hart’s modest legal positivism. In addition, our account entails 
only the following thesis: No matter what the political authority or the stand-
ard for recognition of legal rules is, law is by definition the set of rules within 
a community which marks an outer boundary of disagreement, which produces 
tion would seem unlikely as she probably would not have entered into a contract with D then 
in the first place.
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judgements that by definition need to remain indisputable by their addressees – 
not in the sense of being immune to criticism, of course. On the contrary, legal 
judgements as normative judgements are by their very nature open to outward 
criticism. Therefore ‘indisputable’ is solely meant in the sense of ‘not unilater-
ally changeable’.253 In short, to reach judgements with regard to agents’ actions 
is a practical necessity. We cannot afford to keep quarrelling about reasons for 
or against a certain judgement. At some point a community needs to find one 
definite, concluding judgement to settle matters. To do so is to find the com-
munity’s law. Once more in other words: The central and most salient trait of the 
social phenomenon described as ‘law’ is that it addresses demands which are ul-
timately binding for those they are addressed to. That is, the law of a communi-
ty imposes duties that unquestionably have to be obeyed by their addressees, 
whereas it leaves room for moral duties to fill the regulative gaps. That does not 
mean that moral systems are generally inferior to legal ones. Clearly, from the 
point of view of the law they are subordinate in terms of validity as the purpose 
of legal systems is to ensure a certain degree of normative certainty in com-
munal life through their ultimate validity. Yet, the decisive question, whether 
the legal rules in question are actually just rules depends on an evaluation of the 
law from a point of view outside of it, i. e. from some kind of moral standpoint.
Surely, these last remarks can only become clear if we scrutinise the exact 
relation between law and morals and clarify the notion of ‘morality’ as such. 
So, based on a descriptive account of law as just sketched, how can the relation 
between law and morals best be described? In fact, it appears to be more subtle 
than (conventional) positivist or non-positivist254 theories suggest. Generally, 
positivists claim there is no necessary connection between law and morality. 
Non-positivists, on the other hand, claim there is such a necessary connection 
between law and morality, i. e. they claim that for something to be called law it 
has to have some minimum moral content. We now find that both are correct in 
certain respects. The dissent mainly lies in a defective understanding of the con-
cept of ‘morality’. If it is supposed to refer to the entirety of rules, the entirety 
of normative systems effective within a community (which I think is a rather 
appropriate way to grasp the concept), then it would seem strange to distin-
guish legal from moral systems in the first place as legal systems are normative 
systems just like any others and as such a part of ‘morality’ thus understood. 
253 At least not without a change in the law itself. As much is (correctly) demanded for 
cases of retrospective retribution by Hart himself, see Hart, “Separation of Law and Morals,” 
77.
254 Still often referred to as ‘natural law theories’. As this term seems to imply that non-
positivists are bound to suppose there is some fundamental normative truth to be found in ‘na-
ture’, which seems to be a claim far more than necessary for a modern non-positivist theory, 
this more traditional terminology is avoided here. Cf. Robert Alexy, “Some Reflections on the 
Ideal Dimension of Law and on the Legal Philosophy of John Finnis,” The American Journal 
of Jurisprudence 58 (2013): 98; id, “Concept and Nature of Law,” 288.
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This similarity of legal and ‘moral’ systems would thus seem to point towards 
a non-positivist position. Or should we rather perceive ‘morality’ as some kind 
of higher normative truth which (as a conceptual matter) provides its applicant 
with the plain right reasons, the correct way to behave in a situation, in contrast 
to law as the factual set of rules prescribed by an authority, irrespective of its 
‘correctness’? In that case ‘morality’ would, of course, be something inherently 
different from law. The result is at least equally strange, though – to presup-
pose that there is some higher normative measure, some ‘morality’ which is by 
definition not only different from, but rather qualitatively superior to the law, 
would imply that law is by definition to some degree unjust.255 Our approach 
avoids both problems. In fact, there is a strict dichotomy between law and mor-
als but it only originates from the very act of defining certain normative sys-
tems – out of the entirety of systems, out of all of morality – as legal ones and 
thereby at the same time making all other ones ‘moral’. In this respect, a cen-
tral positivist claim is strongly supported: Law and morals, understood in this 
way, are indeed by definition distinct. Morality understood in this way cannot 
mean a standard that is necessarily closer to some normative ideal, to a high-
er normative truth such as ‘justice’ than the law is. Neither can the law be, of 
course. In fact, ‘morality’ could only refer to normative measures that are dif-
ferent to legal ones – in effect, not (necessarily) in content. Thus, a central non-
positivist claim is also implicitly acknowledged: Namely that law necessarily 
has a ‘moral’ content – it consists of normative systems marked as legal ones 
and normative systems are shaped and defined by their normative content, the 
values they promote and protect.256 In this respect, law and morals have in com-
mon that they both represent (a set of) normative systems. Once more: The no-
tion of ‘morality’ is best understood as the entirety of a community’s normative 
systems, comprising both law and morals s. str. However, this seems to overtly 
contradict a central non-positivist claim: Namely that it is essentially morality 
that provides us with means to criticise possibly ‘unjust’ laws. This would pre-
suppose, though, that judgements based on ‘morality’ are by definition better 
than those based on the law. This could only be so if moral judgements were by 
definition closer to an ideal of justice as the law could by definition get. Such 
an understanding of law and morals is essentially flawed. Not because it pre-
supposes that there is (or could be) a higher standard, an ideal of justice, but 
because it equates this ideal with the notion of ‘morality’. Because now moral-
ity is supposed to be (a) a higher standard (possibly the highest) for normative 
truth, i. e. justice, and (b) an instrument offering practical guidance and practi-
255 Saying this it is not implied that such an ideal could not exist, only that it would better 
be referred to as ‘justice’ rather than as ‘morality’.
256 In this respect, Alexy is entirely correct that a legal (normative) system – as any nor-
mative system – cannot “forbear from claiming to be morally correct” (Alexy, “Some Reflec-
tions,” 101).
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cal judgements; however, both are not possible at the same time. As a pure ideal 
the notion of justice cannot immediately be helpful for us in practical norma-
tive reasoning. At best we could avail ourselves of it as some kind of ultimate 
aim for practical reasoning. In order for it to serve as a basis for criticism of 
practical normative judgements, it needs to take the form of such judgements 
as well. In order to criticise possibly unjust legal judgements, we cannot use an 
abstract concept of justice but at best only practical moral judgements derived 
from some such a concept. Practical normative judgements, however, are per 
se imperfect. Now, were we provided with a specific idea of justice, we could 
of course mark those normative systems that come closest to it as ‘moral’ one. 
There is no reason, however, why these could not also be legal ones as well. In a 
nutshell: Moral rules or morality can provide us with a standard to criticise law. 
However, morality cannot demand that this standard is closer to an ideal of jus-
tice without presupposing certain practical implications this ideal has and thus 
making its own claim entirely redundant. In other words, there is nothing which 
a priori makes ‘morality’ a better or superior set of rules than the law of a com-
munity. Neither, of course, is the law necessarily just. It is simply ‘the law’ and 
as such different from moral rules. In this respect, my endeavour could be re-
garded a truly positivist one, at least to the extent that I fully agree that a prop-
er, scientific approach to the social phenomenon of law is best made by at first 
‘demystifying’257 the concept of law – a theoretical road paved masterfully not 
least by scholars like Hart and Kelsen.258
257 H. L. A. Hart, “Bentham and the Demystification of Law,” The Modern Law Review 
36 (January 1973). See also: David Dyzenhaus, “Consent, Legitimacy and the Foundation of 
Political and Legal Authority,” in Between Consenting Peoples, ed. Jeremy Webber and Colin 
Macleod (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), 172; Kai Nielsen, God and the Grounding of Mo-
rality (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1991), 69. For a very similar aim, namely the ra-
tionalisation of the law as a social phenomenon, yet in different ways, see esp. Kelsen, Reine 
Rechtslehre [1934]. Cf. in this respect also: William Ebenstein, “The Pure Theory of Law: De-
mythologizing Legal Thought,” California Law Review 59 (1971): 617; Peter Koller, “Mei-
lensteine des Rechtspositivismus im 20. Jahrhundert: Hans Kelsens Reine Rechtslehre und 
H. L. A. Harts ‘Concept of Law’,” in Reine Rechtslehre im Spiegel ihrer Fortsetzer und Kri-
tiker, ed. Ota Weinberger and Werner Krawietz (Wien/New York: Springer, 1988). For a brief, 
but well-written introduction to Kelsen’s central theses see Andreas Kley and Esther Tophinke, 
“Hans Kelsen und die Reine Rechtslehre,” Juristische Ausbildung 2 (2001).
258 Despite the obvious differences in their theories, which we are not able to discuss here 
in detail, already due to their being the most prominent and influential legal positivists of the 
20th century, they are arguably worth being mentioned in the same breath in this context.

III. The Theory of Rights
At the outset of our investigation we conceded three fundamental criteria for 
the scope of rights or for an intensional definition of the term right. These were 
for something to be normative, advantageous, and appendant. Our preliminary 
task has then been to clarify the feature ‘normative’ by singling out the con-
stituent atomic features of any normative system and how they relate to each 
other. With all said so far, we are now equipped with something like a manual 
for these systems, a rough map of normative systems. As constituent elements 
we mainly identified the following: principles (values), norms and prescrip-
tions. Thus, we can now ask ourselves which of the elements fulfil the other 
two criteria, namely being appendant to a certain entity and functioning in fa-
vour of it. Thus, our task in this section will be to show which elements pos-
sibly qualify as ‘rights’ or to work out possible manifestations of the scope. 
Very roughly, my thesis is that, based on the scope, a right could either be a le-
gally or morally protected individual competence, i. e. a normative definatory 
power assigned to an individual agent, or any (other) reason appendant to the 
entity deemed a ‘right-holder’. Evidently, the classification of possible rights is 
far too vague in this form and not fit for the complexity of the subject matter. 
Thus, in order to extrapolate all possible manifestations more clearly it appears 
useful not to simply rely on mere deduction or to start from scratch, but rather 
to employ already existing analytical models and schemes regarding the logic 
and form of rights and develop our own position in comparison to these, high-
lighting commonalities as well as disparities. And thinking about sophisticat-
ed analyses regarding the logic and structure of rights, clearly “the beginning 
of wisdom, though not the end lies in”1 the analytical framework laid out by 
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld.2
1 Sumner, MF, 18.
2 See also: Hillel Steiner, An Essay on Rights (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 59; Carl Well-
man, An Approach to Rights (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997), 63; George Rainbolt. “Rights Theo-
ry,” Philosophy Compass 1 (2006), 1; Hubert Schnüriger, Eine Statustheorie moralischer 
Rechte (Münster: Mentis, 2014), 24.
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1. Hohfeld’s Scheme of Fundamental Legal Entitlements
At the beginning of the 20th century, in two seminal papers American jurist W. N. 
Hohfeld developed a system of fundamental legal positions, which heavily in-
fluenced legal theory and does so still to this day.3 His initial intention was to 
make sense of an irritatingly diverse usage of the term ‘right’ in judicial prac-
tice.4 Withstanding much criticism over the years, the overwhelming majority 
of the modern-day theory of rights is still based on the fundamental structures 
provided by Hohfeld’s analysis. As indicated above, our main aim in this section 
will be to work out possible manifestations of the scope of rights. In order to do 
so, we shall avail ourselves of Hohfeld’s scheme as the result of a supposedly 
similar endeavour. Thereby it is crucial to understand the scheme not as a cata-
logue of different rights to be directly utilised in normative practice e. g. by a 
legislature, but rather as what it was originally intended to be: a precise analysis 
and description of necessary deontological structures.5 If this understanding is 
correct, then we ought to expect accordance between Hohfeld’s model and our 
approach. For some parts, e. g. the nature of claim-rights and duties and their 
strict correlativity, we will find that this is indeed the case. However, in other 
parts we shall critically revaluate and revise the traditional scheme in accordance 
with the theoretical framework laid out so far, which will eventually lead us to 
presenting a scheme that works with (almost) all the familiar Hohfeldian termi-
nology – though quite often bearing a significantly different meaning. Roughly, 
my thesis is: Despite the fact that Hohfeld’s fundamental positions, as tradition-
ally understood, can be arrayed in an overall consistent fashion, their features 
often fail to fulfil the basic requirements of the scope of rights. Consequently, 
almost all of Hohfeld’s ‘entitlements’6 have to be significantly strengthened in 
order to qualify as possible rights. It shall be emphasised that these results will 
not be presented as a total renunciation of the Hohfeldian logic and terminolo-
gy, but should rather be seen as a productive advancement of Hohfeld’s scheme, 
some of whose core theses will remain untouched, as we shall find.
3 Wesley N. Hohfeld, “Some fundamental legal conceptions as Applied in Judicial Rea-
soning,” The Yale Law Journal 23 (1913); id. “Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning,” The Yale Law Journal 26 (1917). As the titles already suggest, they were 
not intended as two separate papers, but the latter was supposed to be a continuation of the 
former. In fact, Hohfeld repeats many of his arguments in his 1917 paper, basically an extend-
ed version of his paper from 1913. Thus they are, in fact, best regarded as one cohesive work.
4 Hohfeld, “Some fundamental conceptions,” 30 ff.
5 Kramer, RWT, 22. Cf. also Jonathan Gorman, Rights and Reason (London/New York: 
Routledge, 2014). Gorman fittingly describes Hohfeld’s work as “an exercise in analytical ju-
risprudence” (ibid, 87).
6 The term is not originally Hohfeldian, but (like the terms ‘first-order’ and ‘second-order’, 
see below sec. III, fn. 10) borrowed from secondary literature, see esp.: Henry McCloskey, 
“Rights,” Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1965): 115; Kramer, RWT, 8. Cf. also Pierre Schlag, 
“How to do things with Hohfeld,” Law and Contemporary Problems 78 (2015): 188.
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We shall proceed as follows: In sec. a) Hohfeld’s scheme will be introduced 
and presented, both with reference to his original text and to the most cogent, 
conventional interpretations such as those of Kramer or Sumner, both of which 
were and are able to defend the scheme against most (misled) traditional criti-
cism. Already in sec. a) we shall try to harmonise Hohfeld’s model of legal en-
titlements with the insights we made so far about the functionality of normative 
systems.7 Thus, as a basis for a productive development of Hohfeldian logic we 
initially aim at the best possible understanding of Hohfeld’s scheme in the con-
text of normative systems. Consequently, in sec. b), we will critically review 
and, where necessary, revise the findings under a) according to our primary aim 
of identifying all manifestations of the scope of rights. It is worth emphasis-
ing once more that this specific aim does not necessitate a strictly hermeneutic 
analysis of Hohfeld’s original text with the aim of uncovering the best possible 
interpretation, but rather we will make eminent use of Hohfeldian logic and ter-
minology to further develop our own concept of rights.
a) Hohfeld and the Logic of Normative Systems
After a rough introduction to Hohfeldian terminology in sec. aa), we shall point 
out a number of central axioms and theses underlying the Hohfeldian scheme in 
sec. bb), whereas finally, in sec. cc), each entitlement and its respective correla-
tive will be scrutinised.
aa) An Introduction to Hohfeldian Terminology
In total, Hohfeld identified eight fundamental legal incidents or positions, which 
can be arrayed in various ways. Four of them are his so-called ‘entitlements’, 
i. e. legal positions that are supposed to be in some way (more or less) advanta-
geous for their holder A.8 For Hohfeld these were claim-rights, liberties, pow-
ers, and immunities. Evidently, it is these entitlements which we are most inter-
ested in as they seem to be the most likely candidates to meet the requirements 
of the scope. According to Hohfeld, each of these entitlements can be matched 
7 The relation of the concepts of ‘entitlement’ and ‘right’ is arguably in need of clarifica-
tion: The concept of ‘entitlement’, in contrast to that of ‘right’, will only serve for analytical 
purposes in this context. It shall describe all manifestations of the scope of rights, i. e. all posi-
tions that could possibly be called a right. Accordingly, the features ‘normative, advantageous 
and appendant’ not only form its scope, but rather they are its conclusive features, whereas 
they only represent the scope of the yet-to-be-conclusively-defined concept of a right. Thus, 
the term should certainly not be understood as “merely a verbal synonym for ‘right’” (Rex 
Martin and James Nickel, “Recent Work on the Concept of Rights,” American Philosophical 
Quarterly 17 (1980): 170).
8 Hohfeld limited his analysis to legal positions. Yet, it is widely agreed that the Hohfel-
dian logic applies to all kinds of normative relations, see only Kramer, RWT, 8. Slightly critical 
in this respect: Sumner, MF, 20.
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with four respective fundamental legal positions held by some (other) person 
B. These are duties, no-rights, liabilities, and disabilities. All four stand in dif-
ferent logical relations to the entitlements. Each of them is supposed to be ‘cor-
relative’ to one specific entitlement and ‘opposite’9 of another. That implies, of 
course, that each entitlement has both a correlative and an opposite. Hence, the 
relation between the positions can be illustrated in two different tables, one of 
correlatives and one of opposites:
Correlatives
Claim-right Liberty Power Immunity
Duty No-Right Liability Disability
Opposites
Claim-right Liberty Power Immunity
No-right Duty Disability Liability
Figure 11: Hohfeldian Correlatives and Opposites.
An important theoretical feature of the scheme is that the entitlements are sup-
posed to work on different levels. Hohfeld’s ‘first-order entitlements’10 claim-
rights and liberties are generally concerned with the plain conduct or the ac-
tions of agents, whether these actions are allowed, to what extent, and towards 
whom. His ‘second-order entitlements’ powers and immunities are supposed to 
be concerned with the (lack of) normative control over those first-order entitle-
ments or other second-order entitlements.11 Another fundamental feature of the 
Hohfeldian scheme, as convincingly demonstrated by Kramer, is that some of 
the entitlements are concerned with or defined by the normative demands on 
the right-holder’s own conduct (liberties and powers), whilst others are defined 
by the demands on the conduct of the person holding the correlative positions 
(duties as opposed to claim-rights, disabilities as opposed to immunities).12 In 
other words, Hohfeld essentially distinguishes between active (liberties/pow-
ers) and passive (claim-rights/immunities) entitlements.13
9 Hohfeld’s notion of ‘opposites’ is in philosophical terms best understood as ‘contradicto-
ries’, see: Sumner, MF, 19; Kramer, RWT, 8. For an elaborate, yet ultimately not entirely con-
vincing critique of Hohfeld’s unclear use of the concept of ‘opposites’ cf. also Halpin, 1997, 
32 ff.
10 The terms ‘first-order’ and ‘second-order’ are thereby not originally Hohfeldian, but this 
(rather fitting) terminology is once more directly adopted from Kramer, RWT, 20.
11 Sumner, MF, 31. The distinction between first-order and second-order entitlements/
rules is famously mirrored by Hart’s distinction between primary and secondary rules, see 
Hart, Concept of Law, 79–91. Critical in this respect: K.-K. Lee, “Hart’s Primary and Second-
ary Rules,” Mind 77 (October 1968).
12 Kramer, RWT, 13 ff.
13 David Lyons, “The Correlativity of Rights and Duties,” Noûs 4 (February 1970): 48.
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bb) Central Axioms and Theses
There are a number of axioms and assumptions underlying the logic of the 
scheme, all of which are supposed to be consistent with one another. Therefore, 
before we begin analysing each entitlement, we ought first to be certain about 
the significance for Hohfeld’s scheme of these fundamental assumptions.
(1) Correlativity-Axiom
First of all, Hohfeld’s analysis is strictly constrained to bipolar relations, i. e. 
for every possible ‘right-holder’, that is, for every incumbent of an entitlement 
A there is always some entity B, which is the incumbent of a normative posi-
tion correlative to the entitlement in question.14 Importantly, this correlativity 
of positions in normative relations is a correlativity by definition. So, as Kram-
er correctly clarified, it is rather pointless to try to establish a priority between 
Hohfeldian duties and claim-rights, for instance. Whenever some entity A has a 
Hohfeldian claim-right, some person B has a Hohfeldian duty.15 Within Hohfel-
dian logic these are, by default, two sides of the same coin.16
A common objection to the explanatory adequacy of this correlativity-axiom 
is simply to claim that legal relations are far too complex to be described by 
only bipolar relations, i. e. that a reduction to bipolar relations is an oversim-
plification.17 In this respect, Hohfeld’s critical work shall be decidedly defend-
ed, though also slightly modified.18 In fact, breaking down undeniably complex 
normative relations into bipolar relations is what helps us to make sense of such 
relations in the first place. This is especially so due to the fact that the Hohfel-
dian correlativity-axiom ought to be understood in a modest way and, as such, 
not limited to individual agents as the only relevant entities. Thus, it allows 
for a very wide range of bipolar relations to be described properly. That is, the 
overall explanatory adequacy of the Hohfeldian scheme is maintained mainly 
by almost not at all a priori specifying who or what qualifies to be both a pos-
14 Kramer, RWT, 24.
15 The idea of a correlativity of right and duty was not originally Hohfeld’s, cf. only John 
Salmond, Jurisprudence or the Theory of the Law (London: Steven & Haynes, 1902), 222. It 
was Hohfeld’s achievement, though, to clearly spell out the assumed interdependent relation 
and distinguish more sharply between claim-rights and other allegedly advantageous positions.
16 Kramer, RWT, 24. Kramer vividly illustrates this idea with reference to a slope, that one 
could either perceive as going upward or going downward depending only on the perspective, 
the slope, however, remaining the same.
17 Cf. only: Joseph Raz, “On the Nature of Rights,” Mind 93 (1984): 199–200; Neil 
MacCormick, “Rights in Legislation,” in Law, Morality, and Society – Essays in Honour of 
H. L. A. Hart, ed. Peter Hacker, Joseph Raz (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977), 199.
18 The idea of a strict correlativity is only necessary if one’s aim is to determine concrete/
ultimate advantageousness. It is possible to describe more general normative phenomena that 
do not accord with the correlativity-axiom, yet still meet the requirements of the scope, see 
below sec. III, 1., b) aa).
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sible ‘right-holder’ A and/or the other entity B holding the correlative position. 
For a start, the scheme allows not only for agents but also for non-agents to 
qualify as possible ‘right-holders’.19 For instance, in the case of a claim-right, 
we are interested mainly in B’s action and the reason for B’s having a duty. It 
suffices that A is somehow associated with the reason for B to be under a duty. 
Thereby it is implied – at least in the case of plain claim-rights – that A could be 
virtually any entity at all, i. e. Hohfeld readily accepts the possibility of rights 
of the incompetent, animal rights, etc.20 In turn that implies an important point 
about the notion of the ‘appendance’ of rights: The holder of any entitlement 
does not have to be an agent nor even an individual, but does have to be one 
specific entity. Most importantly, this does not exclude, but rather supports the 
idea of e. g. group rights, to the extent that the group as such is regarded as a 
single entity.21 The correlativity-axiom merely implies the impossibility of one 
right belonging to more than one definable entity. How this entity is defined is 
not predetermined by Hohfeldian logic. So, whilst in the case of claim-rights 
and immunities A could be virtually any entity, B, on the other hand, as the in-
cumbent of the correlative position ‘duty’ or ‘disability’, is necessarily an agent. 
This is because in these cases we are interested to know what (another) agent 
(apart from A) is allowed or not allowed to do towards or with respect to A as 
our potential right-holder. Nevertheless, also the entity B remains unspecified 
from the start. Thus, depending on the context, we could think of B not only as 
an individual agent with duties etc. but just as well B could be understood as a 
group of agents or possibly ‘the state’. In other words, B does not have to be an 
individual agent, but merely an entity that can be accredited decision-making 
ability, e. g. through bodies of a company or public institutions. As much can 
best be demonstrated with reference to an example: the general right to life. 
This example serves as evidence of how Hohfeld’s scheme effortlessly provides 
for the existence of rights that exceed bipolar relations too strictly interpreted 
as relations between two individual agents. We usually think of one’s right not 
to be killed as an ‘absolute right’, i. e. as a right against anyone.22 Hence, one 
could understand this right as an aggregate of a single person’s rights against all 
19 As much goes at least for those entitlements that are defined via an action of B, i. e. 
claim-rights and immunities. In order to hold a liberty or a power, A necessarily has to be an 
agent, of course.
20 Cf. below sec. III, 2., a) and c).
21 Edmundson, Rights, 100–101; Alan Anderson, “The Logic of Hohfeldian Propositions,” 
University of Pittsburgh Law Review 33 (1971–1972): 30.
22 Notably, ‘absolute right’ is by no means equivalent to ‘abstract right’, but it refers to a 
practical reason that simply applies to everyone within a certain community. The question of 
whether we can also understand abstract, appendant principles such as ‘the right to life’ as pos-
sible rights in the sense of manifestations of the scope – thus deviating from Hohfeld’s scheme 
in terms of correlativity and restriction to practical reasons – will be dealt with below in secs. 
b), aa), and b), bb), (1).
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other individuals B not to be killed. Additionally, one could just as well insert 
for entity B (holding the correlative position as opposed to our potential right-
holder A) the entirety of agents within a community; that is, everyone addressed 
by the normative system in question. Obviously, with regard to the specific ac-
tion of killing not the entirety, but rather every single agent capable of acting, is 
addressed by the duty not to kill A. Nevertheless, the entirety of agents could be 
addressed insofar as it is capable of performing actions as well, which it might 
be to the extent that the individual agents agree on laws, that is, to the extent 
that they empower officials to act on their behalf in a democratic process. Thus, 
the right of A against everyone else could have the content that everyone else 
or the state, would be under a duty not to issue rules that would permit killing 
A. Thus, the only condition that the entity B needs to fulfil is being capable of 
making a decision or being capable of performing actions. The state would ful-
fil this condition by allowing officials – civil servants, policemen, members of 
parliament – to act on its behalf. Accordingly, the Hohfeldian analysis is all but 
restricted to rights between two parties, e. g. the parties of a contract in private 
law, but it is also applicable to the rights of an individual agent against the state 
as an artificial, jural person. Ultimately, critical claims regarding a theoretical 
oversimplification due to the scheme’s focus on bipolar relations lose much of 
their force in the light of the aforementioned flexibility.23
One ought to be careful not to confuse the correlativity-axiom with a much 
stronger assumption that could be called the ‘fundamentality-thesis’, which can 
be found (at the very least implicitly) in some literature on Hohfeld.24 There-
in it is claimed that not only is Hohfeld’s analysis restricted to bipolar relations 
but also that the proposed structures represent the most fundamental and uni-
versal ones to be found in intersubjective normative practice. In other words, 
according to the fundamentality-thesis Hohfeldian relations are not only sup-
posed to describe bipolar relations that convey an entitlement to one of the par-
ties involved, but rather the scheme is believed to offer the smallest, irreducible 
elements for a normative system in general. In this respect the fundamentality-
thesis exceeds the correlativity-axiom. We shall attend to the cogency of this 
fundamentality-thesis in sec. b) below.
23 I am well aware of the fact that I am not able to defend the correlativity-axiom in this 
context against all criticism that has been levelled at it, which would call for an investigation 
much more comprehensive than I could reasonably provide for here. Luckily, such vigorous 
defence of the correlativity-axiom has been offered by Kramer in his outstanding essay ‘Rights 
without Trimmings’, see Kramer, RWT, 24 ff. Thus, for a large part I need to rely on the co-
gency of the defence provided there, which I believe to be in line with the (few) arguments 
brought forward here.
24 See only below sec. III, fn. 60.
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(2) Advantageousness-Axiom
The second central axiom, which usually goes unmentioned, possibly due to 
being regarded as almost trivial, is the idea that being an entitlement has to 
mean being in some way positive or advantageous for its holder. Hohfeld him-
self pointed out in this respect: “[…] the word ‘right’ is used generically and 
indiscriminately to denote any sort of legal advantage, whether claim, privi-
lege, power, or immunity.”25 Thus, he explicitly regarded all four of his ‘en-
titlements’ as somehow advantageous, even though it is not conclusively de-
termined whether some might be more or more immediately advantageous than 
others.26 For our purposes the advantageousness-axiom is probably the most 
vital point, because only presupposing this feature of entitlements would we 
actually be able to identify certain parts of the Hohfeldian scheme as manifes-
tations of the scope of rights. What exactly does make an entitlement advanta-
geous, though? And are there varying degrees of advantageousness? These are 
crucial questions, which we shall address in further detail in sec. b) below. For 
now, we shall only state that Hohfeld’s scheme contains certain positions that 
are overall positive for the ones obtaining them, whilst others are regarded as 
overall negative positions.
(3) Exclusivity and Discriminability
A central and often made claim about the four entitlements is that there are no 
necessary implied relations between them, i. e. even though there might be reg-
ular overlaps or coincidental occurrences of entitlements in practice, in theory 
each entitlement is alleged to have its exclusive area of application.27 In other 
words, it is assumed that for each entitlement one can at least theoretically make 
up cases/actions, in which the entity A in question holds only this entitlement 
and no other. Henceforth we shall refer to this as the ‘exclusivity-thesis’. Im-
plied in this rather strong exclusivity-thesis is a similar, yet considerably weak-
er contention, namely that, even if there were necessary entailments between 
certain entitlements, each entitlement can by its features be clearly distinguish-
25 Hohfeld, “Fundamental conceptions,” 717 (emphasis added). Cf. Carl Wellman, “Legal 
Rights,” in Uppsalaskolan – och efferat (Stockholm: Almqvist und Wiksell, 1978), 213.
26 See also Sumner, MF, 32: “Within each pair one of these positions is a normative advan-
tage, the other a normative disadvantage”. Quite in contrast to these and also his own words 
(see above sec. III, fn. 25), Hohfeld asserts that a liability can be “agreeable” for its holder (id, 
“Some fundamental conceptions,” 55, at fn. 90). Hohfeld’s exposition is rather vague in this 
point. If he would have meant “agreeable” in the sense of advantageous one would probably 
have to reject this thought due to the fact that duties are prima facie neither advantageous nor 
disadvantageous for the ones they are prescribed to, see below sec. b), bb), (2), (d).
27 Kramer, RWT, 14. There Kramer claims an ‘absence of any kind of entailment’ be-
tween claim-rights and liberties, which is supposed to encompass powers and immunities as 
well.
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ed from any other entitlement. This would not preclude (necessary) implicatory 
relations between the entitlements, yet it would demand clear criteria to distin-
guish them from one another. Hence, this shall be referred to as the ‘discrimi-
nability-thesis’. Admittedly, the latter is a thesis which is not usually found in 
the literature on Hohfeld, but it is introduced at this point solely in order to be 
employed as an alternative to the possibly too rigid exclusivity-thesis later on.
(4) Parallelism of First-Order and Second-Order Entitlements
Regarding the relation between the two levels of first-order and second-order 
entitlements, Hohfeld and proponents of his scheme make another fundamen-
tal claim: The deontological relations between the respective first-order posi-
tions – correlations and oppositions – are supposed to be mirrored by, that is, be 
parallel to those on second-order.28 We shall therefore refer to this idea as the 
‘parallelism-thesis’.
(5) Restriction to Practical Reasons
Finally, another central aspect about Hohfeld’s scheme is its restriction to legal 
incidents and thus to the practical application of rights – in other words, its re-
striction to actions and therewith to rules and prescriptions.29 Precisely, we con-
ceded that some of the entitlements are concerned with A’s own actions, whilst 
some are concerned with those of B. Hence, we are able to infer that in every 
case a Hohfeldian bipolar relation is defined by reference to a certain action. 
Accordingly, the scheme is only concerned with practical reasons and leaves 
out abstract reasons/principles from its logic entirely.
cc) Fundamental Legal Positions and Normative Systems
Finally, let us now engage in a punctual analysis of each of the Hohfeldian en-
titlements regarding the question of to what extent they can be matched with our 
deontic modalities. For a clearer understanding of each of the entitlements we 
will analyse them in close connection with their respective correlatives.
(1) Claim-Rights and Duties
For various reasons it seems advisable to start with claim-rights30 – by Hohfeld 
regarded as the most basic kind of rights and famously referred to as ‘rights in 
28 See inter alia ibid, 21: “Just as a liability is the absence of an immunity, so a no-right is 
the absence of a right; […]”.
29 Carl Wellman, “Legal Rights,” 214.
30 Often this position is referred to only as ‘claims’ (see only above sec. III, fn. 25), or 
simply as ‘rights’, as Kramer does it. For the sake of terminological clarity, i. e. to distinguish 
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the strictest sense’31. As pointed out earlier, based on other, most sophisticat-
ed and for the most part cogent Hohfeld interpretations, which correctly regard 
claim-rights as being concerned with the actions not of A as the incumbent of 
the entitlement but rather with those of B,32 we will disregard all those positions 
which aim to describe the incumbent’s own actions with the label ‘claim-rights’ 
from the start without further consideration.33 On the contrary, if claim-rights 
are mainly defined by the corresponding actions of others, it seems appropriate 
for an adequate approximation of this concept to start off with a clarification of 
the correlative concept of duties, which seems more easily graspable to begin 
with.
Just like our understanding of duties more generally, the concept of a duty 
in the Hohfeldian sense is best understood as comprising both positive or sup-
portive obligations and negative or defensive prohibitions, i. e. for B to have an 
obligation to assist A in doing something is for B to have a duty towards A (to 
do X), just as for B to be under a prohibition not to assault A is for B to have 
a duty towards A (not to do X).34 As demonstrated earlier, the idea common 
to both obligations and prohibitions in contrast to permissions – and as such 
the reason for summarising them under the term ‘duty’ – is they both address 
some predefined normative content at an agent (in the case of claim-rights at 
the agent B).35
them from ‘rights’ as the linguistic label for our resulting concept, we shall stick to the (ad-
mittedly cumbersome) term ‘claim-right’ henceforth.
31 Hohfeld, “Some fundamental conceptions,” 30.
32 Kramer, RWT, 13; Sumner, MF, 25: “I cannot have claims to do, only claims that others 
do.” See also: John Finnis, Natural Law, 200; id, “Some Professorial Fallacies about Rights,” 
The Adelaide Law Review 4 (1972): 379.
33 Most prominently Joel Feinberg asserted that a juridical claim entails a liberty of a per-
son to do X, see Joel Feinberg, “The Nature and Value of Rights,” The Journal of Value Inqui-
ry 4 (1970). Cf. also: Albert Kocourek, Jural Relations (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1927), 
21; Margaret Gilbert, “Giving Claim-Rights Their Due,” in Rights: Concepts and Contexts, 
ed. Brian Bix and Horacia Spector (Farnharn/Burlington: Ashgate, 2012), 303. Such an under-
standing of claims/claim-rights may be linguistically possible, but it is most certainly not in 
accord with the terminology of Hohfeldian logic. And even though Feinberg does not explic-
itly mention Hohfeld as a resource, his reference to the distinction between claim-rights and 
“liberties, immunities, and powers” evidently bears such a strong resemblance that misunder-
standings are imminent. Certainly, the notion of a Hohfeldian claim-right should not be mis-
taken with the ‘act of claiming’ a right (Feinberg, “Nature and Value,” 251; id, “Duties, Rights 
and Claims,” American Philosophical Quarterly 3 (April 1966): 137, 143–144). Also Hart’s 
theory of rights was slightly flawed in this respect, certainly when he came to the (somewhat 
premature) conclusion that all Hohfeldian entitlements can be described as “legally protected 
choices” (H. L. A. Hart, “Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence,” in Essays in Jurisprudence 
and Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 35).
34 Cf. Kramer, RWT, 9.
35 The use of the term ‘duty’ in this context is comparable to the concept of ‘mitzvot’ in 
Judaism. Here the term ‘mitzvah’ is also a generic term for commandments/duties in general, 
which comprise both positive obligations (Hebrew: mitzvot aseh) and negative prohibitions 
(Hebrew: mitzvot lo ta’aseh).
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Importantly, the notion of a Hohfeldian duty entails more presuppositions 
than that of a duty simpliciter. Precisely, it never suffices for someone solely 
to have an obligation or to be under a prohibition for someone else to have a 
Hohfeldian claim-right. The decisive feature of Hohfeldian duties is the corre-
lativity of duty and claim-right. In contrast to duties simpliciter the (predefined) 
practical reason behind a Hohfeldian duty needs to be appendant to the entity 
A itself, i. e. it needs to be directly associated with A.36 This point is so decisive 
because only by acknowledging the additional condition of appendance is the 
bipolar normative relation between entities B and A – A having a claim-right 
and B having a correlative Hohfeldian duty – established.37 An example: Nor-
mally we would assume that B’s duty not to harm A corresponds to A’s right not 
to be harmed. However, B could just as well be under an obligation not to harm 
A as the emanation of e. g. a divine commandment, which A may only profit 
from subjectively, i. e. from A’s point of view. This advantage would then be no 
more than a mere reflex, though, and certainly not an advantage intended by the 
system in question.38 As little as A would have a right in the example, B would 
be under a duty in the Hohfeldian sense, but it would merely be a duty simplic-
iter. Hohfeld’s concept of duties demands a conceptual link between the reason 
for a duty and the entity having an advantage from it – in other words, they de-
mand the reason’s appendance to A.39
(2) Liberties and No-Rights
We remember: In contrast to claim-rights, liberties are supposed to be concerned 
with the actions of the possible ‘right-holder’ A herself. With regard to the deon-
tological structure of liberties there are two main problems that we have to be 
36 Sumner, MF, 24; David Lyons, “Rights, Claimants, and Beneficiaries,” American Phil-
osophical Quarterly 6 (July 1969): 174.
37 In practice, the question of whether a claim-right exists might be problematic in a way 
that cannot be adequately dealt with in this context. Namely there will often be a whole bun-
dle of reasons for a specific duty in practice. Preliminarily, we may assume that a claim-right 
exists if the reason appendant to A is the decisive, prevailing reason for prescribing the duty. 
However, in a lot of practical cases it might be unclear and hard to determine which reason 
was the decisive one.
38 Cf. below sec. III, fn. 92.
39 This thought retraces another debate in legal theory regarding the ‘directionality’ of 
duties; see in this respect inter alia: Simon May, “Directed Duties,” Philosophy Compass 10 
(2015); Marcus Hedahl. “The Significance of a Duty’s Direction: Claiming Priority Rather 
than Prioritizing Claims,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (2013). Instructive on 
the notion of ‘directional duties’: Gopal Sreenivasan, “Duties and Their Direction,” Ethics 120 
(April 2010); Stephen Darwall, “Bipolar Obligation,” Oxford Studies in Metaethics 7 (June 
2012). The idea of an ‘appendance of a practical reason’ as used in this context can be under-
stood as tantamount to the (correlative) idea of directional duties. The issue of under which 
conditions exactly a duty is directional or, in other words, when a reason is appendant, is not 
an object of this investigation and generally needs to be determined by a substantive norma-
tive theory.
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concerned with: (a) the nature of liberties as either permissions or merely legit-
imate actions or the question regarding a necessary differentiation between uni-
lateral and bilateral liberties or weak and strong permissions and (b) the prob-
lem of whether there is a necessary link between liberties and claim-rights – a 
problem which in the literature on Hohfeld evolved around questions like that 
about a liberty’s possible or even necessary ‘protective perimeter’40 consisting 
of claim-rights or the possibility of so-called ‘unprotected liberties’41.
(a) Unilateral and Bilateral Liberties
Presumably, it is generally agreed that for A to have a liberty must mean for 
A to somehow be allowed or permitted to do something. Thus, in terms of our 
deontic modalities there are two ways to interpret a Hohfeldian liberty: either as 
a permission (P) or as a single option of conduct that is merely legitimate (L). 
As indicated earlier, this distinction is mirrored by the common distinction in 
jurisprudence between unilateral and bilateral liberties.42 Based on our earlier 
findings about the logic of normative systems and the relation of the two levels 
of deontic modalities, it shall be argued at this point that the talk of ‘unilateral’ 
liberties in order to distinguish them from bilateral ones is ultimately misled. 
Surely, it is all but impossible to refer to legitimate options of conduct as uni-
lateral liberties and to permitted actions (as such) as bilateral ones. Indeed, if 
the action is legitimate, it is (at least) in conformity with the system in ques-
tion, and one is thus allowed to perform it. Already on a terminological level 
there are two rather strong arguments against such a two-fold account of liber-
ties and in favour of a limitation of the term liberty to permissions in the sense 
of (P). The first argument regards the theoretical relation of the two phenomena. 
The common differentiation of liberties into unilateral and bilateral ones insinu-
ates that both are of the same kind and that they differ only in their strength to 
some degree – a point that becomes even clearer by considering the analogous 
distinction between weak and strong permissions.43 However, as we saw ear-
lier, the difference between legitimacy and permissibility is not one of degree 
or ‘strength’ but rather one of distinct theoretical perspectives. As demonstrat-
ed earlier in sec. II, 3., the unidimensional modalities (L) and (IL), concerned 
with single options of conduct and not with the decision-structure of actions 
as such, are not fit for any normative conclusions other than determining con-
40 Hart, LR, 179.
41 Alexy, TG, 203; Peter Koller, Theorie des Rechts, 2nd ed. (Wien: Böhlau, 2001 [1992]), 
103.
42 See esp. above sec. II, fn. 76. Cf. also above sec. II, 3., a) and b).
43 For the claim that the difference between weak and strong permissions is one of ‘degree’ 
see also Arend Soeteman, “Weak and Strong Permission in the Law,” in The structure of law: 
proceedings of the 2nd Benelux-Scandinavian Symposium in Legal Theory, ed. Åke Frändberg 
and Mark van Hoecke (Uppsala: Iustus, 1987), 29. See also above sec. II, fn. 76.
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formity or non-conformity of an action with the normative system in question. 
For statements regarding the normative status of an action being either (L) or 
(IL), one needs to take an external perspective on a normative system.44 That 
is, if an action X were legitimate (L) – i. e. if it were the object of a ‘unilateral 
liberty’ – we could neither infer that it is obligatory (O) nor that it is permis-
sible (P) as both could be the case. In other words, a bilateral liberty is in fact 
not a surplus in granted freedom in comparison with a unilateral liberty as the 
terminology seems to suggest, but rather they simply represent different theo-
retical points of view regarding the same action. The second argument draws on 
the relational structure in the Hohfeldian scheme itself. Implied in the scheme 
is the idea that duties and liberties are mutually exclusive, i. e. with regard to a 
certain action one either has a duty or a liberty as the ‘opposite’ or the absence 
of a duty. We learned earlier that there is indeed an exclusive relation in action 
evaluations, namely between duties simpliciter and permissions – explicitly not 
between the existence of a duty and the mere legitimacy of the action. Hence, a 
Hohfeldian could only make sense of the claim regarding an exclusivity of du-
ties and liberties by acknowledging that liberties ultimately represent permis-
sions in the sense of (P).45 To conclude: Even though it is not strictly speaking 
impossible in terms of terminology, even for Hohfeldians it appears preferable 
to regard only permissions as liberties and thereby distinguish more sharply 
between first-level legitimacy (L) and second-level permissibility (P). Besides, 
‘unilateral liberties’ can as such not be advantageous for their holders and thus 
lack a basic quality of any possible right – a point that will concern us below in 
sec. b), bb), (2).
(b) Liberties and Protective Claim-Rights: Introduction
The finding that liberties should be read as (bilateral) permissions does not im-
mediately supply us with an answer to the question of what the mere fact that 
A has such a permission means for B. More specifically: Does the fact that 
A has a permission to perform an action X entail any duties for B towards A and 
accordingly any claim-rights for A? Hohfeld’s answer to this question – and 
that of most Hohfeldian scholars alike – is clear and simple: No, it does not. He 
thereby offers a somewhat reduced account of liberties as plain or ‘naked’ per-
missions.46 Being plain or ‘naked’ permissions the only thing these Hohfeldian 
liberties entail for B is the following indirect effect: If A has a permission to do 
X she necessarily does not have a duty, i. e. neither an obligation to do nor a pro-
44 See above sec. II, 3., b), aa), (2).
45 Thereby the validity of the argument is independent of the fact that there is indeed only 
a mutual exclusivity between duties simpliciter and permissions and not between Hohfeldian 
liberties and Hohfeldian duties, as we will find presently.
46 Jeremy Bentham, Works Volume III, ed. John Bowring (Edinburgh: Simpkin, Marshall 
& Co., 1843), 218. Cf. also Hart, LR, 181.
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hibition not to do X, which evidently entails the impossibility for A to be under 
a duty towards B. This in turn entails that B can have no claim-right against A, 
which led Hohfeld to fittingly describe B’s position as a ‘no-right’. As a purely 
logical deduction this reasoning is indisputable. In order to elucidate the role of 
Hohfeldian liberties in legal and moral reasoning consider the following (stand-
ard) example47: A walks along a deserted alley at night and sees a derelict 50 € 
note lying on the ground. At the same time, B also sees the note approaching it 
from the other side. Now, supposedly, A has a liberty – towards B and towards 
other people in general – to pick up the derelict note. However, B is not under a 
duty to let A pick it up, but in fact B has the same liberty, namely to pick up the 
money. If, however, B has the same liberty as A, then A’s liberty is ‘unprotect-
ed’ in relation to B, i. e. it is not protected by a respective claim-right towards B 
for him to refrain from impeding A’s action, in this case to not pick up the note 
himself. Thus, in a way A and B are in a state of allowed competition to pick up 
the note. Due to the immense importance of properly understanding this com-
petition aspect of Hohfeld’s concept of liberties we shall have a look at another, 
similar example: the freedom of trade or the case of competition on free mar-
kets. Imagine A runs a small business, e. g. a bakery. Suppose she does so in a 
legal system that generally honours the principle of ‘freedom of trade’. Then we 
can assume that A has liberty to run her shop. However, that does not seem to 
imply for legal practice that A is able to raise any claims against B opening his 
own bakery right down the street or possibly even right next to A’s. In this sense, 
A’s liberty (to run her own business) does not necessarily entail any claim-rights 
against other parties not to interfere with her business by way of competition, 
possibly even to the extent of ruining A if all of A’s former customers now prefer 
to buy their bread from B.
Finally, another example – this one originating from Hohfeld himself – 
which helps to demonstrate the independence of Hohfeldian liberties and claim-
rights is the famous shrimp salad.48 The initial situation is this: B owns a shrimp 
salad and A would like to eat it. Hohfeld’s claim is the following: Even though 
in practice perhaps a bit strange, there is nothing theoretically inconsistent in B 
giving A the permission to eat the salad, yet not giving her a respective claim-
right to do so, i. e. putting herself under a duty to let A eat the salad. And even 
though B would be permitted to impede A from eating the salad, A’s norma-
tive situation is supposed to be somewhat improved: Whereas before she was 
not even allowed to try and eat the salad, she now allegedly is. Put differently, 
whilst before she was under a duty not to eat the salad, she now is no longer. 
47 Hart, LR, 180. The example is only slightly modified here.
48 Hohfeld, “Some fundamental conceptions,” 41. For a detailed analysis of this and other, 
similar examples see also: Judith J. Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1990), 51 ff.
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This fact alone is regarded by Hohfeld as advantageous for A independent from 
the fact that B is under no duty to let A actually carry out her action, i. e. that B 
is permitted to take all kinds of countermeasures.
(3) Powers and Liabilities
Powers, like liberties, are concerned mainly with A’s own actions. According to 
Kramer someone holds a power that “can expand or reduce or otherwise mod-
ify, in particular ways, his own entitlements or the entitlements held by some 
other person(s)”49. Put a bit differently a power means “that one can change a 
legal relation through a volitional act or omission”50, through a practical de-
cision. In contrast to liberties and claim-rights, Hohfeld’s second-order powers 
are not determinable with reference to the evaluation of the action in question, 
that is, with reference to the deontic modalities. However, they are in a way 
merely factual abilities to bring about changes in one’s own or others’ nor-
mative positions, whereas in this context ‘factual’ means that having a power 
merely implies the ability to perform actions which themselves do not have to 
be normatively assessed. Hence, the ability51 implied in a Hohfeldian power 
can be described as normative, yet only with regard to its effects, not with re-
gard to its provenance. In other words, according to Hohfeld the central feature 
of a power is the normative effect the factual performance of an action has, ir-
respective of the normative demand associated with this action, i. e. irrespective 
of it being object of a permission or a duty.
Importantly, powers can only be exercised by an agent, by means of an ac-
tion. In this respect it has been often and correctly pointed out that the mere 
causation of changes in legal relations, the simple fact of something having a 
normative effect cannot be the only defining feature of powers, as the content 
of normative systems is generally dynamic and often influenced by events out-
side the control of agents. An example by Harris is a lightning hitting a tree, 
creating the duty of bystanders (or at least of firefighters) to put out the fire.52 
Clearly the lightning does not exercise a power. Hence we learn that the sole 
criterion of ‘having a normative effect on the content of the system’ cannot be 
the only one for something to qualify as a power. In other words, the change in 
normative requirements brought about by exercising a power is in every case a 
49 Kramer, RWT, 20.
50 Visa Kurki, “Why things can hold rights: reconceptualizing the legal person,” in Legal 
Personhood: Animals, Artificial Intelligence and the Unborn, ed. Visa Kurki and Tomasz Pie-
trzykowski (Wien/New York: Springer, 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2563683, 6. Page ref-
erence refers to the version available online.
51 Hohfeld, “Some fundamental conceptions,” 45.
52 James Harris, Legal Philosophies (London: Butterworths, 1980), 81. See also: Kram-
er, RWT, 102; with a similar example: Campbell, Rights, 208–209. Cf. also Andrew Halpin, 
“Rights, Duties, Liabilities, and Hohfeld,” Legal Theory 13 (2007): 37.
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matter of decision of an agent incumbent with the respective power. As much is 
commonly accepted.53
The intended role of Hohfeldian powers in normative reasoning can be elu-
cidated by referencing the following two examples: First, suppose A is a soldier 
and part of a chain of command. G, the general, wants B, another soldier, to do 
X, but she is not able to give the order directly to B. Thus, G orders A, being 
superior to B, to order B to do X, that is, to pass on the respective order. Now, 
even though A is obviously under a duty to give the order to B, she also seems to 
have a power in relation to B. Clearly, A’s order creates a duty that B would not 
have had without A’s action and, independent from the fact that A would violate 
her own duties if she did not comply, B is liable to A’s discretion in this respect. 
Consider also the second example, a typical case from private law, well known 
to jurists as a so-called bona fide purchase: A borrows an item Q from D. With-
out D’s permission A sells Q to B, who believes A to be the lawful owner of 
Q and objectively has no reason to believe otherwise. In most legal systems 
(at least those which I am aware of) in such a case B will gain the property of 
Q despite the fact that A was actually not allowed/entitled to sell Q in the first 
place. Selling Q to B is clearly forbidden for A. Yet, at the same time the change 
in legal relations, i. e. the transfer of the property from D to B, is (apart from 
additional requirements like B’s good faith) dependent on A selling Q to B as 
a volitional act, i. e. A deciding to sell Q. Thus, A appears to have the ability to 
change the normative requirements in this situation by her discretion. A seems 
to have an ability to bring about the normative effect of a change in ownership – 
and therewith a Hohfeldian power – despite being forbidden to perform the very 
same action.
Let us also consider the concept correlative to powers: liabilities. Due to their 
strict correlation with powers the concept of liabilities appears rather straight-
forward. Consider as an example a consent into bodily injury: A allows B to cut 
him open with a knife – hopefully because B is a surgeon and A needs to under-
go surgery. In this case A has a power over B, who might or might not want to 
cut open A, regarding B’s (pre-existing) duty not to cut open or otherwise hurt 
A. B cannot decide for himself whether to be allowed to cut A, but the decision 
regarding whether B should be under a duty not to do so or whether he should 
be permitted to do so lies solely in the hands of A. In that sense B is exposed to 
A’s exclusive ability to alter the normative demand in question. Accordingly, B 
is ‘liable’ to A with regard to his preliminary duty not to cut A, who in turn has 
the ‘power’ to define this specific normative matter, that is, to control the prac-
tical reason in question.
53 Kramer, RWT, 102, with further references.
 1. Hohfeld’s Scheme of Fundamental Legal Entitlements 147
(4) Immunities and Disabilities
Due to a similarly strict connection to the notion of powers, we can finally be 
reasonably brief about immunities and disabilities at this point. Quite simply, 
entity A has a Hohfeldian immunity in case B lacks a power regarding a certain 
normative matter with effect on A, that is, in case B lacks the power to bring 
about any changes with regard to a pre-existent (first-order or second-order) 
normative position of A. This lack of power on B’s side is, in turn, labelled by 
Hohfeld as a disability. Hence, an immunity implies the absence of a liability, 
just as a power implies the absence of a disability.
b) Critical Appraisal of Hohfeld’s Scheme
As indicated earlier, our goal in the ensuing sec. b) is to make an adjustment of 
the findings regarding Hohfeld’s scheme to the proper aims of our approaches, 
i. e. we opt for a critical review of the entitlements laid out so far with respect to 
the question of whether they are able to meet the requirements of the scope in 
their thus far presented form. Wherever this is not the case we shall adjust the 
respective entitlement accordingly.
aa) Advantageousness and Appendance
Preliminarily, we ought to clarify the notions of advantageousness and append-
ance in general in order to consequently apply these thoughts to each of the pre-
viously presented entitlements. Above all, we need to ascertain the meaning of 
the notion of an ‘advantage’. That is: When can we generally assume that a po-
sition is normatively advantageous for its holder and are there different degrees 
of advantageousness which can or should be distinguished? Essentially, I will 
assume in this respect that for anything to be advantageous for an entity with-
in a normative system, the entity needs to be invested with a reason, abstract or 
practical, provided by this very system. That entails: The notions of advanta-
geousness and appendance are very much mutually dependent. More precisely, 
within a normative system any conjuncture is (intersubjectively) advantageous 
for an entity if and only if there is a (practical) reason provided by this system 
that is directly appendant to the entity – either due to ascription or due to alrea-
dy being intrinsic.54 In other words, an advantage exists if a reason, and there-
54 If a state of affairs is supposed to be ‘advantageous’ in some way, it has to be the case 
that there is an advantage for someone or something, i. e. it needs a reference object or a ‘hold-
er’. As a consequence, we can identify two ways to determine rights or entitlements: In theory, 
we start off with a minimal normative system that simply contains some predefined normative 
requirements with regard to the behaviour of the agents addressed by it. In order to acquire 
‘rights’ in this system we could either start with a reason, i. e. the normative content of a prin-
ciple, norm or prescription, as a necessary element of this and any system and ‘append’ it to a 
certain entity in the sense of ascribing it to this entity or a feature of this entity. On the other 
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with ultimately and possibly a reason for the imposition of duties on others, lies 
in the entity itself.
There are a number of things to clarify about this idea of advantageousness. 
First of all, and as already indicated, the idea can only be correctly grasped with-
in the normative system that is investigated, i. e. from the perspective of the re-
spective authority, that is, from an intra-systemic standpoint and explicitly not 
from that of the entity that is supposed to have an advantage.55 This idea to take 
the ‘intersubjective standpoint’ and not the subjective one by questioning the 
advantageousness for A is of crucial importance. It is best explained and dem-
onstrated, however, with direct reference to the specific entitlements. Thus, we 
shall return to it in more depth mainly in sections (2), (b) and (3), (a).
Secondly, how are we to understand the necessity of an appendance of rea-
sons? Generally, a normative system provides reasons, abstract and practical 
ones. By definition, these reasons represent what is deemed good, positive, wor-
thy of being achieved by the respective authority. Thus, from an intra-system-
ic standpoint the notion of ‘advantage’ for anyone or anything is necessarily 
linked with that of reasons. However, plain reasons are for a start only address-
ed to agents. Individual advantage is not necessarily provided for in a norma-
tive system. In order to determine this kind of advantage we need the notion of 
appendance. The reason in question (abstract or practical) needs to be associat-
ed with the entity in question. Importantly, neither the notion of advantageous-
ness nor that of appendance limit the range of rights to practical reasons only, 
i. e. an abstract reason appendant to an entity meets the requirements of the 
scope just as a conclusive reason does. In this respect the scope of rights is con-
siderably wider than Hohfeld’s scheme with its restriction to ‘practical rights’ 
(see above).
Yet, as much entails a crucial question: How determinate does the ‘advan-
tage’ for an entity accompanied by a certain position have to be in order for 
this position to be qualified as a ‘right’? In other words, should we not prefer to 
limit the scope of rights to such positions that are ultimately advantageous, i. e. 
to such reasons that become practical as conclusive reasons for someone else’s 
actual duties and not just those which are general or prima facie? Indeed, the 
fact of whether a conjuncture is in effect advantageous for its holder can, strictly 
speaking, only be determined with reference to practical prescriptions or con-
hand, one could start with a certain entity or a certain feature of an entity and regard it as being 
invested with intrinsic value. This insight might seem trivial; it should be helpful though for 
a clearer understanding of the notions of ‘appendance’ and ‘advantageousness’ of rights and 
their mutual dependence. Furthermore, it should decrease the scope of our analysis, because by 
explaining the role of ‘advantageousness’ for any concept of rights, which is what we are plan-
ning to do, an implicit explanation for the feature of ‘appendance’ is also provided.
55 See, for instance, Raz, “Nature of Rights,” 195 ff., where Raz refers to a subject’s ‘crit-
ical’ interests as opposed to or rather independent of his or her subjective wishes/preferences. 
See also Sumner, MF, 40, with further references.
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clusive reasons. With norms it could only be determined in a generalised form 
that allows for exceptions. Put differently: Earlier we stated that the Hohfeldian 
analysis is restricted to practical reasons. These can be the content of concrete 
prescriptions and general norms. For instance, if we said ‘A has a right not to be 
harmed by B’ we would often mean it not in a conclusive but in a generalised 
sense, which would imply that there could be circumstances under which B no 
longer has a duty not to harm A, e. g. if A herself attacked B and B acted in self-
defence. Thus, strictly speaking an actual or ultimate advantage for A would lie 
only in those concrete cases of application in which B has an actual respective 
duty. Accordingly, an entitlement in the form of a norm can also only be nor-
mally advantageous for A. Importantly, this idea of being ‘normally advanta-
geous’ is supposedly not equivalent to the one Kramer refers to by claiming that 
rights need only be “normally advantageous”56. He thereby understands the 
notion of advantageousness in a way that not all practical manifestations of an 
entitlement necessarily have to be advantageous but rather only most of them. 
Hence, according to Kramer one might have a concrete right in a specific situ-
ation but still not have an advantage from it. Given what has been said so far, 
this thought has to be rejected. One could reach this result only by determin-
ing advantageousness from a subjective point of view, which we clearly should 
not do (see above). With regard to concrete prescriptions the case seems clear: 
To generally possess, for instance, a claim-right like A’s right not to be harmed 
surely does not mean that one’s claim will be successful in any given case. The 
claim would be successful, though, if we thought of the position as a concrete 
claim-right, which is necessarily prevailing as a conclusive reason. Such a con-
clusive reason can by definition not be outweighed or out-reasoned by other 
considerations.
Does this mean we should restrict our investigation to concrete rights, that 
is, conclusive reasons? Surely not. Simply, the scope does not prompt such a re-
striction. Indeed, reasons ultimately exist in order to guide the actions of the ad-
dressed agents, i. e. in order to ultimately serve as conclusive, practical reasons. 
Yet, this is not incompatible with the idea that if an abstract reason is append-
ant to an entity, this can be regarded as (generally) advantageous for the entity 
in question. Even though there are no correlative duties to this abstract reason, 
the requirements of the scope are met nonetheless. Moreover, we are very much 
used to the language of such abstract rights as we can see from the first example 
under I, 1., a), bb). Nevertheless, the idea of different degrees of advantageous-
ness – or rather different degrees of determinateness of advantages – can and 
will help us by comparing the different entitlements, by correctly ordering and 
classifying them.57
56 Kramer, RWT, 93.
57 Depending on one’s perspective, the self-imposed restriction of the Hohfeldian scheme 
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Before we do so, one final, important side note: The notion of advantageous-
ness as presented here is a necessary requirement only to determine manifes-
tations of the scope of rights. Surely the idea of advantageousness as a necessary 
element does not have to be shared by other theoretical approaches with distinct 
theoretical aims. In effect, despite their proposed commitment to ‘rights’, it 
is not shared by Hohfeld and Kramer, at least not comprehensively. Suppos-
edly, they engage in a purely analytical endeavour with the goal of working 
out distinguishable structures and functions within a normative practice such 
as the law. In my view, they fulfil this task in a manner deserving approbation 
and even admiration. However, in order to work out an adequate concept of 
rights, one ought to choose an approach that takes the advantageousness-axiom 
more seriously. Accordingly, we can detect a fundamental conflict of goals with 
the original Hohfeldian enterprise, which is also inherited by Kramer. On the 
one hand different (possible) cases of the application of the term right are sup-
posed to be described, whilst on the other hand the advantageousness-axiom 
is practically neglected. Both are not possible at the same time: An approach 
can be either purely analytical, interested in fundamental deontological struc-
tures, and thus without a specific interest in rights; or one’s approach is con-
cerned with rights and therefore one cannot avoid a strict dependence on the 
advantageousness-axiom as presented above. Put differently, I believe Kram-
er is right that Hohfeld’s analysis could be read simply as an ‘analytically pu-
rificatory’58 enterprise in deontic logic. If this is so, then we should expect an 
analysis of the deontological structures in bipolar relations in an abstract way, 
independent of the aim of identifying possible, individually advantageous ele-
ments, i. e. ‘rights’. ‘Purificatory analysis’ surely would be a more than valid 
theoretical enterprise. Yet, certainly we could not think of the results of such 
an analysis as more or less strong manifestations of a more general idea of 
‘rights’ then. Precisely, to separate the notion of advantageousness from the 
concept of entitlements would be analytically purificatory to an extent where 
the theoretical approach would have to be regarded as inviable if its aim were 
to elucidate a concept of rights. Put differently, one could try and understand 
Hohfeld’s scheme as an analytical framework for bipolar relations in deontic 
to practical reasons can be regarded as either a strength or a weakness. On the one hand, it does 
lack comprehensiveness with regard to normative phenomena. In this respect, by excluding 
principles from the logic of ‘rights’, his account of entitlements is significantly narrower than 
the scope of rights we offer here. This does not have to be regarded as a disadvantage in every 
respect, though. Despite its obvious limitations with regard to explaining normative phenome-
na, I believe Hohfeld made an admirable point for the practicability of reasons, for the notion 
of applicability of normative thought, as promoted earlier in this thesis, see also Carl Wellman, 
“Legal Rights,” 214. The bottom line is: The restriction weakens the explanatory power of 
Hohfeld’s account as a meta-ethical theory, but strengthens his initial point to offer a scheme 
of legal relations, thus of normative relations ‘as applied in judicial reasoning’.
58 Kramer, RWT, 22.
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logic more generally, as Kramer apparently does. Yet, as much would thwart the 
scheme’s very own initial purpose to shed some light on the language of rights 
more specifically and not just to identify general, atomistic deontological struc-
tures without any reference to a right’s central feature of being advantageous 
for its holder.59
bb) Revaluation of the Entitlements
Once more: All these very general thoughts are best illustrated with reference to 
specific entitlements. Thus, let us now return to claim-rights, liberties, powers, 
and immunities and the question of whether, and possibly to what extent, they 
meet the requirements of the scope.
(1) Claim-Rights
With regard to claim-rights and duties there is significant agreement between 
our approach and Hohfeld’s. Only the fact that the concept of Hohfeldian duties 
is more demanding than that of duties simpliciter is not always acknowledged 
amongst Hohfeldian scholars. For instance, Kurki claims that “[f]or every reg-
ulated action […] A has either a duty or a liberty, and B has either a claim-right 
or a no-right”60. Allegedly, there is a serious flaw hidden in this assumption as 
the logic of Hohfeldian duties is simply equated with that of obligations and 
prohibitions as duties simpliciter. However, as we saw earlier, the notion of a 
Hohfeldian duty presupposes a connection between the normative demand on 
B and the entity A, which in terms of fundamental deontic modalities is all but 
necessary and which is not implied in the notion of a duty simpliciter. Hence, 
obligations and prohibitions are more basic than Hohfeldian duties. Accord-
ingly, the fundamentality-thesis needs to be rejected. The correlativity-axiom 
on the other hand not only remains untouched by these findings but rather can 
be regarded as the very reason for this surplus of presuppositions with Hohfeldi-
an duties. Put bluntly: For an entity A to have a normative advantage ultimately 
and in practice means that there is a bipolar relation with correlative duties of a 
person B towards A (see above). In this respect Hohfeld was right and as much 
was probably what led him to perceive claim-rights as ‘rights in the strictest 
sense’. However, it is noteworthy that Hohfeldian duties and claim-rights do 
not necessarily exist in every conceivable normative system – in sharp contrast 
to obligations and prohibitions as their primary elements.
In contrast to ‘liberties’ as active entitlements, claim-rights mark the stand-
ard form of passive entitlements. Notably, despite the classification in active 
59 We will return to this notion of advantageousness, its general importance and meaning 
for a more thorough analysis in a critical re-analysis of Hohfeldian powers, see below sec. b), 
bb), (3).
60 Kurki, “Reconceptualizing the legal person,” 5.
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and passive entitlements, the general idea of an entitlement has no necessary 
connection to the idea of actions or practical reasons. Hence, as indicated ear-
lier, passive entitlements can not only come in the form of concrete prescrip-
tions and norms, but also in the form of principles. Once more: In this respect 
our approach clearly exceeds Hohfeld’s scheme and its restriction to practical 
reasons as we do not only acknowledge ‘A’s right not to be harmed by B (cor-
relative to B’s specific duty)’ but for instance also ‘A’s general right to bodily 
integrity’ as manifestations of the scope and therewith as possible rights, al-
beit the latter does not refer to a bipolar relation and/or to specific, correlative 
duties. Nevertheless, it can be regarded as a passive entitlement, because it is 
certainly not a principle which A can act upon, but at best – namely if put into 
a respective relation with other principles – it could justify duties of others, 
strictly without reference to what A herself is permitted to do, though. We shall 
scrutinise the idea of active entitlements and the difference between active and 
passive entitlement presently in sec. bb), (2), (a) below. For now, we may state 
that by including appendant principles as abstract rights into the wider scope of 
rights Hohfeld’s correlativity-axiom does not have to be given up, but it merely 
needs to be qualified: In order to determine an actual, ultimate advantage, we 
need to rely on the correlativity of A’s claim-right and B’s specific duty. Thus, 
the correlativity-axiom is undoubtedly an appropriate axiom when investigat-
ing only practical reasons. Moreover, one might say that this axiom and the 
scheme’s self-imposed restriction to practical reasons are mutually dependent. 
Yet, neither presupposition is a necessary requirement in order for someone’s 
normative position to fulfil the features of the scope, i. e. to be qualified as a 
possible right. In other words, the correlativity with a duty of B towards A is 
not necessary in order to determine more generally advantageous positions of 
A such as her abstract ‘right to life’, which could – without further ado – be 
qualified as a manifestation of the scope of rights as this scope only asks for 
advantageousness in general. To be clear, though: Appendant principles can be 
regarded as manifestations of the scope of rights and even as passive entitle-
ments, yet certainly not as claim-rights, since in accordance with Hohfeld these 
are limited to the realm of practical reasons.
Finally, based on our insights about claim-rights and duties let us consider 
a long-standing debate in legal theory regarding a possible priority of either 
rights or duties – with those on the one side claiming a priority of rights over 
duties (at least in terms of justification of the latter by the former)61 and those 
asserting a fundamentality of duties instead, arguing that most ‘rights’ – more 
61 Dworkin, TRS, 171; Mackie, “Right-based moral theory,” 350; Jeremy Waldron, The 
Right to Private Property (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), 69 ff. Cf. also this instructive article by 
Raz: Joseph Raz, “Right-Based Moralities,” in Rights and Reason, ed. Marilyn Friedman et al. 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000).
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precisely, claim-rights – are mere reflexes of duties62. We now find that this 
question of whether a right necessarily only follows the logical implications of 
a duty depends not only on how we understand rights, but especially on how we 
understand duties and their underlying reasons. If we see certain entities, e. g. at 
least human beings, invested with appendant value, we find that in these cases 
rights and duties are indeed in a reflexive position with regard to one another. 
Whenever B has a duty not only with an effect on, but towards A, A in turn has 
a right towards B – and vice versa. Whereas if we do not make this assumption 
of appendance of reasons, the idea of duties in the sense of mere obligations 
and prohibitions might well be seen as more fundamental than that of ‘rights’ 
(at least in the sense of Hohfeldian claim-rights). However, in this case there 
would be no deontological connection to any notion of rights whatsoever and 
thus strictly speaking also no priority of duties over rights, as rights are nec-
essarily “relational properties”63, i. e. quantities that presuppose a normative 
relation between two entities, which yet needs to be established (see above). 
Consequently, in the case of only one agent following e. g. a divine command-
ment, there is no room and also no need for rights. Thus we may state: There is 
no priority between claim-rights and directional duties. And, strictly speaking, 
there is no priority between rights and duties simpliciter either, as with duties 
simpliciter there simply are no rights that could be inferior.
In this respect so-called ‘right-based moralities’64, as proposed e. g. by 
Dworkin or Mackie, essentially ignore the difference between rights as practical 
or as abstract reasons. In order for their claim regarding a priority of rights over 
duties to be true, rights would have to be understood as abstract principles. In 
other words, the underlying idea is this: If rights are principles/abstract reasons 
and duties are practical reasons implying a relation of precedence, then rights 
need to precede duties in the sense that the respective right needs to be put into a 
relation of precedence first in order to become a duty. Two things are objection-
able about this reasoning: First, as just demonstrated, practical (claim-) rights 
62 As much is famously referred to as the ‘redundancy-argument’, see inter alia Hans 
Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre [1960], 132 (in German): “[Der] als ‘Recht’ oder ‘Anspruch’ eines 
Individuums bezeichnete Anspruch ist aber nichts andere als die Pflicht des oder der anderen. 
Spricht man in diesem Fall von einem subjektiven Recht […] eines Individuums, als ob dieses 
Recht […] etwas von der Pflicht des oder der anderen Verschiedenes wäre, so erzeugt man den 
Anschein von zwei rechtlich relevanten Sachverhalten, wo nur einer vorliegt”. Cf. also Hart, 
LR, 190, 199. Critical in this respect: Kramer, RWT, 26 ff.; specifically critical with regard 
to the idea of claim-rights being the mere ‘reflex’ of duties: MacCormick, “Rights in Legis-
lation,” 199–200. For a differentiated account, which proposes a kind of weak priority of duties 
over rights see Finnis, Natural Law, 205 ff. In a nutshell, he claims that “the concept of duty, 
obligation or requirement [has] a more strategic explanatory role than the concept of rights” 
(id, Natural Law, 210).
63 For this rather fitting choice of words see Markus Stepanians, Rights as Relational 
Properties (Berlin: De Gruyter, forthcoming). Cf. also Koller, Theorie des Rechts, 95.
64 See above sec. III, fn. 61.
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could never be regarded as prior to duties due to their mutual dependence. Sec-
ondly, the assumption that abstract reasons are prior to practical duties presup-
poses a fact which is not only all but necessary but also in its exclusive aspira-
tion rather false, namely that normative reasoning necessarily starts at the level 
of abstract reasons and ends up at practical judgements. We could just as well 
think of it the other way around. In fact, as much has been attempted to explain 
in the foregoing section on principles and norms: Normative practice is a con-
stant inductive-deductive process with no proper determinable starting point. 
Thus, between abstract reasons and practical judgements there is strictly no log-
ical priority to determine. Admittedly, in terms of justification, we may – in fact, 
we have to – think otherwise. At some point we either need a conclusive reason 
or a final judgement. So, one may claim a justificatory priority of certain (pos-
sibly intrinsic) abstract reasons – and thus also of abstract rights – over practi-
cal duties,65 but he or she would need a cogent substantive normative theory in 
order to do so. Any claim regarding a logical priority of rights or duties has to 
be renounced decidedly.66
(2) Liberties
Earlier we found that – already for terminological reasons – a Hohfeldian es-
sentially ought to understand liberties as (bilateral) permissions, not as mere 
legitimate acts. More precisely, within the logic of Hohfeld’s scheme, liberties 
ought to be understood as ‘naked’ or plain permissions.67 As such they cor-
respond to ‘no-rights’ for any other entity B. However, I contend that a ‘naked’ 
or plain permission can as such never be advantageous for the agent holding it, 
and thus it cannot qualify as a possible right. Initially, permissions are simply 
non-evaluated structural features of a normative system. They merely represent 
the absence of a pre-determined normative content in the form of a duty, which 
entails a normative exemption for A (see above). Hence, the common claim lies 
at hand that liberties as plain permissions need to be surrounded by a ‘protec-
tive perimeter’ of claim-rights, which – being ‘rights in the strictest sense’ – 
thus provide the necessary advantage for A. This is roughly the Hohfeldian rea-
soning, which surely allows for a clear separation of claim-rights and liberties. 
Yet, a decisive question which Hohfeld does not take into account is this: Can 
the fact that agent A has a permission to do X somehow be regarded as advan-
65 Presumably, as much is what Dworkin aimed at in the first place due to his entirely dif-
ferent methodological framework, cf. above sec. I, 1., b), bb).
66 We shall return to the delicate relation of rights and duties and the question for a prior-
ity either way in sec. e), cc), (3), (c), when discussing the genesis of rights.
67 Hart correctly claimed that “Hohfeld’s ‘liberty’ or ‘privilege’ is by his definition a uni-
lateral liberty” (Hart, LR, 176). Indeed, Hohfeld originally intended liberties/privileges to be 
understood that way. In this respect, his scheme is in need of a decided revision. Accordingly, 
and just as correctly, Hart advocated the “bilateral character” of liberties (ibid, 175).
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tageous for A in a way that cannot be adequately captured only in a language 
of duties and correlative claim-rights? My assumption is yes, under the supple-
mentary condition that ‘individual autonomy’ or ‘individual freedom’ is regard-
ed as a general principle/abstract reason in the normative system in question. 
Evidently, such an understanding of ‘liberties’ is bound to blur the lines between 
claim-rights and liberties to a certain degree, because if liberties are supposed 
to be effective they cannot simply represent an abstract reason, but they rather 
need to imply a precedence of the abstract reason of autonomy. Consequently, 
they imply other agents complying with this reason, thus being under duties 
towards A, thus A having a claim-right. However, we will find that liberties as 
active entitlements remain clearly distinguishable from plain claim-rights. To be 
clear, as results of a plain deontological analysis the conventional understand-
ing of Hohfeldian liberties as naked permissions is all but implausible. Thus, by 
revising the concept of liberties in this section, it is not Hohfeld’s supposedly 
impregnable deductions regarding the relation of his liberties and ‘no-rights’ 
that are challenged, but rather the reductiveness of his concept of liberties and 
that of no-rights in turn. We must reject this reductionism when searching for 
a proper concept of rights. Put differently, Hohfeld’s concept is simplifying to 
a point where his liberties no longer serve a meaningful purpose for a concep-
tual theory of rights.
(a) Determinateness of Liberties as Active Entitlements
In the light of the foregoing general remarks on advantageousness, one may 
wonder just how determinate the advantage for A is with such ‘liberties’ under-
stood as valued permissions. In this respect I shall make the following conten-
tion: Whilst we should not perceive of liberties as naked permissions due to the 
necessity to hold some advantage for A, very similar to claim-rights (see above) 
the term can, correctly understood, comprise both active entitlements in a very 
general, non-relational way and in a very narrow way, with reference to specific 
duties correlative to a specific permitted act. In detail: As soon as individual 
freedom of decision is regarded as a principle, then automatically with every 
assigned permission we can also detect an appendant reason. As much is a cru-
cial peculiarity in the derivation or determination of active entitlements. Deter-
mining an entitlement, we can usually ground our thinking in a certain reason, 
for which we then need to establish a connection to an entity – either by ascrib-
ing the value or by presupposing the intrinsic nature of the value with the entity. 
In the case of active entitlements this derivation process is in a way turned up-
side down: To begin with, the general ability to make autonomous decisions is 
necessarily inherent to or appendant to any agent within the logic of a norma-
tive system. Hence, in the case where A has a permission to do something, this 
inherent ability of hers simply needs to be valorised in order for her exercise 
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of this ability to be regarded as something inherently advantageous. In other 
words, passive entitlements like claim-rights place reasons at their core, rea-
sons for duties. Thus, the idea of an advantage is naturally provided for by these 
entitlements; only the notion of appendance or the idea of a ‘directionality’ of 
duties needs to be somehow explained.68 With active entitlements it is the other 
way around: The notion of an agent’s not being under a duty is their core fea-
ture, and thus the notion of appendance (of autonomy) is naturally provided for. 
Only the issue of why the possibility to decide freely should be advantageous 
for A needs to be somehow accounted for. Surely, we might say something sim-
ilar e. g. about A’s passive ‘right to life’ – being alive is a priori appendant to A, 
and it needs to be valorised in order to become a right. Indeed, ‘A’s right to life’ 
and ‘A’s right to freedom’ are structurally similar in this respect: They describe 
an abstract value appendant to a specific entity. However, the decisive differ-
ence between (I) ‘A’s right not to be killed’ and (II) ‘A’s right to do X’ is that 
(I) is determined only with reference to possible duties of B, whilst (II) is de-
termined primarily with reference to A’s own action or the fact that she is her-
self permitted to do X. Hence, it is because A herself has a permission and not 
because of some appendant or non-appendant reason that, in terms of structure, 
active entitlements are clearly distinct from passive entitlements. The assump-
tion that a valued permission is thus not simply a subspecies of claim-rights im-
mediately suggests itself.
Once more, what does the difference between active and passive entitle-
ments amount to exactly? As indicated, we can infer from the examples (I) and 
(II) that active and passive entitlements usually do not show the same degree of 
determinateness with regard to advantageousness. With claim-rights the correl-
ative duty to A’s advantageous position needs to be determinable. With liberties 
at least the permitted action itself needs to be determinable. The existence of 
such a permission is necessary in order for A’s individual autonomy to actually 
pertain. Now, if A’s autonomy is valued, without reference to correlative duties 
we may say that ‘A has a right to do X’ because from the intra-systemic stand-
point she generally profits from the fact she is allowed to decide freely over per-
forming or not performing X. This does not affect the fact which we learned 
earlier, that the advantageousness of any normative position is ultimately at-
tached to the normative demands on other agents. Thus, if we want to under-
stand liberties analogously to claim-rights in a narrow sense, then the execution 
of the permitted action has to correlate with a specific duty of another person B, 
which is essentially based on respect for the specific exercise of autonomy by 
A – a respect duty.69 Such a respect duty exists whenever the acting agent’s in-
68 See above sec. III, fn. 39.
69 Notably, the term ‘respect duty’ is used in a very narrow sense as such duties that are 
based on the exercise of individual autonomy. On the notion of respect as a reason for legal 
duties more generally (and presumably less precise) cf. Kurt Seelmann, “Respekt als Rechts-
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dividual autonomy manifested in the performance of a permitted action X is 
the decisive, prevailing reason for others to be under duties of support or non-
interference. Hence, structurally analogous to our example ‘A’s right not to be 
killed’ would be ‘A’s right to do X and be respected in doing so’. Already it is 
noteworthy that this concept of respect duties is a rather narrow one, i. e. not 
every duty of non-interference with a permitted action is necessarily a respect 
duty.70 Furthermore, even liberties in this narrow sense can often additionally 
be protected by other specific claim-rights. These points shall be scrutinised 
presently in subsection (c). At this stage of the investigation it simply ought to 
be pointed out that, in order to qualify active normative positions as rights, one 
needs to establish some kind of connection from one’s permission to reasons for 
other people’s duties towards the right-holder. With the essential feature of ac-
tive entitlements being the absence of duties and thus the existence of a norma-
tive exemption, the easiest (and in fact the only) way to do so is to valorise in-
dividual decision-making ability, which can ultimately lead to respect duties for 
other agents. However, with regard to the necessary degree of determinateness 
of liberties, what has been stated previously about claim-rights applies: Ulti-
mate advantage is not necessary in order to meet the requirements of the scope. 
Thus, also a solitary, non-relational ‘right to do X’ is perfectly possible as well, 
as long as we keep in mind that correlative respect duties to this ‘right’ need to 
remain theoretically determinable. Hence, analogously to one’s most abstract 
passive entitlements, e. g. the aforementioned ‘rights’ to life or bodily integrity, 
we can also think of a most abstract active entitlement as a ‘right to freedom’.71 
pflicht,” in Rechtsphilosophie im 21. Jahrhundert, ed. Winfried Brugger, Ulfrid Neumann, and 
Stephan Kirste (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 2008). Supposedly, the determination of respect 
duties, i. e. the separation of simple duties and respect duties, can in practice be quite problem-
atic. On the face of it, a certain duty of non-interference could be a respect duty, yet it could 
also be based on another, independent reason. Essentially, as much is a substantive question – 
i. e. it depends on the values protected by the normative system in question and the specific 
mode of protection in this context – and thus not part of our investigation. Besides, the fact that 
a differentiation will not always be easy in practice does not damage or otherwise negatively 
affect the clarity of the theoretical distinction.
70 Cf. Thomson, Realm of Rights, 53–54. The distinction, which Thomson has in mind, be-
tween ‘privilege’ and ‘liberty’ is not unlike ours between ‘Hohfeldian liberties’ and ‘liberties in 
a narrower sense’. Yet, what Thomson, like others, fails to acknowledge is the fact that ‘privi-
leges’ cannot be regarded as entitlements because they are not advantageous for their holders.
71 Essentially, ‘this right to freedom’ as the accepted good of individual autonomy (see 
below) reflects the Kantian notion of freedom as the ‘original [human] right’: “Freedom (inde-
pendence from being constrained by another’s choice), insofar as it can coexist with the free-
dom of every other in accordance with a universal law, is the only original right belonging to 
every man by virtue of his humanity.” (Kant, Metaphysics, 393). However, in effect the two 
conceptions differ significantly. Whilst Kant, just like Hobbes, appears to use the term ‘right’ 
as something existent in a pre-positive, pre-social state, from which duties are thus derived, as 
much is explicitly denied for our concept of rights: Rights exist only if and only because there 
is a social context and there are other agents that comply with the reason these rights represent, 
i. e. (respect for) individual autonomy. Essentially, Kant’s idea of an ‘original human right’ 
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Let us remember at this point that we are only discussing entitlements so far and 
that the issue whether we actually should refer to either kind of entitlement as 
‘rights’ is yet to be decided.
(b) Liberties as Bilateral Permissions
Earlier we argued that liberties should be understood as bilateral or strong per-
missions and not (also) as unilateral ones. Whilst at that point we mainly criti-
cised the danger of terminological confusions entailed by a two-fold concept of 
liberties, it should now be clear why a ‘unilateral liberty’ could also impossibly 
be regarded as an active entitlement, let alone a right. This is due to the necessa-
ry link between freedom and advantageousness with active entitlements, which 
‘unilateral liberties’ cannot account for, because they do not necessarily entail 
an area of autonomous decision, i. e. a permission, but possibly an obligation. 
A legitimate act, which is not at the same time permitted, could only ever be re-
garded as advantageous for the acting agent herself if it were a ‘self-regarding 
duty’, for instance a duty not to do harm to oneself.72 Yet, in this case the agent 
in question would surely not perform an ‘active right’, but she would rather be 
enjoying a claim-right whilst simultaneously performing the correlative duty.
(c) The Relation of Liberties and Claim-Rights
Hohfeld’s contention that there is no necessary connection between his con-
cept of liberties and claim-rights is most agreeable and readily accepted. How 
about our concept of liberties as valued permissions, though? What is the re-
lation of liberties in this narrow sense to claim-rights?73 Evidently, they imply 
claim-rights to a certain degree. More precisely, they imply a specific claim-
right, whose correlative duty is a respect duty. However, liberties do not imply 
all kinds of protective duties. Hart’s and Bentham’s analyses remain too vague 
matches Hart’s idea of freedom as the “one natural right” (H. L. A. Hart, “Are There Any Nat-
ural Rights?” The Philosophical Review 64 (April 1955): 175). For an excellent rendition of 
the Kantian concept of rights see: Marietta Auer, “Subjektive Rechte bei Pufendorf und Kant,” 
Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 208 (2008): 611 ff.
72 The notion of such ‘duties to oneself’ has been a matter of great controversy in legal and 
moral theory. For an original and very elaborate account of such duties (both as moral and pos-
sibly legal duties) see: Kant, Metaphysics, 394–397, 543–588. For an instructive article on the 
subject matter see Marcus Singer, “On Duties to Oneself,” Ethics 69 (April 1959). For a more 
recent debate regarding the nature of such duties (in German language) cf. inter alia: Michael 
Köhler, “Die Rechtspflicht gegen sich selbst,” Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 14 (2006); Bijan 
Fateh-Moghadam, “Grenzen des weichen Paternalismus,” in Grenzen des Paternalismus, ed. 
Bijan Fateh-Moghadam, Stephan Sellmaier, and Wilhelm Vossenkuhl (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 
2010), esp. 28–30.
73 Henceforth the term ‘liberty’ will be used only in the stricter sense of a valued permis-
sion. If referred to in the Hohfeldian sense of a plain permission, it will be explicitly labelled 
as such.
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in this respect. Hart claimed: “where a man is left free by the law to do or not 
to do some particular action, the exercise of this liberty will always be protect-
ed by the law to some extent, even if there is no strictly correlative obligation 
upon others not to interfere with it.”74 Yet, by assuming a protection ‘to some 
extent’ in fact it remains entirely unclear what kind of protection can be expect-
ed from having a liberty and also from whom one is protected. Allegedly, Hart 
does have some kind of general protection of individual autonomy in mind, not 
unlike our account. Yet, what he fails to acknowledge is the strict connection of 
liberties as active entitlements to the value of individual autonomy and thus in 
effect exclusively to correlative respect duties. Other duties, like e. g. B’s duty 
not to assault A, are not necessarily implied by a liberty, as they will be ground-
ed in specific reasons other than the encompassing respect for A’s exertion of 
freedom.
Nevertheless, the notion of respect duties implies that the advantageous 
aspect of active entitlements is decisively determined by somewhat accompa-
nying claim-rights. However, there is a decisive restriction to this statement: 
Therewith liberties do not degenerate into a specific kind of claim-right. That is, 
a liberty is not equivalent to a specific claim-right that correlates with a respect 
duty as a specific duty, but the peculiarity of liberties (of active entitlements in 
general) lies in the fact that they are not determined through only one action ev-
aluation, namely that of agent B, but rather through two reciprocal action evalu-
ations. With a liberty B is under a duty towards A, just because A has a permis-
sion to perform another action X. This reciprocity of two action evaluations by 
two distinct agents is what sets active entitlements apart from passive ones. Due 
to this reciprocity, the idea of having a liberty cannot be adequately captured in 
the bare logic of duties and correlative claim-rights.
What is the primary purpose of liberties thus understood as valued permis-
sions? Quite evidently, it is protection of the performance of permitted actions 
from interferences by third parties through the imposition of correlative respect 
duties. Thus, in practice, liberties exist especially in the relation of citizens to 
state institutions and public officials, which are generally responsible for ob-
serving compliance with and, where appropriate, for enforcing the law. This 
implies the guarantee and protection of granted areas of free permission in case 
autonomy is regarded as a principle, because the authoritative decision not to 
impose duties is then also a (conscious) decision in favour of individual free-
dom. In this respect, liberties will in most cases be rights of the citizen towards 
the state with the state being obliged to provide an adequate protection for the 
permitted action in question. Closely connected to this understanding of liber-
ties is yet another central purpose of valued permissions or of individual free-
dom as a principle, which lies in the justification of normative demands. That 
74 Hart, LR, 179–180.
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is, the principle of individual freedom itself describes an abstract ‘right’ of the 
citizen as the addressed agent towards the authority. Thereby it represents an 
argumentative counterweight to competing authoritative considerations in an 
alleged political discourse. In other words, once we accept individual autonomy 
as a general principle we also acknowledge an institutionalised requirement 
to justify restraints on this autonomy,75 i. e. if freedom is a reason there must 
be better reasons in order to constrain this freedom by imposing duties – con-
straints out of mere caprice are thus made impossible or at least unjustifiable. 
In this respect, liberties represent rights of defence against the state in a clas-
sical sense.76
Let us clarify these general, theoretical remarks with the aid of our standard 
examples for liberties from before, starting with the derelict money note. In case 
individual liberty is generally regarded as a principle, then both A and B pos-
sess abstract liberties (not towards each other) to pick up the money, which are 
flanked by specific, independent claim-rights (towards each other), e. g. forbid-
ding the other party to use violent force. A and B have liberties in a narrow sense 
with correlative respect duties not towards each other, but certainly towards the 
state or public institutions, which ought not deprive A and B of their respective 
‘rights’ without better reasons and, more importantly, which have to secure the 
performance of the permitted act, in case there are ultimately no better reasons 
to restrict A’s and B’s freedom. A does not have a concrete liberty towards B, 
because B is under no duty to ultimately respect the performance of the action 
in question, namely picking up the money, as B himself is permitted to do the 
very same. Thus, the state of affairs in which A and B find themselves can be 
adequately described as a state of ‘allowed competition’. Additionally, A’s po-
sition – and B’s position respectively – could be described as an ‘incomplete 
liberty’. Such a kind of liberty pertains in case the exercise of the permitted act 
is generally normatively secured, but in case the holder of the liberty does not 
have an exclusive entitlement to perform the action in question, i. e. in case there 
are other agents that are permitted to perform the same action. On the other 
hand, a ‘complete liberty’ pertains in case only A is permitted to perform the 
action in question. For instance, A would probably enjoy a complete liberty if it 
was her own money note lying in the street. The idea of (in-) completeness of 
a liberty describes a more global feature of this liberty, thus exceeding the bare 
logic of bipolar relations. However, we can draw certain conclusions regarding 
these bipolar relations A – B from the fact that a liberty is either complete or in-
complete: (1) A complete liberty entails specific liberties of A towards any other 
agent B. (2) An incomplete liberty entails the absence of a liberty of A towards 
75 Cf. David Lyons, “Utility and Rights,” Nomos 24 (1982): 111: “If I have a right to do 
something this provides an argumentative threshold against objections to my doing it […]”.
76 Cf. below sec. III, 2., e), cc), (3).
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any other agent B that enjoys the same (incomplete) liberty. Accordingly, a state 
of allowed competition entails the absence of liberties of A towards B.77
The difference between complete and incomplete liberties can be fittingly 
explained with the aid of our second example from before: the freedom of trade. 
With regard to the action ‘offering a certain product on a certain, defined mar-
ket’ both A and B enjoy an incomplete liberty. For both it is a liberty towards the 
state which is held to secure their respective freedom to participate in the com-
petition on the market. For A to have a liberty towards B as well, B would have 
to be under a correlative respect duty towards A. Presumably, B is under various 
duties towards A, for instance the duty not to assault A, to deceive her, to insult 
her or to damage her reputation otherwise. Certainly, all of these duties correlate 
with specific claim-rights held by A. Also one might say that they are in a wider 
sense grounded in ‘respect’ for A as a person. Yet, they do not represent ‘respect 
duties’ as they are meant to be understood in this context, because that would 
mean that B would have to respect A’s action in the sense of letting her enjoy 
the opportunity to place her product on the market exclusively, which clearly is 
no duty of B’s. Hence, A’s ‘incomplete liberty’, despite being an actual liberty 
towards state institutions, is indeed – as Hohfeld correctly described it – only 
a plain permission towards competitors like B, a permission that is possibly, in 
practice usually, though not necessarily, accompanied by specific claim-rights. 
Accordingly, towards B this position is not advantageous for A, only towards 
those that are not permitted to compete with her, i. e. primarily the state as the 
guardian of the competition/the market. Thus generally, if A has a liberty to per-
form an action X there are two mutually exclusive possibilities for other agents 
to behave towards A, namely they are either permitted to compete with A for the 
respective goal entailed by the action, which implies the absence of a respect 
duty towards her, or they are under such a respect duty.
(d) Duties as a Disadvantage?
Surely, some will object to the thesis that a plain permission is not itself ad-
vantageous for its holder. Their argument will thereby probably draw on the 
idea that duties, in turn, are essentially disadvantageous. If this were the case, 
then, due to the exclusivity of duties and permissions, a lack of a duties would 
77 A different case is that in which a certain goal can only be achieved by two combined 
declarations of will, i. e. if various people have to act in unison in order to perform an action in 
the first place. An example for such an action is the right of both parents to mutually determine 
the name of their child. The difference with incomplete liberties is that neither of the parents 
separately is entitled (or even capable) of performing the action ‘naming the child’. In fact, in 
this case (and similar cases respectively) we need to perceive of the group entity ‘parents’ as 
the significant decision maker that actually performs an action and that enjoys a liberty to do 
so. The fact that a prior agreement must be reached in the internal relationship/between the two 
parents remains untouched by this finding.
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automatically entail a permission, at the same time a lack of disadvantage and 
hence an advantage. Put differently: A duty might be regarded as inherently dis-
advantageous for the addressee of the duty, because it is tantamount to an au-
thoritative restriction on individual freedom. Accordingly, a permission being 
the absence of a duty would also mean the absence of a detriment for A, and as 
such be inherently advantageous. Finally, another way to sketch the argument is 
this: From the fact that A has a plain permission to perform X, i. e. a liberty in 
the classical Hohfeldian sense, we can infer that B cannot have a right to either 
demand the performance of X or a right to demand the omission of X, because 
that would require A to either be under an obligation or a prohibition with re-
spect to X. Now, Hohfeldians usually suppose that the mere fact that it could be 
the case that B had a right towards A, and that this is in fact not the case, must 
be advantageous for A. Precisely, we can detect two distinct claims then: (1) 
Having a duty is inherently disadvantageous for an agent. (2) Due to being the 
correlative position to an advantageous position, i. e. a claim-right, a duty itself 
must be a disadvantageous position. Both are false due to neglect of the fact 
that the idea of a normative advantage is determined only by the appendance of 
a reason. In detail:
To begin with, let us remember that rights are ‘relational properties’. They 
exist interpersonally in intersubjective systems. Put bluntly, if you were alone 
on this planet, you could not and would not have any rights, because there 
would simply be no point for you in having any. Roughly, to have a (claim-) 
right means to have a (practical) intersubjective reason on one’s side for others 
to comply with. This reason ultimately forms duties for other agents address-
ed by the system in question. Importantly, from an intra-systemic perspective 
the reasons provided by the system generally indicate how the order of things 
should be, how the agents addressed should behave. Thus, for the system it-
self none of its implied reasons could ever be in a stricter sense negative, ad-
verse or disadvantageous for any of the agents addressed by the system, as the 
system simply demands the reasons that it provides to be accepted as good. 
Accordingly, duties as such cannot be regarded as adverse or disadvantageous 
for their addressees, because they are in fact the practical affirmation of these 
reasons provided and protected by a normative system. Imagine B had a duty 
with regard to X, and A had a respective claim-right. If B complied with this 
duty, from an intra-systemic standpoint B would do the very right thing that 
one ought to do in this situation.78 How can doing the right thing as such be 
78 Clearly, there is a similarity here to a more traditional Kantian understanding of duties 
with Kantian (moral) duties derived by means of the categorical imperative’s being but an em-
anation of the good as such, cf. Kant, Metaphysics, 254–255; id, “Groundwork of the Meta-
physics of Morals,” in Practical Philosophy, ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1999 [1785]), 55, 61, 73–89, esp. 88: “The objective necessity of an action from 
obligation is called duty”.
 1. Hohfeld’s Scheme of Fundamental Legal Entitlements 163
disadvantageous for B then? Quite simply, within the normative system’s own 
logic it cannot.79
Hence, the idea of an individual normative advantage can only be made in-
telligible if we assume a connection between one of these goods/reasons and 
the respective individual, which is not necessarily implied in the existence of 
a duty. Accordingly, to have and to comply with a duty cannot be disadvanta-
geous for an agent in the same way that rights are advantageous for an individ-
ual, because the fact that there are is a reason appendant to A simply does not 
necessitate drawing any conclusions one way or another regarding possible nor-
mative advantages or disadvantages for B. In other words, the fact alone that 
duties mark the correlative position to an advantageous position in the form of 
a (claim-) right does not make the former a disadvantageous one, which proves 
claim (2) as false. What about claim (1), though? Intuitively it appears plausi-
ble that a duty is an inherent malady for any agent due to the implied restraint 
on his or her personal freedom. And indeed there are ways to perceive duties 
as a disadvantage or a malady, two in particular. One is to take a different per-
spective than the intra-systemic one, namely a subjective point of view, of the 
individual agent addressed, or a point of view outside of the system in question, 
i. e. by critically reviewing the content of the duty based on competing evalu-
ative assumptions, based on the content of a distinct normative system. Yet, as 
we learned earlier, one ought to take an intra-systemic standpoint when deter-
mining what is and what is not advantageous in an intersubjective system. At 
any rate, even from a subjective perspective having a duty does not always have 
to be a wrong either. For instance, if you are under a duty not to torture other 
79 Possibly to many readers this characterisation of the intra-systemic role of duties will 
appear strange at first – not unlike an overture for an otherwise authoritative moral philosophy. 
Therefore, I wish to reassure you that it is not. Indeed, I regard as objectionable the fact that 
in political discourse in modern liberal societies we are very much used to thought patterns of 
freedom (manifest in the form of permissions, i. e. as a lack of substantive normative demands) 
as the universal good and duties as mere ‘necessary evils’. My point is certainly not that per-
sonal freedom should not be promoted as a fundamental value. On the contrary, having been 
‘academically socialised’ as a Kantian, often enough I cannot help but emphasize the need to 
foster autonomy and individual responsibility. However, in terms of theoretical meta-structures 
we should not too readily presuppose personal freedom as the default from which we – some-
what unwillingly – need to abstract a few necessary duties, at least not if we thereby also sup-
pose a necessary substantive priority of individual freedom. In other words, all of a normative 
system’s principles are generally to be complied with, as none of them can a priori be better 
than the other. In this sense, duties do not interfere with freedom; as practical reasons they 
make practical freedom possible in the first place, i. e. even the most liberal moral philosopher 
will have to acknowledge that a certain, however small, set of duties does not interfere with 
personal freedom, but in fact that it enables the practical exercise of freedom in a community. 
The idea that the principle of individual freedom may nevertheless have a somewhat pre-em-
inent role to play in the justification of rules is thereby not precluded, as this pre-eminence at 
best indicates a preliminary default function in the sense of a ‘justification hurdle’, explicitly 
without alleging an elevated normative weight in comparison with other principles. For a de-
tailed development of this central argument see below sec. III, 2., e).
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people, you probably would not object to this duty, but regard it as a sensible 
rule, which you accept willingly without further ado. You certainly would not 
perceive compliance with this rule as an inherent malady. Second, and more im-
portantly, we must understand duties as an individual disadvantage in case auto-
nomy/individual freedom is regarded as a principle in the system in question. In 
that case we account for individual advantage by measuring the degree of free-
dom.80 Hence, an increase in the number of permitted actions is equivalent to 
a greater advantage just as a decrease is equivalent to disadvantage then. The 
decisive point is not that the duty itself is disadvantageous, but rather that a dis-
advantage occurs only if we further suppose that individual freedom is a good 
and thus generally an advantage. Accordingly, claim (1) is false insofar as it has 
to rely on this additional presupposition.
Moreover, this is precisely where Hohfeld’s conception of liberties fails. In 
order to clarify this contention, let us return to our third example for Hohfel-
dian liberties from above, the shrimp salad. Can we perceive the fact that A is 
granted a Hohfeldian liberty in the form of a plain permission to eat the salad 
as advantageous for A – either in relation to B or in general? Whilst Hohfeld 
makes the (at least implicit) claim that through B’s issuance of a permission for 
A the overall normative position of A significantly improved,81 the only cor-
rect answer to this question is a plain and simple ‘no’. The issuance of a naked 
permission to eat the salad, even though theoretically possible, does itself not 
entail any kind of advantage for A. In fact, there are only two possibilities that 
it could do so: first, if B’s possibilities to interfere with A’s eating the salad were 
in some way more limited than before through the issuance of the permission or 
the waiving of A’s duty, for instance if B were now under a duty not to reclaim 
the salad with brute force in case A were to get hold of it first. One might say in 
that case B would at least acknowledge A’s liberty to try to eat the salad and this 
action would be protected. The second and only other way to regard A’s newly 
granted permission as an advantageous position would be for it to be recognised 
as a liberty by a third party, so that, for instance, there would be no more neg-
ative consequences attached to the performance of the action for A. In the ex-
ample it could, for instance, be the case that B would still be allowed to ‘de-
80 That does not mean that we only account for advantageousness in terms of freedom. 
But the imposition of a duty would certainly be some disadvantage for the individual agent 
in question – a disadvantage that could be outweighed by other reasons, e. g. the freedom of 
others or communal considerations, and possibly even by other individual advantages for the 
same agent, see therefore the remarks on the problem of (legal) paternalism in secs. III, 2., b), 
d), and e) below.
81 Thomson, Realm of Rights, 52. There she describes the effects of a ‘privilege’, i. e. a 
Hohfeldian liberty, as follows: “if C does not interfere with D’s eating of the salad […] so that 
D is able to, and does, eat the salad, then C cannot complain that D wronged him. […] That is 
certainly not nothing.” Consequently, she claims: “We make too little of the moral significance 
of a privilege if, in the light of the weakness of privileges, we say that a privilege is not a right”.
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fend’ his salad by any means but that A would no longer have to pay remedies 
to B for eating B’s salad if she were actually to have succeeded doing so. The 
respective liberty of A would thus once more exist towards institutions that are 
empowered to enforce legal rules rather than immediately towards B. In a way, 
B’s issuance of a permission would thus lead to a state of both A’s and B’s being 
‘outlawed’ in an unregulated fight for that salad. In any reasonable legal system 
one or both of the two possible consequences would follow the issuance of a 
permission. Yet, importantly, neither possible effect – additional duties of non-
interference for B or discontinuation of possible remedial damages – is a direct 
or necessary consequence of the fact that A is granted a plain permission.82 In 
this respect Hohfeld was entirely right: his liberties are in theory independent of 
other people’s duties. More precisely, there is no way to infer any immediate, 
necessary conclusion regarding possible reciprocal duties from the fact that a 
person A has a naked permission to do something – not without further infor-
mation about the normative system in question and the reasons provided by it. 
The case in which neither of the two possible consequences mentioned above 
obtains would be evidence of a somewhat insensible, though not impossible 
normative system. In fact, the waiving of A’s duty would be nothing but a purely 
declaratory act then – to the extent that A is ‘free’ to perform the action of eating 
the salad – but without any kind of normative protection. In effect there would 
be no change to the rules applicable to the case because A would in no way be 
better protected through the issuance of the permission. B’s granting such a per-
mission would be comparable to the authoritative issuance of a rule, which tells 
A that she is no longer forbidden from but now permitted to kill B, whilst at the 
same time upholding B’s right to self-defence as well as all the regular sanctions 
for A in case she committed the crime. Effectively, the permission would not 
change anything relevant about A’s overall normative position.
Ultimately, this is what one ought to criticise about Hohfeld’s concept of lib-
erties: Even though his idea of liberties as plain permissions is neither inconsis-
tent nor generally inviable for describing a certain normative phenomenon, it 
is ultimately useless for the purpose of determining possible ‘rights’ because it 
does not give a clear account of how a plain permission is supposed to be any 
kind of normative improvement. In other words, Hohfeld’s undeniable analyt-
ical acumen in working out independent features of liberties and claim-rights 
was ultimately at the expense of the general normative significance of his con-
cept of liberties. As plain naked permissions they necessarily remain in a nor-
mative no-man’s-land. As a theoretical construct taken by itself and without any 
link to the value of autonomy and/or the normative demands on B, the concept 
is not able even slightly to set itself apart from the anomy and meaninglessness 
82 Also critical towards Hohfeld in this respect: Matthias Mahlmann, Rechtsphilosophie 
und Rechtstheorie (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2015), 282.
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of the Hobbesian original position, in which formally every conceivable behav-
iour is the object of a permission, which only means though that there are no 
rules at all – and therewith strictly speaking no normative system.83
(e) No-Rights: A Sudden Change in Perspective
This ‘insubstantiality’ of liberties can also be demonstrated by taking a closer 
look at their correlative ‘no-rights’: Earlier we conceded for claim-rights that 
they are not simply the natural reflex of every duty simpliciter, but that the prac-
tical reason behind a Hohfeldian duty needs to be specifically linked with the 
entity A in order for A to have a claim-right and B’s duty being a correlative 
to this position. Keeping this definitional link between A’s and B’s position in 
mind, we now find that Hohfeld’s liberties as naked permissions have practi-
cally no meaning at all for the other person B regarding the possible normative 
demands addressed to him. In fact, Hohfeld tries to somehow establish a con-
nection between A’s naked permission and B’s position – or rather to veil the 
missing connection – by shifting perspectives in a quite surprising way. Usually 
we analyse the actions in the bipolar relation A – B with regard to the question 
of to what extent A as the potential right-holder has an advantage from certain 
aspects of the rules applicable to the case. Yet, with ‘no-rights’ we suddenly do 
not any longer ask ourselves what B’s supposedly correlative position means 
for A as our centre of interest, i. e. with regard to the issue of A potentially being 
a right-holder, but instead abruptly we ask ourselves what B’s position means 
for B concerning the question of whether B possibly has a claim-right himself 
or not – with the plain result that he certainly does not have one.84 Evidently, 
this logical deduction is entirely correct (see above); nevertheless, one has to 
critically question Hohfeld’s reasons for this change in perspective from A as 
the potential right-holder to B. In my view it must have been to (unknowingly) 
conceal the result reached when properly thinking through his reduced concept 
of liberties, which is namely that their existence does not have any practical im-
plications for B apart from the fact that B does not have a claim-right with re-
gard to A doing X. However, this fact tells B nothing at all about how he should 
behave.85 Or as Gorman correctly analysed: “[…] the sentence ‘X has the priv-
83 Hobbes, Leviathan, 86–92. Cf. also: Sumner, MF, 23; Alon Harel, “Theories of Rights,” 
in The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, ed. Martin Golding and Wil-
liam Edmundson (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005), 192; Rex Martin, A System of Rights (Ox-
ford: Clarendon, 1993), 32–33.
84 Cf. Gorman, Rights and Reason, 94 ff.
85 That also implies that practically everyone and everything could be the holder of a no-
right. If A has the permission to do X, then strictly speaking a tree 10 kilometres down the 
road has a no-right, because it suffices to ground a no-right in the fact that A has no duties to-
wards this tree. Thus, the concept of no-rights – analogous to that of liberties in the Hohfeldian 
sense – becomes indistinct and ultimately inviable for practical normative reasoning.
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ilege of entering on the land’ makes no reference to Y at all, and can therefore 
formally imply no sentence in which Y plays any significant part”86.
(f) Conclusion
To conclude: Liberties in the Hohfeldian sense as plain permissions can be pro-
tected by claim-rights, but it is only these claim-rights which are then advanta-
geous for A. As such a plain permission can never be advantageous for A. If one 
wants to understand A’s permission as an entitlement discriminable from plain 
claim-rights, i. e. as a right to do something actively, it is only possible by refer-
encing the underlying reason – individual autonomy. This reason becomes man-
ifest by A’s deciding to perform the permitted action. To be clear: Liberties in 
this sense certainly are a much narrower concept than Hohfeld’s liberties. That 
is, a great deal of normative protection for an agent A will have to be regarded 
as ‘only’ claim-rights. Additionally, none of the foregoing remarks imply the 
claim that Hohfeld misinterpreted the overall normative situation in the clas-
sical examples for liberties. Moreover, his liberties do indeed serve a valuable 
role in properly describing and rendering certain normative phenomena, as e. g. 
the state of ‘allowed competition’. Only a Hohfeldian liberty certainly does not 
fulfil the basic conditions for being a right. Thus, for our purposes we should 
disregard naked permissions and think of liberties as active rights.
(3) Powers
Hohfeld’s idea of powers as abilities to create normative effects raises sever-
al troubling questions as well. Especially, exactly how are we to describe the 
specifically normative nature of powers (and of second-order positions more 
generally) if not by reference to our fundamental deontic modalities? And in 
what way exactly is the mere fact that a normative effect occurs supposed to be 
advantageous for the acting agent, if at the same time the action in question is 
obligatory or even forbidden? Additionally, while one may have the somewhat 
factual ability to break rules and thus conjure certain normative consequences, 
would it not be more fitting to think of powers as genuinely normative abilities, 
i. e. normatively mediated abilities or such abilities one is empowered with? 
And if so, could we possibly think of an obligation or a prohibition that could 
provide for such a normative ability?
We remember: Hohfeld based his concept of powers on the normative ef-
fects actions can have irrespective of the normative demand associated with this 
action. Thus, the concept falls short of our scope of rights in two aspects and 
needs to be readjusted accordingly. First, I will argue that we can reasonably 
86 Gorman, Rights and Reason, 94. Gorman uses the tokens X and Y, where we use A and 
B instead.
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speak of a ‘power’ only in such cases where A has a permission to precipitate 
the intended changes in one’s own or others’ positions. Only then we can under-
stand a power as a genuinely normative ability, i. e. as a normative definatory 
power.87 And only thus can we as a second step valorise A’s normative ability 
in order for it to become a proper entitlement, namely by regarding the respec-
tive permission and therewith A’s autonomy in this respect as per se valuable. In 
other words, if we want to discriminate powers from mere liberties and to do so 
while asserting the advantageous stance of such powers, we need to understand 
a power as a special kind of liberty, namely one in a superordinate system, by 
whose exertion a reason in a subordinate system is controlled.
(a) Powers as Protected Permissions
To start off, let us quickly recapitulate our concept of powers as introduced 
earlier. There it was said that a power was the ability to somehow exert in-
fluence on, that is, to change other Hohfeldian positions. We shall now return 
to the standard examples for powers from above – the chain of command and 
the bona fide purchase – and therewith to the questions: Which normative de-
mands can possibly be accorded to the exercise of a power? Precisely, can a 
power only be exercised if the action in question is permitted (P) or possibly 
also if it is obligatory (O) or forbidden (F), as proclaimed by Hohfeld and others 
alike? Presumably, the positions described as ‘powers’ in the two examples do 
not accord with the advantageousness-axiom, i. e. it is impossible to detect any 
kind of intended advantage for the acting agents in question. There is no rea-
son whatsoever to assume that the mere ability to bring about certain normative 
effects is advantageous for the person pertaining this ability – not unless either 
the effects brought about are themselves in some way advantageous for A or the 
action is permitted and this fact is as such regarded as advantageous, which, as 
we just saw, would make the power a (special kind of) liberty. In the examples 
the effects yielded by A’s actions are the emergence of a duty for the subordi-
87 Cf. Carlos Alchourrón and Eugenio Bulygin, Normative Systems (Wien/New York: 
Springer, 1971), 151. Cf. also Torben Spaak, “Explicating the Concept of Legal Competence,” 
in Concepts in Law, ed. Jaap Hage, Dietmar von der Pfordten (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1014402, 1 (page references refer to the online version): “The con-
cept of legal competence […] is a normative concept, in the sense that a person has compe-
tence by virtue of a norm, and that the exercise of competence changes a person’s normative 
position”. Spaak rather fervently criticises the idea of a competence being (or at least presup-
posing) a permission, calling the idea “simply a mistake” and “difficult even to understand” 
(Spaak, “Legal Competence,” 7). Yet, his reference to bona fide purchases, which is the only 
argument he presents in favour of his own position, is at best ungainly, as we shall see presently 
in sec. (3), (a). Cf. also sec. III, fn. 91. Moreover, Spaak himself describes a competence as the 
“possibility of changing legal positions”, whereby possibility is explicitly meant in a norma-
tive sense, see Spaak, “Legal Competence,” 4. What else is a normative possibility, though, 
than the structural equivalent of a normative exemption – that is, a permission?
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nate soldier and the fact that the bona fide buyer gains property. Neither effect 
is advantageous for A from an intra-systemic standpoint. Thus, only the latter 
possibility for the advantageousness of powers pertains. Consequently, I hold 
that a power, correctly understood, is exercised by performing a permitted ac-
tion which entails a change to a certain predefined normative position in a sub-
ordinate normative system. Additionally, in order for this permitted action to be 
an entitlement it needs to enjoy normative protection, i. e. it needs to be a valued 
permission, i. e. a liberty. Accordingly, all powers are liberties, even though not 
all liberties are powers.
In detail: In the first example A’s action triggers B’s duty. Thus, in a way 
A indeed has “volitional control”88 over B’s having or not having the duty. On 
the other hand, this control is not provided by the normative system judging 
the action ‘ordering B to do something’. On the contrary, the system in ques-
tion denies A any kind of normative control or definatory power over B’s duty; 
otherwise it would not have put A herself under an obligation to give the order. 
In other words, from an authoritative, that is, an intra-systemic standpoint A is 
all but free to create or not to create B’s duty. The system thus does not grant 
the possibility to decide, i. e. a personally bound normative ability to define or 
erase certain duties, but it merely attaches some kind of normative effects to 
the compliance with or the violation of a duty imposed on A. If this bringing 
about of normative effects would be enough for something to be called a power, 
then strictly speaking A would also exercise a power by killing B, for example. 
Clearly, the action would be a violation of her duty not to kill B. Yet, by doing 
so A would exercise her ability to create a duty, in this case the duty of bystand-
ers to assist B, of the police to arrest her, of the state attorney to file a case, etc. 
Hence, a definition of powers that clings to the mere normative effects which 
an action does or does not have would dilute the concept of powers, let alone 
the idea of entitlements more generally.89 Much the same applies also to our 
second example from above, the bona fide purchase. By performing the forbid-
den action of selling Q to B, A does create a new, advantageous normative posi-
tion for B.90 This ability to cause certain normative consequences is not strictly 
speaking provided by the normative system in question, though. It is merely 
accepted as a consequence of the factual action ‘selling Q to B’, which itself 
represents the violation of a duty and is thus in conflict with the system in ques-
tion.91 The fact that B ultimately gains the property of Q would and could only 
88 Hohfeld, “Some fundamental conceptions,” 44.
89 Cf. Raz, Practical Reason, 104–106. Here Raz generally distinguishes ‘power-confer-
ring norms’ from those norms which are controlled by the power itself. Essentially, this de-
scribes the relation of the rules in a superordinate system (superordinate in terms of justifica-
tion) and those in a subordinate one.
90 Or rather a multitude of such advantageous positions, which together constitute the 
more complex idea of property/ownership.
91 In this respect, Spaak clearly errs by describing the argument behind the proposed link 
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be advantageous for A if the reason or normative effect for this specific con-
sequence of A’s action would have something to do with A, that is, were intend-
ed to create a normative advantage for A. However, this is clearly not the case. 
The reasons for allowing the change in property are B’s good faith and possibly, 
more generally, the smoothness of commercial transactions. At any rate, the rule 
in question is not intended to be an advantage for A in any way at all. Thus, from 
the intra-systemic standpoint A once again does not exercise a genuinely nor-
mative ability to change a legal relation, but his somewhat factual, i. e. only in 
effect normative, ability to do so simultaneously means the violation of a duty 
and thus something inherently negative. Hence, as a preliminary result we can 
state that powers should not be understood as actions which solely entail certain 
effects on lower-order normative positions, but due to the necessity of being 
advantageous for their holders, these actions cannot be obligatory or forbidden. 
They need to be permitted, as only permissions convey genuine normative con-
trol for their holders and only permissions can be valorised to become active 
entitlements (see above).
Let us consider a possible objection to this concept of powers, which simul-
taneously serves as an argument (or at least an illustration) for the foregoing 
assumptions regarding the correct perspective for determining advantageous-
ness. We supposed that we need to take an authoritative or intra-systemic point 
of view in order to determine whether something is advantageous for an entity. 
Advantageousness is thus exclusively understood in the sense of ‘intended ad-
vantage’.92 Applied to our two examples, the objection might read as follows: 
Even though the normative system in question demands or forbids A from per-
forming the actions in question, i. e. even though the system itself does not sign 
over any intended advantage to A, A herself might regard her ability to change 
the normative relations in question as advantageous. Moreover, she might have 
a (subjective) interest in breaking a rule in order to cause a certain normative 
consequence. For instance, in the first example she might actually want to give 
the order to B and feel empowered to do so. In the second example it might 
be A’s foremost intention to damage the former owner D by giving away the 
item Q and thus causing a change in property. Let us concentrate on this sec-
ond example: Is it advantageous for A that she gets her will (possibly because 
she just despises D and wants to annoy him intentionally) by depriving D of 
his property due to A’s transaction with B? From A’s solitary point of view one 
might assume so. Evidently, A’s violation of her duty will have negative con-
sequences for her – like having to pay remedial damages to D – but she might 
between competence and permission as follows: “One might perhaps argue that in such a case 
the legal system somehow permits the agent to bring about a change of legal positions while 
also prohibiting from exercising his competence” (Spaak, “Legal Competence,” 7). In fact, 
there is nothing permissive about A’s ability.
92 Hart, LR, 184–185, 188; Sumner, MF, 41. Cf. also Raz, “Nature of Rights,” 195 ff.
 1. Hohfeld’s Scheme of Fundamental Legal Entitlements 171
believe them to be outweighed by the contentment she feels knowing how much 
she annoyed D. However, A’s exclusive subjective perspective cannot be the 
deciding factor in determining what qualifies as an intersubjective entitlement, 
as entitlements ultimately exist in bipolar relations. In order for entitlements to 
actually apply to both parties A and B, such intersubjective relations can only 
be governed by intersubjective rules from intersubjective systems. And given 
an intra-systemic perspective on the case, A does not have an advantage from 
the rule allowing B to gain the property of Q because the reason for allowing 
the legal effect of D’s losing his property is not giving possibly ill-tempered 
borrowers their fair share of justice but rather respect for the good faith of buy-
ers (see above). If we linked the question of advantageousness with subjective 
preferences, this would yield bizarre results in practice. For example, think of 
a legal system that still applies drastic sanctions like whipping. Suppose A, 
a member of the community in question, is a sadomasochist who personally 
gets pleasure from feelings of pain. Suppose further that A would purposefully 
commit a crime in order to get whipped afterwards. Thus, a proponent of the 
narrow concept of powers such as Hohfeld’s would have to claim that by com-
mitting the crime A exercised a power, because only due to his own action he 
creates the executioner’s obligation to whip him. Presumably, no one in his or 
her right mind would claim that A has a right or an entitlement to commit the 
crime, though. This is so because from the perspective of the law, there is in-
deed nothing at all advantageous about the action for A apart from the fact that 
his deviant sense of pleasure personally leads him to welcome the sanction in 
question instead of fearing it, though which the law does not and cannot take 
into account. Furthermore, the point that intended advantage in an intersubjec-
tive sense is often unequal, if not even adverse to subjectively perceived advan-
tage, can be illustrated by another, somewhat converse example: liberties and 
the ‘burden of choice’. Often enough, to be permitted to freely decide what to 
do and what not to do is regarded as advantageous as we usually reject all forms 
of external, patronising restrictions on ourselves. Yet, from common normative 
practice we know that this is not necessarily always the case. Often the neces-
sity (rather than the freedom) to make one’s own decisions, which is accompa-
nied by having permissions or liberties, is perceived by the individual herself 
as a ‘burden’ rather than an advantage.93 However, the exercise of autonomy by 
93 For empirical evidence (possibly with interesting implications also for political philoso-
phy) of this phenomenon, which we are all familiar with from our daily lives see: Claude Mess-
ner and Michaela Wänke, “Unconscious information processing reduces information overload 
and increases product satisfaction,” Journal of Consumer Psychology 21 (January 2011). Very 
roughly, in the experiment different test groups had to choose between different chocolates, 
some of them had 6, others 24 to choose from. One of the results was that those consciously 
choosing from 24 rather than 6 – those with a surplus of freedom of decision – were signifi-
cantly unhappier with their decision than those with a more limited set of options to choose 
from.
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way of a liberty is necessarily regarded as advantageous for the individual from 
the perspective of the intersubjective system in question.
(b) Powers in the Vertical Extension of Normative Systems
Presumably, the concept of powers – in order to distinguish it from liberties – 
and therewith the Hohfeldian differentiation of first- and second-order can be 
adequately explained with reference to the idea of a vertical extension of nor-
mative systems.94 As indicated, the decisive and meaningful difference between 
powers and liberties (thus holding up the discriminability-thesis) is the fact that 
with plain liberties a definatory power is exercised without reference to sub-
ordinate systems that also address content at other agents, whilst with powers 
exactly this is the case. Hence, the difference between the two is best explained 
by reference to the idea of a super- and subordination of normative systems in 
terms of justification.95 Precisely, if we were to define powers as the mere nor-
mative ability to generally bring about changes in legal relations – and without 
reference to super- and subordination of rules – an otherwise important differ-
ence between liberties and powers would be blurred and possibly overlook-
ed, namely the difference between changes in legal relations that are simply 
brought about by performing a permitted action or a liberty, but which were 
already laid out in the normative routine of the system, i. e. changes whose oc-
currence amounts to a mere reflexive response to other occurrences, and the ex-
ercise of a genuine normative definatory power on the other hand. Put simply, 
the difference is that between either being able to perform different kinds of 
moves in a game of chess, thereby changing the other player’s and one’s own 
possibilities for further draws – as opposed to the ability to change the very 
rules of the game.
In detail: Suppose the only features of powers were ‘bringing about a change 
in legal relations by means of a permitted action’. Then in order to be able to 
hold the discriminability-thesis we would have to work out an additional crite-
rion or additional criteria to help us distinguish powers from mere liberties. 
This point shall be elucidated by the following example: A crosses the street at 
a pedestrian crossing. Supposedly, A has a liberty to do so, not a power. B, ap-
proaching the crossing in his car, has a duty to stop his car in order to let A pass. 
Had A not crossed the street B would himself have been at liberty to just go 
straight ahead. Thus, by crossing the street (or by making the respective practi-
cal decision) A in a way originally created B’s duty to stop his car. Additionally, 
and in contrast to the actions in the examples in the foregoing section, A’s ac-
tion was the object of a liberty, which eliminates a lack of advantageousness as 
an argument for not referring to the action in question as the performance of a 
94 See above sec. II, 5., b).
95 See above sec. II, 5., b), aa).
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‘power’. But does our inability to use the advantageousness criterion mean that 
we should, in turn, consider this action as the exercise of a power? According to 
Hohfeld’s concept of powers one might indeed come to this conclusion. Yet, the 
competence exercised in this example and the competence exercised in the prior 
example of A’s giving consent for B to perform surgery on A or in a slightly 
modified version of the pedestrian-example in which A allows B to actually run 
her over with his car (provided the normative system in question would permit 
A to do so) are of an entirely different sort. It is this difference that marks the 
dividing line between liberties and powers. The difference is that with liberties 
one’s definatory power is exercised only with regard to reasons that are not di-
rectly relevant for other agents. In fact, the reasons for the emergent duties in 
such cases are not controlled, but merely triggered. That is, in the example with 
the pedestrian the general duty not to hurt or kill other people (by running them 
over with your car) was pre-existent in a way and the actual duty of B only be-
came manifest by A’s stepping on the street. Yet, by doing so A did not actually 
control the reason behind B’s duty, but only the reasons for or against crossing 
the street, which are as such completely irrelevant for B.
Another example in order to illustrate this thought: Suppose A has a legal lib-
erty to drink a fine scotch whisky. By deciding to do so or not to do so, A judges 
certain reasons pro or contra drinking whisky – for instance, the sheer pleasure 
of doing so as opposed to (minor) health-related worries. In any case, the rea-
sons ‘controlled’ are not part of another subordinate normative system, which 
prescribes duties to other persons. In other words, even if we understood the law 
as a vast multitude of normative systems in super- and subordination, the law 
is entirely indifferent with regard to the pro- and contra-reasons in this matter. 
That means there is a bottom to a legal system, i. e. certain default systems. My 
decision to drink whisky is a personal one and it does not affect other legal rela-
tions, for example, the whisky-merchant’s liberty to sell the drink. Similarly, in 
our example with the pedestrian crossing, A is in a normative position to define 
her own reasons for crossing or not crossing the street. Indeed, by crossing the 
street she causes or activates B’s duty to stop his car, but she does not control the 
reason behind B’s duty, which is A’s life and bodily integrity. Much the contrary 
applies to the example of A giving consent to surgery. Again, primarily A needs 
to find reasons for herself pro or contra surgery, i. e. for or against granting a 
respective permission. Yet, by doing so she also exercises a genuine power over 
a practical reason, which this time is directly relevant for B, namely A’s bodily 
integrity which is a primary (legal) reason for B to be under a respective duty. 
Thus, a central difference between liberties and powers is that liberties can and 
do exist in default systems, whilst powers by definition cannot. That is, if A had 
liberty to eat sausage rolls for lunch, she could herself define reasons pro or 
contra doing so (as well as pro or contra eating meat in general). The point here 
is that she would not have a power, as her decision to eat or not to eat sausage 
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rolls would not entail any normative demands on other people.96 Naturally, the 
role of powers is thereby not limited to control over default content, i. e. over 
pure liberties, duties and claim-rights, but the usually complex, multiply lay-
ered legal law of a community surely allows for powers to exist with regard to 
other subordinate powers, which can in turn refer to other subordinate powers, 
and so forth.97
Furthermore, just like with plain liberties, we can distinguish between com-
plete and incomplete powers. For instance, A’s power to control the reason 
‘bodily integrity’ is a complete power as it is valid towards any other agents 
addressed by the system. Strictly no one is allowed to assault or to otherwise 
hurt A, unless she explicitly gives her consent to doing so. Yet, A’s power to 
waive or demand compensation for an injury suffered is limited to the person B 
who inflicted the injury, surely not to anyone. Thus, A has a power towards B in 
this example, which in the overall picture is ‘only’ an incomplete power.
(c) Liabilities and the Structural Divergence of No-Rights
If we do understand powers as specific kinds of liberties, then accordingly lia-
bilities must be specific respect duties. As much seems even more appropriate 
for powers than for liberties: Anyone who has to comply with a certain reason 
surely also has to comply with the control exercised over this reason. Thus, if 
A has a power to allow S to perform surgery on her, then S has a correlative 
liability, because he has a duty to ultimately respect A’s decision in either way. 
Interestingly, there appears to be a structural divergence then between no-rights 
and liabilities as their alleged second-order analogue. As much will prove to be 
another central solecism in Hohfeld’s concept of liberties. At the same time, it is 
additional evidence for the alleged ‘insubstantiality’ of his concept of no-rights.
We remember: According to the parallelism-thesis the structural relations of 
first-order liberties and no-rights and second-order powers and liabilities ought 
to be analogous.98 Yet, a closer look reveals that the respective structures of no-
rights and liabilities seem to be all but that. B’s no-right, as described earlier, 
was introduced as the mere lack of a duty towards B on the side of A, which, 
as we worked out in detail, does not entail that B himself is under a duty to do 
anything himself. He could just as well have a permission to perform an inter-
fering action. B’s liability on the other hand appears not only to positively ac-
knowledge the existence of a permission on the side of A but also to implicitly 
acknowledge some kind of duty for B to respect or to obey the exercise of A’s 
96 Analogously, duties and claim-rights can also exist in default systems, whilst immuni-
ties cannot. The lack of definatory power on the default level, which is generally accompanied 
by duties, concerns a lower level of normative content which is no longer relevant for other 
agents.
97 Sumner, MF, 31.
98 See above sec. II, 1., a), bb), (4).
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respective power. That is, the concept of liability implies the idea of a binding-
ness of A’s power towards B, which the concept of no-rights explicitly denies 
for its correlative liberties. In light of the parallelism-thesis this discrepancy in 
Hohfeld’s original design must appear more than odd. If A’s Hohfeldian liberty 
is by definition not binding at all in relation to B, then where does the binding-
ness of A’s power towards B come from? In my view, Hohfeld implicitly ac-
knowledged some form of ‘respect duty’ with his concept of powers, which he 
did not dare couple with his liberties, yet which he should have done if he truly 
wanted to qualify them as possible rights and increase their practical relevance. 
Even for Hohfeld powers are powers only because someone is liable to A’s deci-
sion. Analogously, liberties ought to be liberties just because someone is under 
a duty to respect A’s decision.
(4) Immunities
Given these insights about powers and liabilities we are now able to infer a re-
vised concept of immunities (and their correlative disabilities) as well. If having 
a power means holding a genuine normative control over certain reasons in a 
subordinate normative system, then B’s disability as a power’s ‘opposite’ has to 
be the lack of such a position of control. If B lacks a permission, then in turn B 
must be under a superordinate duty with regard to the reason in question – a 
duty not to alter this reason, i. e. to positively accept it. The correlative position 
to such a lack of power with B thus is an immunity for A.
However, this ‘immunity’ as the correlative position to a disability can take 
two rather different forms. Generally, it describes the fact that the reason for 
B’s disability is somehow appendant to A. That can either be the case if A is 
the holder of an (already advantageous) first-order entitlement, i. e. a liberty or 
a plain claim-right, or if A is the holder of a power over the exact reason with 
regard to which B has a disability. In the first case the immunity functions as 
a kind of ‘fortified first-order position’ as it secures the fact that an already ad-
vantageous position may not be changed by B. In the second case A’s power to-
wards B can in fact only exist if B has a respective disability. That is, a power 
implies an immunity as the absence of control over a certain reason with B is 
necessary in order for B to be liable to A’s own control. Thus, the holder of an 
immunity does not always have to hold an advantageous first-order position as 
well. This point can be illustrated with the aid of the following example: Sup-
pose E, a single parent, has to decide whether a risky surgery is supposed to be 
performed by surgeon S on his newborn son N. Preliminarily, S has a duty not 
to harm N and N has a respective claim-right towards S. Due to a lack of con-
trol over the reason behind this duty with S, S also has a disability and N has a 
correlative immunity towards him, as the lack of control strengthens N’s claim-
right not to be harmed. Furthermore, E has a power towards S with respect to 
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S’ duty not to harm N and S has a correlative liability towards E. If this is so, 
then with this liability S also has a disability towards E and E has an immunity 
towards S as S’ lack of control over N’s bodily integrity not only protects N’s 
bodily integrity, but simultaneously renders E’s power towards S possible in the 
first place. In general, if A has a power towards B, B necessarily lacks an own 
power regarding the same normative matter in question. On the other hand, the 
fact that B lacks a power, i. e. that B has a disability and A has an immunity, does 
not necessarily imply that A actually possesses a power in return. In fact, it is 
not overly hard to think of constellations in which no party in a bipolar relation 
possesses a power, a bipolar relation in which there exists a reason immune to 
any exercise of individual competence.99
(5) ‘Rights in the Strictest Sense’
In order to bring a little order to the insights won so far, the various relations 
between the different first-order and second-order relations shall be summarised 
and illustrated. To begin with, given an understanding of powers and immuni-
ties as outlined above, the basic structure of first-order and second-order rela-
tions would indeed be analogous. Whilst Hohfeldian duties and disabilities es-
sentially represent obligations or prohibitions, liberties and powers as active 
entitlements represent permissions. Thus, we can not only validate the discrim-
inability-thesis, but also the parallelism-thesis (see above).
Disabilities are specific duties just as powers are specific liberties. Liabilities 
imply disabilities, whilst liberties imply claim-rights (with correlative respect 
duties) just as powers imply immunities (with correlative liabilities). Hence, 
initially we seem to find regular unilateral relations of implication between en-
titlements in the same order:
99 Accordingly, based on the foregoing remarks one might even reach the conclusion 
that in order for something to qualify as a full-fledged right it must always be protected by an 
immunity, cf. Matthew Kramer, “Some Doubts about Alternatives to the Interest Theory of 
Rights,” Ethics 123 (January 2013): 247. Here Kramer describes a claim-right unaccompa-
nied by an immunity as a ‘hollow right’. In turn this would necessitate the fact that a position 
is accompanied by a superordinate immunity as a precondition for a position to be a securely 
advantageous position. Indeed, in order for rights to truly function as a defence against state 
power, as individuals’ claims for freedom against public authority, they ought to be protected 
by superordinate immunities towards the authoritative state. Thus, it appears as if also every 
power would have to be ultimately backed by an immunity in order to be securely advanta-
geous for its holder. Yet, we should not infer from this that every regress of justification ul-
timately ends with an immunity. As much would misinterpret the idea of ‘capping’ the infi-
nite regress of justification, as the dialectical relation between competence and content does 
not allow such an inference (see above). In other words, the regress of justification needs to 
end with either an ultimate reason (immunity) or an ultimate decision (power). Importantly, 
through capping the regress of justification, a power itself can serve as an ultimate justification 
without any further reference to another superordinate reason/immunity.
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Liberty → Claim-Right Respect Duty → Duty
Power → Immunity  Liability → Disability
It is noteworthy that due to the peculiar nature of active entitlements, the logical 
relations between B’s positions and A’s positions differ in a significant manner. 
Whilst B always holds a specific kind of duty, A’s passive positions are claim-
rights (plain claim-rights or immunities) whilst A’s active positions are always 
liberties (plain liberties or powers), which – as we learned earlier – should not 
be regarded only as specific claim-rights. They merely presuppose the existence 
of a claim-right as part of the overall active entitlement. Thus, as little as lib-
erties are claim-rights, powers are immunities. Nevertheless, the existence of 
a liberty in favour of A implies the existence of a claim-right held by A just as 
the existence of a power implies the existence of an immunity. Thus – bearing 
in mind this structural difference – we do not necessarily have to revise our no-
tation. Additionally, we can identify unilateral relations of implication between 
the parallel positions on first-order and second-order:
Immunity → Claim-right100 Disability → Duty
Power → Liberty  Liability → Respect Duty
If we combine these insights, we end up with the following three-folded impli-
catory relations:
Power → Liberty → Claim-right Liability → Respect Duty → Duty
Power → Immunity → Claim-right Liability → Disability → Duty
Thus, the result of our critical appraisal of Hohfeld’s scheme is that basically 
every entitlement or every potential right in some way presupposes a claim-
right held by A. In other words, the existence of a claim-right, i. e. a practical 
reason appendant to an entity A as a basis for someone else’s duty, is the mini-
mal content for anything to be called a right. Therewith claim-rights do indeed 
appear to be “rights in the strictest sense”.101 In fact, as much is merely a log-
ical consequence of the advantageousness-axiom in combination with the cor-
relativity-axiom. For any position to be advantageous in relation to others, these 
other persons need to be held under respective reasons/duties. To extrapolate the 
importance of interpersonal, bipolar relations in order to identify rights can be 
seen as the major achievement of Hohfeld, even though the way he applied the 
correlativity axiom is not beyond reproach as we saw earlier. However, he made 
100 Once more: Any immunity of A is also a claim-right of A. Especially, this goes for both 
forms of immunities. Either the reason behind B’s disability is to make A’s power possible and 
therewith appendant to A, or the reason is to secure one of A’s claim-rights or liberties and 
therewith also appendant to A.
101 Glanville Williams, “The Concept of Legal Liberty,” Columbia Law Review 56 (De-
cember 1956): 1145: “every right in the strict sense relates to conduct of another”. Cf. also 
Kramer, RWT, 14; Sumner, MF, 25.
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an admiringly clear point that the very existence of something like an individ-
ual’s right depends on the fact that there is a social or an intersubjective nor-
mative context in which this right can actually exist. That way Hohfeld paved 
the way for an understanding of rights as relational properties in intersubjective 
normative contexts.
Importantly, the fact that claim-rights might indeed be ‘rights in the strict-
est sense’ does not make them rights in the only possible sense. Therefore, 
Kramer’s claim to treat the concepts of right and Hohfeldian claim-right as 
“interchangeable designations”102, which appears to be in accordance with the 
respective passages from Hohfeld’s original text, is most objectionable. For in-
stance, it would be perfectly reasonable to regard the existence of a claim-right 
as merely the necessary condition for something to be an actual right, but count 
only such positions as actual rights that include an active, second-order entitle-
ment, i. e. a power.103
Besides, despite what some might think, the result that basically all rights 
imply the existence of a Hohfeldian claim-right does not oversimplify norma-
tive reasoning, because it does not entail the conclusion that we could reduce the 
language of rights to that of duties, of obligation and prohibition. On the con-
trary, as we saw earlier the idea of liberties and powers as active entitlements 
(or possibly active rights) cannot be explained simply by a language of duties. 
The idea of a genuinely normative competence surpasses an otherwise too sim-
ple logic of duties. This is a decisive difference between the account presented 
here as compared with, for example, that of Andrew Halpin. Halpin claims that 
all Hohfeldian positions could theoretically be reduced to only claim-rights and 
duties.104 As much is plain false. Even though evidently the stronger exclusiv-
ity-thesis does not hold, because it has to give way to the advantageousness-
axiom in combination with the correlativity-axiom, the discriminability-thesis 
is vital for a correct understanding of entitlements. All four entitlements have 
clear and distinct features, i. e. in every case we can unambiguously determine 
whether A merely has a plain claim-right, a liberty, an immunity or possibly a 
102 Kramer, “Some Doubts,” 247.
103 More than simply being an advantageous position for A (liberty/claim-right) and more 
than being the fact that this advantageous default cannot be altered by B (immunity), powers 
confer to A the ability to define for herself what is supposed to be advantageous for her. In other 
words, having a power means to be able to decide between not changing a position advanta-
geous by default or changing this default and thus setting one’s own standard with regard to 
the question of what is advantageous for oneself. In this respect, the ability accompanied by 
powers is fundamentally different from all other Hohfeldian entitlements, which might already 
count in favour of a choice conception of rights, see presently sec. III, 2.
104 Andrew Halpin, “Hohfelds’ Conceptions: From Eight to Two,” The Cambridge Law 
Journal 44 (November 1985): 456. Cf. also id, “Fundamental Legal Conceptions Reconsid-
ered,” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 16 (January 2003): 42. Here Halpin makes 
a questionable attempt to argue for the ‘non-fundamentality’ of certain Hohfeldian positions by 
referring to an entirely defective account of deontic operators.
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power. The fact that all of the latter three imply the existence of a claim-right in 
one way or another does not mean that for A to have an immunity, for example, 
is the same as having a plain claim-right. Thus, following Halpin’s position on 
this point would indeed oversimplify matters. Following ours does not.
c) Conclusion
Towards the end of this section on Hohfeld’s scheme of fundamental legal posi-
tions, it is arguably appropriate to review our investigation thus far, identifying 
what we have actually demonstrated in this section and how this will help us 
proceed in the following. Earlier we identified the scope of rights as contain-
ing the elements ‘normative’, ‘advantageous’, and ‘appendant’. As the ground-
work for defining an actual concept of rights, we aimed to identify all manifes-
tations of these presuppositions, i. e. all such elements of a normative system or 
between different normative systems that meet the requirements of the scope. 
In this respect, Hohfeld’s scheme of basic entitlements appeared to be a most 
useful tool to start off with, as his aim presumably was similar to ours. The de-
cisive additional presupposition which Hohfeld added to his analysis, which 
we adopted in parts and which can easily be regarded as the great success of 
and development due to his work, is its limitation to bipolar relations, man-
ifest in his correlativity-axiom. On the other hand, adducing the advantageous-
ness-axiom as another necessary presupposition in order to determine different 
kinds of rights, we had to substantially revise Hohfeld’s scheme. As a result, at 
least based on Hohfeldian logic and consciously retaining his terminology, we 
ended up with four discriminable elements or proper entitlements able to meet 
the requirements of the scope of rights: claim-rights, liberties, immunities, and 
powers. We identified liberties and powers as active entitlements and claim-
rights and immunities as passive ones. Furthermore, we found that both active 
and passive entitlements function as manifestations of the scope of rights in all 
different forms that reasons can take. Precisely, they can come as abstract rea-
sons, general practical reasons and conclusive practical ones. This latter point 
thereby stands in sharp contrast to Hohfeld’s model, which limits its analysis to 
practical reasons.
It appears to be of vital importance already at this point to be clear about the 
limited nature of how inferences drawn from these findings can aid our task of 
finding an adequate concept of rights. Specifically, the (strictly deontological) 
insight that claim-rights are in a way the most basic type of entitlement could 
seem like a preliminary decision in the dispute between Interest Theory and 
Choice Theory regarding such a concept of rights. As indicated earlier, many 
Interest theorists see rights in one way or another as reasons for other people’s 
duties. Hence, one might jump to the conclusion that such a concept of rights is 
strongly supported by the notion of claim-rights being the most basic form of 
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entitlement or even infer that claim-rights actually represent the best concept of 
rights in general. However, such claims would imply that we had already gone 
one step further than we actually have so far, because, as we saw earlier, to de-
fine a concept one needs to make a judgement and commit oneself to certain 
conceptual reasons – something which we clearly have not done up until now 
by merely sharpening the scope of the term ‘right’. Direct inferences from state-
ments about the scope of a term to its concept are strictly impossible. In order 
to determine a concept of rights in the subsequent step we will have to work out 
which of the four entitlements, either alone or in combination, should actually 
be integrated into a concept of rights and therefore be considered a right. In this 
respect Interest Theory roughly claims ‘all of them’ due to the fact and to the 
very extent that all of them refer to reasons, that all of them at least imply claim-
rights. However, this is, at the very least, not a necessary conclusion. Prelimi-
narily, one could, as Choice Theory does, just as well argue that only powers or 
only liberties and powers, as the individual and protected exertion of freedom, 
should qualify as rights. This is what the dispute between Interest and Choice 
Theory of rights ultimately amounts to, if we harness their theoretical potential 
as conceptual theories. It is the (conceptual) reasons both sides offer for their 
respective accounts which we shall have a closer look at now.
2. Choice Theory versus Interest Theory105
What is a right? Or rather: What should we refer to as a ‘right’? Protected de-
cisions? Or preferably certain (practical) reasons? In this section we shall fi-
nally get to the bottom of these questions. To begin with, it is worth clarifying 
that both Interest Theory and Choice Theory represent certain schools or lines 
of theory rather than precisely articulated and discriminable theories.106 Differ-
ent versions of both Interest and Choice Theory may vary considerably in the 
details. In subsections a) and b) we will therefore try to work out at least some 
105 In recent years there have been a few attempts to break up the antinomy of Interest and 
Choice Theory by establishing a third way between or beyond these two factions. Notable ex-
amples of such attempts include: Schnüriger, Statustheorie moralischer Rechte; Siegfried van 
Duffel, “The Nature of Rights Debate Rests on a Mistake,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 
(2012); Leif Wenar, “The Nature of Rights,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 33 (2005); id, “The 
Nature of Claim-Rights,” Ethics 123 (January 2013); Gopal Sreenivasan, “A Hybrid Theory 
of Claim-Rights,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 25 (2005); David Rodin, “The Reciprocity 
Theory of Rights,” Law and Philosophy 33 (2014). Directly responding to the challenges of-
fered by Wenar and Sreenivasan, Matthew Kramer and Hillel Steiner impressively demonstrat-
ed why and to what extent these attempts are inevitably futile, why IT and CT are ultimately 
irreconcilable/incompatible as conceptual theories in their joint essay “Theories of Rights: Is 
There a Third Way?” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 27 (2007). Essentially, one needs to de-
cide for one or the other, cf. below sec. III, 2. e), dd), esp. fn. 215.
106 Edmundson, Rights, 122.
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fundamental tenets held by each line of theory, which most, if not all, of the re-
spective proponents would agree upon. Additionally, we will sketch the most 
prevalent points of criticism held against each line of theory. In subsections c) 
and d) we will then try to match these findings with our four manifestations of 
the scope of rights, i. e. clarify which of the entitlements are normally regarded 
as rights under each respective line of theory. Hence, in these sections we will 
refine our understanding of both Interest and Choice Theory by reformulating 
each one in the best possible way on the theoretical basis laid out so far, which 
will include responding to typical and possible criticism from the point of view 
of each line of theory. Consequently, in subsection e), we will then try to clas-
sify both theory families by asking ourselves about their actual and possible 
theoretical aims. Thus, we will investigate in turn how both Interest Theory and 
Choice Theory would function if we understood them as proper normative theo-
ries, as purely descriptive theories (i. e. limited to an assessment of the scope of 
rights), and finally as conceptual inquiries s. str., which is where we shall finally 
get to the bottom of our underlying question ‘what is a right?’.
a) Choice or Will Theory – Introduction
Traditionally, choice or will theories of rights were the product of substantive, 
liberal philosophies, such as those of Hobbes and also Kant.107 Influenced by 
Kant, it was German scholar Savigny who first attempted developing an ana-
lytical concept of rights. Famously he defined a right as “the power due to the 
individual: an area in which the individual’s volition reigns, and does so with 
our consent. We call this power the right of this person, tantamount with au-
thority”108. Subsequently, the concept of rights became a heavily controversial 
field of study both in moral and legal philosophy and it remained so till this day. 
Interest in the analysis of rights (and in the autonomy-protecting dimension of 
rights) grew particularly strong once more towards the middle of the 20th centu-
ry. In this respect there are two philosophers whose respective theories are im-
107 For a vivid introduction to the historical development of CT see Thomas Gutmann, Ius-
titia Contrahentium. Zu den gerechtigkeitstheoretischen Grundlagen des deutschen Schuldver-
tragsrechts, unpublished ms., 22 ff.
108 Individual translation from the German original, in which it says “die der einzelnen 
Person zustehende Macht: ein Gebiet, worin ihr Wille herrscht, und mit unsrer Einstimmung 
herrscht. Diese Macht nennen wir ein Recht dieser Person, gleichbedeutend mit Befugniß.” 
(Friedrich Carl von Savigny, System des heutigen römischen Rechts, Band 1 (Berlin: Veit & 
Comp., 1840), 7). The recourse to a spacial/areal metaphor has ever since been most typical 
for choice theorists. See in this respect also Bernhard Windscheid, Lehrbuch des Pandekten-
rechts, 8th ed. with comparative remarks on German Civil Law by Theodor Kipp (Frankfurt 
a. M.: Rütten & Loening, 1900 [1865]), 131; Andreas von Thur, Der Allgemeine Teil des Deut-
schen Bürgerlichen Rechts, Band 1 –Allgemeine Lehren und Personenrecht (Leipzig: Dunck-
er & Humblot, 1910), 53–64, esp. 57; similar: Wellman’s terminology of ‘dominion’, cf. only 
Carl Wellman, Real Rights, 7–8, 107 ff.
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possible to overlook: H. L. A. Hart and Hans Kelsen. By far the most prominent 
version of an analytical will or choice theory of rights in Anglophone legal theo-
ry up to date is Hart’s. In his seminal essay ‘Bentham on Legal Rights’ he devel-
oped a concept of rights that has ever since strongly influenced the debate about 
rights. In a nutshell, he argued that rights are (bilateral) liberties, i. e. all legally 
protected individual areas of free discretion.109 Kelsen on the other hand, as the 
most prominent proponent of a will theory in German language, wanted to re-
strict the language of rights, or rather in his words of ‘authorisations’, to powers 
only.110 There might be good reasons to exclude plain liberties from the concept 
of rights, as Kelsen did.111 Yet, this question can and will not concern us in de-
109 Hart, LR, 196.
110 In German: ‘Berechtigungen’, see e. g. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre [1934], 60; id, All-
gemeine Staatslehre (Bad Homburg v. d. H.: Verlag Dr. Max Gehlen, 1966 [1925]), 60. Later 
Kelsen also describes this position as one’s ‘Rechtsmacht’, i. e. literally the ‘legal power’ to de-
cide some legal matter, see id, Reine Rechtslehre [1960], 139–141. Most noteworthy, Kelsen’s 
assessment of rights is rather particular in quite a few ways. Generally, he denies subjective 
rights an independent status (cf. above sec. III, fn. 62), i. e. he ultimately reduces the concept 
of rights entirely to that of (objective/intersubjective) law, and therewith to duties. According 
to Kelsen, only legal positions granted to an individual, which entail some kind of control over 
other people’s duties, deserve to be treated as distinguishable from mere reflexes to duties, 
yet not as ‘rights’ but only as ‘authorisations’. Kelsen’s aim with this reduction of rights was 
to protect the law as the positive manifestation of an intersubjective normative practice from 
subjectivist and naturalistic justifications, which he found in the traditional dualism of sub-
jective right and objective law in legal theory, see Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 55–60. As 
such, this aim is praiseworthy and his reduction of rights to duties seems in a way only con-
sequent. Yet, he arguably goes too far in his critique of rights. More than just debilitating the 
idea of a subjectivist justification of intersubjective rules, by denying rights any meaningful 
structural part in legal systems, he robs his own theory of the potential to account for the ar-
gumentative force of ‘rights’ in normative discourse – in fact, of the potential to account for 
such a discourse in the first place. This point is made admirably clear by Hammer in his out-
standing article: Stefan Hammer, “Braucht die Rechtstheorie einen Begriff vom subjektiven 
Recht?” in Hans Kelsen. Staaatsrechtslehrer und Rechtstheoretiker des 20. Jahrhunderts, ed. 
Stanley Paulson and Michael Stolleis (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), esp. 178. Despite these 
shortcomings of Kelsen’s theory, and despite his general rejection of the notion of ‘rights’ (for 
an elaborate criticism of traditional accounts of both IT and CT see id, Hauptprobleme, 567–
593), it is nevertheless justified, simply by virtue of his characterisation of ‘Berechtigungen’, 
to count Kelsen amongst advocates of a modest CT of the like proposed here. One should bear 
in mind, though, that Kelsen’s account of rights is rather questionable due to it’s being based 
on a decisionist justification model, see Hammer, “Begriff vom subjektiven Recht,” 190. That 
is, Kelsen’s ‘Berechtigungen’ may be distinguishable from mere reflexes of duties, yet they 
necessarily maintain a derivative status, which ultimately appears all but necessary for a meta-
theoretical, normatively neutral concept of rights.
111 In fact, elsewhere Hart defined a right – or more precisely and in his words elucidated 
the expression ‘a legal right’ – as follows: “(1) A statement of the form ‘X has a right’ is true 
if the following conditions are satisfied: (a) There is in existence a legal system. (b) Under a 
rule or rules of the system some other person Y is, in the events which have happened, obliged 
to do or abstain from some action. (c) This obligation is made by law dependent on the choice 
either of X or some other person authorised to act on his behalf so that either Y is bound to do 
or abstain from some action only if X (or some authorised person) so chooses or alternatively 
only until X (or such person) chooses otherwise. (2) A statement of the form ‘X has a right’ 
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tail here. More importantly, despite differences in detail in Hart’s and Kelsen’s 
theories, by investigating theirs as well as other notable accounts such as those 
of Savigny, Steiner, Sumner, or Carl Wellman,112 one is able to determine a kind 
of smallest common denominator for Choice Theory: Generally, all choice or 
will theories refer to the agents’ ability to decide and act autonomously, some-
times only in the sense of thus being able to enforce certain duties113 or of hav-
ing a certain individual latitude, a “dominion”114 as Wellman puts it or enjoy-
ing “autonomy within a domain”115 as is Sumner’s choice of words. The central 
idea is pervasive, namely that rights are a means of protecting individual free-
dom, the exercise of individual autonomy. Thus, at the core of CT rights stands 
the idea of freedom of decision, with these decisions somehow normatively pro-
tected from interference.
There are various (traditional) points of criticism that CT faces. At this point 
we shall only regard the most prevalent ones. An extensive discussion of these 
and other critical points will ensue in section c). First of all, CT is often criti-
cised for its inherent inability to account for so-called ‘unwaivable rights’ such 
as the right not to be sold into slavery or possibly the right to life.116 Many 
people have at least a strong intuition that one’s right not to be enslaved is some-
thing which he or she cannot simply renounce. Accordingly, such ‘rights’ are 
understood as a line of normative protection out of the reach of an individual’s 
own discretion. And if having a right would only mean being able to choose 
is used to draw a conclusion of law in a particular case which falls under such rules.” (Hart, 
“Definition and Theory,” 35). Apparently he thereby also limited the concept of rights to in-
stances of control over someone else’s legal duties and thus came very close to Kelsen’s con-
cept of ‘authorisations’.
112 Von Savigny, System des heutigen römischen Rechts; Carl Wellman, A Theory of Rights 
(Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985); id, Real Rights; id, An Approach to Rights; Sumner, 
MF; cf. id, “Rights, Interests and Free Speech,” in Rights and Reason, ed. Marilyn Friedman 
et al. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000); Hillel Steiner, “Working Rights,” in A Debate over Rights, 
ed. Matthew Kramer, Nigel Simmonds, and Hillel Steiner (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998); id, An 
Essay on Rights; id, “Are There Still Any Natural Rights?” in Rights: Concepts and Contexts, 
ed. Brian Bix and Horacia Spector (Farnharn/Burlington: Ashgate, 2012). By times so-called 
‘demand-theories’ are presented as a third category, see Leif Wenar, “Rights,” in Stanford En-
cyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Stanford University, 1997–), https://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/rights/. Cf. inter alia: John Skorupski, The Domain 
of Reasons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Stephen Darwall, The Second-Person 
Standpoint (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). Due to the fact that they mainly 
refer to the invididual’s ability to actively ‘demand’ the performance or non-performance of 
certain actions by others, arguably they are better classified as versions of CT under false flag.
113 See above sec. III, fn. 109; possibly only in a very strong sense as being able to exert 
control over a duty on three different stages of enforcement, see Kramer, “Some Doubts,” 
248–249.
114 Carl Wellman, Real Rights, 8.
115 Sumner, MF, 98.
116 MacCormick, “Rights in Legislation,” 197.
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between different options, then indeed any notion of unwaivability would be 
strictly incompatible with the notion of rights.
Another standard point of criticism is CT’s alleged inability to account for 
‘non-enforceable rights’, e. g. one’s ‘right’ to initiate or terminate criminal pro-
ceedings.117 An example: B assaults A. Clearly, B violates a duty towards A not 
to do so, thus he also violates A’s respective claim-right. Yet, the enforcement 
of this criminal law duty or the sanctioning of B’s violation does not lie within 
A’s discretion, but rather with the state attorney or the public prosecutor. Now, 
if CT implies the claim that a right only exists in case a person A is in a position 
to command over a respective duty of another person B, and A lacks the per-
mission to enforce B’s duty in this case, would that imply that A does not have 
a right not to be assaulted according to CT? Interest theorists sometimes take 
this point as an argument against the undue narrowness of CT. The idea is: Why 
should we reject the idea of rights on account of a lack of control over the per-
formance or enforcement of someone else’s duty, when it is already as such so 
evidently advantageous for A?
Finally, the most wide-spread and most serious objection against CT is the 
fact that CT does not and in fact cannot include rights of the incompetent into 
its concept, i. e. rights of small children, of handicapped or demented persons, 
(possibly) of animals, etc. At least for the former (human) groups, we doubtless 
have a strong intuition that these entities should have rights. In fact, the intui-
tion is two-fold: Not only do we normally have the strong normative intuition 
that, for example, a newborn’s well-being is an intrinsic good, to be protected 
irrespective of circumstance and individual discretion, but this thought is ac-
companied by the linguistic intuition that this intrinsic reason should be regard-
ed as the newborn’s very own right. The fact that CT deprives these and other 
comparable entities of having rights seems to majorly discredit its cogency as 
a theory.118
b) Interest or Benefit Theory – Introduction
Historically, IT emerged in explicit renunciation of and as an alternative to 
CT.119 Thus, in German legal theory it was first von Jhering who defined a right 
117 Edmundson, Rights, 125.
118 For a vivid exposition of this specific point of criticism see esp. Neil MacCormick, 
“Children’s Rights: A Test Case for Theories of Rights,” Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphiloso-
phie//Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy 62 (1976).
119 Nowadays it can well be regarded as the prevalent concept of rights. For instance, Jere-
my Waldron notes: “There used to be a controversy in the analysis of rights about whether the 
concept itself presupposed an exclusive concern with liberty. But the claim that it did (…) has 
now largely been abandoned” (Jeremy Waldron, “Rights,” in A companion to contemporary 
political philosophy, Vol. 2, 2nd ed., ed. Robert Goodin, Philip Pettit, and Thomas Pogge (Ox-
ford: Blackwell, 2007), 746).
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as the individual’s “utility, benefit, gain, which is supposed to be warranted by 
the law”.120 In conscious and clear distinction to Savigny’s account he added: 
“Not the volition or the power mark the essence of the right, but the utility”.121 
Arguably, this turn from volition to utility itself marks the essence of the dispute 
between CT and IT. Nowadays, similar to CT, there are various versions of IT, 
both Anglophone and Germanophone – too many to cover all of them in detail 
at this point.122 Yet, also with interest theories it is possible to find a smallest 
common denominator, some core tenets that are generally shared. All versions 
of IT have in common that they – directly or implicitly – refer to (practical) rea-
sons appendant to a certain entity, to the holder of the right.123 As already indi-
cated earlier, Joseph Raz, in his most distinguished account of an interest theo-
ry of rights, places the concept of ‘reasons’ at the core of his rights-concept by 
defining a right as “an aspect of X’s well-being (his interest) [which] is a suf-
ficient reason for holding some other person to be under a duty”124. Due to its 
reference to reasons more generally and not simply to autonomy, IT is correctly 
regarded as “more capacious”125 than CT in terms of the applicability of its con-
cept of rights. In fact, CT’s weaknesses appear to be the strengths of IT: Neither 
does IT have a problem implementing unwaivable rights nor, more importantly, 
implementing the notion of rights of the incompetent.
These (apparent) advantages can be seen in all kinds of interest theories. For 
instance, even though regarded as Raz’ main rival for the most convincing inter-
est theory,126 the aforementioned core tenet – the reference to reasons – is also 
shared by Matthew Kramer’s account of IT rights. In contrast to Raz he offers a 
somewhat reduced version of IT, for the most part naming only necessary crite-
120 Once more the author’s personal translation from the German original “Nutzen, Vor-
teil, Gewinn, der durch das Recht gewährleistet werden soll” (Rudolph von Jhering, Geist des 
römischen Rechts auf den verschiedenen Stufen seiner Entwicklung, Teil 3 Abt. 1, 4th rev. ed. 
(Darmstadt: Wiss. Buchgemeinschaft, 1888 [1866]), 339–340). The idea of a conceptual link 
between rights and a certain normative advantage for a person/an entity had also been existent 
in Anglophone legal theory around that time, cf. only William Hearn, The Theory of Legal Du-
ties and Rights: An Introduction to Analytical Jurisprudence (Melbourne: John Ferres, Govt. 
Printer, 1883), 141.
121 Von Jhering, Geist des römischen Rechts, 350. German original: “Nicht der Wille oder 
die Macht bildet die Substanz des Rechts, sondern der Nutzen”. Cf. also this instructive article 
about von Jherings theory of rights (in German): Gerhard Wagner, “Rudolph von Jherings 
Theorie des subjektiven Rechts und der berechtigenden Reflexwirkungen,” Archiv für civilis-
tische Praxis 193 (1993).
122 At least it appears noteworthy that the first Anglophone interest-concept of rights was 
developed by Jeremy Bentham (see Bentham, Works III, 181).
123 For other notable, contemporary examples of an interest conception of rights see only 
Neil MacCormick, “Rights in Legislation,” esp. 192; id, “Rights, Claims and Remedies,” Law 
and Philosophy 1 (August 1982); Lyons, “Rights, Claimants, and Beneficiaries,” esp. 176.
124 Raz, Morality of Freedom, 166. Emphasis added.
125 Wenar, “Rights”.
126 Ibid.
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ria for rights, yet a priori excluding an (at least possible) sufficient one: “Nec-
essary though insufficient for the holding of a legal right by X is that the duty 
correlative to the right, when actual, normatively protects some aspect of X’s 
situation that on balance typically redounds to the benefit of a being like X.”127 
He continues explaining: “Neither necessary nor sufficient for the holding of 
some specified legal right by X is that X is competent and authorised to de-
mand or waive the enforcement of the duty that is correlative to the right.”128 
Whilst for Raz the ‘well-being’ of the right-holder is decisive, Kramer regards 
the ‘(typical) benefit’ of a being as central to the idea of its having rights. Thus, 
despite differences in the details, both align with the theoretical legacy of IT. 
Traditionally, for interest theories the purpose of rights was, in conscious con-
trast to choice theories, not seen in (merely) promoting autonomy, but rather 
in the more general good that comes with rights, the advantage that goes along 
with having a right. Already von Jhering, for instance, claimed that the “prac-
tical purpose” of rights were “the utility, the advantage, the gain that ought to 
be provided by the right”129. Thus, in sharp contrast with CT, in which the in-
dividual, normative competence entailed by permissions is regarded as central, 
IT essentially focusses on the content-dimension of normativity, i. e. on the rea-
sons provided by a normative system. A right thereby is supposed to exist in the 
case where an agent (or some other possible right-holder) has an advantage (or 
benefit) from a certain rule, which is nothing but a paraphrase for the notion of 
a reason being appendant to the respective entity.
What appears problematic is the question of to what extent these reasons are 
an entity’s ‘interests’. Whereas with CT we could quite easily determine the 
central element of a ‘decision’ as a protected permission, the notion of ‘interest’ 
is less accessible. Does it refer to the individual being and its subjective prefer-
ences or to its interests properly understood within an intersubjective normative 
system? If it is supposed to be the latter, it certainly cannot – as the term seems 
to imply – also refer to subjective thoughts, wishes, preferences, feelings, etc. 
as these two notions regularly conflict (see above). Ultimately the entity’s ‘in-
terests’ as laid out in interest theories of rights must be understood as its well-
understood or best interpreted interests from an intersubjective standpoint, i. e. 
as appendant reasons within an intersubjective system.130 That does not imply 
127 Kramer, “Some Doubts,” 246.
128 Ibid.
129 Von Jhering, Geist des römischen Rechts, 339–340. Cf. also Gutmann, Iustitia Con-
trahentium, 30.
130 Essentially, that is what Kramer appears to have in mind by referring to aspects which 
are ‘typically’ in the interests of certain beings, see above sec. III, fn. 127. Similarly, Penner 
notes: “[…] there must be some sort of critical judgement of the interests that ground rights 
[…]. Our critical interests do not depend on our particular subjective wishes. One has many 
rights, such as the right to education, whether one wishes it or not.” (James Penner, “The 
Analysis of Rights,” Ratio Juris 10 (September 1997): 305). Cf. also Raz, “Nature of Rights,” 
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that it is completely irrelevant what the entity itself thinks or wishes or feels, 
but in order for these ‘subjective interests’ to become duties of other persons 
they need to be regarded as reasons by them, by the community, i. e. intersub-
jectively.131 Hence, the notion of advantageousness for the holders of rights is 
inseparably linked with the notion of communality, of other persons’ possibly 
behaving towards the right-holder in a way that is regarded as advantageous for 
her. Accordingly, we do not even have to decide whether interests in this inter-
subjective sense are rights or rights are only supposed to protect subjective in-
terests.132 In any case, rights are supposed to be reasons for duties, and thus they 
need to be understood as intersubjective reasons.
Beyond these definitional issues regarding the term ‘interest’, just like with 
CT there are various standard points of criticism which IT is regularly faced 
with. Just like above we will only discuss the most prevalent ones at this stage. 
First of all, a central problem of IT, even though one of its own making, is its 
theoretical indeterminateness. It is what Kramer fittingly describes as IT’s in-
herent problem of “delimitation”133. By identifying rights with appendant rea-
sons we still do not know (a) exactly what kinds of entities qualify as possible 
right-holders134 and (b) under which circumstances the interest – that is, the ap-
pendant reason in question – is the actual reason for a duty or whether we are 
dealing with a duty simpliciter. The point is that there are quite a few additional 
judgements to make in order to actually determine whether a right actually ex-
ists. As we will see, the same partly applies to choice theories, yet IT’s increased 
indeterminacy is reason enough to raise concerns about unnecessary vagueness 
in comparison with CT.
195 ff. Hence, with respect to the justification of norms the concept of interest somehow tries 
to bridge the gap between subjective wishes and intersubjective norms. Yet, what it actually 
does is blur the lines by implying one can virtually be the other, when in fact there is only one 
or the other. A subjective state of mind cannot be an intersubjective reason, unless it is regard-
ed as one by the respective intersubjective authority. If one does not distinguish carefully be-
tween subjective interest and well-understood, critical interests, the term is bound to lead to 
confusions.
131 Not to be confused with the subject’s act of claiming of a right (see above), which in 
this form is not provided for or does not exist in the intersubjective normative system in ques-
tion. However, due to the act of claiming that a right ought to exist, the concept of rights can 
serve as an instrument to criticise the content of a certain intersubjective system by employing 
a differing value judgement from another normative system, i. e. for instance a moral critique 
of the law (see above).
132 Cf. Lyons, “Rights, Claimants, and Beneficiaries,” 173, at fn. 1.
133 Matthew Kramer, “Refining the Interest Theory of Rights,” American Journal of Juris-
prudence 55 (2010), http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ajj/vol55/iss1/2/, 34.
134 One might say ‘all such entities that have or can have interests’. Yet, having defined an 
interest as an intersubjective reason appendant to the right-holder, the case of interest-holders 
appears all but clear, as reasons could be ascribed to virtually any being. For a deepened dis-
cussion of this point see below section d).
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Apart from that IT faces similar problems as CT with respect to (apparent) 
deviations from actual language use. Precisely, such cases are usually regard-
ed as problematic, in which the occurrence of an interest (seemingly) deviates 
from the occurrence of a right in ordinary language. First, the cases of so-called 
‘third-party beneficiaries’ appear to be problematic for IT.135 If A and B enter 
into an agreement that B ought to give a certain good to C, it is unclear who is 
supposed to have a ‘right’ in this case – A or C? Whilst C, not being a party to 
the contract but merely a direct beneficiary of it, would certainly profit in some 
way from the performance of B’s contractual duty (in that C certainly has an in-
terest in receiving the good from B), we usually regard only A as having a right 
towards B as she was the one entering into the contract with B in the first place 
and she being the one able to demand or waive the performance of the contrac-
tual obligation.136 How can IT explain the discrepancy between right and ad-
vantage or interest in such cases?
Secondly, the reverse case appears just as problematic for IT, namely the one 
in which from linguistic intuition we usually expect someone to have a right, yet 
this person or entity does not seem to have any personal advantage or interest 
in the allocation of this right. As much can be the case with fiduciaries or legal 
representatives, but e. g. also in this example employed by Raz: We assume 
journalist J has a right to protect his source S in court, which would also be to 
say that public prosecutor P is under a duty not to force J to reveal the identity of 
S.137 Quite plainly, the reason behind the rule in question (that is, the ‘interest’ 
protected) is S’s interest in anonymity and/or the public’s interest in a function-
al system of free press. Regardless, J does not seem to have an individual inter-
est in this case, at least not one that would justify P’s being under a respective 
duty. Nevertheless, linguistic intuition tells us that it is (at least also) J who has 
a right in such cases.
Finally, another point of criticism frequently levelled at IT is its alleged in-
ability to account for an adequate critique of (legal) paternalism.138 Gutmann, 
for instance, claims that any theory of rights concerned only with an entity’s 
135 Lyons, “Rights, Claimants, and Beneficiaries,” 180 ff.
136 Another (analogous) example is offered in Wenar, “Rights,” namely the case of some-
one’s partner winning the lottery. Obviously, you have an interest in that as you would indi-
rectly benefit from your partner’s getting paid out, yet the law ascribes a right to receive the 
money exclusively to the one with the valid ticket.
137 This example is borrowed from Joseph Raz, Morality of Freedom, 179 and 247–248. 
Cf. also id, “Legal Rights,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 4 (Spring 1984): 7.
138 Thomas Gutmann, “Paternalismus und Konsequentialismus,” in Paternalismus und 
Konsequentialismus, ed. Michael Kühler, Alexa Nossek (Münster: Mentis, 2014); Tony Hon-
oré, Making Law Blind (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987), 255. Cf. also: Penner, “Analysis of Rights,” 
320–321; Sumner, MF, 97; Norbert Paulo, “The Bite of Rights in Paternalism,” in New Per-
spectives on Paternalism and Health Care, ed. Thomas Schramme (Cham: Springer Inter-
national Publishing, 2015).
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well-understood interests necessarily has paternalistic implications.139 Indeed, 
if we understand interests in the sense of well-understood interests, i. e. as inter-
subjective reasons, which is necessarily the case (see above), then IT implies 
the possibility of rights opposed to a subjective interest, an individual will – a 
possibility which CT explicitly negates. Thus, it is true that IT rights imply the 
possibility of (substantive) paternalism. Whether or to what extent that is actu-
ally a problem is another matter to which we will return later on.
c) Choice Theory – Theoretical Clarifications
Which of the revised Hohfeldian entitlements that we earlier identified as man-
ifestations of the scope are regarded as rights by CT? The answer is both pow-
ers and plain liberties.140 In other words, according to CT rights are generally 
best understood as active entitlements or valued permissions. Put differently, 
for a choice theorist rights are protected areas of individual competence.141 Ac-
cording to CT, one has a right to do X both because and to the very extent that 
he or she is free to decide to perform or not to perform X – in addition to the 
fact that the normative system in question protects this decision by ensuring 
the possibility of respect duties for other agents, at least for the state itself. 
Hence, even under CT not every plain permission – that is, every act of individ-
ual competence – is supposed to be a right, but only such permissions which 
are safeguarded to a certain degree through the valuation of individual auto-
nomy. Presumably, quite a few choice theorists would disagree. We are very 
much used to plain permissions described as rights, especially as permissions 
antecedent to any organised state. In this way one could and should also inter-
pret Hobbes’ language of a pre-positive ‘right to everything’.142 Importantly, 
it is a major and necessary concession which every version of CT has to make 
towards IT that the permissions in question, with which autonomy is exercised, 
must at the same time be the reason for possibly holding other agents under re-
spective duties, i. e. that every active right implies a (passive) claim-right (see 
above). As described earlier, leaving the intersubjective normative context for 
rights, as Hobbes does in his state of nature, would necessarily deprive them of 
what makes them advantageous for their holders. Thus, importantly, despite its 
clear definitional focus on the competence-aspect of rights, CT ultimately can-
139 Gutmann, “Paternalismus und Konsequentialismus,” 59.
140 As we saw earlier, in the relevant literature as much goes for powers in all cases and 
for liberties in most. In my view, both should be encompassed by a CT concept of rights, as the 
core of such rights lies in the protection of individual autonomy, which is not only warranted 
by powers, but especially also by liberties.
141 Cf. Massimo La Torre, “Rechte und rechtstheoretische Ansätze,” Rechtstheorie 41 
(2010), 86 (in German): “Ein Recht zu haben weist eher daruf hin, innerhalb eines Handlungs-
spielraums autonom entscheiden, d. h. sich in Deliberationen einlassen zu dürfen”.
142 Hobbes, Leviathan, 91–92.
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not avoid an accompanying reference to the content-dimension and thus to cor-
relative, advantageous duties in order to make its concept of rights plausible. As 
much inevitably needs to be conceded by any choice theorist. In this respect, it 
is not surprising that it is sometimes argued that IT describes a more fundamen-
tal aspect of rights and that it in a way encompasses all of CT’s tenets.143 In a 
way that appears correct. Whether this is a valid or even decisive argument in 
favour of IT as a conceptual theory will be our concern in the ensuing sec. e).
On this basis let us proceed by reconsidering the most common points of 
criticism against CT. Some of them will be shown to be entirely futile, whilst 
others do pose serious problems which proponents of CT cannot evade but 
rather need to endure. First, there was CT’s inability to account for ‘unwaivable 
rights’. Clearly, this would only be a problem for CT if one were to presuppose 
that there actually are or rather should be ‘unwaivable rights’. Yet, on the con-
trary, it is one of the central claims of any choice theory that such ‘rights’ do 
not and should not exist. So, even if it is the case that people have a strong lin-
guistic intuition about the ‘unwaivability’ of certain rights, which in my view 
can probably already be doubted, then this criticism of CT amounts at best to a 
deviation of the proposed terminology from common terminology. This can of 
course be regarded as a disadvantage (just as the cases of a divergence between 
interests and alleged rights might be one of IT). It is notable, though, that it 
certainly cannot be regarded as an argument against the theoretical cogency of 
CT, i. e. with respect to its description of certain normative structures. In other 
words, the normative position in which an agent A is said to have an advantage 
by virtue of a certain reason, but in which she herself is not able to exert norma-
tive control over this reason, can in revised Hohfeldian terms be regarded as a 
‘sole immunity’, i. e. the existence of an immunity accompanied by the non-ex-
istence of a power. In technical terms, as much is the normative position of hav-
ing an ‘unwaivable right’. Suppose, for instance, the right to life is regarded as 
unwaivable, as it is – at least under most circumstances – in most contemporary 
legal systems. Then first of all A has a claim-right against others that they not 
kill her. Additionally, she has an immunity that no one alters this claim-right. 
Furthermore, for the right to be unwaivable she must lack the power to alter the 
claim-right herself, i. e. to possibly allow others to end her life. Thus, the struc-
ture of ‘unwaivable rights’ can be adequately explained by reference to our fa-
miliar entitlements. However, within CT such a position is simply not regard-
ed as a ‘right’ in the first place, i. e. intentionally excluded from the concept of 
rights as a matter of a conceptual decision, because it can fully and adequately 
be described in the language of duties. B has a duty not to kill A, and both B and 
143 Kramer, RWT, 61; Rainbolt, Concept of Rights, 115; Sumner, MF, 96. Cf. also Ed-
mundson, Rights, 127. Edmundson regards CT as a special kind of IT if both were understood 
as justificatory theories.
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A have disabilities with regard to this duty. Thus, the aforementioned linguistic 
argument against CT, which criticises a possible deviation from common lan-
guage usage, holds and needs to be taken seriously. Yet, any further theoretical 
argument concerning CT’s inability to account for ‘unwaivable rights’ would 
have to be based on the presupposition that the labelling of the described po-
sitions as ‘rights’ is indispensable for normative reasoning, which clearly it is 
not. In fact, in normative debates the very construction of ‘unwaivable rights’ 
or ‘sole immunities’ is rather a cause for vigorous debates about the legitimacy 
of (legal) paternalism.144
What about the second point regarding ‘non-enforceable duties’? In this re-
spect already the underlying way of thinking is misleading. In contrast to the 
common critique, which often judges the foregoing example with the assault 
and the ensuing proceedings as a single set of facts, we need to clearly dis-
tinguish two entirely different issues here: (1) Does A have a right with regard 
to B’s preliminary action, i. e. the assault? (2) Does A have a right with regard 
to the opening/termination of criminal proceedings against B? With regard to 
question (1) the answer is yes, to the extent that A initially had a claim-right not 
to be assaulted and presumably also a power to decide whether B’s default duty 
not to assault A should persist or should be rescinded. That is, according to CT, 
A has a right against B not to be assaulted insofar as A could have given con-
sent to the action in question. Almost en passant this debilitates another com-
mon reproach of CT, namely that it allegedly cannot account for ‘passive rights’ 
due to its focus on what the right-holder herself is able to decide or to do.145 
Precisely, the concern is this: If rights really were only protected permissions as 
CT claims, why indeed should we still speak of, for example, a ‘right not to be 
assaulted’ under a CT concept? As much clearly misses the point of CT if cor-
rectly understood. Its aim is not to entirely get rid of the notion of other people’s 
duties, but rather to link the notion of rights with that of a normative control 
over these duties (so much at least for powers, see above). CT simply aims to 
exclude plain claim-rights and sole immunities from its concept of rights, i. e. 
of such solitary claim-rights for which the right-holder does not also possess 
a power.146 Hence, excluded are both claim-rights without accompanying im-
144 Good introductions to the problem of paternalism in general are the following: Gerald 
Dworkin, “Paternalism,” in Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Stan-
ford University, 1997–), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/paternalism/; Joel 
Feinberg, “Legal Paternalism,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1 (September 1971). For a 
more elaborate account on the role of paternalism in legal reasoning (in German) see Thomas 
Gutmann, “Paternalismus – eine Tradition deutschen Rechtsdenkens?” ZRG GA (Zeitschrift 
der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Germanistische Abteilung) 122 (2005).
145 See inter alia: Edmundson, Rights, 126; Rainbolt, Concept of Rights, 105, with fur-
ther references.
146 Hence, Hart’s idea that immunities could not be adequately integrated by a Choice 
Theory of rights (Hart, LR, 198–200) was not entirely accurate, but in light of these insights 
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munities, which Kramer and Steiner call ‘nominal rights’147, as well as claim-
rights accompanied by ‘sole immunities’ (see above). Thus, CT rights should 
not be understood only as liberties and powers, but the respective powers need 
to be seen in direct relation to lower-order reasons controlled by them. In fact, 
as Sumner pointed out, correctly understood, a power as a means of control over 
one’s own claim-rights comprises this first-order position.148 In other words, the 
objection regarding ‘passive rights’ is only valid for such cases in which agent 
A does not also have a power with regard to the claim-right in question. That 
narrows the problematic cases down to ‘unwaivable rights’ (see above). CT, 
correctly understood, is able to account very well for passive rights like A’s right 
not to be assaulted – if understood as A’s right not to be assaulted without her 
prior (or possibly also posterior) consent.149
Returning to our example, we can state that CT can account for A’s right to-
wards B with respect to question (1). How about question (2) though regarding 
an alleged right to initiate or terminate criminal proceedings? Evidently, A does 
not have a power to do either of these things; thus, according to CT, A does not 
have a right. Does it matter, though? Should or indeed do we actually think that 
A has a right in such cases? The nature and purpose of criminal proceedings in 
general suggests something different. The ‘beneficiary’ of criminal proceedings 
is not ever supposed to be the victim, in this case A, but the goal is, very roughly 
speaking, maintaining and affirming public order.150 This reason is certainly not 
a reason appendant to A, thus at least it does not directly suggest that A should 
be responsible for controlling it. Naturally, the fact alone that a certain reason 
is not appendant to a specific entity, i. e. that it is not a claim-right, does not 
mean that one cannot have a ‘right’ with respect to it. In the example case the 
public prosecutor holding a power over whether to initiate proceedings could at 
least be thought to hold a ‘right’ according to CT. That is, the reason which one 
has at one’s command does not have to be one’s own claim-right.151 Only the 
power itself needs to enjoy normative protection as a special kind of liberty. To 
conclude: We find that the problem of so-called ‘non-enforceable rights’ is not 
actually a problem at all for CT. According to CT, reasons which are not ‘en-
forceable’ in the sense of being ‘controllable’ by an agent A, are simply not to be 
understandable. By contrast, Simmonds errs when he describes this concession of Hart as 
“misguided” (Nigel Simmonds, “The Analytical Foundations of Justice,” The Cambridge Law 
Journal 54 (July 1995): 219).
147 Kramer and Steiner, “Is There a Third Way,” 297. According to the authors the contrary 
is a ‘genuine right’, i. e. a claim-right accompanied by an immunity.
148 Sumner, MF, 37.
149 Carl Wellman, Theory of Rights, 75.
150 The very opposite usually goes for civil proceedings, in which case the parties involved 
argue about their individual demands towards each other. Here rights to initiate or to terminate 
proceedings should indeed be expected.
151 Consider also the case of parents in relation to their child, as to be explained presently.
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regarded as rights, because they do not endow A with a respective competence. 
Again, at best one could raise the accusation that CT thus deviates from con-
ventional language usage, which, however, in this case seems much more far-
fetched than in the case of ‘unwaivable rights’.
We shall investigate one more point in this context, though, that has not been 
mentioned earlier but has only just been touched upon, namely by affirming the 
possibility of a public prosecutor’s having ‘rights’ under CT. Naturally, state offi-
cials quite often have the possibility of deciding certain normative matters either 
way. The question is: Can state officials, acting in their assigned role, actually 
have rights?152 It seems as if we would obtain quite implausible results if we al-
lowed all protected or valued permissions to be counted as ‘rights’. An example: 
A lives in a country with an authoritarian regime. When emperor E decides to 
destroy a park in the middle of A’s city, she decides to demonstrate in a peaceful 
manner against oppression and for freedom of press and expression. Suppose 
policeman P is given the permission by E to violently beat down A in order to 
stop her from protesting.153 Now, even though P has a permission and that per-
mission is presumably also protected against interference by the law, from our 
ordinary understanding of rights it would seem almost bizarre to say that P has a 
right to bludgeon A. Indeed, any plausible choice theory needs to reject the idea 
of officials’ rights, that is, to confine rights to individual citizens as a normative 
instrument against authoritative ruling. Such a theoretical restriction is necessary 
not only with respect to the historical genesis of the concept of rights, as we shall 
find later on. In defence of CT as we described it earlier, one might claim that 
this restriction is already laid out in the central purpose of CT rights, which is to 
foster and protect ‘individual’ freedom or autonomy. Even though P as a person 
is also an individual, in his role as an official (a policeman) what he actually does 
is to enact authoritative will – that is, to enforce authoritatively predefined du-
ties, which are as such contrary to individual freedom. Thus, if one acts in such a 
function, even though formally on account of a permission, this act represents not 
an exercise of individual autonomy, but rather the opposite. Importantly, these 
remarks – especially the implied idea that policemen cannot have rights – are in 
no way supposed to degrade the work of policemen or other state officials. They 
are merely supposed to sharpen our concept of rights. If P breaks in the door of 
notorious thug T after hearing screams from inside and after asking for permis-
sion to enter, we can be thankful that he did. However, we should – for the sake 
of rights – not think of him as having a ‘right’ to do so, but rather of T having a 
duty not to hit other people and to open the door on request, and of P enforcing 
this duty in his function as an extended arm of the state.
152 Peter Jones, Rights (New York: Palgrave, 1994), 31.
153 Suppose P does not have a duty to do so, because A’s behaviour is regarded as a mere 
nuisance, not a real threat.
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Finally, what about CT’s inability to account for ‘rights of the incompe-
tent’? To be clear, this one is a problem that cannot simply be explained away 
by proponents of a choice theory, at least not entirely. Once more, the problem 
lies with a – this time very strong – deviation of the proposed terminology from 
actual usage of the term. Though yet again, it is not a problem of structural or 
meta-theoretical defects of the proposed concept of rights. Neither does a CT 
concept of rights deprive any group of entities of any (possible) advantages, 
nor indeed does it offer an inadequate explanation of normative practice. Take 
as an example a newborn’s alleged ‘right no to be injured’. According to CT, 
the baby itself does not possess such a right, which is plainly counter-intuitive. 
However, within its theoretical framework (not with regard to terminology) CT 
can very well account for the baby’s endowment with a plain claim-right to-
wards others, i. e. the fact that the baby’s well-being is the reason for hold-
ing others under a duty not to injure it. Moreover, CT does by no means ex-
clude the possibility that we regard this reason as an intrinsic reason, i. e. as a 
reason immune to anyone’s discretion. As much would, for instance, surely in 
all cases apply to a baby’s claim-right not to be tortured.154 Supposedly, there 
is no case imaginable in which such an act could possibly be allowed. No one 
could possibly control the reason in question or have it at his or her command. 
Thus, according to CT no one could have a right with respect to this action of 
torturing. Also the baby would not have a ‘right’, but is merely protected by 
respective duties and disabilities, which on a substantive level would by no 
means make the baby normatively any less protected.155 Contrary to this per-
sistent claim-right not to be tortured, the baby’s alleged ‘right not to be injured’ 
is usually controllable to a certain degree by its parents or legal guardians, e. g. 
by giving consent into a risky yet indicated surgery or a vaccination. In short, 
others normally have a duty not to hurt or injure a small child C. The reason 
for this duty can be regarded as one appendant to C. All these ideas can be ac-
corded for by CT. Finally, even under accounts like IT, which do ascribe rights 
to small children, it is someone other than the actual ‘right-holder’ in ques-
tion, namely the parents or legal guardians, who actually have and exert control 
over the relevant reasons in the case. Whom to label as having a ‘right’ is then 
simply a terminological matter. The fact that CT strongly deviates from ordina-
ry language in this respect undoubtedly is an equally strong argument against 
154 Cf. Thomson, Realm of Rights, 17 ff.
155 See inter alia: Joel Feinberg, “The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations,” in 
Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 
180; Phillip Montague, “Two Concepts of Rights,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 9 (Summer 
1980): 384; Carl Wellman, “The Growth of Children’s Rights,” Archiv für Rechts- und Sozial-
philosophie//Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy 70 (1984): 452. Cf. also 
Christopher Wellman, “Feinberg’s Two Concepts of Rights,” Legal Theory 11 (2015): 219: 
“[…] it is awkward to assert that human infants cannot be right-holders, but not every awk-
ward conclusion is absurd”.
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it. That does not exclude the possibility, though, that there are other (possibly 
even better) reasons for positively endorsing a CT concept. We will meticu-
lously analyse these reasons in subsection e). For now, we may at least state 
that a normatively neutral CT concept of rights does not entail worse practical 
results than its rival IT.
d) Interest Theory – Theoretical Clarifications
Which of the four entitlements, identified earlier as manifestations of the scope 
of the term right, qualify as IT rights? We find that IT can take two different 
stances towards this issue. Either interest theorists need to maintain that es-
sentially rights are only claim-rights or that rights are all normative positions 
which are or at least imply a claim-right. As indicated earlier, the first position 
is apparently taken by Kramer: “[…] Interest Theorists join Hohfeld in regard-
ing ‘right’ and ‘claim’ as interchangeable designations […].”156 To be fair, in 
saying so Kramer presupposed an understanding of the four entitlements in the 
traditional, Hohfeldian sense, which in a way justifies his conclusion. Accord-
ingly, it is hardly Kramer’s conclusion which is questioned, but rather his and 
Hohfeld’s reduced account of entitlements. At any rate, according to a narrower 
version of IT, strictly speaking the four entitlements as described earlier would 
not tout court have to be regarded as rights but rather at best to the extent that 
they also are or imply claim-rights. Importantly, such a narrow IT would not 
necessarily deny that there might be other additional features which join in with 
claim-rights, it simply would be agnostic regarding these additional presup-
positions. However, to limit the language of rights to plain claim-rights would 
not strictly speaking be impossible, yet it would be a conceptual limitation en-
tirely unnecessary, whose only noteworthy effect would be an oversimplifica-
tion of normative practice. It is entirely possible to claim that rights essentially 
are claim-rights, but still distinguish between different forms of claim-rights. 
In terms of theoretical clarity, it is therefore preferable to interpret IT in such 
a way, namely that it refers to claim-rights as the most basic kind of right, but 
in due consideration of other advantageous normative positions, i. e. discrimi-
nating plain claim-rights from different classes of other, more specific potential 
rights such as liberties, immunities, and powers. Thus, properly understood IT 
comprises all of the four entitlements – not simply to the extent that they are or 
156 See above sec. III, fn. 102. One could interpret Raz in the same way, when he writes: 
“A person who says to another ‘I have a right to do it’ is not saying that […] it is not wrong to 
do it. He is claiming that the other has a duty not to interfere.” (Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public 
Domain, rev. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, repr. 2001 [1994]), 275). He certainly appears to show 
the ambition to exclude active entitlements from the concept of rights. Presumably, this claim 
is based on a misconception of the peculiar, reciprocal nature of active entitlements, which, as 
we learned, are not reducible to claim-rights.
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imply claim-rights but because they do.157 Put differently, IT’s rights definition 
does not entail a restriction to plain claim-rights alone, but properly understood 
the existence of a claim-right needs to be regarded as the necessary basic ele-
ment for anything to be called a right under IT. That way the definition easily 
allows for different kinds of rights to exist as long as they possibly imply certain 
correlative duties and thus an advantage for right-holder A. Hence, IT’s concept 
of rights is indeed the most encompassing as it comprises all kinds of passive 
and active entitlements.
Let us now reconsider what Kramer described as the problem of delimita-
tion.158 Especially that implies the necessity for IT to limit the scope of possible 
right-holders. As much stands in sharp contrast to CT to which any such neces-
sity for an a priori limitation does not apply. We remember: Both CT and IT – 
as any theory concerning a concept of rights – need to somehow offer an ac-
count of the notions of advantageousness and appendance. CT, due to its linking 
rights to acts of individual competence, does not specifically have to explain the 
notion of appendance, but rather needs to enrich the notion of autonomy, which 
is manifested as a permission that is an act of individual competence, with the 
notion of advantageousness (see above). IT, on the other hand, a priori links the 
notion of rights to that of advantageousness. Thus, it decidedly leaves open the 
question of under which conditions a (practical) reason is appendant to a certain 
entity. Obviously, it is all but impossible to consequently draw a respective line 
or to define respective criteria. Yet, it is noteworthy that such (clear) criteria for 
the necessary subsequent demarcations are expressly not provided by any (an-
alytical) IT of rights. The interest theorist will reply: There is such a criterion, 
namely only such beings can have rights which have or can have interests in 
the sense of some pre-normative aspiration inherent in the being in question. 
Accordingly, not all entities are possible right-holders. For instance, if one has 
a duty not to demolish a famous natural monument, it would be both linguis-
tically and theoretically dubious, bizarre even, to claim that the monument had 
a right not to be demolished, even if you were to see it as invested with intrin-
sic value. Nevertheless, the interest-criterion must remain vague at its edges as 
there are quite a few unclear cases. For instance, the case for animal rights is a 
157 Cf. George Rainbolt, “Rights as Normative Constraints on Others,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 53 (March 1993): 99. Rainbolt wishes to limit the concept of 
rights as “normative constraints” on others to claim-rights and immunities. The underlying 
reasoning is that from the traditional Hohfeldian positions only duties or disabilities restrict the 
options of conduct for B, which entails that only claim-rights and immunities could be advan-
tageous for A. Rainbolt’s argument is sharp, yet he overlooks the notion of active entitlements 
and the impossibility of describing such entitlements only in a language of duties/claim-rights 
(see above). Furthermore, despite his intention to remain neutral in the interest/choice-debate 
(ibid, 99), his focus on the advantageous aspect of duties without restriction to active rights 
ultimately makes Rainbolt’s theory an interest theory.
158 Kramer, “Refining the Interest Theory,” 34.
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heated contemporary debate.159 But even beyond that, what about the rights of 
nature, of certain plants, trees or even of national parks?160 We know, for in-
stance, that quite a few trees react to outside threats in a way that would not ex-
actly indicate a consciousness, but maybe something similar to a sense of pain 
and certainly some kind of inherent will to live, to survive. Thus, where is the 
line to be drawn then exactly? If it is not the ability to make decisions that de-
termines right-holders, is it a matter of species, of the ability to communicate, 
to feel pain, or simply of being a living creature? All these questions remain un-
determined under an analytical IT for further evaluation. Admittedly, as much 
is not a severe problem for IT insofar as it would make the theory any less con-
sistent in a stricter sense. Thus, justly, by Kramer the above-mentioned points 
are not regarded as a weakness in a stricter sense due to the fact that IT simply 
implies that there are further moral judgements necessarily to be made in order 
to determine who or what exactly should enjoy the advantage accompanied by 
having a right.161 However, with respect to the examples given above and in 
direct comparison with CT, IT at least appears less accessible and less feasible 
from the start to the applicant of a normative system – an argument against IT 
that we shall return to later on.
Furthermore, the problem of delimitation finds expression in another point: 
Even within a certain class of beings, e. g. of competent adult human beings, 
the question of whether someone is the holder of a right can often not be an-
swered clearly by reference to a certain rule, but requires an additional norma-
tive decision/demarcation. That is, from the actual normative content of a rule 
we cannot per se and in every case infer who has an advantage or is supposed 
to have an advantage from it, i. e. who the respective right-holder is supposed to 
be. However, this would only have to be regarded as a problem for IT if it want-
ed to make any justificatory determinations or specific preliminary judgements, 
which – even expressly in the case of Kramer’s version of IT – it does not and 
does not have to, either. In fact, if this point were to be regarded as a weakness 
of IT, CT would share it, because also with CT we cannot infer the existence of 
a right from the mere content of a rule. In order to determine the existence of 
a right under IT we need to ask ourselves ‘is there a duty for a person B?’ and 
subsequently ‘is the reason behind it appendant to right-holder A?’ as well as ‘is 
this reason the decisive, outweighing reason?’ For CT much the same applies. 
The mere existence of a permission is not enough to determine the existence of 
159 Cf. only Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of Cal-
ifornia Press, 2004).
160 Quite fascinatingly, in the summer of 2016 the state of New Zealand did indeed endow 
a national park with ‘legal personhood’, cf. Bryant Rousseau, “In New Zealand, Lands and 
Rivers Can Be People (Legally Speaking)”, New York Times on the Web, July 13, 2016, http://
www.nytimes.com/2016/07/14/world/what-in-the-world/in-new-zealand-lands-and-rivers-
can-be-people-legally-speaking.html.
161 Kramer, “Refining the Interest Theory,” 34–39.
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a right. Additionally, we need to ask ‘is there a corresponding duty to this per-
mission for B (or possibly a state of competition)?’ and more precisely ‘is this 
duty based on the fact that individual liberty as an abstract reason outweighs 
other abstract reasons in this case?’ Hence, the line of thought is much the same 
for both lines of theory. Both are in need of practical concretisation of their re-
spective concepts.
In that sense, the two more specific arguments against IT mentioned earlier – 
the cases of so-called ‘third-party beneficiaries’162 as well as the reverse cases, 
in which we usually assume an entity’s having a right, whilst it does not seem 
to have (sufficient) own interests to do so – are in fact mainly manifestations of 
this more general issue of practical delimitation, i. e. these ‘problems’ arise only 
due to the fact that further normative demarcations are necessary, which makes 
it more than doubtful whether these points can actually question the cogency of 
IT as a conceptual theory. Let us start with the so-called ‘third-party benefici-
aries’: In my view, for an interest theory properly understood such cases do not 
pose a problem at all, because any modest theory concerning a concept of rights 
does not even pretend to offer a tool in order to determine who actually has a 
right in each practical case, but it explicitly affirms the necessity to make further 
normative judgements in order to do so (see above). In other words, IT – just 
as well as CT, for that matter – describes what rights are and what they should 
be; it does not describe the conditions under which a specific right actually oc-
curs. That is, on the basis of a concept of rights we may never infer whether 
there is a right in a certain case and who has it merely from knowing the facts 
of the case. Otherwise we would be dealing with strictly substantive, justifica-
tory approaches. What one can accomplish with the aid of a concept of rights 
is to correctly denominate a right in the case where one knows all the relevant 
underlying value judgements. Back in our example case for ‘third-party benefi-
ciaries’, the reason for the promisor to make a payment towards the third party 
could simply be interpreted in different ways – and actual legal systems in fact 
do differ in their rules regarding such cases.163 One could either interpret it as 
only a contractual duty towards the promisee, in which case the reason would 
be appendant only to A, i. e. A would be the holder of the respective claim-right. 
Just as well one might interpret the case in a way that B has the duty to make 
the payment directly towards the intended ‘beneficiary’ D, who would then hold 
the respective claim-right. The point is: Both interpretations are possible within 
the framework of IT and could be adequately described by it. The question of 
which of the two interpretations is preferable is a substantive one and is simply 
162 David Lyons, Rights, Welfare, and Mill’s Moral Theory (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1994), 36–46.
163 Cf. Dennis Solomon, “Die Aufhebbarkeit der Drittberechtigung beim Vertrag zugun-
sten Dritter in rechtsvergleichender Perspektive,” in Festschrift für Harm Peter Westermann 
zum 70. Geburtstag (Köln: Schmidt, 2008).
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neither raised nor answered by IT. Thus, we can hardly regard it as a fault in the 
theoretical structure that it remains agnostic in this respect.164
Much the same applies for the reverse cases – for persons allegedly having 
rights, but no proper interests/reasons appendant to them. Reconsider the exam-
ple with journalist J from above: Suppose prosecutor P does have a duty not to 
force J to reveal his sources, whilst J has a permission to do so towards P. Sup-
pose further the reason for P’s duty is a reason appendant to S or simply a gen-
eral, non-appendant reason in order to maintain a functional society. That means 
we can infer that not J, but (at best) S holds a respective claim-right against 
prosecutor P. As much does not per se exclude the possibility, though, that J also 
holds a liberty. The question of whether J has such an additional liberty – that is, 
whether P has an additional respect duty – depends on whether J’s ‘interest’ to 
freely decide about the revelation of his sources is a sufficient, prevailing reason 
for a correlative duty. That is, would J’s autonomy taken by itself outweigh the 
public interest of finding the truth before the court? In the case where it would, J 
would have a right against P, namely a liberty. It is all but impossible to imagine 
P thus having duties towards both S and J or both S and J having a right towards 
P. Thus, each of the appendant reasons by itself would have to be regarded as a 
sufficient reason for the respective duty. Given this (positive) alternative there 
would be no problem for IT at all as J would have a right and IT would be able 
to adequately explain why. In the reverse case, if J’s autonomy were not regard-
ed as a sufficient reason to outweigh the public interest, IT would indeed, sim-
ilar to CT with the rights of the incompetent (see above), suffer from a linguistic 
inadequacy in the sense of a gulf between the proposed and common terminol-
ogy. Yet, also similar to CT, as much does not necessarily harm the consistency 
and cogency of IT as a conceptual theory of rights. In fact, the assumption that 
J has a right despite a lack of any actual personal advantage to him does seem 
a bit strange. Hence, IT might well be correct in demanding an adjustment of 
common language use for such cases.165
164 Regarding a certifiable divergence between subjective interest and right in such cases: 
This argument clearly presupposes a subjective concept of interests (D has a subjective interest 
to get the payment; I have a subjective interest in my spouse’s winning the lottery; etc.), which, 
as laid out earlier, is clearly defective; see above sec. III, 1., b), aa).
165 Things are even more clearly in favour of IT in the before unmentioned case of legal 
guardians. If a guardian G makes practical decisions on behalf of the entrusted person, e. g. 
entering into certain contracts, then again one might have worries about the divergence of the 
alleged right of the guardian to do so and the corresponding lack of one’s own interest. Yet, 
in these cases we even have reason to believe that it is G’s freedom of decision that is mainly 
protected, which would give her a right that also IT can account for. In other words, the reason 
to respect the exercise of freedom of decision by G is not directly the interest of the entrust-
ed person; however, to define what these best interests are precisely is assigned to G herself. 
Thus, it is the respective normative competence and G’s freedom to decide which is protected 
in such cases.
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Finally, what about the paternalistic implications of IT? In this respect we 
conceded earlier that IT does indeed imply the possibility of legal paternalism. 
Thus, importantly, we are dealing with possible, but certainly not necessary im-
plications. The paternalism-objection is based on the fact that IT, in sharp con-
trast to CT, allows for rights that are best described as ‘sole immunities’, i. e. a 
(normative) state of affairs in which an agent’s claim-right is protected by an 
immunity but precisely not by a power. Indeed, by allowing for rights to be ‘sole 
immunities’ of competent agents, IT also allows for the kind of (hard) paternal-
ism entailed by such a construction. On the other hand, IT is flexible enough to 
not let these be necessary implications, i. e. IT is compatible with paternalistic 
patterns of argument, but endorsing IT does not entail any endorsements regard-
ing substantive claims in favour of paternalism. In fact, employing an IT con-
cept one could even allow for ‘sole immunities’ to exist and at the same time not 
defer to paternalistic arguments insofar as the scope of such normative positions 
is restricted to non-competent right-holders like small children, animals, etc. In 
other words, the fact that IT allows for sole-immunity-rights does not entail that 
one has to endorse a foundational, substantive theory which promotes (hard) 
paternalism. By contrast, IT as presented here would be just as compatible with 
a decidedly anti-paternalistic substantive theory.
e) Methodological Classification and Evaluation 
of Interest and Choice Theory
Before making a final stand in the rights-debate, we shall first try to compare the 
results won so far regarding CT and IT rights with the possible methodological 
focusses a theory of rights can obtain. That is, we will ask ourselves: What if 
CT and IT were not (only) theories in search of an adequate concept of rights, 
which both expressly propose to be? What if instead we considered to what ex-
tent do they (also) function as purely descriptive or as justificatory theories? Put 
differently, and with respect to the distinct epistemological interests outlined 
before166: To what extent do IT and CT provide us with viable answers to only 
question (1.1), at least also with answers to question (2), and finally which theo-
ry offers the preferable answer with respect to our central, conceptual question 
(1), i. e. (1.1) plus (1.2)?
aa) As Purely Descriptive Theories
CT, limiting the language of rights to liberties and powers, certainly could not 
be regarded as a successful attempt for a purely descriptive theory of rights, i. e. 
delineating the scope of rights. It does not give an adequate answer to the ques-
166 See above sec. I, 1., a), bb).
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tion ‘what, out of all things, could possibly be called a right?’ Instead CT needs 
to be regarded as a purely conceptual approach – a rather demanding one even. 
IT on the other hand – with respect to the results it produces – offers a very pre-
cise answer to our methodological question (1.1) by including all four entitle-
ments without any further conceptual demands. In other words, IT above all 
very clearly delineates the necessary conditions for rights and could thus also 
(if not preferably) be interpreted as an attempt to render the scope of rights, not 
a proper concept.167 Thus, if we understood IT as a purely descriptive account, 
it would be in accordance with the original aims of the Hohfeldian endeavour, 
certainly much more so than CT possibly could. Accordingly, and as indicated 
earlier, it is not an uncommon claim that IT comprises CT in such a way that it 
offers the more fundamental account of rights or, put differently, that CT nec-
essarily needs to rely on the central tenets of IT.168 We now find that as much is 
true in case we understand IT as a purely descriptive account. As such its tenets 
are evidently necessary conditions for any plausible theory concerning a con-
cept of rights and thus also for any plausible CT concept. Yet, what IT would 
actually offer then is not a concept of rights, but only a rendering of the scope 
of the term. Importantly, this does not imply that IT does not or could not also 
work as a conceptual approach. In order to assume so, though, one would have 
to demonstrate that there are good reasons why the concept should be just as 
wide as the scope and that there are no better reasons against such a contention. 
We shall see whether and to what extent there are either way in the following 
section cc).
bb) As Substantive, Justificatory Theories
To what extent do both CT and IT imply any preliminary judgements, i. e. 
to what extent and why do they possibly possess a substantive, justificatory 
stance? Doubtlessly, both lines of theory are rooted in a strongly substantive, 
normatively pre-shaped tradition. Whilst CT stands in the tradition of classic 
liberalism and deontological ethics such as those offered by Kant, Savigny, etc., 
IT has traditionally been developed and defended by members of the opposed 
consequentialist camp such as Bentham, v. Jhering, et al. From this fact it is 
sometimes inferred that a debate about different concepts of rights is essentially 
normative in nature, that it is always also a dispute between different substan-
tive moral conceptions.169 This thesis shall be challenged, at least in this rigid 
form. My adverse thesis, as it has been indicated already, is that it is at least pos-
167 We remember: this seems to be what Kramer claimed all along by marking the fea-
tures for his ‘concept’ of rights “necessary though insufficient […]”, see above sec. III, fn. 127.
168 See above sec. III, fn. 143.
169 Gutmann, “Paternalismus und Konsequentialismus,” 58–59; id, Iustitia Contrahen-
tium, 34–35.
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sible and therefore ultimately preferable to formulate a modest, restrictive con-
cept of rights, one which entirely abstains from any practical normative impli-
cations – and that both CT and IT can be understood in such a modest way. That 
is, I suppose that by employing modest versions of IT or CT no necessary nor-
mative judgements have to be backed, even though certain minimal and indirect 
normative implications are inevitable.170 Yet, there are no hidden or disguised 
normative disputes carried out between the concepts of IT and CT if understood 
in the proposed way.171 Still, even the most restrictive version of CT will have 
to positively acknowledge the valuation of individual autonomy, i. e. the fact 
that individual autonomy is regarded as a principle. Hence, at least pure duty 
ethics are a priori excluded by endorsing CT. Yet, the same must apply for any 
interest theory, which in practice allows the existence of ‘autonomy rights’ as 
one type of rights amongst others, which presumably no interest theorist would 
deny.172 For instance, Rainbolt contends: “Sometimes [rights] are justified on 
autonomy grounds while in other cases they are justified on the basis of individ-
ual welfare”173. However, and importantly, this normative presupposition of CT 
does not entail any specific normative claims in the sense of concrete substan-
tive judgements. In other words, with a CT concept, if we knew a rule, we could 
determine whether there is a right, but knowing only the concept of rights we 
could never determine the rule.
Saying it is possible for such modest concepts to be formulated, it is implied 
that other kinds of concepts are possible as well, such as a CT concept of rights 
which not only describes protected decisions as rights but at the same time 
implies a ‘presumption in favour of freedom’ on the justificatory level, which 
emphasises a general substantive priority of individual freedom over other so-
cial goals or concerns of the community – in other words, a priority of the right 
over the good.174 The term ‘right’ can be understood in such a normatively 
charged – or one might say ‘political’ – way. Yet, such a concept would not be 
an adequate result of a conceptual inquiry with the aim of facilitating a norma-
tive discourse. To be clear: My point is not that such justificatory claims need to 
170 The term ‘modest’ is expressly not used in the sense Frank Jackson uses it to distin-
guish between modest and immodest conceptual analyses. See therefore the corresponding ar-
ticle by Kenneth Himma, “Immodesty in Dworkin’s ‘Third’ Theory: Modest Conceptual Anal-
ysis, Immodest Conceptual Analysis, and the Lines Dividing Conceptual and Other Kinds of 
Theory of Law,” in The Legacy of Ronald Dworkin, ed. Wil Waluchow and Stefan Sciaraffa 
(Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2465170.
171 Gutmann, “Paternalismus und Konsequentialismus,” 59; Gerald Postema, “In De-
fence of ‘French Nonsense’. Fundamental Rights in Constitutional Jurisprudence,” in Enlight-
enment, Rights and Revolution, ed. Neil MacCormick, and Zenon Bankowski (Aberdeen: Ab-
erdeen University Press, 1989), 128–129.
172 See esp. Raz, Morality of Freedom, 188 ff. Cf. also above sec. III, fn. 143.
173 Rainbolt, Concept of Rights, 115.
174 See inter alia John Rawls, “The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good,” Philosophy 
& Public Affairs 17 (1988).
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be rejected for having the function of justification, but they do need to be decid-
edly rejected as the content of any concept of rights, as the relation of freedom 
and social goods is exactly what we are supposed to argue about with the aid 
of concepts like that of ‘rights’. Thus, the term ‘rights’ certainly cannot already 
imply a general priority of individual freedom over other goods as this would 
obstruct the debate from the very start. If the concept of rights already entailed 
a priority of the right over the good, all those which do not share the view that 
such a priority exists are not even able to use the term, i. e. the two factions on 
the level of substantive moral philosophy described above175 would not even 
be able to speak the same language. Exactly this, a common language, is what 
conceptual inquiries ought to make possible, though. It could, of course, be the 
case that it was generally impossible to formulate a value-free concept of a nor-
matively charged term like ‘rights’. Yet, there is no perceptible explanation of 
why this should be the case in the first place, namely an answer to the question 
of why there is supposed to be no clear line to be drawn between the conceptual 
level – question (1.1) and (1.2) – and the justificatory one – question (2).176 My 
aim is to demonstrate that such a line can be drawn by employing the distinction 
between abstract reasons/principles and practical reasons/judgements, i. e. the 
idea of relating abstract reasons as introduced earlier.
Let us therefore shift our attention for a moment from the nature and pur-
poses of concepts to what it is that makes approaches substantive or ‘justificato-
ry’. The ultimate aim of any practical normative philosophy is to supply agents 
with (practical) reasons, to supply agents with answers to the question ‘what 
ought I to do?’ In other words, justificatory or substantive normative reasoning 
means the evaluation of certain actions or types of actions. Evaluating actions 
and producing practical reasons means prioritising principles, which is to say, 
defining relations between them.177 That is, in every perceivable case justifica-
tory reasoning means pre-forming judgements, i. e. defining relations of priority 
or precedence both concrete and general. Thus, conceptualisation as understood 
here could successfully contrast with justificatory approaches if it could dem-
onstrate avoiding any such judgements or any implications regarding relations 
of precedence between the involved principles.
Hence, what I propose is a distinction between two different kinds of con-
cepts of rights, depending on the concrete substantive implications they have: 
a neutral one and a normatively charged one.178 Importantly, the difference be-
175 That is, deontologists versus consequentialists. Or rather, a justificatory emphasis on 
individual freedom versus a respective emphasis on intersubjective goods. Cf. above sec. II, 
fn. 224.
176 See above sec. I, 1., a), bb).
177 See above sec. II, 4., b), bb).
178 One might also consider ‘modest’ and ‘immodest’ with regard to substantive impli-
cations. Importantly, though, the distinction introduced here is not at all equivalent, not even 
similar to that introduced by Jackson – and thereon following Himma – between modest and 
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tween the two cannot be found by investigating rights as practical reasons (see 
above). In this respect both CT rights and IT rights do imply a certain prev-
alence of rights. If we say a practical CT right exists, it is implied that individ-
ual autonomy outweighs other considerations in this specific case. If we say a 
practical IT right exists we just as well imply a priority of the respective ab-
stract appendant reason. The difference lies elsewhere, namely on the level of 
principles: A neutral or modest concept of rights has no further normative im-
plications because it does not imply an a priori prevalence of one good over 
another already on this abstract level. In contrast, a normatively charged or 
immodest concept does imply such an abstract priority. Traditionally, amongst 
choice theorists the assumption of a general, justificatory priority of individual 
autonomy has been and is all but uncommon (see above). Yet, we do not have 
to understand a choice conception in that way. As an abstract ‘right to freedom’ 
we could just as well take individual autonomy as one reason amongst many 
others. The same applies for IT: At least some versions of IT seem to imply a 
general priority of such abstract reasons that are supposed to be rights; rights are 
thus usually regarded as somehow weightier reasons than others, as some kind 
of normative “threshold weights”179. However, also here we could refer to the 
abstract appendant value as only one reason amongst others without implying 
any increased weight or higher priority only due to the fact that this reason is 
referred to as a ‘right’.
Now, what makes the neutral understanding of a concept of rights preferable 
to the ‘normatively charged’ one? Essentially, it is the indifferent applicability 
in normative debate. Additionally, there are other strong intra-theoretical rea-
sons not to rely on a normatively charged concept for each line of theory.180 For 
CT the claim for an abstract priority of autonomy over social concerns on a con-
ceptual level would lead to defects of liberal and especially libertarian theories 
that were (at least in parts) correctly pointed out and aptly criticised by theorists 
like Sandel, Taylor, et al.181 Without wanting to endorse a ‘communitarian’ po-
immodest concepts, see already above sec. III, fn. 170. Himma presents the concept pair as 
differing with regard to the epistemological interests. As said before, I only aim at a differen-
tiation with regard to substantive implications. Thus, even though generally worthy of further 
consideration, we cannot and need not dwell further on Jackson’s account as his project was 
one fundamentally different from ours.
179 Dworkin, TRS, 92. See also Gutmann, Iustitia Contrahentium, 40, with further refer-
ences. Cf. also: Thomson’s ‘High-Threshold-Thesis’ (Thomson, Realm of Rights, 166–167); 
Koller, Theorie des Rechts, 252.
180 Note that the following arguments are principally also general arguments against the 
(pre-) theoretical accuracy of such concepts, cf. below sec. cc), (3). As they entirely fail with 
respect to the criterion of normative inclusivity – see below sec. cc), (2) – it seems reasonable 
already at first glance to focus on the neutral/modest variants of both lines of theory in deter-
mining a concept of rights.
181 See inter alia: Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 2nd ed. (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 1–10, 135–141, 175–178; Charles Taylor, “Atom-
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sition and all of its possibly problematic implications here, it appears clear from 
what we have learned so far that virtually every intersubjective duty that is not 
grounded in the mere respect for another’s autonomy means an outweighing of 
autonomy by some other intersubjective principle. Thus, if we would presup-
pose an abstract priority of autonomy over other goods already on the concep-
tual level, we would in a way disguise the fact that we actually need to decide in 
which cases autonomy and in which cases some other social good should pre-
vail. In other words, a general priority of autonomy, a ‘suspicion in favour of 
freedom’ (see above) might be a reasonable claim on the justificatory level, yet 
employing a CT concept with such an a priori implication bears the imminent 
danger of promoting an excessive individualisation, a too extensive disentan-
glement of the individual from its social context, and consequently neglect for 
the necessary conciliation between concerns of the individual and concerns of 
the community on the substantive level.
On the other hand, a normatively charged interest theory would suffer from 
a similar and equally severe problem. By implying an abstract priority of such 
abstract reasons that are labelled as ‘rights’ over other reasons, such a con-
cept would encourage a development that can already be witnessed in norma-
tive practice and has been regularly detected by legal theorists: the inflation 
of rights, as indicated by the increasing prevalence of rights talk.182 If even 
to have an abstract right meant having a somewhat weightier, better reason on 
one’s side, it is only understandable that people will try to label their concerns, 
their own or those which they advocate, as ‘rights’. Thus, the strictly substan-
tive matter of which interests/values should prevail in a certain context is veiled 
and relocated to the conceptual level. In other words, it is no longer a question 
of who has the better arguments or reasons on their side, but it more and more 
becomes a matter of who has a right and who does not. Such a disguising of 
substantive questions as conceptual ones is certainly counterproductive and not 
tolerable for a sophisticated normative debate.
To conclude: If we understand IT and CT in the proposed neutral or mod-
est way, we are able to draw a distinct line between conceptual and justificato-
ry approaches – the former being of the kind that they do not entail any state-
ments of normative priority on the level of principles. In this sense, the dispute 
between IT and CT can be understood as a purely conceptual one without any 
practical implications. As much is preferable, because the normatively charged 
ism,” in Philosophical Papers Vol. 2. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 188–
189. Cf. also Mary-Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse 
(New York: Free Press, 1991), 109 ff. For an introduction to libertarian ideas and the respective 
understanding of freedom (in German) see Peter Rohs, “Libertarianische Freiheit,” in Auf Frei-
gang, ed. Sibille Mischer, Michael Quante, and Christian Suhm (Münster: Lit, 2003).
182 Loren Lomasky, Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1987), 3 ff., 224; Rowan Cruft, “Beyond Interest Theory and Will Theory?” Law 
and Philosophy 23 (2004): 347, with further references.
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concepts would not only obstruct the substantive debate, but would also entail 
serious theoretical problems either way. The consequent substantive questions 
regarding what actually makes rules just are not affected by the dispute on the 
conceptual level. On the justificatory level (at least in Western philosophy) there 
remains a clash between two fundamental positions: one side standing in the 
liberal tradition of Kant, Rawls, et al., taking the individual and its autonomy as 
its theoretical starting point, grasping law as the reciprocal compatibility of in-
dividual spheres of freedom, and demanding a general priority of the right over 
the good, its rival standing in the consequentialist tradition of Bentham and Mill 
trying to base rules on the well-understood (objective/intersubjective) interests 
of individuals, imposing a priority of the good over the right. Presumably, both 
would have to be regarded as misconceived insofar as they were to claim a gen-
eral logical priority in terms of theory of either freedom over intersubjective 
goods or goods over freedom. Theoretically, there can be no such general prior-
ity, certainly not in the sense of pre-theoretical explicability of one phenome-
non by means of the other, as freedom of decision (the right) and substantive 
reasons for actions (the good) are interdependent on a meta-ethical level. That 
is, in the relation between individual and society it is an undoubtable practical 
necessity to constantly prioritise between individual freedom (in the form of 
permissions) on the one hand and predefined reasons (in the form of obligations 
and prohibitions) on the other. In normative practice this priority is established 
in the form of practical reasons that are in constant need of refinement. Hence, 
the difference between the opposing kinds of substantive moral theory does not 
lie in per se incompatible, yet fundamental theoretical structures. In fact, they 
do lay a different justificatory emphasis on common general structural ideas. 
The liberal tradition emphasises the notion of autonomy or the individual’s po-
tential to exert normative competence, whilst consequentialism emphasises the 
notion of reasons or the idea of authoritatively imposed content.183 The focus 
183 In fact, with respect to the individual being, consequentialism as a theory family 
usually emphasises the notion of beneficence in the sense of an intended well-being. As a 
short side note, it shall be insinuated why and to what extent such a reasoning is objectionable. 
Bluntly, if we suppose a notion of ‘intended well-being’ it is a just question to raise whose in-
tentions exactly should play a role here. In this respect, consequentialist theories tend to ignore 
the individual’s side and the just demands for consideration of his or her subjective preferences 
in the process of justifying rules. Supposedly, these theories do so by presupposing the legiti-
macy of an active, rule-issuing authority merely by virtue of its derivation, not by virtue of the 
reasons the authority provides in normative discourse. Ultimately, that leaves the individual 
as passive with regard to the definition of his or her own well-being – a subject to the will of 
the authority. In fact, such an understanding is already implied in the Latin stem for the Eng-
lish term ‘beneficence’, as the Latin ‘bene facere’ literally means ‘doing good’. Hence, the 
term suggests a relation of someone doing good and others receiving it. The meta-theoretical 
problem of a struggle for the proper definition of what is ‘good’ in the first place, for the proper 
perspective in doing so, is thus better captured by the more neutral expression ‘advantageous-
ness’. For the terminological issue cf. above sec. I, fn. 27. For a more precise rendering of the 
meta-theoretical problem just mentioned see esp. below sec. III, 2., e), cc), (3), (c).
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and emphasis of these theories may differ, but there is surely no pre-justificato-
ry priority of autonomy over reasons or vice versa. Ultimately, all substantive 
theories have to work with the same basic meta-theoretical tools. They all need 
to strike a balance between the individual citizen and social concerns, between 
individual freedom of decision and prescribed reasons.184 As substantive theo-
ries, both schools are doing the same, namely issuing permissions and duties in 
a way that is regarded as overall just in the internal logic of the practice. In this 
respect different substantive approaches can, do, and will dissent regarding the 
problem of to what extent individual freedom is necessary for a good, peaceful, 
prosperous social coexistence; however, they should not deviate with regard to 
the underlying meta-theoretical structures. In short, to determine a modest con-
cept of rights is naturally only the first step. On the justificatory level we then 
need to decide precisely just how important rights are to us.185
cc) As Conceptual Theories
What exactly is it then that makes any concept of rights a good one? What de-
termines the quality of such concepts? And how do the different criteria for the 
concept’s overall quality relate to the two concepts of rights which we just out-
lined? Properly applied, the very purpose of conceptual inquiries in normative 
philosophy is to reverse the reasoning from theory to corresponding concept. 
Thus, the aim is first to establish and generally agree upon a common termi-
nology in order to then be able to discuss an adequate substantive, foundational 
theory. Accordingly, a concept needs to meet certain requirements. The extent 
to which a concept fulfils these requirements coincidently offers reasons/argu-
ments for the decision in favour of one concept and against another with respect 
to programmatic question (1.2). Essentially, these at times reverse aims or pur-
poses or ‘conceptual reasons’ are (1) linguistic adequacy, (2) normative inclu-
sivity, and (3) meta-theoretical accuracy.186 In detail:
184 Thereby, it does not matter whether this justificatory process is described as a weigh-
ing, an appreciation of values (German: Abwägung) or as a demarcation of spheres or domains 
of freedom (German: Abgrenzung). The latter is the preferred language of those who see in-
dividual freedom as the default and intersubjective reasons as restricting autonomy. The form-
er is the language of those regarding intersubjective values as primary and consequently in-
dividual autonomy as one value amongst others.
185 The notion of a normatively neutral concept as presented here thus follows in the foot-
steps of Hart, who considered the aim of his ‘descriptive jurisprudence’ a demystification of 
law, see Hart, “Demystification of Law”. Analogously, normatively neutral concepts of rights 
aim at a demystification of rights. Normative problems need to be solved and decisions need 
to be made independent of mere conceptual questions. It should never be of importance alone 
whether we describe something as a right, but essentially the respective normative weight of 
the reasons involved should matter. Thus, especially a neutral CT in the tradition of Hart stands 
for a conscious discharging of a normatively charged concept with the primary aim of a ration-
alisation of the language of law and thereby (hopefully) a rationalisation of law itself.
186 This categorisation and the ensuing investigation – especially the distinction between 
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(1) Linguistic or Practical Adequacy
The first possible benefit of a concept of rights is its compatibility with the ac-
tual usage of the term. In other words, being as close as possible to the scope 
of the term needs to be considered as a quality feature of the concept. This 
might appear strange in light of the fact that we explicitly divided questions 
(1.1) and (1.2) in the first place. Yet, if we understand linguistic adequacy as 
not the, but only one quality feature of concepts, we detect no inconsistency 
whatsoever. Hence, in terms of being an argument for one possible concept and 
against others, a concept’s accordance with the term’s scope is simply an en-
tirely acceptable pragmatic one. The question in this context is: To what extent 
do speakers of the language have to adjust their usage of the term? The (valid) 
claim for linguistic or practical adequacy thus amounts to the following: The 
smaller the necessary adjustments, the better.187 Evidently, IT is preferable to 
CT in this respect. Even though both lines of theory know cases in which the 
practical usage of the term right might have to be aligned with the theory (see 
above), IT can accord for many more practical manifestations of the term than 
CT, especially for central, intuitive ones like rights of the incompetent, of small 
children, elderly or handicapped people, certain animal rights, etc. Hence, prac-
tical adequacy is a strong argument in favour of IT.
(2) Normative Inclusivity or Normative Neutrality
The second criterion is again concerned with the idea of a concept being appli-
cable for as many people as possible – yet this time not in the sense of a practi-
cal habit which ideally should not at all or only at best minimally be changed, 
but in the sense of being compatible with as many substantive moral theories, as 
many conceivable justificatory approaches as possible. Thus, in order to be suit-
ed for or to be deployable in a general normative discourse, the concept should 
imply minimal evaluative presuppositions, i. e. should require as few abstract 
values and concrete evaluative decisions as possible. With the restriction ‘as 
few … as possible’ it is implied that inclusivity need not and must not go at the 
expense of the explanatory adequacy of the term, i. e. the restrictiveness with 
regard to implied reasons should only go so far as the implied normative claims 
remain contested. All entirely uncontested normative claims could and should 
indeed be part of the concept. As indicated earlier, the appreciation of the in-
(1) and (3) and their relation with respect to the dispute between CT and IT – in many ways 
draws on the outstanding analysis of Leonard Sumner (Sumner, MF, 95 ff.). Note that I am 
surely not trying to offer a conclusive account regarding the nature of concepts; the follow-
ing implications should be read as merely a selection of thoughts and remarks on the nature 
and purpose of concepts, especially of theoretical normative concepts like ‘rights’ – thoughts 
which should be seen as an invitation for further debate.
187 Cf. Sumner, MF, 49–50.
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dividual’s freedom to decide one’s own fate as a general principle (at least one 
amongst others) can be regarded as truly pervasive – even among proponents 
of IT. Thus, the inclusion of this abstract principle into one’s concept of rights 
presumably does not harm the concept’s normative inclusivity.188
Ultimately, neither IT nor CT can be regarded as more inclusive than the 
other. Correctly interpreted neither of the two implies any concrete normative 
judgements or any general priority of principles (see above). Both IT and CT 
are equally agnostic with regard to specific value judgement and thus both (in 
theory) equally applicable as meta-theoretical concepts in normative discourse. 
Hence, ‘normative neutrality’ is no argument for either side. In order to illus-
trate this normative neutrality of both IT and CT, let us return once more to the 
example of paternalism from above. There we claimed that a modest IT would 
be compatible with both paternalistic and strictly anti-paternalistic substantive 
theories. Importantly, much the same applies for a modest CT of rights. It does 
not per se exclude substantive paternalistic theories. In fact, hard paternalism is 
compatible with a CT concept of rights as well, only the reasons for paternalis-
tic measures could never be regarded as ‘rights’ under CT, but would have to 
be presented as respective duties of the person acted towards paternalistically. 
Thus, on the one hand we find the criticism levelled at IT debilitated: IT is not 
necessarily more paternalistic than CT. On the other hand, the example case 
does point to a subjacent difficulty with IT. Its concept of rights proves to be 
theoretically vague and indistinct. Whilst it is not problematic that it is wide 
enough to allow for paternalistic patterns of arguments, it is surely problem-
atic that its concept of rights to a certain degree loses its contours by allowing 
for cases in which there is a conflict between different (sets of) rights for the 
very same entity/person. For instance, consider this standard example for prob-
lematic, paternalistic reasoning: A wants to end her own life. The question is: 
Should she be allowed to relieve others of their duty not to end her life or not? 
This issue describes a conflict between an alleged power of A’s in contrast to an 
alleged sole immunity. From the point of view of the competent authority this 
conflict can also be described as a one between different principles (autonomy 
versus welfare/beneficence). Thus, there is nothing strictly wrong with IT in 
terms of meta-theoretical structures. But we do need to ask ourselves whether 
it is sensible to describe this conflict as ‘conflict of rights’ of the same individ-
ual or rather as a conflict between a subjective right (to freely exert control over 
one’s own life) and an intersubjectively imposed duty (to preserve one’s own 
life) as CT would suggest. We will return to this question in much more depth 
in the following sections. Already I may insinuate that it is more than doubtful 
188 Only pure duty-based ethics are precluded from the start by accepting a CT concept – 
a fact which historically is all but surprising, as in times of purely duty-based ethics the notion 
of individual ‘rights’ was entirely unfamiliar to those engaged in normative reasoning. Cf. only 
Edmundson, Rights, 4 ff. See also below sec. cc), (3), (c).
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whether there are any valid theoretical or meta-theoretical reasons in favour of 
IT in this respect.
(3) Meta-theoretical Accuracy
Finally, there is one final, rather important goal that an ideal concept of rights 
ought to achieve. Not only should such a concept accord to practical usage and 
enable us to indiscriminately engage in substantive discourse. Ideally, it should 
also pre-shape the consequent normative debate and the resultant substantive 
theories in a sensible manner.189 A good concept should be to some degree help-
ful in the design of a proper substantive, normative theory of justice. Therefore, 
one aim of a concept needs to be to describe and trace important meta-theoret-
ical structures as accurately as possible. In other words, by making a concep-
tual claim we draw a line between properties we decide to call rights and those 
which consequently are not. For this demarcation we need reasons. The reasons 
for choosing one concept over the other are not exhausted by claims for linguis-
tic adequacy and normative inclusivity, but if our ultimate aim is to establish an 
adequate substantive theory, i. e. a proper theory of justice, we merely make a 
general debate about such a theory possible by ensuring the concept’s norma-
tive inclusivity. Yet, we can do more than that. We can support and facilitate the 
substantive debate by directing it into the right channels from the start with the 
terminological demarcation proposed.
This now leads us to ask which of the rival concepts does a better job at trac-
ing necessary meta-theoretical structures? Let us begin by roughly sketching 
the arguments to be scrutinised henceforth: First, CT does a rather compelling 
job in this respect by drawing the line between rights and non-rights analo-
gously to the line between permissions and duties, between individual com-
petence and prescribed, intersubjective normative content. If we would under-
stand only powers and liberties as rights, then we could demarcate a quite clear 
dichotomy between rights on the one hand and duties on the other. Regarding a 
certain action any person/agent would then either have a right (liberty or power) 
or a duty. Thereby this dichotomy exists under the sole condition that individual 
autonomy is regarded as a principle within the normative system in question, 
because only in that case every permission would necessarily be a right (see 
above).190 The agent in question might not have this right towards every other 
agent but would at least towards the norm issuer/the state (see above). Hence, 
CT “enables us to draw boundaries within a rule system in an illuminating 
189 Cf. Sumner, MF, 52: “[…] one conception might be functionally more adequate than 
another if it is better adapted to serving some important conceptual or theoretical purpose”.
190 The connection is said to be only ‘quite clear’ because on the side of permissions we 
left out ‘unprotected permissions’ in bipolar relations, which we consciously chose not to refer 
to as ‘rights’.
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way”191. Moreover, by implying a content-wise distinction between the value of 
individual autonomy and other intersubjective values, it enables us to accurately 
describe a necessary, pre-substantive stress ratio regarding the justification of 
normative content, namely between the community as a whole represented by 
its authority and the individual, both of which are generally able to make their 
own decisions. CT rights thus function as an argumentative counterweight to 
and a justification hurdle for authoritative considerations in this stress ratio. IT 
on the other hand fails on a broad scale to provide meaningful meta-theoretical 
insights. The only thing that it does provide is a differentiation between rights 
as appendant reasons and other kinds of reasons. In comparison, this does not 
seem anywhere near as important as the distinctions that CT traces.192 In detail 
as follows:
Sumner writes: “Rights on the choice conception […] enable us to distin-
guish between two grounds for imposing constraints on others: the protection 
of individual autonomy and the protection of individual welfare”193. For a start, 
I believe he is entirely correct. Yet, there is more to CT rights than just that. The 
particular strength of the choice conception includes not only, as Sumner sug-
gests, its ability to distinguish between two kinds of normative protection by 
means of imposing different kinds of duties/constraints on others, i. e. in fact its 
ability to distinguish between different kinds of content, but also the ability to 
clearly distinguish within one system between authoritatively imposed content 
on the one hand and areas of individual competence on the other.194 Addition-
ally, by distinguishing between the two aforementioned kinds of content (auto-
nomy and welfare), CT terminologically reframes a central, pre-justificatory 
stress ratio, namely between community and individual with the community’s 
191 Sumner, MF, 53. Yet, for reasons to be laid out presently, Sumner errs in consequently 
asserting that “the interest conception could plausibly claim that it too draws lines in a theoret-
ically fruitful way” (ibid). Cf. also Leonard Sumner, “Rights,” in Blackwell Guide to Ethical 
Theory, ed. Hugh LaFollette (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2000), 295.
192 Sumner, MF, 96–97.
193 Ibid, 98.
194 The reason why both claims are consistent lies in the dialectics of content and compe-
tence; see already above sec. III, fn. 99. In every case an (active) right will be a protected area 
of individual decision making, which does not necessarily entail that it only exists because a 
certain personal authority assigned it to the right-holder. Thus, we would understand the sov-
ereign’s decision as an ultimate justification. One could do so, yet it is equally possible to re-
gard the ‘original human right’ of freedom/autonomy (see above sec. III, fn. 71) as an original, 
intrinsic reason, which – at least in a certain area – would as such be immune to the sovereign’s 
decisions. In other words, the most problematic issue regarding the proper justification of 
rights is not and cannot be settled in this context. Whether one regards their status as an orig-
inal one (autonomy as an intrinsic value) or as a derived one (rights assigned by the authority, 
wherever deemed appropriate) is not of importance for determining a concept of rights as such. 
Cf. Gutmann, “Paternalismus und Konsequentialismus,” 58–59. In any case rights will serve 
as the individual’s means to argue for and to claim more freedom and responsibility and less 
authoritative restraints on conduct.
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authority addressing rules at agents, who are themselves capable of making 
their own decisions. In a way, this is a conflict of competing potential compe-
tences. Employing a CT concept, the notion of rights then helps us to explain 
and stress the individual’s position in this conflict. Rights are thus something 
the individual is endowed with, something which he or she can claim, against 
or in contrast to the exertion of authoritative power. Importantly, despite the im-
plied terminological distinction between different kinds of content, it is a de-
cisive benefit of CT that it draws the conceptual dividing line between rights 
and non-rights essentially along the line between acts of individual competence 
and duties as predefined normative demands. IT, on the other hand, draws this 
line much further out,195 based on the intuitive insight that rights are something 
which people are better off with than without. Notably, the fact that IT draws the 
conceptual line further does not necessarily mean that IT per se cannot explain 
the difference highlighted by CT. Within IT we could simply think of rights as 
the generic term and then further differentiate types of rights. For instance, it is 
all but uncommon to differentiate between autonomy-rights (liberties and pow-
ers) and welfare-rights (claims and immunities). Thus, it might seem that by 
employing an IT concept we can make sense not only of the distinction between 
specific appendant reasons (relational duties) in contrast to other practical rea-
sons (non-relational duties), but it seems IT can also draw a line between the ex-
ercise of freedom and other more basic forms of rights.196 Notably, the former 
is a distinction which CT’s concept of rights does not imply, let alone even try 
to explain or reframe. Provided there is indeed a meaningful difference between 
appendant and non-appendant reasons (which is at least not impossible), ulti-
mately that would make IT not only an equally convincing, but even a prefera-
ble theory in terms of meta-theoretical accuracy. However, there are a number 
of powerful arguments which speak against IT and thus in favour of CT in this 
respect, which shall be scrutinised in the following.
(a) Lack of Feasibility through Indeterminateness
To begin with, let me try to sharpen a thought introduced earlier: IT’s alleged 
lack of feasibility as a concept. As indicated, CT conceptually distinguishes 
between protected permissions on the one hand and obligations/prohibitions 
on the other. Hence, it draws a conceptual line between rights and non-rights 
analogous to that between acts of individual competence and prescribed nor-
mative content in normative systems that generally value individual autonomy. 
IT draws this line in the realm of content alone, i. e. between different kinds 
of reasons. In other words, it presupposes different types of reasons without a 
priori specifying these reasons. Accordingly, the difference between the two is 
195 Sumner, MF, 100.
196 Ibid, 98.
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that CT’s concept can be applied without much further ado, because in its case 
the underlying reason in question is unambiguous: As we saw, it can only be in-
dividual autonomy. IT on the other hand, with its implied claim that rights are 
simply reasons amongst others, lacks feasibility precisely by lacking prior crite-
ria to distinguish those reasons which are supposed to be rights from others. The 
only criterion it does provide, namely the ‘appendance’ of such reasons deemed 
rights, appears rather meaningless in terms of meta-theoretical structures. Why, 
in fact, should it be of any importance? Practically, with regard to the content 
of the duty in question, it does not make any difference whether we are deal-
ing with a directional or a non-directional duty. As much would and could only 
make a difference if rights were a priori weightier reasons, a possibility we ex-
plicitly denied by discrediting normatively charged concepts beforehand (see 
above). Apart from that, the (moral or legal) reasons behind not hurting another 
person and behind not destroying a monument or not cutting down a very old 
tree might be regarded as reasons different in kind. Yet, is it sensible, let alone 
necessary, to a priori distinguish between the two terminologically? In other 
words, is the proposed distinction important enough to justify the label rights or 
do we thereby rather disguise more important meta-theoretical structures? And 
which structures exactly would they be?
(b) The Structural Problem of Interest Theory with Regard to Paternalism
In order to approach these questions, we shall, for the third time already, pick 
up the problem of paternalism. Earlier we clarified that neither a normatively 
neutral IT nor an equally neutral CT entail any positive or negative implications 
with respect to the substantive problem of paternalism. A justification as well as 
a critique of paternalistic measures can be established only by way of substan-
tive normative reasoning. However, the possibility of criticising IT in this con-
text goes well beyond the accusation that IT has substantive paternalistic impli-
cations, which correctly understood it does not; yet, one may point out that by 
employing an IT concept, in contrast to its rival CT concept, due to the nature 
of IT rights one will be less able197 to leverage a critique of paternalism. That 
is, IT does not acknowledge and does not provide for the fact that paternalism 
is a problem, which is in need of a resolution on the justificatory level. In order 
to make this point plausible we need to show two things, namely that (aa) pater-
nalism represents a necessary, meta-theoretical problem to be solved one way 
or another by any substantive theory and that (bb) IT is structurally less able to 
account for this problem.198 In detail as follows: (aa) Any normative community 
consists of a certain number of capable agents. The intersubjective rules within 
this community are usually provided by some personal authority, for instance a 
197 Duly note: less able, not strictly unable.
198 Cf. Gutmann, “Paternalismus und Konsequentialismus”.
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sovereign single ruler (a king, a dictator, etc.), a democratically elected parlia-
ment, a religious leader, a divine entity, etc. This authority decides certain nor-
mative issues, and thus it provides reasons/predefined normative demands for 
the agents within the community. However, in order to be able to decide in fa-
vour of these reasons in the first place, in order to follow the imposed normative 
demands, each agent needs to be capable of making decisions him- or herself. 
Thus, due to their own decision-making ability every agent must by definition 
be able to disagree with a predefined judgement, claiming that he or she could 
have judged just as well or even better by him- or herself. Hence, in any con-
ceivable normative community there is a necessary, meta-theoretical stress ratio 
between the rivalling abilities of the authority and of the individual to judge a 
certain action. As indicated earlier, there is a stress ratio between two kinds of 
potential competences. Reconsider the paternalism-example from above: Sup-
pose A is not permitted to command over her own life, thus she is not permitted 
to give her consent to any form of euthanasia. Furthermore, A is generally re-
garded as an autonomous agent, capable of making her own decisions and thus 
possibly being responsible for their outcomes. We can understand a rule that for-
bids others to comply with A’s explicit death wish in only two ways: Either A is 
no longer regarded as capable under certain circumstances. However, then we 
are not dealing with ‘paternalism’ as a problem in the first place, as paternalism 
presupposes an interference with a person’s autonomy.199 Or we suppose that 
A was generally capable of making a decision in this case, only that her deci-
sion would have been a somehow flawed one. Then we discover the conflict de-
scribed before: The relevant authority, the lawmaker makes a judgement about 
a normative issue with respect to A’s own well-being, whereas A could have 
also made such a judgement. Now, it is possible, of course, that there are better 
and worse reasons to do certain things; this is a matter for evaluation. But once 
we agree that the person A in question is still able to decide for herself, there is 
a clash between competing capabilities to decide, to judge. There is a conflict 
between different reasons and one needs to decide which should enjoy priority: 
the intersubjective or the subjective definition of the good in this case. (bb) Now, 
why and to what extent is IT less capable of describing this structural conflict of 
competing competences regarding the same normative issue? The reason is IT’s 
unilateral focus on the dimension of content. By referring only to the reasons 
for duties, the rights-concept of IT overemphasises the advantageous aspect of 
rights. Thereby it is able to include a wide variety of different rights, which in 
turn leads to its inability to distinguish through or by means of its concept be-
tween elements that are or are supposed to be advantageous for the right-holder 
due to an imposed judgement and such elements that are advantageous due to 
the (protected) permission to judge by oneself. Once again, this does not imply 
199 G. Dworkin, “Paternalism”.
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that IT produces worse practical results nor that one could not otherwise criticise 
paternalism or paternalistic reasoning despite employing an IT concept. Only 
one could certainly not employ the concept itself as a means to criticise pater-
nalism, which in turn one is able to do with CT rights. In other words, IT is less 
viable in terms of describing the problem of paternalism because for IT, to have 
a right simply means to enjoy an advantageous position, regardless of whether 
this advantage is autonomous, paternalistic or anything else. For CT to have a 
right means to obtain a means against authoritative implementations.200 Thus, 
CT rights are anti-paternalistic by nature – only in the sense, though, that it is 
impossible to have a ‘right’ with an underlying paternalistic reasoning given CT, 
whilst it is not so under IT. In turn, we could have paternalism in a normative sys-
tem that works with CT rights, only the relevant authoritative measures would 
then prescribe respective duties for the agent acted paternalistically towards.
(c) The Emergence of Rights or Right-Based versus Pure Duty Ethics
Ultimately, the inability of IT to account for the central stress ratio between 
individual and authoritative competence goes well beyond the rather specific 
problem of paternalism, where we are by definition only concerned with nor-
mative issues regarding the individual well-being of one specific person, i. e. 
put bluntly, cases in which the state claims to know better what is good for this 
person. Moreover, the stress ratio between authoritative and individual claims 
for competence can in fact be regarded as pervasive within any intersubjective 
normative system.
Once more: It is one of the central theoretical benefits of CT that by em-
ploying its concept of rights (in contrast to other concepts like duties, virtues, 
etc.) one is able to account for the above-mentioned stress ratio. As indicated 
earlier, CT rights thus serve as a means for individuals in the struggle for free-
dom and against authoritative power. Let us dwell on this thought by inves-
tigating the history, the genesis of rights.201 Where did rights come from? Why 
were there no rights before and, consequently, what were they needed for in the 
first place? As much shall become clear by a thorough comparison of purely 
duty-based ethics with those ones that more or less rely on a notion of rights, 
which practically all contemporary and reasonably developed normative com-
200 Cf. above the remarks on the role and function of liberties in general, sec. III, 1., b), 
bb), (2), (c).
201 Well-written introductions to the history of the concept of rights include the following: 
Thomas Gutmann, “Normenbegründung als Lernprozess? Zur Tradition der Grund- und Men-
schenrechte,” in Von der religiösen zur säkularen Begründung staatlicher Normen, ed. Tho-
mas Gutmann, Ludwig Siep, Bernhard Jakl, and Michael Städtler (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
2012); Helmut Coing, “Zur Geschichte des Begriffs “subjektives Recht”,” in Das subjective 
Recht und der Rechtsschutz der Persönlichkeit, ed. Helmut Coing, Frederick Lawson, and Kurt 
Grönfors (Frankfurt a. M.: Metzner, 1959); Finnis, Natural Law, 206 ff.
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munities do. Hence, the central question that any rights advocate needs to ask 
himself is: What do we need rights for in comparison and contrast with duties? 
More precisely: What is the decisive aspect about rights that cannot and could 
not be adequately represented in a language that is exclusively based on duties, 
directional and/or non-directional? What was the decisive development in nor-
mative reasoning through the emergence of rights, for which a pure language of 
duties did not suffice? Notably, the following remarks will first focus on pure 
duty ethics and should not be read as a critique of IT. We will work out why and 
to what extent IT does not account for the specific function of rights thereafter.
When speaking of ‘pure duty ethics’ we need to distinguish two things care-
fully: (1) The meta-theoretical claim that it is possible to conclusively define 
the nature of normative relations solely in terms of the content of the duty or 
duties implied and (2) a substantive normative account that only uses the logic 
and the language of duties in order to justify rules such as traditional relig-
ious ethics202. Presumably, both the meta-theoretical claim and the substantive 
normative theory are objectionable. In short, whilst thesis (1) is plain false, a 
theory like one described under (2) is at least inadequate because it does not ac-
count for the specific function of rights which lies in the process of justification 
of rules as an argumentative counterweight to authoritative power.203 In detail: 
Thesis (1) is false, because a pure language of duties could only draw on the fact 
that agents are capable of making decisions in order to explain the side of the 
obligated party and possibly of those parties that have a direct advantage by vir-
tue of those duties. The fact that the reason for the correlative duties of liberties 
and powers is the permission of the right-holder itself, i. e. the reciprocity of two 
action evaluations with active entitlements, cannot be adequately captured in a 
bare logic of duties (see above). Furthermore, a substantive ethical theory that 
forgoes the notion of rights is inadequate, because it misses out on the important 
justificatory impetus that this notion usually entails. Here we need to be careful: 
I (still) do not claim that the concept of rights implies any concrete, substantive 
judgements. The concept itself is normatively neutral. Yet, in making use of the 
concept its practical function is often a specific justificatory one. Namely, rights 
are claimed in order to defend the principle of individual autonomy against au-
thoritative considerations. In order to elucidate these thoughts, let us attend to 
traditional pure duty ethics, e. g. any traditional religious ethics: In the respec-
tive normative systems there are a number of positive and negative duties plus 
a number of plain permissions. Hence, what traditional duty ethics strictly do 
not contain is autonomy as a good worthy of protection. The emergence of the 
202 Due to immense changes in normative language and the justification of moral rules, 
Stepanians makes the bold, yet surely interesting and not unjustified assumption that Moses 
would nowadays probably return with ten human rights from Mount Sinai instead of ten com-
mandments, see Stepanians, introduction, viii.
203 See, once more, above sec. III, 1., b), bb), (2), (c).
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idea of an individual self-worth and the idea that this individual agent should be 
free to decide certain matters for herself, more than leaving certain areas of con-
duct indifferently to her discretion, was born during the period of late scholas-
ticism.204 The idea is: One ought to have a permission, i. e. be free of imposed 
duties, whenever this value of individual autonomy outweighs all other relevant 
considerations. Exactly then does one also have a right. In the wake of intro-
ducing the idea of individual freedom as a good worthy of protection, the idea 
and the concept of ‘rights’ was born, because by itself the normative language 
hitherto, i. e. the language of duties, knew only one kind of normative definatory 
power within a certain normative system, namely that of the respective author-
ity which issued intersubjective rules. It did not allow for the above mentioned 
distinction between different, competing, potential competences. Consequently, 
for pure duty ethics permissions were merely a by-product of the authority’s 
lack of will to prescribe certain duties. Hence, the appreciation of individual 
freedom as a principle, as a good worthy of protection resulted in a structural 
counterweight to authoritative power, which was indeed ground-breaking for 
normative reasoning. Through the general intersubjective valuation of auto-
nomy the individual was no longer unilaterally dependent on the issuance of 
permissions from a superordinate authority, but was capacitated to claim them 
by virtue of its own free will,205 namely by demanding that one’s own ability to 
judge and decide outweighed or at least should outweigh other, intersubjective 
considerations. In other words, purely duty-based ethics could only either de-
mand obedience in the form of duties or abstain from such demands. Thus, their 
language was not fit to account for the value of autonomy in contrast to and in 
conflict with authoritative norm issuance.
Let me reframe this crucial point with reference to the fundamentals of deon-
tic logic as sketched earlier. We remember: In sec. II, 3., c) above we clarified the 
exclusive juxtaposition of duties and permissions within one normative system 
and the neutrality of permissions as structural elements of such systems. Gener-
ally, whether there is a duty or a permission depends on the respective authority. 
What does that tell us about the nature of permissions? Precisely, does it mean 
that any authoritative decision against regulating a certain conduct is also a de-
cision in favour of individual freedom? Not necessarily. Certainly, in every case 
the non-regulation of a conduct by the authority simultaneously means the emer-
gence of a permission. Yet, under certain conditions one could understand per-
missions simply as authoritative indifferences, i. e. as a label for morally or le-
gally neutral actions, which the authority is literally indifferent towards. Similar 
204 Gutmann, Iustitia Contrahentium, 22, with further references.
205 Cf. Feinberg, “Nature and Value of Rights,” 250. Here Feinberg emphasises the no-
tion of claiming a right as an activity and aims at distinguishing it from the mere possession of 
a ‘claim’. For an excellent, critical appraisal of Feinberg’s account of rights see Christopher 
Wellman, “Two Concepts,” 214–215, 223–225.
218 III. The Theory of Rights
to the distinction between permissions simpliciter and protected permissions or 
rights, the question of whether we understand permissions as ‘authoritative de-
cisions in favour of freedom’ or simply as ‘authoritative indifferences’ depends 
on whether the system in question regards individual freedom as an indepen-
dent principle/value. Hence, it depends on one’s foundational, substantive theo-
ry. In detail: Let us begin by imagining two normative systems, one system N1, 
which does not value individual freedom, and another system N2, which does. 
Accordingly, we can and ought to distinguish very carefully between implied 
preconceptions regarding the demands on the role of the respective authority.206 
In system N1 permissions are nothing but authoritative indifferences. Here the 
authority only becomes active if and to the extent that it issues normative con-
tent/duties. Everything else would be a mere waiver to take (authoritative) ac-
tion, which in turn would not require specific reasons.207 Consequently, with-
in the logic of this system N1, limits to the authority’s power are set only at its 
own discretion. More precisely, there is no need in N1 to justify rules except for 
making the claim that the authority itself is just. And that is the decisive differ-
ence with system N2. Here we need to understand permissions as authoritative 
decisions in favour of freedom. Accordingly, we find a basic evaluation of every 
conceivable conduct in N2 – either there is a predefined reason for an action, 
or there is a valued permission. An objection to this reasoning lies at hand: The 
idea that there should be an authoritative decision for any conceivable conduct 
seems to make impossible demands on a given authority. Much the same applies 
to an idea introduced earlier, namely that any option of conduct is always either 
legitimate (L) or illegitimate (IL) within a system. Both points at least seem to 
imply that an authority actually needs to make an evaluative judgement about 
any perceivable way its addressed agents might behave. Importantly, the fore-
going remarks do not imply that. Not each and every possible action needs to 
be consciously assessed or judged, not even in N2. Undoubtedly, a normative 
system that would have to provide a conclusive judgement about any possible 
action would put untenable requirements on both the authoritative norm issuer 
as well as the addressees. Some areas of human conduct can (and should for 
that matter) be left unregulated. And surely, any cogent normative meta-theory 
206 In doing so, we suppose, for now, that the authority is wielded by some person/agent. 
See already above sec. II, fn. 6.
207 Even though the objection lies at hand, this understanding of personal authority is not 
(necessarily) inconsistent with the thesis from above that persons/agents cannot avoid acting/
forming decisions if we suppose the general, latent capacity to do so. Supposedly, we do not 
have to assume this capacity in case the agent acts in the role of a normative authority, but it 
might be argued that in this specific, authoritative role it is possible to take action only par-
ticularly. Besides, even if the objection were justified, at best it could debilitate the claim that 
authorities can indeed not act, which would then only support our claim that pure duty ethics 
as in the case of system N1 from the example rely on implausible presuppositions in their foun-
dational theories.
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ought to offer an adequate explanation for this indifference on the part of the 
respective authority, for ‘normatively neutral’ behaviour. Correctly understood, 
we are able to do so within N2 and still maintain the idea of a general decision 
in favour of freedom. The peculiarity of N2 lies elsewhere than in its excessive 
regulation demands on the authority. Precisely, in N2 freedom merely exists as a 
kind of basic value,208 and therewith as a justification hurdle for the authority.209 
In other words, once we do regard individual freedom as a principle, one can-
not justify rules simply based on a claim of authority, but only on the claim that 
the reasons provided by this authority outweigh freedom, i. e. that these reasons 
are better reasons, which only in that case are able to justify constraints on free-
dom.210 Hence, by virtue of an even, balanced justification process we simply 
suppose authoritative decisions in favour of freedom in those cases in which the 
authority is in fact not interested in regulating human conduct or in which there 
are no reasons to restrain individual freedom. An example: Imagine N brushing 
her teeth at home. Further suppose that N has a legal permission to do so and 
that the law in question values N’s autonomy. Now, obviously it would be absurd 
to claim that the legislator made a concrete, let alone conscious, judgement to 
permit tooth brushing. In terms of deontic logic, it is permitted due to the leg-
islator’s not having prohibited or obliged people to brush their teeth. Beyond 
that, though, N has a right to do as she does not simply due to a lack of will to 
regulate tooth brushing, but rather due to the fact that there are no good reasons 
imaginable to do so, i. e. no reasons to outweigh N’s autonomy. Thus, N’s per-
mission is not the result of a conscious decision in favour of freedom, we may 
nevertheless suppose such a decision as the result of a hypothetical deliberation 
process. To conclude: Both N1 and N2 are at least theoretically possible as nor-
mative systems. Yet, similar to the argument against the cogency of substantive 
pure duty-ethics from above, the underlying substantive theory of N2 appears to 
be much more plausible than that of N1, as it alone is able to make sense of the 
stress ratio of authoritative power and the individual’s decision-making ability 
by installing the aforementioned justification hurdle. At any rate, only within N2 
we can make sense of ‘rights’ as clearly distinguishable from ‘duties’.
208 Note once more: not as some prevalent, or per se weightier reason. Cf. above sec. III, 
fn. 79.
209 Forst refers to much the same idea by asserting a basic ‘right to justification’ in nor-
mative discourse, cf. Rainer Forst, Das Recht auf Rechtfertigung (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 
2007). For an analogous argument employed as a critique of the respective shortcomings of 
Kelsen’s concept of rights see Hammer, “Begriff vom subjektiven Recht,” 188–190. Cf. above 
sec. III, fn. 110.
210 Importantly, the described presupposition of the value of individual freedom is inde-
pendent of the (substantive) issue, whether this value is recognised by the personal authority as 
a kind of rational, self-imposed restraint, or whether it is thought to deserve an a priori elevat-
ed role in normative reasoning as an intrinsic reason. In both cases rights would serve the func-
tion of an argumentative counterweight, a ‘justification hurdle’ for the respective authority.
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Hence, it is no surprise that, historically, the notion of ‘rights’ was born in 
order to fill the linguistic hole torn open by the valuation of individual auto-
nomy and therewith the creation of the argumentative counterweight just de-
scribed. Accordingly, the emergence of (a language of) rights in addition and in 
contrast to (one of) mere duties can be regarded as the birth or at least the up-
rising of a normative individualism forming the basis of liberalism.211 In terms 
of the process of the justification of rules within a community the individual 
was given a powerful tool, a weapon almost, to be used in order to defend one’s 
own concerns.212 Hence, in this best tradition of rights they stand to protect the 
dignity and self-worth of the capable agent in communal life, of the individual 
whose interests are no longer supposed to be the mere function of some collec-
tive interest, ultimately submitted to the will of some intersubjective norm is-
suer/authority.213 Rights, in this sense, exist and emerged in order to set limits 
to authoritative power.
Transferring these insights to our competing conceptual approaches, we may 
state: Liberties and powers deserve the proper label as ‘rights’ because it needs 
to be clarified that the position of the individual in the struggle for the correct 
rules to submit to is recognised and consequently strengthened. The exercise of 
individual competence is not simply something that occurs when there is a lack 
of other considerations made by the relevant authority or when there is a lack of 
duties; rather, the individual demand to exercise competence is given its own, 
proper normative weight. As Sumner fittingly put it, the language of rights was 
necessary in addition to that of duties, because “autonomy […] is sufficiently 
important to be safeguarded by a distinctive normative concept”214. In turn, do 
claim-rights and immunities also deserve this proper label? An interest theorist 
might claim: yes, because it needs to be clarified that the advantageous aspect 
of a duty is not a mere reflex of this duty, but that duties may be based on rea-
sons inherent in, or appendant to certain things or persons. But what does this 
intended distinction between appendant and non-appendant reasons – or be-
tween directional and non-directional duties respectively – actually argue out in 
terms of necessary, meta-theoretical structures? That is, is any problem or stress 
ratio which substantive normative theories have to deal with captured by this 
conceptual dividing line? Ultimately, the answer is no. Once more: A norma-
tive theorist would seriously have to consider the difference between appendant 
211 Richard Flathman, The practice of rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1977), 33–34; Coing, “Geschichte des Begriff,” 47. Cf. also Duncan Ivison, Rights (Stocks-
field: Acumen, 2008), 5.
212 In other words, rights are a means of an ‘individualistic critique’ of the law, cf. Hart, 
LR, 200–201.
213 Gutmann, “Paternalismus und Konsequentialismus,” 59–60. For a similar argument 
with respect to a submission under the aim of maximising general utility cf. David Lyons, 
“Utility as a Possible Ground of Rights,” Noûs 14 (March 1980): 20–22.
214 Sumner, MF, 98.
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and non-appendant values only in case the former were regarded as weightier, 
prior reasons. Then the theorist would have to decide which reasons belong to 
which categories. This case is excluded already, though, because such a norma-
tively charged IT concept faces the serious danger of an inflation of rights (see 
above). If, however, the distinction between appendant and non-appendant is 
not by weight but simply by type, a substantive normative theory can imple-
ment it, but it certainly does not have to, because practically, i. e. with regard to 
the outcome of a case, it would not make any difference. In short, the distinction 
between rights and non-rights that IT offers could only be rendered useful for 
normative reasoning if rights had an elevated status in the realm of normativity. 
As this cannot be the case with a normatively neutral concept of rights, which 
we should aim at for reasons provided earlier, IT ultimately fails with respect to 
meta-theoretical accuracy.
(d) Conclusion
What exactly counts in favour of including all different kinds of entitlements 
into a concept of rights as IT does? In terms of its utility for an ensuing nor-
mative debate, not much. To be clear: With respective terminological adjust-
ments and specifications it is not impossible to describe the necessary conflict 
of potential competences in a normative system by employing an interest theo-
ry of rights. However, the crucial stress ratio between individual and communi-
ty regarding competing decision-making abilities, which was the reason for a 
concept of rights to emerge in the first place, is certainly not predetermined or 
traced by IT, which by contrast CT achieves with admirable clarity. Thus, CT is 
clearly preferable in this respect.
dd) Conceptual Evaluation or the Making of a Decision
As a preliminary conclusion about the dispute between IT and CT we can say 
that neither of the two offers the best concept in the sense of the necessarily 
correct result to question (1). Due to the fact that any concept of rights exists 
in a stress ratio between different, competing, regularly adverse purposes, we 
should not be surprised that both IT and CT show both strengths and weakness-
es. As Christopher Wellman aptly puts it: “Of course, there are advantages and 
disadvantages to concentrating on each of the lines of demarcation with its cor-
responding theory of rights […], so neither will nor interest theorists can accuse 
the other of making either a logical or conceptual mistake. And if this is right, 
then we are not in a position to suggest that [one] must opt for one theory over 
another.”215 Neither concept is able to meet all of the requirements to a full ex-
215 Christopher Wellman, “Two Concepts,” 225.
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tent. Yet, the fact that “there is no right or wrong answer”216 to the question re-
garding a concept of rights should not come as a surprise. After all, as repeat-
edly pointed out so far, committing to a certain concept of rights is an evaluative 
matter217, i. e. we cannot determine a concept of rights in terms of right and 
wrong, but only with respect to better or worse reasons and arguments, which in 
turn makes it something which one could never prove to be correct in the sense 
of true or false. The establishment of such a concept is simply a matter of de-
cision, of (necessary) commitment to one side due to arguments, which can be 
exchanged and discussed and eventually need to be prioritised.218 With regard 
to a concept of rights, this necessary commitment largely amounts to a commit-
ment to either theoretical accuracy or practical/linguistic adequacy.219
Thus, it comes only in the form of a reasoned opinion, that surely can be dis-
puted, when I conclude that one ought to judge theoretical accuracy over mere 
linguistic or practical adequacy and hence decide for CT and against IT.220 Ul-
timately, the reason for this endorsement of CT is that otherwise legal theory 
would, virtually without objection, consent to an almost sadly ambitionless ex-
istence, namely to the extent that its only proclaimed aim would be to obtain 
just as much consistency as possible out of an otherwise ambiguous language 
use in order for speakers to adjust as little as possible.221 Without a doubt, CT 
is much more demanding in this respect. It demands to eliminate central cases 
of application of the term ‘rights’ from actual language use in order to improve 
the theoretical accuracy of political debate, which surely is a lot to ask. The 
not entirely unreasonable worry, whether in practice it is even imaginable that 
practical usage of a term like ‘rights’ would or could ever actually adjust to the 
predicaments of an academic theory (however cogent that theory may be), is in-
separably connected to CT’s demands on linguistic practice. Accordingly, many 
interest theorists will find these demands “too violent”222. Yet, I contend that 
at least the claim that as much should happen, that linguistic practice ought to 
216 Ibid, 224.
217 See above methodological question (1.2) as laid out in sec. I, 1., a), bb).
218 Christopher Wellman, “Two Concepts,” 223: “[one] faces a choice between the two 
competing concepts”.
219 Cf. ibid, 224, at fn. 25.
220 Notably, it is not until this point that we actually have to decide between the two con-
cepts.
221 For a dissenting opinion on this matter, i. e. regarding a possible priority of ‘theoretical 
adequacy’ over ‘extensional (practical) adequacy’, see Rainbolt, Concept of Rights, 112. Rain-
bolt advocates a general priority of a concept’s practical adequacy over its (meta-) theoretical 
benefits, yet he gives no meaningful arguments why exactly the kind of concept which encom-
passes more practical manifestations of a term is supposed to be better than others. That he 
simply takes for granted. Thereby his blunt remark “wishes do not make reality” (ibid) reflects 
exactly the kind of ‘ambitionlessness’, wide-spread in legal theory, that I wish to impugn in 
this context. Cf. also id, “Two Interpretations of Feinberg’s Theory of Rights,” Legal Theory 
11 (2015): 229–230.
222 MacCormick, “Rights in Legislation,” 196. Cf. also id, “Wrongs and Duties,” 140.
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defer to theoretical cogency, needs to be raised and be entailed by any serious at-
tempt to determine a concept of rights, unless this attempt wants to render itself 
useless in the sense of being obsolete as a theory at least indirectly concerned 
with questions of normativity. Certainly, a theory that judges practical aspects 
over theoretical ones cannot purport to aim at making a meaningful contribution 
to substantive theory design or to the proper assessment of practical normative 
questions. A CT concept is able to do so by terminologically framing the nec-
essary stress ratio between individual autonomy and intersubjective authority. 
The rights-concept of IT is not able to do so insofar as it more or less restricts 
itself to a mere analysis of language and consequently a clarification of existent 
linguistic practice. Thus, in a way CT’s ambition that legal theory should have 
an impact on everyday language, its demandingness, which is often enough an 
object of criticism,223 should in fact be regarded as its decisive advantage in 
comparison to an interest theory that is convincing as a descriptive account of 
rights, but ultimately inadequate and ineligible as a conceptual one.224
223 See above sec. III, fn. 222; Rainbolt, Concept of Rights, 112. Cf. also the foregoing re-
marks on rights of the incompetent, unwaivable rights, etc.
224 Once more: This claim is made not in denial of but rather in full concession to the ap-
parent disadvantages CT partly has in comparison to IT.

IV. Conclusion and Prospects
1. Summary: Line of Thought and Central Results
The central epistemological interest of this thesis was to determine the, or at 
least an adequate, concept of rights. The main result of the thesis thus comes 
more in the form of a strong suggestion rather than as an analytical truth, namely 
that rights in my view should be understood as valued or protected permis-
sions, i. e. according to a (modest) version of Choice Theory. Hence, we ought 
to understand rights as elements of a normative system that empower individ-
ual agents by providing them with areas of unregulated discretion, and, more 
generally, that implement a justification prerequisite on authoritative power for 
any restraint on individual freedom. Although the road to this final result of-
fered quite a number of theoretical hurdles and possible detours, I followed 
only those which seemed either inevitable or at least helpful in order to obtain a 
clearer understanding of the concept of rights.
Before engaging in a discussion about the proper concept of rights, we need-
ed to clarify what exactly is meant by a ‘concept’ of rights, what separates 
such a notion from other theoretical phenomena. In this respect, we found that 
the linguistic property of a concept is that it is evaluative in the sense that one 
needs reasons to commit oneself to one concept leaving aside other possible 
ones, which essentially separates a concept from the purely descriptive scope 
of a term. This scope, by contrast, is acquired by means of a pure analysis of 
factual language use. Hence, a concept is not purely descriptive or analytical, 
but in parts always evaluative. At the same time, it does not necessarily have to 
imply practical, substantive implications for normative practice. Methodologi-
cally, our approach thus can be counted among those usually regarded as works 
of ‘descriptive jurisprudence’, whereas it does not deny the essential normative 
nature of concepts such as right, duty, law, etc. That is, it does not deny the fact 
that law can only be fully grasped as an ‘interpretative practice’.
Subsequently, before we were able to describe and discuss different concepts 
of rights, we needed to clarify the scope of rights. The somewhat easier part was 
identifying the features of the scope, i. e. the necessary features of any concept 
of rights, which we found to be normativity, advantageousness, and append-
ance. The considerably harder part was finding out what exactly that means, i. e. 
to work out the possible manifestations of these minimal conditions for being a 
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right, the actual normative phenomena that meet the requirements of the scope. 
In order to do so, Hohfeld’s basic analytical scheme of fundamental legal en-
titlements was supposed to prove helpful. Yet, in order to correctly assess his 
scheme in the first place, we needed to clarify quite a few more fundamental 
notions beforehand: the concept of actions, the structure of the deontic modali-
ties, as well as the nature and significance of reasons, i. e. of norms, principles, 
and prescriptions.
Unquestionably, there is a strong link between the notion of rights and that 
of (human) actions. To have a right usually means either to have a right to do 
something or at least to have a right that someone else does or does not do 
something. Thus, in order to truly understand rights, we first needed a rough 
idea of what an action (and a respective omission) actually is. To begin with, 
we clarified that, to a certain degree, freedom in the sense of an individual’s 
decision-making ability is a necessary, internal requirement of our normative 
practice. Accordingly, we affirmed and defended the principle of alternative 
possibilities, the idea that to perform an action essentially means to make a 
practical decision between different options. Thereby a practical decision was 
introduced as the element of an action which we suppose – which we have to 
suppose, in fact – in order to ascribe responsibility. Clearly, the notion of an ac-
tion alone is not what determines a right, though. The notion of rights, as well 
as the Hohfeldian notion of entitlements, is inseparably connected to the norma-
tive demands associated with these actions, to action evaluations. Essentially, 
these demands come in the form of the deontic modalities, i. e. in the form of 
permission, obligation and prohibition. An important result of this work is that, 
for the most part, a right is (or at least should be understood as) a specific kind 
of permission. Therefore, the nature of permissions as permitted decisions, as 
normative exemptions, and therewith as alternatively allowed options of con-
duct, needed to be clarified by making a detour into the realm of deontic logic 
and the logical structure of the deontic modalities, as it is commonly perceived. 
This detour was especially important in order to clarify, or rather to repudiate, 
the often alleged distinction between unilateral and bilateral liberties, which 
does nothing but obfuscate the true nature of permissions as spheres of freedom, 
of unguided individual decision-making. As the result of a fine-grained analysis 
of the standard model for the deontic modalities, a new system of deontic logic 
had to be sketched. It is based on the insight that the notions of obligation, pro-
hibition and permission cannot adequately be understood without reference to 
decisions, i. e. to multiple, alternative options.
Still, we were not fully equipped for a proper assessment of the theory of 
rights, because linguistic practice teaches us that rights are not always but rather 
only usually associated with actions. We are also used to thinking of more ab-
stract rights such as one’s ‘right to life’, from which practical rights might be 
derived, but which do not directly refer to any actions. In order to understand 
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this difference between practical and abstract rights or between practical and 
abstract reasons, we needed to examine the difference between norms and valu-
es. A suitable way to do so was to assess and in part revaluate theories con-
cerned with principles as an alleged in-between phenomenon, theories such as 
those offered by Dworkin and Alexy. Even though a full and sufficient analysis 
of these theories was not possible and not intended either, presumably we were 
at least able to demonstrate the structural difference between practical and ab-
stract reasons, as well as that between general norms and concrete prescriptions, 
by reference to the notions of relationing and concretisation. An (at least rough) 
understanding of these differences would prove to be inevitable for a proper un-
derstanding of how one’s abstract ‘right to bodily integrity’ could actually be-
come someone’s duty not to harm the respective right-holder (at least not with-
out her consent). The most central insight from this section was that practical 
reasons, i. e. norms and prescriptions, show a relational structure, i. e. an im-
plied precedence of one abstract reason over others. In other words, in order to 
produce norms from a set of principles one has to relate these abstract reasons, 
whereas one applies norms, and thus receives prescriptions, by concretising 
them in the light of a specific case. Importantly, the relational form of practical 
reasons is mirrored by the logical structure of actions as practical decisions. In 
this respect, it appears appropriate to explicitly point out an aspect of this in-
vestigation which is believed to be a particular strength. Namely, all the points 
made thus far – the proposed concept of actions, the newly developed scheme 
of deontic modalities, including a multidimensional structure of the deontic mo-
dalities, as well as the proposed relational structure of norms and practical rea-
sons – are not independent arguments, which could be debunked separately. As 
parts of a wide-angled, systematic endeavour, which this work aspires to be, in 
terms of argumentative force, they rather support each other mutually.1
Finally, with the notion of a ‘normative system’ we introduced a new theo-
retical concept in this work, which is not directly linked to the notion of rights 
as such, but whose primary purpose was to limit the theoretical scope of the en-
terprise as a whole. By restricting ourselves to the investigation of rights only 
in specific, already determined normative contexts, i. e. for the most part within 
one specific normative system, we consciously avoided problems regarding the 
general justification and justifiability of these rights, e. g. questions regarding 
the possible existence of ‘natural rights’, as well as problems regarding con-
flicting evaluations of the same action. Thereby the central feature of normative 
systems, namely that any one action can only be assigned one deontic demand, 
was a most useful presupposition for our consequent investigation, as it allowed 
1 On the downside, one might say they stand and fall together. Thus, presumably, if one 
feels unconvinced by only one of the points made, he or she may either question the entire 
endeavour, or let him- or herself be convinced by the (assumed) cogency of the other parts. 
I readily leave this decision to the benevolence of the reader.
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us to reduce the complexity of actual normative practice to a minimum for the 
purpose of this concrete inquiry, whilst at the same not losing all explanatory 
relevance, as we at least sketched the necessary and vast multiplicity of norma-
tive systems in practice.2
Based on these more general theoretical insights we were thus able to ad-
equately carve out possible manifestations of the scope of rights, originating 
from, though not simply adopting the logic of Hohfeld’s fundamental legal re-
lations. We acknowledged Hohfeld’s perspicacity in linking the notion of rights 
to bilateral relationships, in distinguishing two levels of normative positions, 
Hohfeld’s first- and second-order relations, and for the most part also in linking 
the notion of advantageousness to the idea of someone else’s having a respec-
tive duty. Yet, we were able to point out flaws in Hohfeld’s analytical frame-
work as well, especially in his account of liberties and their supposedly cor-
relative ‘no-rights’. Upon closer inspection, both of them are reductive to an 
extent that they no longer have any meaningful explanatory relevance. Also, 
even though Hohfeld, not entirely unjustly, regarded only his claim-rights as 
‘rights in a stricter sense’, he also wrongly regarded his other entitlements as 
somewhat advantageous for their holders. If he would have taken the notion of 
advantageousness, which we equated with the idea of the appendance of a rea-
son, more seriously, he would have had to considerably strengthen these posi-
tions – precisely to the extent that all of these either are or at least imply specific 
claim-rights. This might not have been Hohfeld’s aim in the first place, but only 
thus they would meet the requirements of the scope; only thus we could regard 
a certain position as a potential right. Hence, resembling the four Hohfeldian 
entitlements, we were able to work out four distinguishable manifestations of 
the scope of rights, four fundamental positions we could possibly refer to as 
rights: claim-rights, liberties, immunities, and powers. Thereby we distinguish-
ed passive entitlements, i. e. first-order claim-rights and second-order immuni-
ties, which are both defined solely by the duties of other agents, and active en-
titlements, i. e. first-order liberties and second-order powers, which are held by 
virtue of being permitted to perform the action in question, and this very per-
mission being the reason for others to be under correlative respect duties. As 
the decisive criterion to differentiate between first- and second-order entitle-
ments, we identified the question of whether an entitlement refers to the content 
of another, subordinate, intersubjective normative system. Hence, most notably, 
we introduced an original conception of normative powers, which regards them 
as a specific kind of protected permission that is entailed by a normatively con-
2 Apart from their reductive role in terms of theoretical complexity in this context, 
I strongly believe the notions of normative systems and their necessary multiplicity to be ca-
pable of growing into a useful tool in the task of properly mapping normativity as a whole in 
the future.
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veyed control over certain intersubjective reasons from a superordinate level of 
justification.
In the following, we specifically clarified once more that the entirety of the 
aforementioned four entitlements marks the outer limit of any cogent concept of 
rights, not its necessary content, though. Thus, consequently we were in need of 
a conceptual evaluation of these entitlements, i. e. an answer to the question of 
which of them – alone or in combination – would serve as a good, sensible, use-
ful concept of rights. In this respect, we found that its practical adequacy, i. e. 
the ability to consistently account for most practical instances of usage of the 
term, very much counts in favour of Interest Theory, whose concept comprises 
all four entitlements. However, this advantage is accompanied, and in a way 
payed dearly for, by a meta-theoretical vagueness and inaccuracy of Interest 
Theory. What Choice Theory, on the other hand, lacks in practical adequacy, it 
more than enough makes up for in meta-theoretical accuracy. That is, in contrast 
to Interest Theory it offers an account of rights which allows for a much clearer 
theoretical distinction between rights and duties. Especially, Choice Theory’s 
concept of rights terminologically reframes the stress ratio in the justification of 
moral and legal rules between the authority’s claim to make decisions and thus 
impose binding duties and the individual’s aspiration to make use of his or her 
own decision-making ability. Finally, favouring the theoretical merits of a con-
cept of rights over mere practical linguistic amenities, a modest, normatively 
neutral Choice Theory, that regards only normatively protected decisions as 
rights, ultimately appeared to be the preferable option.
2. A Few Concluding Remarks
At the bottom line, what are all these insights worth for (future) legal theory? 
To be honest – and to the author’s great distress at times during the writing of 
this thesis – the answer is: not nothing, but, if anything, very little. I intend to 
say ‘precious little’, though. As already mentioned at the beginning, what is 
presented here is a theory solely concerned with the linguistic concept of rights. 
As much implies that with regard to substantive normative philosophy it is a 
meta-theory, aiming at nothing but conceptual clarity by unification and sim-
plification.3 As such it does not directly contribute anything to the solution of 
ordinary practical moral problems or legal disputes. Presented were the out-
lines of a theory that has no direct practical implications, whatsoever. Howev-
er, properly applied this theory is able to widen our understanding of rights and 
rights talk. In addition, by applying it one should be able to work out one’s sub-
stantive theory more accurately and clearly, which implies the ability to draw a 
3 Cf. Cruft, “Beyond Interest and Will Theory,” 348.
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reasonably clear line between normatively neutral conceptual inquiries on the 
one hand, and justificatory thinking and arguing in legal philosophy in a strict-
er sense, i. e. theories of the good and of right and wrong, on the other. The 
concept of rights, as presented here, does set the boundaries on and the mode 
of discussion for proper substantive questions. It should enable the normative 
philosopher to design his or her theory a bit more accurately, and distinguish it 
more clearly from competing approaches. As indicated earlier, employing a CT 
concept such as ours as a basis for a substantive theory design, the question any 
theorist needs to ask herself is not ‘what kind of rights, if any, does my theo-
ry contain?’ but rather ‘how important are rights (to us)?’ This question is then 
tantamount to asking, ‘exactly how important is individual freedom (to us)?’ On 
the other side stands the equally important question ‘how important are com-
mon principles and norms to us and what exactly should they contain or pro-
tect?’ This interplay, this contrast of individual competence and authoritatively 
predefined content is what every substantive theory needs to be concerned with, 
and the possible answers may indeed vary greatly on the basis of our concept of 
rights.4 Accordingly, the author is acutely aware it is not conceptual questions 
that matter in solving practical social conflicts. Hence, what is and what will al-
ways be needed more urgently is a cogent justificatory theory of what should be 
protected by the law, i. e. a general theory of justice.
Even though our concept of rights does not contribute to such a theory in any 
way other than rendering its design more accurate, I still assume that the con-
cept proposed here advocates, surprisingly perhaps, a philosophy of freedom in 
a way. As scrutinised earlier, it does not promote a justificatory priority of free-
dom. Yet, its very existence necessarily allows for individual freedom to exist 
alongside authoritative power. Hence, it is certainly not part of a philosophy 
of freedom in any stronger sense, i. e. not an advocate for a liberal normative 
theory favouring the right over the good, a philosophy which decides ‘in case of 
doubt in favour of freedom’, as Kant, Rawls, and others propose. Yet, our con-
cept of rights, and in fact this whole thesis, is animated with the insight that the 
very idea of rights – and therewith also any language of rights and any substan-
tive approach incidentally implying the notion of rights – directly implies the 
idea of a value of individual decisions between alternate options of conduct, of 
individual normative definatory power, and therewith of individual responsibil-
ity. The notion of rights thus is (or at least should be) but the mode to claim and 
consequently to exercise this subjective ability and to be respected in doing so 
by other agents in an intersubjective context. It seems almost impossible to find 
more precise words in order to describe this central idea than those from this 
4 Possibly even to a degree where rights are disregarded entirely. As much would be the 
backlash of a substantive theory that entirely rejects the worth of individual freedom for social 
life, which – so much may be said despite the aim of being normatively neutral – will be hard 
to substantiate.
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(rather famous) quote from Hannah Arendt, which in just a few words distils 
the central thoughts of my thesis, and which in turn makes a fitting quote with 
which to close this book:
Kein Mensch hat […] das Recht zu gehorchen.5
Admittedly, the statement was made in a rather different context and with 
another motivation and theoretical interest regarding the scientific assessment 
of the phenomenon of ‘rights’. Arendt’s main purpose at the time was to de-
scribe and defend the (undoubtedly substantive) rights theory of Kant in the 
context of her assessment of Adolf Eichmann’s trial in Jerusalem, who – in a 
grotesque attempt to defend himself and justify his actions as a high-ranking 
Nazi-official – explicitly appealed to the Kantian categorical imperative. Thus, 
her main intention was to deny Eichmann – and anyone for that matter – the 
use of Kant’s concept of duty in order to justify blind obedience to authorita-
tive rules and commands. Hence, her intention was certainly more to defend the 
consistency of Kantian moral philosophy against ignorant misuse than to offer 
an account of the nature or an analytical concept of rights. Still, reading and in-
terpreting the quote more freely, Arendt apparently, even though maybe unwill-
ingly, also got right to the heart of a central aspect about the concept of rights 
as such, probably the central aspect of this thesis: the apparent dichotomy of in-
dividual freedom as well as individual responsibility in the form of rights on the 
one hand, and externally dictated normative requirements in the form of duties 
on the other – the inevitable contrast of individual competence and authorita-
tively imposed content.
5 In English: No one has the right to obey. Original quote by Hannah Arendt, inter-




Abstract Reason = normative → content of a → principle/value.
Action/Action as Such = at least one → practical decision plus at least one imputable prac-
tical effect, or a series/chain of such effects.
Appendance = direct association of a →  reason with an entity/subject, which is based 
either on positive ascription to that entity as an act of will, or is due to the intrinsic 
nature of the reason associated with the entity. A. as a concept remains agnostic in 
this respect.
Authority = generic term for the justification of a → normative system’s → content due to 
either the persistence/inaccessibility of its content, an act of superordinate → compe-
tence, or a combination of both.
Coherence = specific manifestation of normative → consistency; describes the state of a 
multitude of → normative systems, in which two or more of them produce compet-
ing → normative demands regarding the same → action, whereas they are reconciled 
through a superordinate → permission.
Compatibility = specific manifestation of normative → consistency; describes the relation 
of two or more distinct → prescriptions, imposed by distinct → normative systems; they 
are compatible if it is possible for them to be jointly valid within the same normative 
community, which is the case if they are reconciled through a superordinate system’s 
→ permission.
Competence = a normative → definatory power with regard to a certain normative matter; 
comes in the deontic form of a → permission.
Concept = the evaluated → scope of a term, whereby evaluation happens with the aid of 
conceptual → reasons.
Conclusive Reason = normative content of → prescriptions, i. e. insofar as the prescription 
entails content, which is the case only with specific → duties.
Consistency = see → homogeneity, → satisfiability, → compatibility, → coherence.
Content = the → reasons, both abstract and practical, provided by a → normative system.
Definatory Power = ability to define or control normative → content; necessarily accom-
panied by every → permission.
Dilemma/True Dilemma = a practical decision situation, in which none of the available 
→ options of conduct are legitimate; in a way, a specific prescription which cannot be 
complied with and which therefore, in practice, needs to be resolved for one of the 
other three.
Duty (or Duty Simpliciter) = predefined → normative demand; generic term for → obliga-
tion (O) and → prohibition (F).
Entitlement = manifestation of the → scope of rights, i. e. not a normative → concept but 
a technical term employed as a generic term for different manifestations of the scope 
of rights.
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Homogeneity = specific manifestation of normative → consistency; core trait of any → nor-
mative system. Describes the idea that every specific → action is matched with only 
one specific → normative demand.
Interest = an aspect of an entity’s well-being as interpreted from an intersubjective per-
spective, i. e. the entity’s well-understood interest/intended advantage.
Legitimacy = conformity of an → option of conduct with the → content of a → normative 
system; as such, l. is a binary concept, i. e. an option of conduct can only be legitimate 
(L), or illegitimate (IL).
Norm = general but, due to its relational form, directly applicable → practical reason.
Normative Demand = generic term for multidimensional deontic modalities (O), (F), or 
(P), i. e. labels for → actions as such.
Normative Exemption = lack of normative → content with regard to a certain normative 
matter, which entails a → permission and therewith individual → definatory power with 
regard to that matter.
Normative Status = generic term for unidimensional deontic modalities (L) or (IL), i. e. 
labels for solitary options of conduct.
Normative System = the → homogeneous, inductive-deductive process of application of a 
multitude of → reasons to a set of addressed agents’ specific → actions; exists by virtue 
of an → authority.
Obligation = positive → normative demand (O) to perform a certain → action X.
Option of Conduct = factual or hypothetical behaviour of an agent, irrespective of pos-
sible alternatives; as such often mistaken for an → action.
Permission = normative demand (P), which entails a → competence for the addressed 
agent.
Practical Decision = essential feature of any → action; leverage point for the ascription 
of responsibility.
Practical Reason = normative content of → prescriptions and → norms; applicable due to 
its relational form.
Prescription = the concrete → normative demand for a specific → action; cf. also → con-
clusive reason.
Principle = an abstract, non-applicable reason; see also → value.
Prohibition = negative → normative demand (F) not to perform a certain → action X.
Reasons = see → practical reasons, → abstract reasons; → conclusive reasons represent a 
specific subform of the former category.
Rule = see → norm.
Satisfiability = specific manifestation of normative → consistency. Two or more distinct 
→ prescriptions, imposed by distinct → normative systems, are satisfiable in case it is 
possible to comply with all of them at once, which goes for → permissions in com-
bination with → duties, but not for → obligations in combination with → prohibitions.
Scope = describes the necessary, commonly agreeable features of a term; is won purely 
by means of analysis of factual usage. Manifestations of the s. are such practical phe-
nomena that meet all the requirements.
Value = see → principle.
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Addendum: Glossary of Hohfeldian Incidents (in systematic order)
Traditional, reductive reading
Hohfeldian Duty = a → duty, which exists towards another entity, the holder of a → claim-
right, due to the → appendance of the → reason underlying the duty with the claim-
right-holder.
Claim-right = describes the fact that the reason behind a → duty as a predefined → norma-
tive demand is → appendant to the claim-right-holder.
Hohfeldian Liberty = a plain or ‘naked’ → permission (P) to perform an action X.
No-right = describes the fact that a person A has a → liberty, which entails that A is not 
under a → duty towards anyone, which in turn excludes the possibility that someone 
has a claim-right towards A.
Hohfeldian Power = the ability to change certain → normative demands of oneself and 
others by means of performing a certain → action, which makes H. p. normative in ef-
fect, but not in provenance.
Hohfeldian Liability = describes the position affected by the exercise of a → Hohfeldian 
power.
Hohfeldian Disability = describes the lack of a → Hohfeldian power.
Hohfeldian Immunity = describes the position correlative to a → disability, i. e. of a posi-
tion that cannot be altered by the disability-holder.
Modified entitlements in order for positions to qualify 
as manifestations of the scope of rights
Liberty = a protected/valued → permission, i. e. a permission in a → normative system that 
generally contains the → principle of ‘individual freedom/autonomy’.
Respect Duty = a → Hohfeldian duty towards liberty-holder A which is based on respect 
for the exercise of individual autonomy by A.
Power = personal → authority, i. e. a → permission to exert → definatory power over some 
subordinate, intersubjective → content, which is addressed at other agents.
Liability = specific → respect duty to comply with the results of someone else’ execution 
of a → power.
Disability = specific superordinate → duty, i. e. a lack of → definatory power with regard to 
some subordinate, intersubjective content.
Immunity = describes the fact that some other agent is under a → disability. As such ad-
vantageous for i.-holder A, either in case A has a respective → power, or in case A al-
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